Triple Colonial and Neo-Colonial Challenges of Guinea - Conakry versus International Capitalist-Communist Stances of Continuous Hegemonic Manipulation 19th -20th Centuries
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DOI: 10.36348/sjhss.2021.v06i11.004 | Received: 09.10.2021 | Accepted: 13.11.2021 | Published: 27.11.2021

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Abstract

This paper deals with triple challenges confronted by Guinea- Conakry versus the Western Capitalist and Eastern Communist Struggles in the context of colonial and neo-colonial interests in a strategic African country with full accessibilities in the Atlantic Ocean. The principle actors in such an exploitative operations includes the British, French, Americans and the Soviet Union. In fact, lucrative commercial activities conducted in this region of West Africa acted as one of the most important factor which attracted Whites immigrants into the country which later witnessed serious challenges in the hands of French diplomatic agents in the wake of African Nationalism and the desired self-determination whose independence was declared by its famous political elite known as Sékou Touré in 1958 as the first President of the Republic of Guinea. This was not the end of Western manipulation and hiding operations in the peak of the Cold War conflicts with targeted interests which once more set the new leader into mixing Capitalist-Communist ideologies while gaining much international recognition as one of African despot until his death in 1984. The scrutiny of specialized sources and government documents online pertaining to those challenges enable us to use a historical analytical approach to come out with our findings. That the geo-strategic and geo-political position of the country and its natural resources kept both camps in the Cold War busy to make their presence felt by the 26 year pioneer President after the pre-mature departure of the French colonial agents with the famous “No” of Touré.

Keywords: Capitalist, Communist, colonialism, diplomatic agents, hegemonic manipulation, neo-colonial.

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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Guinea is a crescent-shaped country in West Africa with an area of 245,857 km². It faces the Atlantic Ocean and shares borders with Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its population was estimated at 4,660,582 in 1983 barely one year before the death of Sékou Touré who became the first President in 1958. Given its vast mineral resources, opportunities for agricultural diversification and hydrological and hydroelectric resources, Guinea has the potential to become one of the richest and most economically developed countries in West Africa but colonial exploitation rendered the country as one of the poorest in the African Continent. Its coastline, relatively low population density and still modest level of urbanization are further factors conducive to future economic development yet Guinea is in the group of poor countries. What is now Guinea was on the fringes of the major West African Empires (Brownfield M.E, online, October 2021). The Ghana Empire is believed to be the earliest of these which grew on trade but contracted and ultimately fell due to the hostile influence of the Almoravids. It was in this period that Islam first arrived in the region. Starting in the 13th century, the Arab slave trade flourished in the region and the Gulf of Guinea. The slave trade was greatly expanded in the 15th century when Portugal established a number of trading posts in Guinea, purchasing and exporting captives as part of the Atlantic slave trade. Other European nations would eventually participate in the trade, which persisted into the mid- 19th Century (Gakunzi, D., 2018). After the fall of the major West African empires, various kingdoms existed in what is now Guinea. Fulani Muslims migrated to Futa Jallon in Central Guinea and established an Islamic state from 1735 to 1898 with a written constitution and alternate
Guinea, country of western Africa, located on the Atlantic coast. Three of western Africa’s major rivers—the Gambia, the Niger, and the Sénégal—rise in Guinea. Natural resources are plentiful: in addition to its hydroelectric potential, Guinea possesses a large portion of the world’s bauxite reserves and significant amounts of iron, gold, and diamonds. Nonetheless, the economy is largely based on subsistence agriculture. Guinea, under the name French Guinea, was a part of French West Africa until it achieved independence in 1958. It then was ruled successively by Sékou Touré (1958–84) and Lansana Conté. Guinea is bordered by Guinea-Bissau to the northwest, Senegal to the north, Mali to the northeast, Côte d’Ivoire to the southeast, and Liberia and Sierra Leone to the south. The Atlantic Ocean lies to the west. Guinea consists of four geographic regions: Lower Guinea, the Fouta Djallon, Upper Guinea, and the Forest Region, or Guinea Highlands. Lower Guinea includes the coast and coastal plain. The coast has undergone recent marine submergence and is marked by rias, or drowned river valleys, that form inlets and tidal estuaries. Numerous offshore islands are remnants of former hills. Immediately inland the gently rolling coastal plain rises to the east, being broken by rocky spurs of the Fouta Djallon highlands in the north at Cape Verga and in the south at the Camayenne Peninsula. Between 30 and 50 miles (48 and 80 km) wide, the plain is wider in the south than the north (M. S. Toure, 1960). Its base rocks of granite and gneiss (coarse-grained rock containing bands of minerals) are covered with laterite (red soil with a high content of iron oxides and aluminum hydroxide) and sandstone gravel. The Fouta Djallon highlands rise sharply from the coastal plain in a series of abrupt faults. More than 5,000 square miles (13,000 square km) of the highlands’ total extent of 30,000 square miles (78,000 square km) lie above 3,000 feet (900 metres). Basically an enormous sandstone block, the Fouta Djallon consists of level plateaus broken by deeply incised valleys and dotted with sills and dikes, or exposed structures of ancient volcanism resulting in resistant landforms of igneous rock. The Kakoulima Massif, for example, attains 3,273 feet (998 metres) northeast of Conakry. The highest point in the highlands, Mount Tamgoué, rises to 5,046 feet (1,538 metres) near the town of Mali in the north. Upper Guinea is composed of the Niger Plains, which slope northeastward toward the Sahara (O. Goerg 2011). The flat relief is broken by rounded granite hills and outliers of the Fouta Djallon. Composed of granite, gneiss, schist (crystalline rock), and quartzite, the region has an average elevation of about 1,000 feet (300 metres). The Forest Region, or Guinea Highlands, is a historically isolated area of hills in the country’s southeastern corner. Mount Nimba (5,748 feet [1,752 metres]), the highest mountain in the region, is located at the borders of Guinea, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. The mountain’s densely forested slopes are part of the Mount Nimba Strict Nature Reserve, which has significant portions in Guinea. The Guinean sector was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1981 and is home to a unique and diverse array of flora and fauna. More than 20 rivers in western Africa originate in Guinea. The Fouta Djallon is the source of the three major rivers of the region. The Niger River and several tributaries, including the Tinkisso, Milo, and Sankarani, rise in the highlands and flow in a general northeasterly direction across Upper Guinea to Mali. The Bafing and Bakoye rivers, headwaters of the Sénégal River, flow northward into Mali before uniting to form the main river. The Gambia River flows northwestward before crossing Senegal and the Gambia (Cairn.info 2021).
Based on the Guinean example, this paper argues for a history of colonial ... the result of an intellectual construction with pre-colonial roots and drawing ... Guinea Map, Flag, Population, People, Religion, & Facts, https://www.britannica.com › place.

The map No. 1 above clearly illustrated the geo-strategic importance of Guinea - Conakry to the former Great Powers of Europe and Super Powers of the 19th and 20th Centuries. The country is surrounded by other five potential countries of West Africa where European interest were too high during the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras.

1. The Roots of International Conflicting Ambitions in the Strategic Guinea - Conakry

1.1. The British Pathways in Guinea-Conakry

From the late 18th Century, British agents maintained a lively interest upon Guinea-Conakry coast and in Fuuta Jaloo which fed numerous rivers that emptied on this coast. British commercial firms with headquarters in Liverpool and London had maintained numerous trading relationships here since the mid-18th Century, especially in the Nunez and Pongo rivers, upon Iles de Los, and upon islands located at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River. The firm of Barber & Bolland operated a trading factory at Iles de Los, for example, and its principal agent, Miles Barber, developed an elaborate network for supplying and merchandising European and American products with numerous African, European, and Euro-African merchants. Trades in coastally produced commodities and in slaves were paramount to the commerce of this coast. Inevitably, however, interest was keen for the sources of more distant products that were brought coastward from interior markets. To be sure, every trader upon this coast perhaps dreamed about a commerce that would link his trade to that believed to exist on the Niger River itself and bring gold and highly sought and equally profitable goods to increase his fortune. It was this dream, encouraged by a lucrative trade in coastal goods that drove British and other foreign fascination with the hinterland of Guinea-Conakry and with the Fula peoples who ruled in the Fuuta Jaloo highlands (Bruce L. M., 2003).

The official ending of the slave trade in 1808, however, influenced more than just the missionaries and the slave traders. The premise that the Northern Rivers’ commerce (including that between the Fuuta and the coast) could be transformed from one principally in slaves to one in commodities continued to infatuate British officials at Freetown. And, again recognizing perhaps that the mouth of the Sierra Leone River had been a poor choice for an enterprising and successful settlement, officials sought to expand the colony northward in the second decade of the 19th Century (Maurice H., 1953). Beaver’s ill-fated settlement upon Bulama Island in 1792-1793 was now copiously discussed in government correspondence, and considerations were given once again to restoring treaty stipulations that Beaver had obtained with local landlords on that island. A believed interest by American commercial firms in purchasing Iles de Los in 1818 led, moreover, to a formal agreement reached between British officials and Baga/Susu landlords on the islands and on the neighboring shore of Sumbuya and Kalum for formal cession of the islands to Britain. An enthusiastic governor of Sierra Leone promptly
suggested renaming all the islands and in renaming its colony centered at Freetown to “Sierra Leone and the Iles de Los”, perhaps anticipating an addition of Bulama Island at a later date. Clearly some at Freetown wanted a northern colonial expansion, effectively creating three centers of British commercial and political influence—Freetown, Iles de Los, and Bulama Island, all important for establishing a British sphere within the region. Some directly suggested that the slave trade and trades from rival American competitors could be quashed completely by military detachments stationed at the mouths of strategic rivers and at the Île Tombo at the tip of Cape Sangara, where Conakry is now located (Djibril T. N., 1995).

Whatever preeminence that Britain may have enjoyed in Guinea-Conakry and in the Fuuta Jaloo highlands before 1850 was flittered away by events in the decade that followed, French interests was clear that French officials at Gorée and Saint Louis were more interested in aggressive commercial and territorial expansion in the “Rivières du Sud” and Fuuta Jaloo than were the British, especially after Omar’s assumption to power in 1843. The French also were firm supporters of those of its traders on the coast who found themselves in conflicts with local landlords or with unclear commercial agreements and graded anchorage or water age duties imposed upon them by landlords. In contrast, the British tended to take the position that traders should not expect royal power to intervene directly to protect their individual economic interests or agreements with landlords. By the 1860s, British objectives had been replaced by a forceful French presence in the rivers (Marie-Vic O. M. et al., 2008). This French forceful occupation did not discouraged the British and after independence, she strongly appointed diplomatic missions with portfolios of Ambassadors with non-resident and resident in the new Republic of Guinea-Conakry as seen below. Between 1965 and 1970 diplomatic relations with Britain deteriorated over the Rhodesia question in Southern African region which were mostly under the British colonial domination. Those 12 Ambassadors moderated British neo-colonial interests in the country former colonized by France after the later challenged the British in the late 19th Century.

