

Terrorism and Global Security: A Comparative Analysis of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS)

Elemanya A. Vincent Ph.D.^{1*}

¹Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Rumuolumeni-Port Harcourt, Nigeria

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*Corresponding author: Elemanya A. Vincent Ph.D

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Rumuolumeni-Port Harcourt, Nigeria

Abstract

The transformation of terrorism from Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State (IS) has created new security challenges. This article examines the threats posed by these two groups by discussing their ideologies, structures and capabilities. Unlike local terrorist groups like the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda pose a global threat. The work looked at the origin of Al-Qaeda which cannot be separated from the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the objective of Al-Qaeda which main purpose is unifying and leading the jihad movement and providing its purpose and direction. The organization of Al-Qaeda was also discuss in this work, which is divided into four levels, which include, core Al-Qaeda, affiliated groups, allied groups and motivated persons and network. This work also assessed the impact of Al-Qaeda in global security, where some scholars argued that the group is not viable enough to pose global threat while others argued against it. On the other hand this work examined the origin of IS which started as a result of U.S military intervention in Iraq in 2003. It also examines resource base of IS and its objectives which is the destruction of the asymmetry status- quo existing for a long between Muslim countries and the Western allies. The impact and threat assessment of Al-Qaeda and IS on global security which we found out is that IS initially was fighting the near enemy in Iraqi and Syrian regimes, but latter changed its strategy by equally focusing on the “far enemy” as well, and manifested in its high profile attacks in Europe and other places beyond the Middle East. Lastly the researcher look at the differences between Al-Qaeda and IS in terms of their structure, brutality, popularity, conceptual difference etc. At the end, this paper recommends that a comprehensive global strategy is required to eradicate this growing menace of organized terrorism.

Keywords: Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State, Global threat, Terrorism.

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INTRODUCTION

The War on Terror has significantly changed the security environment, having series of alliances with the emergence of new terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS). Terrorist groups can be divided into three level based depending on their capability and approach: First-level terrorist organizations have activities restricted within a state, however, their actions may have impact at the international level. These groups can enhance their activities in other parts of the world if allowed to grow unchecked. The Afghan Taliban may be group under this since they do not have a global agenda and their focus has been on local and national political dynamics in Afghanistan.

The second category of terrorist organization are those that operates at the regional level and its subversive actions cross at least one international

boundary, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan i TTP) as it operates in collaboration with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The Afghan Taliban is different from TTP in many ways. The TTP have faith in overall jihad (holy war) and team up with transnational terrorist group, while the Afghan Taliban work all the more freely and advance their character of nationality. The third category of terrorist organisations are those which can work at the global level and their desires can be transnational and even worldwide. The IS and the Al-Qaeda fall into this classification having a worldwide jihad (holy war) plan.

The post September 11 2011 moves in affiliations of different various terrorists from one group to another; decentralization of the way of Al-Qaeda receives command and instruction under Ayman al-

Zawahiri; break out of ISIS from Al-Qaeda and its rise as the Islamic State; and Pakistan's task Zarb-e-Azb against terrorist in North Waziristan, are a developments that require analysis to comprehend the degree of the threat Al-Qaeda and the IS pose.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

To establish the difference between Al-Qaeda and Islamic state (IS) in terms of their origins, objectives, structure, threats assessment and their impact on global security.

METHODOLOGY

The method adopted in the course of this research is content analysis using mainly secondary data. The secondary data include existing literature on the topic such as books, journals, conference publications and newspapers and other related documents.

THEORETICAL framework

To understand this study, we have to revisit the Structural functionalism theory, which has existed for a long time in social science and the biological sciences. As one of the co-founders of functionalism, Emile Durkheim (1933) accepts that society is made out of interrelated frameworks and systems. Additionally, functionalism Accept assumes and considers equilibrium to be one of the important tenants of social life.

Functionalism is "the theory that different social institution and processes in the society exists to serve some significant (or vital) function to keep society running. As the author of functionalism, Durkheim (1933) accepts that society is made out of interrelated system and gets its name from the idea that the best approach to examine society is to identify the jobs that various parts of society play. Social deviance, loosely understood, can be interpreted as meaning any transgression of socially established norms. This can extend from the minor slamming a door in somebody's face to the major terrorist act. Consequently, terrorism is a deviant behavior. Functionalism sees terrorism, which is a type of crime as a temporary deviation from the normal way of a society, and is in a way functional to society.

A sociologist that uses structural functionalism would explain the existence of any social phenomena through the function they perform. Subsequently, terrorism is functional on the grounds that it brings people together in opposition, and brings a sense of belonging to the group that is against them. This feeling of group solidarity would help avoid anomie, which is a stage where individuals do not have to pursue any standards or norms of the society so as to survive in society (Durkheim, 1933).

Terrorists, like other criminals, became what is known as a reference point; individuals use a reference

point as a standard for evaluation. The norms and rules of society become clearer, and are seen as necessary, in comparison to terrorism. In order to secure the status quo, society utilizes terrorism as an approach to reassert the significance of social values in the lives of people. Normally, people consider terrorism to be a threat to the social balance and their life in a functioning society. Functionalists believes that, social change is required to keep a healthy society. Well planned and evolutionary technique types change a sound society socially. These social changes mostly come about from a drastic requirement for change and are preceded by a social shock. Terrorism brings about a social shock that moves society towards a change in direction that allows it to discover new ways to protect itself Functionalists see these new changes as providing society with a sound and moderate paced social change that was required. Terrorism in this way turns into an expected and required shock, thus can be to encourage society to change for the better (Durkheim, 1987).

