The independence of prosecutors is a crucial component in the fight against corruption. Accordingly, a robust rule of law system and the application of anti-corruption laws require that prosecutors be free from any undue external pressure. Independence here means it should not be subordinated to the executive or any other state bodies. To avoid undue instructions, it is essential to develop a catalogue of such guarantees of non-interference in the prosecutor’s powers in order to ensure that their activities in trial procedures are free from external pressure. Such guarantees should cover appointments, discipline, career, removal from office and specific rules of management of cases and decision-making process. This must be complemented by an adequate remuneration, budgetary, financial, internal and external independence. In Cameroon, the hierarchical subordination system of the Prosecution Service exists, with the Minister of Justice playing a crucial role in its functioning. This paper holds that the way it is practiced hinders the Legal Department from effectively combatting corruption, because prosecution may only be engaged in certain cases after instructions have been received. This system, to an extent, justifies the alarming rate of active corruption cases which are committed with impunity, even to the knowledge of the Prosecution. This research, which investigated the institution of an independent prosecution service in Cameroon as an effective anti-corruption mechanism, recommends the abolition of the principle of hierarchical subordination, or that it should be regulated and instructions should be limited only to the general application of the criminal policy. To conduct this research, a qualitative research methodology was adopted and a doctrinal method used. We essentially relied on desk research wherein we examined the primary and secondary data on the Prosecution Service.