List of abbreviations used on Table 1

N.R: Non Resident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: British Neo-Colonial Diplomatic Agents (Ambassadors) Accredited to Guinea Conakry 1958-1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAMES OF DIPLOMATIC AGENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Guy Clarke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Donald Logan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Hilary William King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 John Waterfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 John Tahourdin &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ivor Porter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Denzil Dunnett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 John Powell-Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Laurence O’Keeffe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: theinfolist.com > php > SummaryGetList of ambassadors of the United Kingdom to Guinea

The Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Guinea is the United Kingdom’s foremost diplomatic representative in the Republic of Guinea, and head of the UK’s diplomatic mission in Conakry. The Republic of Guinea (formerly known as French Guinea) declared its independence from France on 2 October 1958, and the then U.K ambassador to Liberia, Guy ...

1.2. The Beginning of French Forceful Influence and Installation of Colonial Diplomatic Agents

Once the French had secured the rivers and had reached agreements with local landlords, an open and secure British connection between Timbo and Freetown no longer was a reasonable expectation. Understandings already in place between Timbo and Freetown before 1850 quickly became irrelevant. At the time of French colonization, the division of Guinea into four regions solidified, especially from the 1920s onward. However, this administrative and ethnic partitioning was a process of simplification, which continued even after independence in 1958, and its symbolism continues to influence a whole array of everyday processes. Based on the Guinean example, this paper argues for a history of colonial heritages. The division of Guinea into four “natural” regions (Maritime Guinea, Middle Guinea, Upper Guinea, and Forest Guinea) has been apparent since the 1920s and can be found in works introducing the country, designed in Guinea and abroad, as well as in current discourse. This division, the result of an intellectual construction with pre-colonial roots and drawing on various historical memories, has an impact on the perception of the country and its peoples, on regional and local identities, even on political options (Odile G., 2011). First it is clear that the division of Guinea could not take place until after the colonial borders had been definitively set, i.e., at the very end of the nineteenth century after the annexation of the Faranah district in...
1895, the military defeat of the Fouta-Djalon State in 1896, and the integration of the entire southern region of Sudan in 1899. This process was internal to the French Empire as part of negotiations between the military and civilians. Second, it is equally clear that once the borders were fixed, categorization was subjected to the political imperatives of the moment; hence Fouta-Djalon could not be considered a unique region as long as Alpha Yaya Diallo, France’s ally, dominated the eastern province of Labé. Likewise, the far southeast retained a separate status as a military region until 1911–1912 (Odile G., 2011).

At the Paris Colonial Exhibition of 1931, Guinea’s division into four regions was presented as self-evident (The Note published for the 1931 International Colonial) and this apportionment then became the norm. This categorization is necessarily rough-hewn, and it would be reckless to challenge the natural evidence of the boundaries between regions on the ground. Furthermore, to complete the picture, other categorization factors were patched on to the criteria of physical geography and climatology in an equally simplistic way. This reinforced the feature in question in an attempt to make the regional apportionment coincide with a nation, even if this proved more difficult. The four-part division provided a simple view of a country created through colonial intervention for purposes of administrative, promotional, or touristic presentation, clearly a classic phenomenon. Moreover, this partitioning did not come out of nothing. Rather, it is clearly informed by local memories or the strategies of certain groups or individuals and backed by indications given by the colonized peoples themselves. Thus we can detect continuities or similarities between the supposedly colonial categorization and prior divisions, opposition between old neighboring political entities (theocratic state of Fouta-Djalon/Empire of Samori Touré; initial domain of Samori Touré/political organizations of the forest), contrast between ancient Muslim areas (Center and East, mainly) and recently converted areas located outside the Muslim sphere, confrontation between slave-predatory and slave-provider regions, or juxtaposition of ecosystems (forest kola, coastal salt, central cattle, etc.). From this standpoint, the colonial categorization, long ignored by the colonized masses though rooted in previously held perceptions, revived locally rooted feelings of belonging and can therefore be seen as a step toward national consciousness and identity, one of the formative stages in the nation’s image. In fact, the end of colonization did not mark the disappearance of the four-way division, which went through various incarnations in contemporary discourse and practice (O Goerg 1985).

Guinea’s resounding “No” in 1958 was not enough to turn the past into a tabula rasa, and Sékou Touré in turn took up the elements of the colonial heritage, manipulating the ambiguity between the use of the four-part division and its obsolescence. Breaking away from France, Guinea needed international recognition. From this standpoint, various documents intended for foreign consumption were written, mainly in English, German, and French. These richly illustrated documents presented an image of Guinea that matched the earlier categorization. Moreover, the division was also perpetuated in the discourse of the PDG as well as institutionally as background for development plans in 1960 or for ministerial delegations from 1964 to 1975. At the same time, in order to build the nation, Sékou Touré focused on what united Guineans (anti-imperialism, socialism) and not on divisions, at least rhetorically. “It is not possible here to closely analyze a regime that, given... Influenced by Pan-Africanism, the PDG transcended regional differences in a dialectic relationship between ethnicity and nation: “No ethnic group could survive if the nation perished under the solvent effects of ethnic particularities.” Sékou Touré, La Lutte du Parti Démocratique de Guinée pour... (Marie-Vic O. M et al., 2008). The Guinean national anthem, which combines a tune composed as a song of praise to the Peuhl leader, Alpha Yaya, and the virtuosity of Malinké lyric writers is symptomatic of the desire to move beyond ethnicity. This tension between national unity and regional specificities is also illustrated by the artistic competitions aimed at promoting traditional cultures and contemporary creativity as regionally selected bands went on to participate in a national festival in Conakry. Brieu van de Wiele, “La politique culturelle de l’état... This was an attempt at creating the nation through unifying hybridization. The instrumental ensemble played tunes from all over Guinea: Mandingo epics, songs from Lower Guinea, melodies of the Mande kora, notes on the Peuhl pastoral flute, etc. The national orchestras (Kélétigu and his Tambouriniss, Balla and his Baladins, Bembeya Jazz) contributed toward founding modern Guinean music as a symbol of the Revolution. In short, the four-part division was carried on for both internal and external purposes and combined with elements calling for national unity. Demographers presented the 1983 census according to the four natural regions on the grounds that these ecological and sociological entities were more homogeneous than the Revolution’s seven general commissariats or the provinces resulting from the current administrative partitioning. This adoption of the customary divisions shows both the persistence of this categorization and the impact of the international institutions that financed the operation (Djibril T. N., 1995).

In the French case, the wave of ‘democratization’ – including the introduction of the positions of elected territorial councillors who, theoretically, could rival the prestige if not the power of the chiefs – followed a climax of reliance on these chiefs under Vichy rule in the Afrique Occidentale.
The organisation of colonial rule was, for processes. In practice, it showed to be the struggle against imperialism led to the further introduction of democratic structures after 1944 came to give to a considerable group of the local populations the right to elect their representatives in both the colonial capitals and in Paris. In the following, these deputies attempted to influence colonial capitals and in Paris. In the following, these deputies attempted to influence local decision-making in their constituencies, although, in the second half of the 1940s, they only had the task to vote over national laws in the metropole and to advise the colonial authorities in territorial matters, but not to interfere in the local processes. In practice, it showed to be impossible to separate both levels. The elected representatives used their new networks to carve out an important role for themselves in the regional theatres (Alexander Keese, 2010). The glorification of resistance against imperialism led to the further glorification of a resistance figure region by region, at the risk of overturning history. Thus SamorTou ré went from representing the country to representing a region, despite the fact that he initially symbolized the struggle of all of Guinea, playing on his association with Sékou Touré (Marie-Vic O. M. et al., 2008).

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED ON TABLE 2 BELOW:**

- **G**: Governor
- **A.G**: Acting Governor

**Table 2: Twenty Seven French Colonial Diplomatic Agents in Guinea-Conakry 1891-1958**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Names Of Diplomatic Agents</th>
<th>Period In Office</th>
<th>Colonial Portfolios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Noël Ballay</td>
<td>22/12/1891-16/6/1895</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Noël Ballay</td>
<td>16/6/1895-2/11/1900</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Paul Cousturier</td>
<td>2/11/1900-28/9/1904</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Antoine Marie Auguste Frezouls</td>
<td>28/9/1904-15/10/1940</td>
<td>A.G § G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jules Louis Richard</td>
<td>27/3/1906-16/5/1907</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Joost van Vollenhoven</td>
<td>16/5/1907-25/7/1907</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Georges Poulet</td>
<td>26/7/1907-18/2/1908</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Victor Liotard</td>
<td>18/2/1908-4/7/1910</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Georges Poulet</td>
<td>4/7/1910-11,1910</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Camille Guy</td>
<td>11,1910-9/5/1912</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jean Louis Georges Poirot</td>
<td>9/5/1912-7/3/1913</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jean Jules Emile Peuvergne</td>
<td>7/3/1913-23/10/1915</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Jean Louis Georges Poirot</td>
<td>23/10/1915-12/10/1916</td>
<td>A.G§ G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Louis François Antonin</td>
<td>21/07/1929-1931</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Robert de Guise</td>
<td>1931-1/1/1932</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Joseph Zédédé Olivier Vadier</td>
<td>1/11/1932-7/3/1936</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Louis Placide Blacher</td>
<td>7/3/1936-12/2/1940</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Antoine Félix Giacobbi</td>
<td>12/2/1940-8/1942</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Horace Valentin Crocchia</td>
<td>8,1942-25/3/1944</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Edouard Louis Terrac</td>
<td>30/4/1946-1948</td>
<td>A.G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Roland Pré</td>
<td>1,1948-9/2/1951</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Paul Henri Sirieux</td>
<td>9/2/1951-4,1953</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1. Independence and death of Sékou Touré at the Height of Capitalist - Communist Superpower Tousle 1958-1984