Modem day American culture On September 11, 2001 was disoriented due to an attack. This event affected both. American travel customs, reflecting the Structural Functionalist idea that a change in one element of society results in changes in other aspects of society. Prior to this attacks, airport security in the U.S. existed, but they changed significantly because of the attacks. Scrutiny of travelers was significantly elevated and included new protocols, like the removal of shoes, belts, and eventually liquids, as well as random, more detailed screenings. Thus, a change in the cultural sense of security resulted in a corresponding change in travel procedure (Hiiseyin, 2010).

ORIGIN OF AL-QAEDA

The development of al-Qaeda can be traced back 1979 when the Soviet invaded Afghanistan. During the period of 1973-1978, Afghanistan was headed by Daoud Khan, who ended the monarchical regime, announcing the nation a Republic. Even if he had the support of the communist initially, Daoud Khan started to turn to one side in 1977 because of the deep recession that was affecting the country. The quest for an increased external income and the decrease in Afghanistan's reliance and dependence on the Soviets were two factors that led the Afghan government to open discussions with Iran, which was encouraged by the United States who brought about US\$2 billion being directed to the city of Kabul over a period of 10 years (Ewans, 2002. This conjuncture exacerbated the opposition to run to the Daoud Khan (President), who now begun joining diverse groups of the Communist Party. The final phase for the coup d'etat was when Daoud Khan attempted to remove all Communists from the Army, the fundamental institution for controlling the country. Accordingly, Moscow was afraid of losing political and economic control in Afghanistan, therefore masterminded the unification of the Communists and the removal of Daoud

Khan. Thus, after the assassination of Daoud Khan and his whole family, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan emerged between April 27-30, 1978.

Initially, the new government initiated several changes enlivened by the Soviet model, with the goal to modernize the country. For the purpose of this paper we would take another dimension of history of Al-Qaeda. That we take us to the time of 1979, this was the period for other significant scenario in the Middle East. Beginning from the Iranian Revolution which occurred in January 1979, removing Shah Reza Pahlavi and introducing a Shiite religious government in the country. In November there was an attempt to capture the Great Mosque of Mecca by opposition groups to the Al Saudi Monarch, this event marked the main huge revolt against the Saudi government since its formation. In light of this international juncture it was expected that Afghanistan could be on the way to a possible Iranian revolution and fearing the domestic breakdown of the Communist regime in Kabul, the USSR invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 (Gomes and Mikhael 2018).

The presence of a foreign power on Afghan soil was one of the significant reason behind the development of an opposition. Regardless of the geopolitical interests involved in weakening the presence of the USSR in the region (most importantly, the U.S. and countries, such as, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) there was symbolism around this event. It had to do with a Communist state attacking a Muslim country, providing airs of war to the defense of Islam. This resulted to a private meeting in the city of Peshawar on August 1988 where Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam now established Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda had the aim of diverting combatant and resources to the Afghan resistance be that as it may, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it started to accompany the struggles of Muslims around the world, including rebels against regimes which were said to be traitors (Byman, 2015).

After the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, Bin Laden came back to Saudi Arabia. However, he discovered U.S. troops who had been installed there since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, this act he considered inadmissible on the grounds that it inferred the presence of foreigners in sacred Muslim land. This was how his already-explicit opposition to the U.S aggravated, as well as his antagonism to the Saudi regime, and it drove him to engage with groups that oppose Al Saudi monarchy. Because of these acts, Bin Laden became a 'persona non grata' in the country, with exile (at first in Sudan, between 1991 - 1992) (Coll, 2004).

In Sudanese region, Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda found the basic conditions to form the group by means of an agreement with Sudan's government. On the other side, through his own fortune, Bin Laden added to the

development of construction of infrastructure in Sudan. Then again, the Sudanese government supported them with, for instance, training camps and different conditions for their tasks (Gomes and Mikhael 2018). The smooth rapport between Khartoum and al-Qaeda, be that as it may, did not keep going for that long, because Bin Laden's activities started to draw the attention of the Persian Gulf monarchies. In this way, Middle Eastern countries pressure on Sudan increased, especially for Bin Laden's expulsion. With the imposition of international sanctions in 1996, the Sudanese government saw no other alternative than to ask Bin Laden and his comrades to leave the country (Byman, 2015).

Al-Qaeda's next aim was to move Afghanistan and this was the time Afghanistan was been dominated by the Taliban regime. According to Stern and Bergen (2015:179), Al-Qaeda subjected itself, at least formally, to the Taliban through an agreement consented by Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the Taliban's head at that time. Toward the beginning of 1997, the Taliban approved the opening of training camps in Afghanistan for Al-Qaeda's to use. It was said that about 10,000-20,000 volunteers were prepared after Bin Laden gain control those spaces (9/11 Commission Report, 2004:67). However the help offered was not free: US\$20-30 million of Al-Qaeda's yearly pre-9/11 spending plans would fill the Taliban's coffers every year (Byman, 2015:22).

