The ethical considerability of nonhuman animals remains a central debate in moral philosophy, often constrained by anthropocentric frameworks that prioritize human interests and rationality. Traditional ethical theories, particularly Kantian deontology and classical utilitarianism, have historically relegated animals to mere instrumental value, denying them intrinsic worth. This paper addresses a critical gap in value theory—the absence of a rigorous philosophical foundation for recognizing nonhuman animals as moral subjects in their own right. Employing the conceptual analysis method, this study critically examines the distinction between intrinsic/inherent and extrinsic value, exploring how a value-theoretic approach can redefine our ethical obligations toward animals. Drawing on the works of Tom Regan, Peter Singer, and Paul Taylor, the paper challenges speciesist assumptions and advocates for an ethical model that extends moral status beyond human boundaries. Through insights from environmental ethics, virtue ethics, and contemporary debates on sentience, this study highlights the philosophical and practical implications of acknowledging nonhuman animals as ends in themselves. The paper concludes that embracing a non-anthropocentric perspective in moral philosophy is essential for fostering a more inclusive and just ethical order.