Ahmed Sekou Toure was a Guinean politician who played a key role in the African independence movement. As the first president of Guinea, he led his country to gain its independence from France in 1958. He was known as a charismatic and radical figure in Africa’s post-colonial history (Pauthier, C., 2013). Ahmed Sékou Touré, first president of Guinea, trade unionist, Pan-Africanist and authoritarian leader, was born on January 9, 1922 at Faranah, Guinea, a town on the banks of the Niger River. His parents, Alpha Touré and Aminata Fadiga, were peasant farmers of the Malinké ethnic group. Sékou Touré was first educated at the local Koranic school and pursued further studies at the regional school of Kissidougou, south Guinea. In 1938, he was expelled from school in Conakry, Guinea’s capital, for leading a hunger strike. He continued educating himself through correspondence courses while taking on various jobs. A member of the Post and Telecommunications Department, Sékou Touré formed Guinea’s first trade union, the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers’ Union, in 1945. He participated in the founding of the Pan-African Democratic African Rally (RDA) in 1946 and was nominated secretary general of the Democratic Party of Guinea, the regional branch of the RDA, in 1952. He also helped create the country’s first general trade union in 1946, the Federation of Workers’ Union of Guinea, which was associated with the French communist-led trade union movement. Devoting most of his time to trade union work, Touré lead strikes and protests often openly against French colonial rule. In 1956, Sékou Touré was nominated to be the mayor of Conakry and elected a deputy to the French National Assembly in Paris. By 1957, he was vice president of Guinea and was soon empowered to form the colony’s first autonomous government under control of a French Governor (Maelenn, K. T, 2009). On October 2, 1958, Touré proclaimed Guinea’s independence making it the first West African country liberated from French governance. Deprived of French support, President Sékou Touré developed close links with Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah. He also sought economic support from the Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. In the early 1960s Touré also developed Pan-African ideologies, combining efforts with other African leaders to establish a union of African states. The Organization of African Unity founded in 1963 is an outgrowth of his efforts. Sékou Touré ruled Guinea with political values close to socialism and based on a one-party system. His rule quickly showed the characteristics of a dictatorship with arrests of government opponents and executions. He also drove many dissents into exile. Despite Guinea’s rich natural resources, economic development of the country remained slow, impeded by poverty, corruption, and few foreign capital investments. President Sékou Touré, urgently transported in the U.S. due to serious heart condition, died of a heart failure in a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 26, 1984. Lansana Béavogui took the country in charge as interim president and declared a forty-day national mourning period. Republic of Guinea President Ahmed Sékou Touré, Andrews Air Force Base, USA, 1982. (Maelenn, K.T, 2009).

The strained relationship between Guinea and France was an episode of the Cold War as well as a turning point in the decolonisation of the French empire. Scholars such as Elizabeth Schmidt have shown how Touré’s departure was driven by grassroots activists on the left side of the political spectrum who convinced Touré to cut ties with France. She considers the repression of the Communist-leaning RDA by French officials to be a ‘Cold War choice’. Mairi MacDonald’s work on Guinea also refers to ‘Cold War preoccupations in Washington and Paris’. Historians who focus on the French stance towards Conakry, such as Fred Marte and Lacine Kaba, have emphasised the importance of clientelism in the French Africa policy. In their interpretation, the radical French retreat from Guinea was due to the conflicting personalities of de Gaulle and Touré, while Cold War historians like Sergei Mazov claim the international Cold War dimension should not be ignored (Frank G., 29 April 2019). Nevertheless, French cultural assistance has been analysed in public relations (PR) terms. How exactly French officials believed their operations would lead to influence over target audiences and how those views framed their understanding of the African landscape in which French ambassadors and cultural attachés had to operate remains under examined. Historian Laurence Saint-Gilles, for instance, has credited France with being the first country to understand the potential of soft power. Soft power is the ability of one nation to attract others to its cultural values and consequently adopt its way of thinking – which is distinct from hard power, where others are coerced through offers of compensation, through bargaining and negotiating, or by making threats. However, the soft power concept amounts to a distortion of the French strategy, since it is a partial justification of the Cold War projection of US ideals abroad. Joseph Nye devised the concept in 1990 in response to Paul Kennedy’s argument that the US was going through its phase of imperial decline (Frank G., 29 April 2019).

Moreover, the opening of archives that document French cultural diplomacy and psychological warfare in the French colonial territories has served to further complicate our understanding of the French tactics in the battle for hearts and minds. Jennifer Dueck’s work on French cultural diplomacy in Syria and Lebanon elucidates how the distinction between propaganda, as ‘causing people to leap to conclusions
without adequate examination of the evidence’, and information or education, ‘which invites inquiry’ did not apply to French public diplomacy, whereas it was a core dilemma for US operatives (Frederick Cooper, 2014). Louisa Rice has examined how Hollywood films and American cultural centres in Senegal were perceived as a threat to French influence. From the vantage point of cultural assistance, the de Gaulle-centred explanations become less convincing and it emerges that a French presence was maintained in Guinea. For France, the Cold War threat was part of a multifaceted competition for influence in Conakry. Taken together, the changing views on the workings of public diplomacy shed light on what motivated French decision-making in the 1950s and how views on empire and the Cold War in Africa changed. Guinea provides a starting point to determine in what way the Cold War should be ‘reduced in significance by future historians’, as Odd Arne Westad writes. A first part of this article will therefore analyse how French cultural diplomats believed their activities would generate influence on the continent after 1945. Those beliefs were the product of a mindset in which French culture was considered to be a privilege bestowed upon Africans hungry for modernity. When confronted with the challenge of Guinea, where Soviet influence was rumoured to be mounting, this cultural assistance approach became the subject of harsh debates between French officials in West Africa and Paris (Frank G., 29 April 2019).

On 25 August 1958 de Gaulle visited Conakry to advocate for the yes vote, but he was caught off guard by Touré’s speech, which demanded revisions to the proposed constitution. Shocked by this opposition, measures were taken in the realm of culture. Eleven days before the referendum, the French ambassador, Jean Mauberna, asked teachers who were holidaying outside of Guinea not to return, a punitive measure that reflected the French views on development in which teachers and language were important. Instead of an increased effort to fight a battle for Guinean hearts and minds, via the spread of information, the French cultural presence was thus reduced (Tony C., 2002). By January 1959, however, Paris began to realise that aid offers from other countries to Guinea had to be more directly countered, and they started negotiating a cultural protocol with Touré. The Quai d’Orsay sent an unofficial diplomat, Pasteur Mabille, to different capitals to investigate what motivated the United Kingdom (UK) and the US to go to Guinea. At the Africa Department of the Foreign Office, Mabille was assured that the UK had nothing to do with the Ghana-Guinea union. In his meeting with Dulles, he was asked why de Gaulle had granted Guinea independence if the general still wanted to intervene. On 16 June 1959, the psychological warfare committee of France was instructed by Prime Minister Michel Debré to take action because he wanted to maintain Guinea in the French Franc zone and preserve some level of intellectual influence by providing the necessary educational infrastructure. The committee, which had been created in October 1955, was headed by Charles Lacheroy and part of the French army, which was looking for ways to deal with FLN propaganda. In mid-May, after other NATO members could not be convinced of the seriousness of the Soviet threat, a negotiation team led by the DGACT director Roger Seydoux was sent to Guinea to resume negotiations about an economic and cultural agreement. That decision was driven less by the 4000 remaining French inhabitants and their economic interests than it was by competitors who had their feet in the door to Guinea, possibly unlocking the rest of French Africa in the process (Elizabeth S., 2013).

In the face of intense competition, public diplomats on the ground were forced to think about ways in which they could make their aid more attractive, a novel situation for public diplomats who had been convinced French culture needed little PR. The issue of attractiveness preoccupied one man in particular, Louis de Guiringaud, the French ambassador to Accra, who was confronted with a Ghanaian propaganda campaign in which France was depicted as Africa’s enemy, while a growing group of African students chose the US or Germany over France. Guiringaud explained the lack of interest in French culture by pointing to Africans who were supposedly insufficiently prepared for a culture that came from a ‘highly civilised’ country. Guinea’s independence created a ripple effect across the French colonies in Africa (Mairi Stewart M., 2009). In 1960 de Gaulle was confronted with a cascade of independence declarations from Cameroon, Senegal, Togo, Mali, Madagascar, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon. In response, bilateral and multilateral agreements with African countries were hurriedly elevated to the level of official policy, known as Coopération (Martin G., 2010). The Brazzaville group, created in 1960 by former French colonies which wanted a strong connection to France, transformed itself into the Union africaine et malgache (UAM) which voted with France in the UN General Assembly. De Gaulle’s televised speech on cultural and economic cooperation in July 1961 was indicative of the level of improvisation. The cost of empire had made disengagement inevitable, de Gaulle declared, in his calculated political vernacular. But if France could ‘establish new relations based on friendship and cooperation’, ‘tant mieux’, all the better!. It took the French government until 1963 to establish a commission – led by and named after Jean-Marcel Jeanneney – that was tasked with devising a doctrine for Coopération (Martin G., 2010).

In French Africa, Cold War concerns were entangled with a shifting perception of the postcolonial
political situation. Consequently, French public diplomacy in Africa became a form of cultural assistance. In the early 1950s French culture was not a political instrument aimed at convincing anticolonial activists, but a means to manage African populations in French colonies, who were perceived to be eager for modern ideas. When Guinea rejected French tutelage, the initial harsh French retreat – which historians have emphasised – was quietly reversed when Debré noticed other countries were eager to offer Touré assistance. In defiance of, or with his quiet permission, de Gaulle’s punishment was quickly softened because of the resolve to retain Guinea in the French Franc zone and the desire to preserve some level of intellectual influence (Jessica C. E. et al., 2010). By 1960, Paris’ view on cultural assistance had become more explicitly transactional: cultural resources were more consciously granted to those countries that were expected to remain closely allied with France. The pleas of French ambassadors to pay more attention to the competitive PR environment fell onto deaf ears in Paris. Foccart’s strategy, which relied on personal ties with African leaders, was therefore not only a response to emerging Cold War conflicts on the continent, but part of a longer interpretation of modernisation. Cultural assistance became a frame of reference of French diplomats in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, and as such adds a layer of complexity to Cold War-inspired analyses and interpretations of interventionism and conflict in Africa. In the French estimation, the Soviet Union was only one of many competitors besides the UK, the US, and Ghana that France had to contend with in Conakry. For the French, Touré’s defection was not proof of his leftist convictions, since they were well aware that he played off different parties against each other to obtain aid. Rather than increase France’s Cold War sensibilities in Africa, setting the stage for an unholy alliance with Mobutu and others, Touré’s defection highlights the continuity of French assumptions about the power of the postcolonial cultural transaction (Kaba Lanciné, 1988).