After the 9/11 attack, the agitation on the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden increased to a great extent and when leader refuse to do as such, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001. On November 13, 2001, the Taliban fell, yet neither its principle heads nor Bin Laden were found. It is estimated that al-Qaeda lost at least 80% of its members and training camps (Byman, 2015:42). Nonetheless, despite the fact that its ability to act was destroyed, played prominent roles in other terrorist attacks, especially an assault on a synagogue in Tunisia, bomb blast in a club in Bali (both in 2002), explosion in train stations in Madrid in 2004, and metro stations in London in 2005. Finally, in May 2011, Bin Laden was killed by U.S. troops in Abbottabad, Pakistan, taking Al-Zawahiri up to the highest point of Al-Qaeda.

Objectives of Al-Qaeda

From the origin contexts above there is a clear evidence that the formation of Al-Qaeda was as are result of a violent connection between the West and the Muslim world. Thus, the status quo that they intended to alter was one of asymmetry which, from the perspective of contemporary militant Islamist groups, Islam was being continually and constantly attacked by Western countries, particularly by the interference of the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East. First, it was to serve as a terrorist group in and of itself. Second, it was to act as an organizer, recruiter, and logistical provider for other militant Muslims, encouraging them to fight beyond

Afghanistan. Lastly, Al-Qaeda was to be the vanguard of the resistance, unifying and leading the Jihadist movement and providing it with purpose and direction (Byman, 2015).

Most modern Islamist militant's primary target is Western modernity that is why Esposito (2005) postulated that, movements and groups such as al-Qaeda are as a result of contradictions of modernity itself which started in Europe and was spread to other part of the world through technical/scientific, military, and economic dominance, but also through European colonization.

Therefore one can argue that, since the eighteenth century, the Muslim world has considered itself to be being in decline, especially in relations to European nations. Given this situation, a few masterminds have linked this scenario to the deviations of Muslim governments away from Muhammad's doctrines. One of the most notable movement originating from this crossroads was Wahhabism, established by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). Essentially, Wahhab proclaimed that the answer for the social and political problems of the time was tern to the initial external and infallible sources of Islam: the Qur'an and the Sunnah. More recently, particularly from the 1960 we have the influence of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb became the main ideological leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, articulating a vision of Muslim society divided between two distinct and irreconcilable fields: the believers and the unbelievers. Likewise, Qutb considered the assertion of an Islamic state indispensable because it would be through it that God's designs on the Earth would be realized (Esposito, 2005).

Consequently, it does not appear to be unreasonable to us to say that the political goals of al-Qaeda reflect, somewhat, the political and ideological symbolism originating from this complex context. They were mainly influenced by the thoughts of Qutb, who believed the West to be a historical enemy of Islam, and that Jihad (which was understood by him to be an armed struggle) was the only way out of that circumstance. Bin Laden and his associates saw government actors' deviations from Muslim doctrines and foreign actors' interference as the reasons for decadence in the Muslim world. It is no mistake that the U.S. was constantly prominent in the public pronouncement of AlQaeda. In 1992, al-Qaeda distributed a 'fatwa' calling for jihad to battle the U.S. control of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim state. Likewise, in a 'fatwa' published in 1996, which criticized Saudi Arabia and the U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula, relating neighborhood struggle to the worldwide anti-U.S. struggle.

In same 1996 'fatwa', there were countless allegation against the Saudi regime, apart from allowing infidels to enter the Holy Land the most sacred places for

Muslims, Mecca and Medina, in Saudi Arabia; they also suspended Islamic laws, wasted the oil wealth of the country, and ignored the Palestinian cause, among other crimes (Byman, 2015). Furthermore, it also declared al-Qaeda's support for the conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Palestine. However, for bin Laden, the first step was to defeat the U.S. so that victory could then be achieved in these local conflicts (Coll, 2014).

We can however conclude that the political objective of al-Qaeda is to reflect the political and ideological orientations of fundamentalist Muslim imagery and to revert the Muslim world's submission to the West. The initial goal would be to concentrate efforts against the U.S., considering it the main cause of the missteps of the countries of the regions. The next step would then be to overthrow the subversive regimes, creating the conditions for the emergence of authentic Muslim governments.

Organizational Structure of Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda has progressively devolved into four levels:

1. Core Al-Qaeda: This group is headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. He is the senior leader of Al-Qaeda who retains some oversight of the affiliates and resolves differences among partners and also provides strategic guidance. But Zawahiri has been facing challenges from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) while enforcing Al-Qaeda's judgments.
2. Affiliated groups: This are number of groups who have shown loyalty to core Al-Qaeda such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), formed in 2009 as a coalition of Al-Qaeda's Saudi Arabian and Yemeni branches, Taliban and the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan, Al-Shabab in Somalia affiliation with Al-Qaeda since 2007, Boko Haram, based in northern Nigeria, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria and neighboring nations, and Jabhat al-Nusrah located in Syria.
3. Allied groups: There are a few allied Salafi-Jihadist elements in Asia, Middle East, Africa, and the Caucasus whose leadership has not demonstrated dedication to core Al-Qaeda. This allows these groups to stay autonomous and seek their own objectives. However, they work with Al-Qaeda on special operations and trainings (Seth, 2014).
4. Motivated persons and networks: This type of group has no direct contact with core Al-Qaeda, however, they are driven by the Al-Qaeda cause and offended by mistreatment of Muslims in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine etc. They have a tendency to be persuaded by scions of the West and allied administrations in the Middle East.

