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Review Article

The Insights of China's New International Strategy of Hyper Exploitation of Natural Resources (NISHENR) in the Lucrative Zones of South American Continent (LZSAC) 2001-2020

Dr. Njuafac Kenedy Fonju[1*]

[1](Ph.D), Senior Lecturer, History of International Relations, University Of Dschang / Faculty Of Letters And Social Sciences Department Of History- Archeology-Cameroon

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***Corresponding author:** Dr. Njuafac Kenedy Fonju

Abstract

The present paper focuses on Sino- Latin America and the Caribbean, (LAC) radical profitable continental relations of the South-South relations with exploitative agenda based on win-win diplomacy in the aftermath of terrorists attack of a Hyper-Super Power and subsequent recognition of Chinese Global Economic Strength (CGES) from the beginning of the 21st Century. The historical challenges in the contemporary World ended up with the admission of China as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) headquarters in the New York City of the United States of America. The main objective is to bring out specific mechanisms used by China to consolidate her relationship with LAC bringing out the potentials of the thirty three countries of the region perceived by Chinese investors and heavy industries in quest of raw materials and available markets for the final products. Therefore, New Peking Consensus of win-win Going Out policy goals vis-à-vis the outdated Washington Consensus proved to be more realistic in the region than those manifested in the previous Centuries by Western capitalist countries in relations to late 19th Century Monroe Doctrine. The scrutiny of primary and secondary sources with evidences collected from Government documents made available online, specialized research papers and related articles enabled the used of historical analytical approach to illustrate the visibility of new strategy of Sino-LAC during the first two decades of the 20th Century making China an unchallengeable position of a Hyper-Economic Power (HEP) vis-à-vis USA in political economy as one of the most powerful existing Communist World.

Keywords: Latin America, Caribbean, natural resources, hegemony, hyper exploitation, neo-colonial actor, radical engagement, acquisition, investment.

INTRODUCTION

In the course of facing the challenges of International Economic Relations (IPER) between the U.S and LAC during the post-slavery and slave trade era with the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the 20th Century became more worsen in the implementation of U.S policy towards South American Continent. Contradictorily, the beginning of the 21st Century was opened with new types of international challenges following terrorist attacked of U.S on September 11, 2001 and the admission of China in WTO marked the beginning of New Power Parity between China and U.S over the exploitation of LAC. Therefore, LAC in the context of the present study refers to countries which form the South American Continent which have in the past centuries suffered from the hands of America hegemony and gross domination at her backyard in viewed of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (James Monroe, 1823). According to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, extra-hemispheric powers (namely European powers looking to regain, or maintain, depending on the case, influence in Latin America and the Caribbean), must not have influence over or take actions to promote their interests in the Americas. The emergence of China as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony may call into question the relevance of this doctrine as well as Washington's authority in Latin America and the Caribbean (W. Alex Sanchez *et al*., 2019). Its territorial wise include; Mexico, most of Central and South America, and in the Caribbean with thirty three member states namely: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Santa Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (www.worldometers.info › geography, online). Following their geographical locations, the majorities of these countries are rich in terms of natural resources which is a strong push of China"s radical engagement in the contemporary IPER with each country's consideration.

In order to properly tackle the profitability of Sino-LAC IER in this paper, four main issues have been illustrated namely, how the inspirations of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen Three Principles and the question of the battle field shaped China's foreign policy goals and objectives towards consolidation of IER with LAC. The potential natural resources of the countries acted as constituent tools of attractiveness to Chinese investors, how Chinese soft loans granted by Export-Import Bank (EX-IM Bank) conditionalities are different from those previously offered by the Western Capitalist Countries and International Financial Institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) which qualified those relationship to be more profitable. Lastly, an assessment of Chinese-LAC relationship which brings out some lapses in the course of massive exploitation of natural resources. It can also be noted in this study that those relations have mixed feelings of the win-win Chinese Going Out Policy since the introduction of Deng Xiao-Ping's famous Four Modernisations (Njuafac Kenedy F. 2018) in the history of China since 1978. It was in the aftermath of the successes recorded by China towards her economic development and growth as a Third World Country that raised her to the status of HEP in a balance of prudence with U.S.A. Other Less Developed Countries (LDC) like those of the LAC region among others found the reinforcement and consolidation of IPER with China as opposed the stance of Western Neo-colonial actors with inconsistent prescriptions of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). Those confusing policies came up during the age of the New World Order (NWO) in the Post-Cold War Era (Nah Thomas, F *et al.*, 2016), in favour of new democratic waves and the democratization processes chained with liberalization of all types according to new exploitative mechanisms of the former colonial actors with each defining new prescriptions tobe suitable for their respective National interests as the main goal of international relations of late 20th Century Post-Cold War Era (PCWE) and new patterns of global exploitation of LDC (Njuafac Kenedy F, 2004, 2012).

1. How Chinese Invasion of LAC is in Line with the Principles Postulated by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen

This section deals with the roots of China's rapid engagement in LAC region with moving strength developed from the Three Principles of the People (TPP) of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the question of involving and winning in any battle field by any leader and the mathematical equation developed by other Chinese leaders during the 21st Century towards foreign engagement with the main strategic goals.