In 1958 the French Fourth Republic collapsed due to political instability and its failures in dealing with its colonies, especially Indochina and Algeria. The founding of a Fifth Republic was supported by the French people, while French President Charles de Gaulle made it clear on 8 August 1958 that France’s colonies were to be given a stark choice between more autonomy in a new French Community and immediate independence in the referendum to be held on 28 September 1958. The other French colonies chose the former but Guinea — under the leadership of Ahmed Sékou Touré whose Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) had won 56 of 60 seats in 1957 territorial elections — voted overwhelmingly for independence. The French withdrew quickly, destroying infrastructure and equipment along the way and on October 2, 1958, Guinea proclaimed itself a sovereign and independent republic, with Sékou Touré as President (Suret-Canale, J., 1980).

2.2. The Course of American International Capitalist Engagements Towards Guinea-Conakry

United States engagement in the pre-colonial Another issue for Turner and successor governors in the late 1820s and early 1830s was a renewed initiative by American commercial and colonial interests along this section of coast. Many of Freetown’s own settlers were of American descent, having come from former British colonies that had obtained independence at the end of the eighteenth century. The long European war of 1793-1815, an American Embargo, and a short-lived war between the United States and Britain in 1812 had resulted in a hiatus of American activity on the African coast (Jessica C. E et al., 2010). A trade in now-illegal slaves and in commodities revived dramatically in the latter half of the second decade of the nineteenth century. As in Britain, sentiment in the United States was strong for abolition of slavery. Some in the American South and North who opposed slavery, but who also objected to free slaves residing in their states, wanted to return freed slaves to Africa or at least to transport them away from their states. These sentiments toward both abolition and resettlement/emigration led to increased pressures in America to re-settle free or freed persons of African descent along the African coast (Kelly, Kenneth G. et al., 2015). Although this paper focuses more directly on British interest in the coast and interior of Guinea-Conakry, it is instructive to summarize here American activities and objectives in the 1820s and 1830s as a way to better understand British actions in the Northern Rivers. Numerous traders resident in the Nunez and Pongo rivers were Americans or of American descent, and they maintained valuable contacts with American commercial firms from the late eighteenth century. John Frazer of Bangalan branch in the Rio Pongo, for example, operated a factory from the 1790s from which he shipped commodities and slaves, some of the latter destined no doubt for a rice plantation that he owned near Charleston in the state of South Carolina (Schafer 1999). He married in the Pongo, sired a number of Euro-African children many of whom attended the short-lived missionary schools located there, and sent at least two children for finishing education in England and France. When the slave trade became illegal for American citizens in 1808, Frazer returned to Charleston and subsequently moved his plantation, as did others, from South Carolina to Spanish Florida where slave trading remained legal. He also took up Spanish citizenship to better protect him in the trade. Meanwhile, his African wife and children remained in the Rio Pongo where they operated the African base of his commercial network (Kelly, Kenneth G et al., 2015). Others in the Nunez and Pongo trades or with connections at Charleston did the same thing in an attempt to avoid application of laws designed to stop
slaving by British and American subjects. American documents clearly demonstrate that traders in the Nunez and Pongo with strong American connections included William and Elizabeth (Frazer) Skelton, John Sergent, John/Samuel Holeman, Paul Faber, Styles Lightburn, the Curtis family/ lineage, and of course the Frazers (Jessica C. E et al., 2010).

In the year since Guinea’s independence, the country has assumed a critical importance among all the French-speaking areas of West and Equatorial Africa. Because Guinea accepted General de Gaulle’s challenge and voted for independence, its experiment is being closely watched by all its French-speaking neighbors. If it seems to be succeeding, it will almost certainly act as a magnet to the surrounding area. Furthermore, if the Soviet Bloc is able to achieve a dominant position there, it will undoubtedly use Guinea as a bridgehead for expanding its influence throughout West Africa. The Soviet Bloc appears to be making an all-out effort to capitalize on the present situation in Guinea. So far five Bloc nations have concluded bilateral trade agreements, theoretically committing a third of the country’s trade. Some 150 Bloc technicians have replaced French officials so that the key officers in many vital ministries are from Eastern Europe: i.e., Radio Conakry, which in the absence of daily newspapers is the principal information medium in the country, is being operated by Czech technicians and the leading advisers of both the Ministries of Defense and Mines are also from behind the Iron Curtain. Recently the Soviets have offered a 35 million dollar loan. Although we believe President Toure is trying to maintain a neutral policy, there are members of his government who reportedly are trying to push him to the left. Saifoulaye Diallo, for example, who concluded the negotiations for the Soviet loan, may develop into a potential rival of Sekou Toure if he is able to represent the Soviet Union as the real supporter of African nationalism, as opposed to the United States which delayed recognition of Guinea and has produced comparatively little aid. The recent Congress of the PDG, the only political party in Guinea, was attended by official delegations from the Soviet Communist Party and the parties of other satellites and represented the high-water mark so far of Bloc influence in the area. (U.S. Department of States, Foreign Service Institute, October 6, 1959).

However, President Sekou Toure’s trip to Washington from 26 to 28, October 1959 provided a unique opportunity to exert a moderating influence on the future course of U.S.- Guinea consolidated bilateral relations at the apex of the Cold War. Such actions were serious challenges to the Communist World as an urgent attempt to contained them and change the minds of Conakry’s leaders once more towards the Capitalist World in spite of her differences with the former colonial master France. An indication of President Toure’s determination to maintain a neutral course is his choice of the United States for his first official trip outside Africa. Our Embassy in Conakry reports, however, that if he is unable to show that, as a result of this visit, the United States is as firm a supporter of Guinea as the USSR, his dominant position in the ruling hierarchy may be threatened by those further to the left (Telegram 24 to Conakry, July 31). Our principal objective in Guinea is to maintain the presence of the United States and the West in the country and to establish a position for future United States action to stem the flood of expanding Soviet influence and reinforce our own influence when this flood recedes. Also we believe that while Toure cannot be considered wholly satisfactory from the West’s point of view, he nevertheless represents a stable element strongly committed to neutrality and, as such, is worthy of our support. Only with this support will he be able to oppose extreme leftist opposition now developing within the Party and be influenced toward a position more truly in Guinea’s (and our own) best interests (Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5–MSP/10–659). You will recall that on April 27 you approved the principle of United States aid to Guinea and the dispatch of an ICA survey team there (Tab A). As a result of this visit, the team recommended (a) a technical cooperation program, (b) P.L. 480 support activities and (c) possible DLF loans, including one for setting up a development bank (Tab B). In addition to any impact projects that may be approved for presentation during the visit of Sekou Toure, it is planned to mention as evidence of United States interest in the well-being of Guinea the following examples of present and potential United States assistance: ICA and USIA have initiated a joint English teaching project (Tab C) which to date has resulted in the arrival of one English teacher in Conakry on August 15, and the supplying of necessary equipment, such as tape recorders, mimeograph machines, books and supplies (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199). Following the signature of a Technical Cooperation Agreement with Guinea, which it is hoped will be ready for signature by Sekou Toure during his forthcoming visit to Washington (October 26–28), ICA proposes to expand this program by contracting with a university in the United States to provide a minimum of at least four additional English language teacher-trainers plus necessary backstop equipment. The estimated cost of this project is $200,000 for two years. This joint ICA–USIA project could be expanded as opportunities present themselves. ICA, following signature of the Technical Cooperation Agreement, is also prepared to finance the training at Ohio State University of five (5) Guinean elementary school teachers whose classes initially would be in French. This would be a one-year program commencing in January 1960, the total budget for which would run approximately $42,500. Additionally, ICA contemplates obligation of up to $370,000 for technical
assistance projects in the fields of agriculture, education, industry, etc., based on such recommendations as may develop out of joint USOM/GOG planning. The foregoing activities scheduled for FY 1960 implementation will lay the basis for a continuing program, currently estimated at $2.5 million for FY 1961 (Memorandum of conversation, April 27; Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199).

Guinea has already agreed to a USIA program. USIA will formally open its office in Conakry with the assignment of one American officer who, it is hoped, will be on duty before the end of the calendar year. The activities to be undertaken are a press operation based on radio-teletype monitoring of the wireless file, film distribution, and local production to be included in the agency’s African newsreel, “Today”. In the field of radio, USIS Conakry will publicize the Voice of America schedule to build up listenership for VOA programs and will attempt to place package programs with Radio Conakry. A library of English and French books will be opened in the Information Center. The contract English teacher previously mentioned, who arrived in Conakry on August 15, is conducting an English teaching program aimed primarily at VIP’s. On September 15 a USIS officer was sent to Conakry to arrange for coverage of the Sekou Toure visit. Approximately $39,000 will be spent in FY 1960 under this program for USIA Mission expenses alone. Ambassador Morrow has been instructed to discuss this with the Guinean authorities when he considers it opportune.4 In FY 1959 Title II PL 480 commodities, consisting of 5,000 tons of rice and 3,000 tons of wheat flour valued at $2,175,000 were made available to Guinea. Similar commodities under the same program mounting to $4,000,000 may be proposed during FY 1960. There are several possibilities of providing further assistance to Guinea under P.L. 480: Under Title II or possibly Title III, the initiation by some welfare agency of a school feeding program in which Sekou Toure has expressed interest. (This program might be arranged through CARE since all religious mission schools have been closed down.). Utilization of Section 104 (d) currencies, which the United States own, (such as Israeli pounds or Indian rupees), to purchase and supply Guinea with United States own, (such as Canadian dollar or American dollar). Utilization of Section 104 (d) currencies, which the Guinean government has been closed down. (This Section 104 (d) currencies, which the government of China has been closed down).