THE IMPACT OF AL-QAEDA ON GLOBAL SECURITY

There are different interpretations of the impact of Al-Qaeda on global security. However there are contestation whether Al-Qaeda today is a worldwide danger or only a regional risk in the Middle East and in some portions of Africa. Some experts believe that the core Al-Qaeda is in decay and does not have the capacity any more to pose a worldwide risk, particularly towards the West and United States. A few analysts, however, believe that Al-Qaeda is malleable, which pose a genuine threat to the U.S. and to world peace, especially the devolved groups comprising of different radical sub-organisations. The decentralization of Al-Qaeda has led to the spread of Salafi-jihadist groups and supporters in recent years, especially in the Levant and North Africa. For example, groups working in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Egypt (also in Sinai), Syria and Lebanon. There has additionally been an expansion in the quality of attacks executed by Al-Qaeda and other Salafi-Jihadist sections. The more disturbing is Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula which propelled the 2013 Boston marathon bombers (Seth 2013).

According to Maqdisi cited in Joas (2012), Al-Qaeda's authoritative structure has crumpled which activeness is solely dependent on allegiance. There is just communication channels, and devotion but there is no real organizational structure. Nevertheless, Zawahiri was geologically isolated when he assumed control over the leadership after Osama Bin Laden's end. He has been stuck in the remote mountain areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, while a large number of militants have moved to the new battle zones in Syria and Iraq. With Pakistan's Armed Forces and the American net putting eyes on him, it became increasingly hard for Zawahiri to keep up communication with his administrators on the ground; and control militants in Iraq and Syria from Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding, the belief of Al-Qaeda remains a more grounded risk than the association itself. As Al-Qaeda continuously depends upon similar groups to direct attacks which other Islamist associations may follow suite. Generally, with better training couple with more experience and exceptional devoted militant, Al-Qaeda may at present still attack more hard targets, especially key targets, and leave the less difficult and strategic ones to its related militant group. With its decentralization, its militants are cooperating nearly on a tactical level with other groups. By this, the impact of the attacks led by the partner organisations of Al-Qaeda is expanding.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

If the origin of Al-Qaeda was a response to the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, the rise of ISIS is identified with the U.S. military involvement in Iraq in 2003 of particular relevance to the initial history of the

group is the direction of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose severity earned him the title 'Sheik of Assassins' (Byman, 2016:131). Zarqawi even went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets, but when he returned to Jordan toward the end of the conflict, he ended up participating in a group opposed to the government. However he was arrested on 1992 after series of explosives was found in his possession, it was during his time in jail that Zarqawi had his first contact with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most significant contemporary jihadist evangelists, who ended up turning into his intellectual mentor (Warrick, 2015).

After leaving prison in 1999, Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan, seeking the support of Bin Laden in order to develop his organization. In a meeting with leaders of Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi asked for financial help to begin his activities, even though, at that moment, he had refused to swear loyalty (McCants, 2015). Furthermore, Bin Laden and Zawahiri disagreed with the extremist views of Zarqawi, mainly with his idea on attacking Shiites, who the Jordanian accused of betrayal. Despite their differences, both groups managed to work together, because of the fact that Zarqawi operated in the Levant a region that spans from Jordan to Syria where al-Qaeda was fragile.

The U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003 was an important event in this story. Chosen by then President George W. Bush to command the provisional authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer took two decisions that contributed to increasing the destabilization of the country. Upon dissolving the Iraqi army and firing all members of the Baath party from public service positions, Bremer created more than 100,000 unemployed Baathists, supplying skilled human resources to the insurgency (Stern & Bergen, 2015:19).

In 2004, Zarqawi took advantage of this situation and swore loyalty to Bin Laden, giving birth to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This association brought benefits for both groups. While the use of the name Al-Qaeda made Zarqawi gain support and notoriety among Iraqi jihadists, Al-Qaeda began to become a powerful associate in the region (McCants, 2015).

In spite these gains, the relationship continued to be permeated with differences because Bin Laden and Zawahiri were pressing for terrorist attacks focused on U.S. targets as opposed to attacks on Shiites and Sunnis who were considered apostates.

After the death of Zarqawi in June 2006 and a series of attacks on Al-Qaeda in Iraq when Sunni tribes allied with the U.S., the group was almost annihilated. Bin Laden and Zawahiri looked to intervene, advising the people remaining to discard the objectives and tactics designed by Zarqawi and to seek the support of the local population. The decision taken, however, went contrary

to that advice. Before the death of Zarqawi he found a council composed of various jihadist groups acting in Iraq because he recognized that it made no sense for Al-Qaeda in Iraq to compete with them. It is this council that now announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, leading Abu Hamza AlMuhajir, Zarqawi's successor, to swear loyalty to this new body, which was led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. The tactic of attacking civilians continued to be used, with an average of 53 people killed every 24 hours by the group in 2006 (Stern and Bergen, 2015:27).

