The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established to strengthen continental judicial protection of human rights. However, access to its jurisdiction remains partly dependent on State consent. This paper examines whether the conditional nature of individual standing under Articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the Court Protocol affects the distribution of procedural authority which is between States, rights-holders and the Court. And what this reveals about the Court’s democratic legitimacy twenty years after its establishment. The study employs doctrinal legal analysis, treaty interpretation, examination of the Court’s jurisprudence and institutional analysis. Although it had limited comparative reference where relevant. Reading the Court’s rules of access through the lens of coloniality and democratic legitimacy. The focus is on the connection between the substantive rights and the ability to bring a case before the Court at the continental level. The study shows that the Protocol does acknowledge that individuals are subjects of rights, but denies them the same and autonomous path to the Court in countries that do not accept or have withdrawn their declarations of Article 34(6). Although indirect access through the African Commission provides an alternative route, but referral remains institutionally controlled. It does not place the individual in the same procedural position as a direct applicant. The study therefore identifies a persistent State-centred distribution of procedural authority that can weaken the participatory dimension of the Court’s legitimacy. It recommends stronger Commission referrals, greater acceptance of direct jurisdiction, safeguards for proceedings affected by withdrawal, and clearer limits around the use of State consent as a condition of individual access.