By 1960, Touré had declared the PDG the only legal party. For the next 24 years, the government and the PDG were one. Touré was reelected unopposed to four seven-year terms as president, and every five years voters were presented with a single list of PDG candidates for the National Assembly. Advocating a hybrid African Socialism domestically and Pan-Africanism abroad, Touré quickly became a polarising leader, and his government became intolerant of dissent, imprisoning hundreds, and stifling free press. At the same time, the Guinean government nationalised land, removed French appointed and traditional chiefs from power, and broke ties with French government and companies. Vacillating between support for the Soviet Union and (by the late 1970s) the United States, Guinea's economic situation became as unpredictable as its diplomatic line. Alleging plots and conspiracies against him at home and abroad, Touré's regime targeted real and imagined opponents, driving thousands of political opponents into exile (Robert L., 1970). U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was hostile to Touré, so the African nation quickly turned to the Soviet Union—making it the Kremlin's first success story in Africa. Following France's withdrawal, Guinea quickly aligned itself with the Soviet Union and adopted socialist policies. This alliance was short lived, however, as Guinea moved towards a Chinese model of socialism. Nevertheless, President John F. Kennedy and
his Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver tried even harder than the Kremlin's Nikita Khrushchev. By 1963 Guinea had shifted away from Moscow into a closer friendship with Washington [6]. Guinea relied more and more on aid and investment from the U.S. Even the relationship with France improved, after the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as president, trade increased and the two countries exchanged diplomatic visits (Philip E. M., 2008).

In 1970, Portuguese forces, from neighboring Portuguese Guinea, staged Operation Green Sea, a raid into Guinea with the support of exiled Guinean opposition forces. Among other goals, the Portuguese military wanted to kill or capture Sekou Touré due to his support of the PAIGC, a guerilla movement operating inside Portuguese Guinea. After several days of fierce fighting, the Portuguese forces retreated without achieving most of their goals. The regime of Sékou Touré increased the number of internal arrests and executions (Wayback Machine, The Economist, November 22, 1980). The Guinean Market Women's Revolt in 1977 resulted in the regime's softening of economic restrictions and began a turn away from the radical socialism previously practiced by the government. Sékou Touré died on March 26, 1984 after a heart operation in the United States, and was replaced by Prime Minister Louis Lansana Beavogui, who was to serve as interim president pending new elections. The PDG was due to elect a new leader on April 3, 1984. Under the constitution, that person would have been the only candidate for president. However, hours before that meeting, Colonels Lansana Conté and Diarra Traoré seized power in a bloodless coup. Conté assumed the role of president, with Traoré serving as prime minister until December. Conté immediately denounced the previous regime's record on human rights, released 250 political prisoners and encouraged approximately 200,000 more to return from exile. He also made explicit the turn away from socialism, but this did little to alleviate poverty and the country showed no immediate signs of moving towards democracy (Wayback Machine, The Economist, November 22, 1980).

The former French colony of Guinea declares its independence on October 2, 1958, with Sekou Touré as the new nation’s first leader. Guinea was the sole French West African colony to opt for complete independence, rather than membership in the French Community, and soon thereafter France withdrew all aid to the new republic. It soon became apparent that Touré would pose a problem for the United States. He was fiercely nationalistic and anti-imperialist, and much of his wrath and indignation was aimed at the United States for its alliances with colonial powers such as Great Britain and France and its refusal to openly condemn the white minority government of South Africa. More troubling for U.S. officials, however, was Guinea’s open courting of Soviet aid and money and signing of a military assistance agreement with the Soviet Union. By 1960, nearly half of Guinea’s exports were going to eastern bloc nations and the Soviets had committed millions of dollars of aid to the African republic. Touré was also intrigued by Mao’s communist experiments in China. Touré played the Soviet Union and the United States against one another to get the aid and trade he desired. While Guinea’s relations with the United States got off to a rocky start (American newspapers routinely referred to the nation as “Red” Guinea), matters improved during the Kennedy administration when Touré refused to accommodate Soviet aircraft wishing to refuel on their way to Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962. In 1975, Touré changed course and allowed Soviet and Cuban aircraft to use Guinea’s airfields during the Angolan civil war, then he again reversed position by revoking the privileges in 1977 and moving closer to France and the United States. The concerns of U.S. officials over communist influences in Guinea, and the up-and-down relationship with Guinea were but precursors of other difficulties the United States would face in postcolonial Africa. As Guinea and other former colonies achieved independence during the post–World War II period, Africa became another battleground in the U.S.-Soviet conflict (History.Com Editors), The Cold War comes to Africa, as Guinea gains its independence, October 2, 1958.

The most spectacular visit of Sékou Touré in U.S. took place in 1979 with a Memorandum of Conversation, subject focusing on U.S.-Guinea Bilateral Relations; African Issues (Department of States, Washington, August 8, 1979) as an important foreign policy pattern of U.S between 1977 and 1980 which started witnessing relaxation of tension in the Cold War conflicts between Communism and Capitalism. In fact, participants on the side of Americans includes the President, Jimmy Carter, Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, Gerald Funk, National Security Council, Oliver S. Crosby, Ambassador to Guinea and William C. Harrop, Acting Assistant Secretary of State. On the Guinean side, they include, President Sekou Toure, Moussa Diakite, Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Ismael Touré, Minister of Mines and Geology, Damantang Camara, President of the National Assembly and Mamady Conde, Ambassador to the U.S. During the exchange, Sekou Touré declared that “he agreed that the NAM should not be dominated by the Soviets”. To that effect noted he was working with Tito to seek a collegial leadership for the NAM rather than a single President like Castro. He expected their proposal to be accepted. The President and Sékou Touré agreed on the urgent need for resolution of Southern Africa issues. Touré acknowledged that Muzorewa was a bona fide political leader and felt that a negotiated reconciliation with the Patriotic Front should be
possible. In response to the President’s request that
Guinea support Sadat, Sékou Touré replied indirectly
by emphasizing his close personal relationship with
Sadat. The President underlined American concern
about human rights questions, and congratulated Sékou
Touré on the release from prison of Archbishop Tchidimbo. The President said the U.S. looked forward
to expanding its aid to Guinea. The President
reminded Touré of the importance his country attached
to continued cessation of Soviet reconnaissance flights
from Conakry. The atmosphere was cordial,
with Touré projecting a moderate image. End
Summary. Sékou Touré said he was happy to be in
Washington and was determined to improve
cooperation between Guinea and the United States. He
then presented an historical sketch of Guinea since the
13th century, emphasizing the country’s resistance to
colonial domination. He described how he, starting
from the labor movement, had led Guinea toward
freedom and toward the historic vote of 1958 when
Guinea was the only one of 13 French colonies in
Africa to choose independence. Since that time Guinea
had been wrongly accused of communism and
extremism. Guinea had a very bad press and wished to
be judged on its actions not upon what people said of it.
The Guinean people and their leaders were deeply
religious, poor in material terms but not poor
spiritually; they had a refined sense of human dignity.
The President said he hoped that Sékou Touré, as a
founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and an
African leader, would use his influence to prevent
the NAM from coming under Soviet domination. In the
American view, Cuba and Castro are subject to Soviet
influence and we are concerned by the draft
communiqué distributed by Castro (National Archives,
RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790341–0712).

The President wished to ask two questions: First, he understood Touré had just met with Tito and
wondered how he assessed the balance among members
for the Havana Conference. Second, he wanted Sékou
Touré to know that the United States agreed fully with
the Guinea view on Zimbabwe and Namibia. He would
appreciate Touré’s assessment of the Lusaka
Commonwealth meeting. On Rhodesia, Touré felt the
Lusaka conference had exposed certain contradictions
between the UK and the Front Line. He believed there
was a possibility of compromise between Muzorewa
and the Patriotic Front on condition that the reality of
radical change be accepted both by Ian Smith and the
more conservative elements in the British government.
Touré had supported the recent OAU resolution
recognizing the Patriotic Front as sole representative of
the Zimbabwe people, but he knew that this was no
solution. Muzorewa was a political leader regardless of
how one evaluated the election (Keessing’s
Contemporary Archives, Volume XXV, 1979, pp.
29901–29908). The Patriotic Front and the leaders of
the Salisbury regime must come together and initiate a
reconciliation in good faith. There must also be good
faith shown toward the armed cadres of the Patriotic
Front who had fought and suffered for their
independence. They were really the ones whose
interests were recognized by the OAU resolution. Sekou
Touré returned to his presentation, noting that after self-
determination were effected in Namibia and Zimbabwe
we would be faced with the core problem of apartheid.
If apartheid could be abolished then there would be an
excellent prospect for cooperation between the
countries of black Africa and South Africa, by far the
most industrialized nation on the Continent. Turning to
the NAM, Touré said that he and Tito had recently
published in Belgrade a long communiqué on non-
alignment. Their intention was to create a collegial
leadership of the NAM in place of a single president
who could be the instrument of a major outside power,
for example Fidel Castro and the USSR. It was not
reasonable for an organization composed of many
varied governments to have a single spokesman for the
two-year period between non-aligned
conferences. Sekou Touré agreed completely with the
President that the non-aligned should be in fact non-
aligned, not a tool of the Soviet Union. He believed that
the membership would approve of the collegial
leadership proposal. Touré said he had hoped also to
discuss the Western Sahara, Uganda, his recent talks in
Yugoslavia, Rumania and Libya, the questions of Chad
and Vietnam, and other issues. Toure emphasized his
long and close personal friendship for Anwar Sadat and
his admiration for him. Toure had had a long and useful
exchange with Sadat at the Monrovia conference in July
about the Middle East peace process. Sadat was a fine
and courageous leader.

On his part, President Carter welcomed the
Guinean delegation, noting pleasure at our new
friendship and the fine record of American investment
in Guinea. He congratulated President Toure on his
leadership role in Africa, his mediation of conflicts, and
his forthcoming presidency of the OAU. The President
commented on our mutual concern for the enhancement
of human rights. He knew that Sekou Toure appreciated
the importance of this issue to the American people.
The President congratulated Sekou Toure on the release
the previous day of Archbishop Tchidimbo. Turning to
temporary African problems, Toure urged the U.S.
to lend its effective support to self-determination, so
that blacks and whites could have equal rights in South
Africa, and the people of Zimbabwe could live together
in true self-determination, so that Namibia could reach
independence under international and UN auspices
(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File,
D790362–0610). President Carter said he had listened
with attention to Sekou Touré’s explanation of Guinea
and the courage of its people, who insisted upon
independence and freedom. All Western nations were
gratified by the improving relationship between
themselves and Guinea. He had discussed this among
leaders of the West who all felt this evolution is of mutual benefit to the industrialized nations and to Guinea. The President said he admired the way Guinea had been able to utilize American aid and looked forward to some expansion of both this assistance and of trade between our countries. President Carter said the United States would support the British effort as developed by the Commonwealth at Lusaka and which has the support of certain Front Line leaders. He asked Toure’s views of the NAM meeting in Havana. The President suggested these other matters be saved for the later meeting Toure would have with Secretary Vance. President Carter thanked Toure for this explanation. The President said we were very concerned about the isolation of President Sadat and asked Toure for his views on this matter. He asked that Guinea provide maximum support to Sadat. President Carter concluded the meeting by noting that Sadat’s courage was like the courage of the Guinean people. He thanked Sekou Toure for his visit and wished him a good trip in the U.S. He hoped for continually improved understanding between the U.S. and Guinea. The President recalled that when the Guinean Ambassador had presented his credentials two years ago the President had expressed his concern over the deployment of Soviet TU 95 BEAR reconnaissance aircraft from Conakry, Sekou Toure had shown his friendship for the U.S. and his interest in true non-alignment by cooperating with us on this matter of importance to our security, and had ceased the flights. This had opened a period of warmer relations between us which we hoped would continue and prosper. President Toure thanked the President for the useful exchange (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790362–0610).