However, in 2010, the Islamic State of Iraq seemed to have its days numbered after the U.S. was able to eliminate Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and other members, making the group weaker despite the emergence of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a new leader. Two events, however, ended up helping the Islamic State of Iraq survive. First, after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began to persecute Sunnis in the country; a prime example of this was the imprisonment of Vice President Tariq Hashimi because of accusations of terrorism. Later, in the parliamentary elections of 2014, Maliki contested on an electoral platform that portrayed him as a candidate this is capable of defending Shiites from a Sunni counter-revolution (Gomes & Mikhael 2018). Such a stance galvanized Sunni resistance, throwing it into the arms of extremist movements acting in the country, especially the Islamic State of Iraq.

The second event was as a result of the civil war in Syria in 2011. If the sectarianism between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq was of the great importance in accepting the regrouping of the Islamic State of Iraq, the Syrian context allowed al-Baghdadi to expand his operation radius. The border between Syria and Iraq had always been porous, which allowed jihadists to penetrate Iraqi territory. Jihadist groups now returned to Syrian territory and destabilized the country even more. The Islamic State of Iraq took advantage of this situation and entered the conflict, especially through the Jabat al-Nursa organization, which was formed in January 2012. Even so, Jabat al-Nursa opted to follow rules from central al-Qaeda, that is, to garner the support of the local population, cooperating with other groups and avoiding brutality (Byman, 2016).

Therefore this formed the system for the faction between al-Qaeda and ISIS. On April 09, 2013, Baghdadi declared the combination of Jabat al-Nursa with his group, forming the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) and awarding himself head of the two groups. The leaders of Jabat al-Nursa spoke to Zawahiri, and on February 02, 2014, al-Qaeda renounced this unification, denying any relationship with ISIS and exculpating itself free from any responsibilities its actions (Stern and Bergen, 2015:43). Finally, on July 04, 2014, after taking a large parts of Syrian and Iraqi

territories, Baghdadi announced the development of another caliphate, occupying the position of caliph himself.

Resource Base of IS

Within three years (2013-2016), the IS has effectively made stronghold in at least 19 states. It is approximated that about 25,000 militant were enrolled by the group through the social media and online networking to fight in Iraq and Syria by taking advantage of the civil war in Syria and the sectarian factions in Iraq. Among these foreign militant, there are more than 4,500 natives from Western countries, including 250 U.S. natives. As stated by the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the rate of expansion of the IS was "unparalleled", with the number of militant groups, belonging to Philippines, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Libya and Nigeria, now in affiliation with the IS reaching 34 states. Its function in Syria has added another level to the multifaceted group fighting to remove President Bashar al-Assad's administration. Since March 2012, about 250,000 people have been murdered, while nearly 11.6 million have been displaced from their homes in Syria.

Since June 2014, the Islamic State notwithstanding the destruction it has unleashed in Iraq and Syria, also propelled more than 60 terrorist attacks in 20 countries this event led to the death of 1,160 people and more than 1,700 individuals were injured. Its global threat crusade include the October 31, 2015 accident of a Russian jet, killing 224 passengers; and the November 13, 2015 shootings in Paris that killed 130 people.

Despite that the territory under their direct control has reduce in recent time, the IS militant did at one time have control of a territory larger than Finland or Belgium. This, as well, motivated foreign fanatics to join the group. Its fast growth has become a driving force for the so-called global jihad. With a belief system and propagandistic tendencies (particularly recruitment through the social media) which is more stronger than that of Al-Qaeda and money from the oil fields which it controls in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State is in a superior position to expand its ideological war. Under the guise of re-establishing the "Caliphate", their message has turned out to be far more inspiring than the clandestine terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda.

In an interview with author of *The Islamist Phoenix* (2014), economist Loretta Napoleoni (2016) stated that with an expected funding of \$2-4 billion, it is increasingly useful and appealing for the IS recruits to be an Islamic Caliphate, particularly since it works like a state by gathering cash through taxes. She contended that the rise of the IS in Syria and Iraq astounded the world since the West was dormant at the worst possible time.

Objectives of IS

Like Al-Qaeda which origin was discussed above was as a result relevance U.S. interference in the Middle East, and the military intervention in Iraq, in particular gave rise to the emergence of ISIS. More also the destruction of the asymmetry status- quo existing for a long between Muslim countries and West. The difference here as observed is the justification that the ISIS sought to resolve with their means of actions. Like al-Qaeda, ISIS was also significantly influenced by the teachings of Wahhabi, which rejected any religious alteration due to innovation, warned against cultural influences, and contended that only a few Muslims were steadfast believers (McCants, 2015:151).

In ideological terms, however, the most significant contrast between the groups was maybe the prophetically biasness of ISIS. According to McCants(2015:22), a good number of its members shares the idea of the Mahdi, a prophetic figure that will lead all Muslims in a fight against the unbelievers and infidel. It involves the process of cleansing Islam, to the extent that some chosen ones will figure out who ought to be extirpated from the political community, as well as those from outside who threatens the community. More also, Baghdadi, having a degree in Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad and having functioned as an Imam in Baghdad and Fallujah, believes himself to be an immediate decedent of the prophet Muhammad, which would legitimize much more his interpretations of Muslim doctrines.