List of abbreviations used on table No. 3
C.A.I: Chargé d’Affaires ad interim
A.E.P: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Neo-Colonial Diplomatic Agents</th>
<th>Years in office</th>
<th>Portfolios</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Robert W. Rinden</td>
<td>30/7/ 1959-30/7/ 1959</td>
<td>C.A.I</td>
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<td>3 William Attwood</td>
<td>20/10/ 1966-20/10/ 1969</td>
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<td>7 Terence A. Toddman</td>
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2.3. The Course of Communist Accusation and fortification of Sékou Touré’s International Ambitions

This perception grew particularly stronger in French Africa where the colonial administration, most often, adopted hostile attitudes vis-à-vis Islam. Due to its historical antecedence in these areas and its greater adaptability to African traditions, Islam had been accepted as “an African religion” and utilized in the resistance to European occupation. Put in the context of the history of globalization, this phenomenon epitomizes the clash of agents of globalization responsible for the forging of Africa’s so-called “triple heritage.” As for the alleged conflict between Marxism and Islam in Guinea’s nation building history, it, too, is not free from controversy. Mamoud Béla Doumbouya, a founding member of the PDG and long-time unionist and spiritual leader, downplayed the allegation and suggested that even though some traditional chiefs opted in the colonial structures 12 stridently accused the PDG of being communist and godless, the party was able to demonstrate to the masses that compared to those chiefs it was more faithful to Islam’s precepts of freedom, equality, justice and brotherly solidarity.
In Fadiga’s opinion, there was nothing special in this state of affairs: “It simply reflected the normal course of conflict of authority and conflict of interests in societies in profound transformation whereby decadent forces always fight to the last minute, sometimes using the most absurd arguments” Chérif Nabaniou, former minister of Islamic Affairs and former secretary general of the National Islamic Council, perceived the matter differently when he argued that even though the PDG was never anti-Islamic its policies did nonetheless contradict Islamic precepts in key areas of national policy. One such area was the adoption of socialism. “Islam advocates neither socialism nor capitalism, and yet the PDG imposed socialism’s institutionalized collectivization of property in agriculture and commerce” (Robert L., 1970) the PDG toward both 13 religion and Marxism was aimed at establishing the party’s political predominance over the different forces competing for power in Guinea in the waning years of the colonial era, including the French administration, the old traditional chieftaincies which the same administration had turned into proto-colonial structures, and para-political forces whose power rested on the manipulation of religion. In fact, under the Socialist Cultural Revolution (SCR) proclaimed in 1968, this policy was expanded to include “demystification,” a campaign aimed at neutralizing the marabouts (clerics) and at abolishing secret societies of amnist initiation and fetishist divination (Robert L., 1970). The principal objective of the SCR was the standardization of all aspects of Guinean culture, including but not limited to religion and education, according to norms determined in the political program and ideological doctrine of the single-party regime in place since independence. Diplomatic Offensive and the Politics of Islamic Internationalism. The politics of Islamic internationalism under Sékou Touré can be better grasped when analyzed from the systemic standpoint of the PDG regime’s theory and practice of foreign policy as articulated in President Sékou Touré’s writings from which one notes that Guinea’s foreign policy was primarily focused on Pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism. In 1964, the Guinean leader wrote, “But our international policy is not conducted exclusively in view of Guinea’s interests. We subordinate it to Africa’s overriding interest” (Touré 1964). To subordinate Guinea’s national interests to “Africa’s overriding interest” and conduct a foreign policy accordingly was, in Touré’s view, to hold a dual outlook whose justification is twofold. First, “A vertical development in Guinea would indeed inevitably result in cutting us off from the African context; hence, irrespective of its quality, it would be 14 extremely frail, since, in making for our isolation, it would weaken us” (Touré, 1964). Second, “If our development was an isolated phenomenon, if it was to make us retire within ourselves, it would not be very dangerous for imperialism and colonialism... Imperialism and colonialism desire as a lesser evil the isolation of Guinea, her walling in, which would limit the effects of her struggle against their privileges and powers of domination in Africa and in the world” (Touré, 1964). In the conditions of the Cold War, the PDG regime added to this framework that of non-alignment because, in Touré’s view, “To attempt to interpret Africa’s behaviour in terms of capitalism or Communism is to ignore the fundamental fact that Africa’s present conditions correspond neither to the essentials of capitalism nor to those for building up Communism, as generally admitted” (Touré, 1964).

In retrospect, therefore, it is from the triple perspective of the defense of national sovereignty, African unity, and non-alignment that Guinea’s official internationalist philosophy and politics under the PDG ought to be considered. Hence, the role of Islam ought to be examined as one of many venues in Guinea’s international policy geared toward upholding the principles of this triple perspective. Even though the mid-1970s is generally considered to be a turning point in the political and ideological attitude of the PDG regime toward Islam, it is useful to know that as early as the first years of Guinea’s independence, Touré had established close personal and political relations with African Muslim leaders such as King Mohamed V of Morocco and Presidents Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (Gakunzi, D. 2018). But in terms of ideological globalization through Islam, an attentive analysis of President Touré’s policy of Offensive Diplomatique officially launched through the International Ideological Colloquium of Conakry and the subsequent PDG Eleventh National Congress of 1978 will help to understand the trend. In 1978, Touré’s regime was gradually emerging from a decade of relative isolation, including political tensions with neighboring Senegal and Côte-d’Ivoire (which Guinea had accused of harboring anti-PDG Guinean exiles) and an extremely challenging Western embargo due, allegedly, to Guinea’s close ties to the Communist bloc.
and questionable human rights record. Indeed, in 1975, diplomatic relations were normalized with France. As a result, reconciliation was reached with the two Francophone neighbors in February 1978, and, in December of the same year, French President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing was scheduled for a state visit to Guinea for the first time in history (Mairi Stewart M., 2009). In the heat of this “détente,” the PDG leadership undertook the highly publicized task of hosting a forum on the role of ideology in African politics and international relations under the theme “Africa on the Move.” Judging by its unusually inclusive nature, one can argue that the forum was chiefly designed to sell to international public opinion the regime’s new open-door policy without compromising its commitment to third world revolutionary ideology. Indeed, of the eighty-three foreign delegations representing states, political parties, labor unions, national liberation movements, and international organizations, fifteen were representatives of Muslim nations including Algeria, Egypt, Gambia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen whose pronouncements were particularly well received by the Guinean National Islamic Council and Ministry of Islamic Affairs created two years earlier to further integrate Islam into the PDG political apparatus and further integrate Guinea into the international Islamic community. Thus, international panels endeavored to tie Islam to revolutionary socialist ideology as a unifying factor among political parties and states sharing this religion and this ideology. This transpired from the allocations of a number of delegates from Muslim socialist states. Malek Bachour of the Iraqi Arab Socialist Baath Party indicated, “The meeting of revolutionary ideological forces which the Democratic Party of Guinea has organized constitutes, from our point of view, a serious and effective opportunity to share our experiences, to expose and overcome the challenges posed to the national liberation movements and to the socialist Revolution in the third world by the imperialist forces and their agents” (Machour 1979).

Still from the Islamic standpoint, the International Ideological Colloquium of Conakry was once and at the same time an occasion to ascertain anew the political unity of the world Muslim community against the enemies of Islam and Muslims everywhere. Following the colloquium and the National Congress, President Touré embarked, in 17 1979, on an unprecedented diplomatic shuttle which led him to Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait notably (Mairi Stewart M., 2009). Throughout these diplomatic missions, the Guinean leader emphasized his country’s longstanding “privileged relations” with the Arab world and unwavering support for the Palestinian people because of which his government was among the first in Africa to break diplomatic relations with Israel in the 1960s. As a result of the government’s heightened political and diplomatic engagement, oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, Iran and Libya provided much needed financial aid to Guinea (Guia M. 2012). In addition, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Libya offered a number of scholarships, thus enabling Guinean students to pursue higher and vocational education in North Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia established the Dar al-Mal al-Islamiyya Bank in Conakry, while Libyan, Tunisian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Moroccan businesses opened in Conakry. Guinea’s policy of Islamic internationalization also materialized through President Touré’s increasingly active participation in Muslim organizations and programs in his cumulative capacities of first vice president of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, president of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Iran-Iraq War, and president of the Al-Quds Committee. Quite interestingly, Guinea’s increasing political respectability and diplomatic prestige among Muslim nation-states helped advance the Touré regime’s quest for warmer relations with the West so by the end of the regime Guinea was, for the first time since the 1960s, enjoying meaningful bilateral relations with France, the United States and West Germany (Kaba L., 1988). Furthermore, beginning in the early 1990s, Guinea has been experiencing an increasingly aggressive campaign of evangelization by various Christian denominations from the United States and other Western nations targeting areas where the influence of Islam remains minimal. Some evangelical missionaries use material and financial rewards to attract followers from among indigent individuals while some (Neo-Apostolic missionaries notably) go as far as to profess toleration of polygamy and open mixture of animism and Christianity. Likewise, and perhaps in an effort to counter evangelization and secularism, unidentified Muslim organizations are pursuing an equally aggressive trend of recruitment of Wahhabi fellowship particularly among women of precarious conditions (Kaba L., 1988). Whether with French colonialism, West African “theocratic” aristocracies, Sékou Touré’s civilian autocracy or Lansana Conté’s military junta, Islamic activism has, from time to time, cornered the state in a position of crisis and reconsideration leading to what Migdal terms triangular accommodation for political survival. Such political acrobatics rarely produced positive social results and are more likely to generate far-reaching crises in correlation with the current international situation. International organizations and states, big and small, ought to face this historical fact realistically if lasting peace and security are to be restored. The emerging tendency to dismiss the historical relevance of the state in the name of globalization is at best a hypocritical argument and at worst an imperialistic doctrine (Tony C., 2002).
CONCLUSION