This vision of the world presents significant implications, most importantly about the definition of enemies of the caliphate. Among its list of enemies, ISIS accepts that it must start to wipe out the antagonists who are nearest, such as, the Shiites and Kurds. In the same sense, al-Baghdadi draws from a similar ideology as Zaraqawi about the need of a territorial base in the Middle East, without which his struggle will fail (Munir and Shafiq 2016). In the last instance, the goal of ISIS, according to Stern and Bergen (2015), is the formation of a transnational caliphate that needs a local starting power. The U.S. and other European countries are certainly on the rundown of targets, similar to the apostate monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the Alawite regime of Syria, and the Shiite government of Iraq and Iran. It is hence that ISIS's assets and activities are devoted mainly to these regional and local theaters, or, as Zaraqawi used to say, "the way to Palestine passes through Amman" (Warrick, 2015:65).

Therefore, the political objective of ISIS is also the reversal of the situation of the Muslim world's submission. However, in contrast to al-Qaeda, such a reversal has, as stages, the territorial affirmation of ISIS, which implies the definition of local and regional enemies. This is to be carried out without overlooking,

however, the threat that external actors like the U.S. offer to the fulfillment of such objectives.

THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC STATE (IS) ON GLOBAL SECURITY

The Annual Threat Assessment 2016 involves the forecast of terrorist threats in various regions of the world from Southeast Asia to Central and East Asia, from the Middle East to South Asia and from Africa to South America. There were various high degree of terrorist attack everywhere throughout the world in 2015, incorporating assaults in Maiduguri in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the vast majority of these attack, the contribution of the IS was apparent. Some of the high profile terrorist attacks claimed by the IS in 2016 outside Iraq and Syria include:

1. January 12, 2016: Istanbul bombing that killed 13 people and injured 14.
2. March 22, 2016: Coordinated suicide bombings in Belgium that killed 32 civilians and injured more than 300 people.
3. July 14, 2016: Cargo truck attack in Nice, France during the Bastille Day celebrations on the Promenade des Anglais, where 85 people were killed and 307 injured.
4. July 23, 2016: Twin bombing in the vicinity of Deh Mazang square in Kabul, when protesters, mostly from the Hazara ethnic minority, were marching against a decision to bypass their region in the development of a mega power project. At least 80 people were killed and 260 injured (Munir and Shafiq 2016:10).

Most Southeast Asian nations, for example, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, which were battling with terrorism by traditional groups, are also now threatened by the increased involvement of IS in the region. Because of precariousness in some of the South Asian countries, especially Afghanistan, this area also remain defenseless against terrorist threats and attacks. The poor governance and clashes between different Taliban groups after the demise of Mullah Omar is giving a chance to the IS to improve its relevance in Afghanistan. Religious intolerance in Bangladesh is on the high side, bringing about the spread of the influence of IS in the country. Maldives which had remained traditionally safe from terrorism was now prone to attack because of its involvement Maldivian fighters in Syria and Iraq. Sri Lanka is again under fear from the leftovers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The recruitment of Sunni Muslims from Central Asian countries and Xinjiang area in China is probably going to have detrimental spillover impacts. The Middle East has now progressed toward becoming the focal point of the global jihadist threat. The IS has also profited by the shakiness in Africa.

The rise of IS, has created a sense of panic at the regional and global level, pushing the U.S., Iran and

other Middle East states towards working together. In this backdrop, a serious alliance of 62 states which involve Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and all other Gulf nations was set up to against the IS. Since the U.S led attack on Afghanistan in 2001, this alliance may perhaps be one of the biggest ever. In fact, the power model in the area might be totally changed, particularly given the active corporation and participation between Washington and Tehran.

The flow of foreign combatant into Iraq and Syria which was as a result of IS propaganda publicity going down as airstrikes scatter the moral of the group's fighters. Only about 200 foreign combatant are currently joining the IS every month, which is one-tenth of the figure the organization had attained some time ago. Recent report put the number of ISIS militant as low as 19,000, from a potential pinnacle of 31,000, the least since the numbers were first observed in 2014. The group has likewise lost 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and 10 percent in Syria this is huge losses for the self titled "Caliphate".

However, regardless of this, the Islamic State remains a threat to world's security because of absence of a common bound, unified strategy among the major powers of the world. On September 30, 2015, as part of an enemy of ISIS operation, Russia launched airstrikes in Syria, which did not focus on the IS, rather anti- Assad rebels. The Obama government's reaction to Russian proposal was not clear. Several analyst point to a major role of Russia in handling the fanatic group followed by the U.S., the Kurds and the Iraqi armed forces among others.

Threat Assessment of the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda

Roughly 10,000 terrorist attacks were carried out in 2013 around the world by radical group like the Al-Qaeda, the IS, Boko Haram and the Taliban which brought about colossal economic and human loss. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2015, the total number of life lost from terrorism was 3,329 in 2000; 18,111 in 2013; and 32,685 in 2014 (almost an 80 percent expansion) (Global Terrorism Index, 2014).