On September 28, 1958 - Guineans overwhelmingly rejected Charles de Gaulle's proposal of retaining association with France evidenced by enraging the famous 95 percent "no" vote, from the first courageous Black African country and the French leader decided to make a new lesson of Guinea to other colonies considering granting total independence. In total anger and retaliation, France pulled out all 4,000 colonial servants - administrators, doctors, judges, technicians and teachers within one week. This marked the end of colonial diplomacy but the stage of neo-colonialism was too futile and conflicting as the Cold War became intensified by the heightening of Capitalist and Communist ideologies in the newly independent country as well as in other areas of the Continent. Unfortunately, departing French civil servants burned blueprints, archives and machinery manuals. "Divorce without alimony" was how French commentators described the fate of Guinea and its new President, Ahmed Sékou Touré. Our findings shows that there are still good symbols in Conakry bearing the legacy of its first President Touré's defiant challenge of 1958: "Guinea prefers poverty in freedom to riches in slavery." Endowed with gold, diamonds and the World's largest bauxite deposits, Guinea was considered in 1958 "the pearl of French West Africa." In the recent past, according to the World Bank records, the populations of Guinea and neighboring Sierra Leone have the world's lowest life expectancies of 38 years. Endowed with verdant farmland and a hard-working peasantry, Guinea in 1958 fed many of the less fortunate countries of French West Africa. But years of collectivist farm policies reduced the nation to famine in 1977. President Toure's attempts to replace French aid with Eastern bloc aid met with little success. Unwilling or unable to develop the country, the Russians instead used Guinea to geopolitical advantage. In the 1960's Conakry became the K.G.B. center for the west coast of Africa. In 1975, the 6,000-foot Soviet-built airstrip here - for years the longest in the region - was used to ferry Cuban troops into Angola. Neither rich nor free, an estimated one-quarter to one-third of Guinea's population left the country by the mid-1970. Thousands disappeared; torture and murder of Mr. Toure's opponents were widespread. Army Seizes Power Eight days after Mr. Toure's death in 1984, the army seized power. One of its first acts was to send a mission to Paris. Since then, in the words of one American here: "It's a gold rush for the French. The attitude is 'Guinea is opening up, let's get in early" (James Brooke, 1987).

According to Ahmed Sékou Touré, the President of Guinea, who died Monday in a Cleveland hospital, it was better for his western African country to live in poverty than to accept what he denounced as "riches in slavery" as part of the French Community. The President, a towering charismatic and radical figure in Africa's post-colonial history, led his country to independence from France in 1958 and ruled it with a strong hand for 26 years. The 62-year-old leader was black Africa's longest serving head of state (Guia M. 2012). He presided over one of the world's poorest nations. The Guinea radio said the President died of an apparent heart attack. He had gone to the Cleveland Clinic Monday for emergency heart treatment, and a spokesman there said yesterday that the President had succumbed during heart surgery. Organizing a referendum in 1958 that rejected close ties with France, Toure said, "Guinea prefers poverty in freedom to riches in slavery." After rejecting French ties, Toure made his country into a closed Soviet client state, and his Democratic Party of Guinea into its only political organization. Rights Violations Charged In his continent's troubled political landscape, Toure proved so strong a figure since becoming President in 1958 that he was called the Elephant and was repeatedly re-elected. From 1958 to 1972, he also served as his country's Prime Minister. Toure ruled sternly, foiling repeated coup and assassination plots and drawing charges from Amnesty International and other human rights organizations that his rule was highly oppressive. Over the years he variously charged that he was the target of plotting by the Soviet Union and Western nations, although he took economic aid from both sides. He also repeatedly voiced distrust of other African countries while, by some estimates, 1.5 million Guineans fled to exile in such neighboring nations as Sierra Leone. Tensions within Guinea were underscored as more than a dozen of Toure's government ministers died in prison or by hanging or shooting and more than a dozen others received life prison sentences. After Guinean exiles charged two years ago that Toure's regime "practices tyranny and torture on a daily basis" and that several high Guinean diplomats had disappeared, a State Department official declared, "While we have expressed concern over the Sekou Toure Government's performance with regard to human rights, we have noted the progress he has made in this area." U.S. Investments Sought Toure's reply to such criticism was to offer to open Guinean prisons to inspection by any other African head of state who was prepared to take similar action. And diplomats in West Africa who were generally critical of Toure said that in the late 1970's his regime ceased carrying out executions, torture and mass arrests (Guia M. 2012).

After his earlier policies turned Guinea into a Marxist enclave in the 1960's and 1970's, Mr. Toure reversed them with fanfare. At a news conference in Washington in July 1982, he urged greater American private investment in Guinea, which he said had "fabulous economic potential." United State diplomats said his appeal was almost a confession that Marxism had been a failure in his homeland. A tropical country of 95,000 square miles on the West African coast, Guinea had an annual per capita income of only $140 at the time, although it has rich deposits of uranium.
He was known as a charismatic and radical figure in Africa's post-colonial history. President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea (Getty Images). Toure's activism for independence and decolonisation bore fruit in 1958, when an overwhelming population of Guinea voted in favour of independence, rejecting French President Charles de Gaulle's offer of joining a new federal community. Toure's words regarding de Gaulle's offer strongly resonated across the Guinean public. He famously said: "Guinea prefers poverty in freedom than riches in slavery." It was a comment that angered de Gaulle. "Then all you have to do is to vote 'no'. I pledge myself that nobody will stand in the way of your independence," Gaulle said in response to Toure's assertion. Guinea became the first independent French-speaking state in Africa and it was the only country which did not accept the proposal of the French president. In 1958, Toure became the first president of what became known as The Republic of Guinea. The French reacted by recalling all their professional people and civil servants and by removing all transportable equipment. As France threatened Toure and Guinea through economic pressure, Toure accepted support from the communist bloc and at the same time sought help from Western nations. (As part of a series, TRT World explores fascinating stories of African figures whose contribution to humanity has been largely neglected).

Often referred to as Guinea-Conakry to distinguish itself from nearby Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, as well as the Pacific Island nation of Papua New Guinea, the West African nation of Guinea has an abundance of the world’s most valuable natural resources. Even though the country has “natural affluence,” it is one of the poorest and least-developed nations in the world. Guinea has struggled with political instability and endemic corruption since its independence from France in 1958. Despite the country’s poor infrastructure, there is a significant foreign presence in Guinea. Countries are mostly competing for its mineral resources, such as gold, diamonds, bauxite, and iron ore. The United States, along with other foreign powers, vies for access to these resources and for the ability to influence the country’s government. There are over 20 foreign companies conducting mining operations in Guinea, but three companies dominate the industry: Chinese-backed Société des Mines de Boké (SMB), Russian-owned RUSAL, and Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG). CBG is 49 percent owned by the Guinean government and 51 percent owned by the international (American and Anglo-Australian) consortium Halco Mining. France’s Alliance Minière Responsable (AMR) also joined the foreign companies vying for a share of the profits from Guinea’s vast bauxite reserves, starting bauxite production operations in 2017 and agreeing to sell the entirety of its output to Chinese SMB. In addition, the French transportation and logistics

Ahmed Sekou Toure was a Guinean politician who played a key role in the African independence movement. As the first president of Guinea, he led his country to gain its independence from France in 1958.
While the People’s Republic of China is currently the principal global competitor of the United States, Beijing is not the only foreign presence in Guinea, or the rest of Africa for that matter. The Russian Federation does not wield the same economic clout on the continent as China, but with its private military companies/contractors (PMCs) and increased military presence, Moscow has the potential to negatively affect U.S. national security. A growing Turkish presence in Africa also raises security concerns. France’s longstanding hand in the affairs of its former colonies, along with its counter-terrorism efforts, contributes to instability in countries such as Guinea (Jessica Pickering, 2021).

In response, the country’s first president, Sekou Touré, said, “It is better to be poor and free than to live in opulence and be a slave.” Touré began as a communist-leaning grassroots organizer but is remembered for instilling in his people a strong sense of nationalism and an extreme fear of the state. He died in 1984, and shortly thereafter, his successor restored relatively cordial relations with Paris. Guinea then became the “second-largest recipient of French foreign aid,” with projects set to revitalize infrastructure, training, and education. France once again held the power to influence nearly every aspect of Guinean life, particularly through economic means. The legacies of French colonialism are still felt today in Guinea. Between 1984 and 2010, Guinea experienced three coups and had only four presidents. In many cases, France’s continued presence has perpetuated political instability and domestic turmoil, notably in the Sahel, which threatens to spill over into greater West Africa. (Jessica Pickering, 2021).

The relations that Guinea maintains with several States around the world date back to its independence in 1958. This bilateral and multilateral cooperation is a major asset for the country’s socioeconomic development. The focus of Guinean diplomacy has since shifted, under the Third Republic, towards seeking out the best economic opportunities to benefit from this cooperation. Development diplomacy is now the focus. It is reflected in the Government’s strongly expressed desire to harness the country’s enormous economic, cultural and social potential. Guinea cooperates bilaterally with countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Arabian and Persian regions and the Americas. The country cooperates multilaterally with the Bretton Woods institutions, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, United Nations agencies, the European Union and international NGOs. This cooperation enables Guinea to implement national initiatives aimed at ensuring the full realization of the rights enshrined in the Covenant and creating better living conditions for its people. Article 2: International cooperation, line 82-86). Initial report submitted by Guinea pursuant to articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, due in 1990, U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Articles 4 and 5: Derogations from and restrictions or limitations on economic, social and cultural rights. 110.When the country became independent, the authorities of the First Republic established a socialist regime that limited quite severely the enjoyment of economic and social rights, namely freedom of enterprise, the right to own property and freedom of association. 111. Following the military takeover in April 1984, Guinea opted for a new legal regime based on economic liberalism, individual property ownership, freedom of association and political freedom. These rights are enshrined in the Constitution. 175. The National Social Security Fund was established in 1955. In 1984, it was given the status of a public administrative institution with legal personality and administrative and financial autonomy. It provides salaried employees in the private sector and employees of the State and other public bodies without civil servant status with family, old-age, disability, survivorship, occupational accident and sickness benefits. The contribution rate is 23 per cent, with 18 per cent paid by the employer and 5 per cent by the employee. This applies to a contribution base with a floor and ceiling set at G.F 440,000 and 1.5 million, respectively. Generally, the history of Guinea Conakry is very important in the studying of African History and the entire history of colonialism and neo-colonialism to the young generation of contemporary African historians. It exposes the White colonial supremacist in the fact that an African been too courageous enough stood firm to say “No to the French domineering colonialist diplomatic agents and the then President General Charles De Gaule thereby tendering his “Loi Cadre absolute.” However, Sékou Touré remains a famous leading legendary among the famous Great Figures of African Political Elites of the late 20th Century.