Recently, the IS has been expanding successfully in its global agenda to restore the purported Caliphate and extend its influence all over the world. Fawaz (2016) stated that the move in the IS technique from a focus on the close enemy to far enemy in contrast to Al-Qaeda, the IS initially centered on the near enemy Shia, the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, and secular Pro-Western states in the Middle East. However, in a tactical shift ISIS has now assumed responsibility for critical attacks in Europe and different places beyond the Middle East, making it clear the group is progressively keen on focusing on the far enemy also.

The ideologue of the radical fringes of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, turned jihad (holy war) into fighting against the escalation of materialist ways of life, be it capitalist or communist, in a violent manner, rather than in a spiritual manner as the greater jihad asks Muslims to do. The near enemy is the concept used by radical Islamist groups to speak of the government acting in Muslim-majority countries and seen as illegitimate because it is hostile to the propagation of Islam within state structures. For many years, Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood at the front of the line, have been targeting their own national political leaders and tried, mostly in vain, to take power on a national level (Benoit 2015).

In the first two years after the declaration of the so-called Caliphate" (June 29, 2014), the IS started following the policy of attacking the near enemy and saw a gradual rise. Approximately It occupied one third territory of Iraq and Syria by the end of 2014 (Fawaz, 2016). In order to stop its expansion, the U.S. led alliance which is made up of Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began operation "Inherent Resolve" in September 2014. Subsequently, in September 2015 Russia also launched airstrikes against the IS targets in Syria which led to the IS downfall in terms of loss of territory, as well as curtailment of its financial resources. Radu (2016) while discussing the benefits and disadvantages of the air strikes against the IS, explains that, although airstrikes is though effective to halt the alarming spread of Islamic State's growing influence in Iraq and Syria, the reliance on air-based campaigns could turn out to be a waste of resources, if no counter-productive, in the framework of a long-term strategy to wipe out the root causes of the caliphate and of Islamic terror on the whole (Radu 2016).

The IS involvement in Paris (France) and San Bernardino (U.S.A.) attacks during 2015 showed its strength to reach round the world. While its role in the latter is disputed since it did not have any operational linkages to the perpetrators. According to the FBI investigation, the two shooters were ISIS-inspired, but had conducted the attacks on their own. On the other hand, the Paris attack did depict operational connections.

The IS has built up linkage with other terrorist and recruited youth from different nations, for example, Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Somalia. It has turned into a difficult and powerful organization that has increased strategic strength with the help of its regional and worldwide partners. A United Nations survey on the rise of the IS shows that the gathering has been connected to many high profile attacks. Just between six months (December 2015 to June 2016), it has enlivened and launched attacks that has resulted to the death of about 500 civilians in eleven nations outside the Middle East, for example, Belgium and the United States, excluding the group's attacks in its stronghold of Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Utilizing religion for its

political objective, the IS has turned into a dangerous non-state actor profiting from the porous borders and the idea of globalization therefore undermining global security (Munir and Shafiq 2016).

In order to examine whether Al-Qaeda is still a global threat, there is a need to study three aspects:

1. What are the goals of Al-Qaeda?;
2. What are the economic and human resources at Al-Qaeda's disposal?; and
3. Where are the main reserves of Al-Qaeda and its training sites located?

Over decades the structure of Al-Qaeda has been shattered and the group is no longer able carry out attacks as fatal as 9/11 because most of its affiliates have either been detained or executed, Afghanistan is no longer a strong hold of Al-Qaeda militancy. After the assassination of Osama bin Laden on May 2011, there have been intense structural transformations within the outfit. From the late 1990s to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Al-Qaeda followed a global and regional agenda. Although, it also confronted France and Russia during the early 1990s, it never altered its principal agenda of anti-Americanism. In its early stages, the central authority of Al-Qaeda was mostly Arab fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen. However, non-Arab warriors were also its members especially from Tajikistan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Western China. The now "franchised Al-Qaeda" is increasingly autonomous and powerful. In order to accomplish their political objectives, each branch of Al-Qaeda is mainly following a local line up. These IS branches are recruiting manpower at the local level and running their training camps through local organization. In recent time, the branches of Al-Qaeda is largely not the same as the main Al-Qaeda. Professor Bernard Lewis, a Middle East expert, in 1998 opined that Al-Qaeda's top agenda was to compel the U.S. to withdraw from the Middle East. Several analysts has posited that the Israeli-Palestinian issue gingered Al-Qaeda to conduct terrorist attacks in and on the United States territory. Later, Osama bin Laden preferred Afghanistan and Chechnya for his activities. Most of its allies benefited from Al-Qaeda in terms of money, training and fighting experience (Rollins 2011). With the growth of its branches, Al-Qaeda saw changes, especially in the Iraq under the authority of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, he pledged for allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2001. However, Zarqawi soon separated from Al-Qaeda on operational issues. Osama strongly supported global jihad against the Far Enemy, whereas Zarqawi desire was to fight with the Close Enemy in the Middle East, particularly the government in Jordan. The Taliban permitted Zarqawi to build his own training facility, which he set up close to the Iranian border. Contrary to his camps, Zarqawi recruited Arab fighters, mainly from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestine.

After the U.S. attack in Afghanistan in 2001 Al-Qaeda divided and Zarqawi moved into Iran and then to Iraq. At the operational level, Zarqawi in addition to his operations in Iraq also started his activities in Jordan. In order to strengthen his operation against the Hashemite Kingdom, he enhanced his power in Syria as well. It is interesting to note that Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda branch had a special relationship with Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda central authority that allowed the "franchise" to operate independently. The Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq developed its own strategy and instead of working as a subordinate organization and just receiving instructions from the central authority, it took its own initiatives. Zarqawi found that this strategy was also being embraced by Al-Qaeda's commanders as well. On July 9, 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was then Osama bin Laden's deputy and his successor, through a letter appreciated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's strategy of moving the focus of the global jihad to the Arab countries. Zawahiri, who was then following the lead of his Iraqi branch (franchise), lay out the next steps of jihad in the Middle East. He directed Zarqawi to follow a three-step strategy: (1) defeating the U.S. in Iraq; (2) extending the jihad to the secular countries bordering Iraq, namely Syria and Jordan, and; (3) entering into a clash with Israel (Munir & Shafiq 2016).

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AL-QAEDA AND THE IS

Fighting method: Unlike Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State is fighting like a conventional army using conventional military tactics. It has been expanding its territory and declared a Caliphate in Northern Iraq, one of the major reasons the two groups split as we discussed earlier.

Brutality: The IS make use of violence which is gotten more from its supporters. By executing detainees and adversaries and posting photos of its cruelty on social media, the IS has gained worldwide recognition.

Popularity: Another contrast is that the IS has a larger number of young devotees. It has a following among youth (both men and women) via online networking, while Al-Qaeda adhered to more old-style enlisting techniques. This is the critical difference between AQ and the IS. The IS ideology lives in the cyber domain, something AQ did not largely manipulate. Byman explains: The Islamic State's impressive social media efforts and overall appeal also make it better able to mobilize "lone wolves" to attack in the West. Many of these individuals will have had little or no contact with the Islamic State as an organization, but they find its ideology and methods appealing and will act on their own (Byman 2015).

Plans against the U.S.: After 9/11, Al-Qaeda has tried to attack the U.S. again, while the IS does not seem to have a specific bone to pick with the United

States, even if it has declared that it wants to attack it.

Others are:

The conceptual difference between al-Qaeda and ISIS

According to an ISIS combatant in an interview with the New York Times, the main difference is that al-Qaeda is an organization and we are a state. Through the prism adopted here, such a difference is derived from distinct political objectives, despite the two organizations mirroring the desire to reverse a status quo of the submission of the Muslim world to the West. As a result, equating both groups as terrorist would be imprecise.

ISIS is a more complex organization which ultimately aimed to reconfigure the Levant's borders. It is no coincidence that there have recently been debates interested in determining what would be the best denomination for ISIS: a hybrid and insurgent terrorist organization (Stern & Bergen, 2015:11) or a quasi-state sponsor of terrorism (Byman, 2016:144). Furthermore, with different objectives and logics of action, the two groups have different behaviors. While al-Qaeda privileges terrorist attacks that are relatively cheap and have the goal of transforming the correlation of forces in the future, ISIS given its ambition to have a regional foothold makes non terrorist use of terror while also, however, incentivizing the terrorist use of terror, above all in Europe. Such a consideration reinforces the arguments against ideas that argue for a direct causality between religion and terrorism.

Another consideration is relative to combat

As we have seen, terrorism is a response to a specific sociopolitical juncture and it is therefore not possible to ignore the influence that foreign interference has had on the formation of both groups. In the case of al-Qaeda, fighting involves fewer strategies of militarization and more investments in understanding what logistic are necessary, such as how to recruit and train militants and how to cut off financing channels. With respect to ISIS, recent reports indicate that the group lost a significant portion of its territory and resources. From a regional point of view, one can argue that the goal of consolidating the caliphate is collapsing, but it would be hasty to argue that the group is definitively finished. As mentioned before, ISIS has two fronts of combat, and it is the regional one that is under threat now (Gomes & Mikhael 2018).

CONCLUSION

There are various geopolitical problems in the Middle East that this militant group capitalize on to perpetuate their evil deeds. One is the issue of excessive attachment to a particular sect, party or religious group. The other is the intermediary wars of global powers going after geostrategic interests in the Syrian crises. A

comprehensive response is needed which will find out the factors and strategies that are encouraging the spread of terrorism globally.

The tensions among Iran and Saudi Arabia will give opportunity to fanatic elements to further increase their impact, in this manner, the peace building process by Pakistan and China to reduce tension between these two Muslim nations ought to be reinforced through further diplomatic process by international community.

While areas in Pakistan are no longer center base of terrorism, following the country's military activities against aggressors, the development of the IS in Afghanistan can have a detrimental impacts.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The best available option for peace in Afghanistan is to make the building process a success for reconciliation. Maneuvering the IS against the Taliban in Afghanistan would not work and any such procedure to exploit the rivalry between the two may prompt further instability in the region.
2. There is need at the global level to discourage partisan and communal viciousness and efforts ought to be made to ensure that the right and privileges of minorities and marginalized group of society are adequately protected. Without such assurance, terrorist group like the IS can capitalize on social grievances as it did in Iraq and Syria.
3. It is hard to eliminate with force any terrorist organization having an ideological base without first underlying the root causes of terrorism and finding innovative approaches to counter the story of terrorist groups. Finding inventive approaches to counter the story of psychological oppressor gatherings.

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