Biography of the Author
Dr. Njuafac Kenedy Fonju is a holder of a Doctorate / Ph.D in History with specialisation in the History of International Relations obtained from the University of Yaounde I, Cameroon in 2012. He has been lecturing since 2007, as a Part-Time Lecturer (2007-2015), Assistant Lecturer (2015-2017) and presently a Senior Lecturer in the University of Dschang, Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences, Department of History and Archeology since November 2017. He delivers lectures in the History of International Relations and Political History in the Post-Graduate and undergraduate levels. Dr. Kenedy has been lecturing courses such as Africa in International Relations, China from the Communist Revolution to Market Economy, Communist World in International
Relations, Inter-American Relations and Black Problems in the Americas, Conflict Resolution and the Culture of Peace, Issues and Challenges of the Commonwealth of Nations and Political Elites in Colonial Black African Countries, the Politics of empowerment of Minorities in the World since the 20th Century, and History of Political Thought since Machiavelli. He is also lecturing Introduction to Bilingualism, Introduction to language and Nation-Building, the History of Bilingualism in the World, National and International Business in Bilingualism in the Department of Bilingual Letters of the University of Dschang. In addition, He also delivers lectures concerning scientific English in the Departments of Physics and Earth Sciences in the Faculty of Sciences of the same institution. His broader research interests include emerging powers and their foreign policy strategies and strength in the 21st Century specifically China and United States as hyper-economic powers of the 21st Century with the Super Stars of Asia. He is the author of eighteen scientific articles focusing on Asia, China, Eastern and Western Europe, U.S.A, Africa and the Challenges of international terrorism in the World with two scientific international communication papers presented and have also edited two books and the third ongoing on the African Gulf of Guinea with two prefaces and one introduction written in three volumes of 2017, 2018 and presently 2021. He has also saved as the Divisional Secretary of the former Cameroon National Elections Observatory of Lebialem Representation, Elections Supervisor, Election Monitor, and Trainer of Trainers of Polling Stations Delegate from 2002 to 2007. He was also appointed Secretary of Alou Council Tenders Board for the Awards of Public Contract in the municipality from July 20, 2016 to April 2, 2019. Presently, he is a Municipal Councillor of Dschang Urban Council since February 9, 2020 Municipal Elections in Cameroon, spokesman of the Municipal Group, appointed Referral in the implementation of Bilingualism (English and French) in the Dschang Municipality and recently, Rapporteur of the Commission of National, International Decentralised Cooperation of Development and Communication within the forty-one (41) Councillors of Dschang Council since December 2020. Presently, Team Leader of Diaspora Studies in RUASD and Secretary of the upcoming international conference scheduled for November 2021 on Migration challenges of Africa-America and Africa-Europe Diasporas in the 21st Century.

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**subject**: Aid to Guinea, President Sekou Toure’s forthcomin trip to Washington (October 26–28).

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L'héritage controversé de Sékou Touré, « héros - Caire

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de C Pauthier 2013 Cité 24 fois — L'expression courante de « Guinée-Sékou Touré » témoigne de cette ... Sékou Touré donne également une dimension internationale à son rôle de guide de la ...

L'héritage controversé de Sekou Tour, de la l'indépendance

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Guinée-Sékou Touré » témoigne de cette ... Sékou Touré donne également une dimension ... guinéen, Conakry, Institut polytechnique de Conakry, Faculté.

Sékou Touré | Biographie | Perspective Monde

https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca › BMBiographie

Sékou Touré, Ahmed | 1922-1984. Né le 5 janvier 1922 à Faranah, en Guinée française; Président de la République de Guinée (2 octobre 1958 - 26 mars 1984) ...

Ahmed Sékou Touré - — Wikipédia

https://fr.wikipedia.org › wiki › Ahmed_Sékou_Touré

En 1956, il est élu député de la Guinée à l'Assemblée nationale française et maire de Conakry sous la bannière du RDA, positions qu'il utilise pour lancer des ...

Termes manquants : dimension Doit | inclure:dimensionGuinée - — Wikipédia

https://fr.wikipedia.org › wiki › Guinée

La Guinée maritime abrite des Soussous, mais on y trouve aussi presque toutes les grandes ethnies du pays, en raison de la présence de la capitale, Conakry, qui ...

La musique en République de Guinée : rôle et enjeux dans la ...

https://journals.openedition.org ...

Le prestige international de la Guinée dans le domaine artistique. 13Au lendemain de l'indépendance, Ahmed Sékou Touré fut le premier chef d'État africain à ...

La Guinée, cinq ans après - Offres et services | INA

https://fresques.ina.fr › la-guinee-cinq-ans-apres

La République de Guinée est proclamée dès le 2 octobre. Son président, Sékou Touré, se tourne alors simultanément vers les pays africains, les pays de l'Est ...

Ahmed Sékou Touré - Encyclopédie Universalis

https://www.universalis.fr › ... › Guinée, histoire

Né à Faranah (Guinée orientale) dans une famille musulmane modeste d'ethnie malinké, Sékou Touré fréquenta une école technique française à Conakry mais en ...

L'art oratoire Chez Sékou Touré

https://deport.erdudit.org › bitstream

Sous Sékou TOURE, les Guinéens en ont connu un : le sien, ... exceptionnel qui a su se hisser à la tête de la Guinée et au devant de la scène internationale ...

République de Guinée, Constitution du 10 novembre 1958 ...

https://mjp.univ-perp.fr › constit

Sekou Touré reste président du pays jusqu'à sa mort en 1984. ... Le principe de la République de Guinée est : « Gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et ...

République de Guinée, Constitution du 10 novembre 1958 ...

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Sekou Touré reste président du pays jusqu'à sa mort en 1984. ... Le principe de la République de Guinée est : « Gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et ...

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de BQ Qloruntiméhin · 1972 · Cité 6 fois — administration of colonial French West Africa evolved, and did not result from the planting of pre-conceived blueprints or theories. In any case, the West ...

Indirect Rule: French and British Style - jstor

https://www.jstor.org › stable

de M Crowder · 1964 · Cité 382 fois — Guinea in 1906, Conakry, 1906, cited by J. Suret 2 R. Delavignette in’ Lord Lugard et la poli. Canale in 'Guinea under the Colonial system', africaine', Africa, ...

Colonisation, institutions and development - DIAL / IRD

https://dial.ird.fr › version › file › 18_huillery

de E Huillery · 2006 · Cité 10 fois — was the sub-colonial administrative unit in the former French West Africa. The territory was divided in 8 colonies (Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, ...

Understanding colonial chieftaincy from its final phase

https://d-nb.info › ...

de A Keese · Our main example will be territories of AOF – Senegal, Guinea- Conakry, Upper Volta, and Côte d’Ivoire – as the principles of French colonial rule left.

The Impact of European Settlement within French West Africa

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15 juil. 2014 — more prosperous pre-colonial areas and that the European settlement ... current Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and South Benin.

History Matters: The Long Term Impact of Colonial Public ...

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Continuing British Interest in Coastal Guinea-Conakry and... https://journals.openedition.org; etu...

Before the imposition of French rule over the coast of Guinea-Conakry and... British governmental efforts to establish colonial posts along this coast and...

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Cet article traite de l'histoire du territoire de la République de Guinée dont les... Il est l'un des derniers héros de l'histoire pré-coloniale du pays.

La Guinée des grands empires · La Guinée sous la colonisation...

History of Guinea - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Hist...

The modern state of Guinea did not come into existence until 1958, but the history of the area stretches back well before European colonization.

Dividing Guinea into Four Parts: How Colonization Imagined...

https://www.cairn.info › article-E...

de O Goerg · 2011 — Based on the Guinean example, this paper argues for a history of colonial... the result of an intellectual construction with pre-colonial roots and drawing...

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de MS Toure · 1960 · — First, there was the stage of pre-colonization, in which our organization was communal. Each group had its own customs, its own concepts of economic...


8 oct. 2021 — Guinea's main urban centre is Conakry. The old city, located on Tombo Island, retains the segregated aspect of a colonial town, while the...

CONAKRY - Council for the Development of Social Science...

http://www.codesria.org › IMG › pdf › Capital_Ci...
de O Goerg — Founded in colonial times, Conakry, the capital of Guinea, ... A view that contrasted with this nostalgic image was given by Governor Roland Prê. 23 pages

A Traditional History of the Konyan (15th-16th Century)
Ahmed Sékou Touré, né le 9 janvier 1922 à Faranah en Guinée et mort le 26 mars 1984 à Cleveland aux États-Unis, est le premier président de la République de Guinée, qui est le père de Sékou Touré et la contestation de l'ordre colonial en Afrique.

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Guinea: Total reinforces its exploration in West Africa
https://totalenergies.com › news › gu...
... Petroleum of Guinea (ONAP) signed a Technical Evaluation Agreement to study deep and ultra deep offshore areas located off the coast of Guinea Conakry ...

- Guinea's National Petroleum Office Takes First Contract ...
- https://resourcegovernance.org › blog
- 4 janv. 2018 — The National Petroleum Office, or ONAP, is playing an increasingly active role in promoting oil exploration in Guinea. It might sign more ...
- Guinea Bissau: Independent E&P Companies, IOC's Unlock ...
- https://www.africanews.com › guinea...
- 28 sept. 2021 — Oil has already been discovered in the shallower waters of Guinea Bissau. Sovold believes that going into the deeper waters should provide scope ...
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- theinfolist.com › php › SummaryGetList of ambassadors of the United Kingdom to Guinea
- The Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Guinea is the United Kingdom's foremost diplomatic representative in the Republic of Guinea, and head of the UK's diplomatic mission in Conakry. The Republic of Guinea (formerly known as French Guinea) declared its independence from France on 2 October 1958, and the then UK ambassador to Liberia, Guy...