1.1. The Shaping of Dr. Sun's Three Great Principles and Occupation of the Battle Field During the First Half of the 20th Century

The principal logic of the TP of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen were originally formulated as slogans for his revolutionary student group known as the United League (UL) representing one of the main forces behind the 1911 Chinese Republican Revolution, which ended the Qing dynasty rule of China under the manipulation of the West especially the British and Portuguese with Unequal Treaties bearing on intensive torturing approach of the inhabitants. Those TPP also called Three Great Principles (TGP) was the ideological basis of the political programme of the Chinese Nationalist leader championing the course of nationalism, democracy and socialism. The first principle, "nationalism," earlier had meant opposition to the Qing (Manchu) dynasty and to foreign imperialism; now Sun explained the phrase as denoting self-determination for the Chinese people as a whole and also for the minority groups within China. The second principle, the "rights of the people," sometimes translated as "democracy," could be achieved, Sun explained, by allowing the Chinese people to control their own government through such devices as election, initiative, referendum, and recall. The last principle was "people's livelihood," which is often translated as "socialism (Britannica, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, 1866-1925, online). This was the vaguest of the three principles, but by it Sun seemed to have in mind the idea of equalization of land ownership through a just system of taxation. After the failure of this revolution to establish democracy in China, Sun formed a new party, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), utilizing his principles as fundamental doctrine. In 1922 the Nationalists formed an alliance with the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning the following winter, Sun, in response to communist demands for a more formal party ideology, gave a series of lectures in which he sharpened and defined his three principles (Chinese ideology, online).

Concerning the battle field, Sun outlined six type of grounds or terrain which can play an important part in a battle plan classified according to its nature, as follows: First, accessible - ground which affords relatively easy travel for both sides. Therefore, the advantage goes to whoever can take the high position first. Second, entrapping - an area that is easy to get out of, but difficult to return to. Third, indecisive - ground that is equally disadvantageous for both sides. Fourth, constricted - ground which could be blocked off. Thus, a good commander could wait for the enemy to appear and attack him as he entered. Firth, precipitous - ground which is elevated. It is paramount to take the heights and wait for the attack. If the enemy has this ground, do not follow; rather, try to lure him off it and then attack. Sixth, distant - ground where two armies of equal strength are separated by a vast expanse of land, it is not profitable to attack. Sun concluded that "the nature of the ground is the fundamental factor in aiding the army to set up its victory. He further stated that a leader with a hasty temper that is provoked by insults does not consider all the facts before attacking (Chipman, 1986). This explained the reason why Western neo-colonial actors have been qualifying China's move to LAC as new forms of colonialism of the 21st Century. In spite of that accusation, Chinese leaders remain firmed in her relationship with LAC.

1.2. The Importance of Mathematical Calculation Announced by President Xi Jinping's in 2014

Since the Revolution of 1911 in China, all the warlords have clung to their armies for dear life, setting great store by the principle, "Whoever has an army has power." The "1+3+6″cooperation framework" was first announced during President Xi Jinping's trip to Fortaleza, Brazil for the BRICS Summit in 2014 (Margaret Myers, 2015). The "1" here means one plan, referring to the China-CELAC Cooperation Plan (2015-2019), which was made public following the China-CELAC ministerial meeting in Beijing in January 2015. The "3" refers to the economic "engines" – trade, investment, and financial cooperation – that will drive China's relations with the region. Lastly, the "6" in this framework refers to the six industries in which China will focus its attention (and money) in the coming years: energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and technological innovation, and information technologies. Premier Li largely upheld this new framework during his trip to Latin America in May 2015. The tens of billions in deals announced during that trip focused overwhelmingly on the "6" industries outlined above. Premier Li also introduced a new numerical policy – the "3×3" model for Sino-Latin America economic cooperation – during his visit. This policy proposes cooperation between Chinese and Latin American enterprises, societies, and governments (3) in logistics, power generation, and information technology (3). Li simultaneously proposed a $30 billion special fund to develop production capacity in these and other industries. Though promoting of "much of the same" in terms of economic engagement (Chinese entities are already active in all of the above-mentioned sectors, to varying degrees), these new policy frameworks are intended to communicate China's commitment to more and increasingly diversified engagement. They promote "systematic upgrading of the relationship," as Zhu Qingqiao, director general of the LAC division at the Chinese MFA, explained during a recent meeting at the Inter-American Dialogue (Margaret Myers, 2015).The above were calculations that the future Chinese leaders and businessmen were going to use in the global scale to relief themselves from Western Century of humiliation and advanced economic development and growth in which happened during the 1980s with the advent of Deng Xiao Ping and his famous 4 Modernisations. Most LDC in the early 21st Century decided to follow the profitable Chinese 50 year's methods and have been recovering faster than ever before comparing with the rest of the 50 years after granting independence with strings hanging on their shoulder to do the undo to former colonial peoples and territories as imaginary sphere of influences (Njuafac Kenedy F, 2017). But China have helped most countries to be relief from Western continuous contemporary hegemony by challenging the notion and Practicability of Exclusive Sphere of Influence (PESP) around the World and LAC in particular as seen in this study.

1.3. Strict Strategic Goals of China's Foreign Policy Objectives Towards LAC

This section handles three main issues namely: four foreign policy goals of sustaining relations with LAC ,the creation of BRI and *ECLAC* as the Chinese Government decided to develop those mechanisms to have a successful profitable exploitation of natural resources in exchange of executing other major visible projects as a reward in different countries of the South American Continent. The first targeted goal focuses on the promotion of mutual respect, mutual trust and expansion on common grounds based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, as opposed to those developed by Western Europe and North America. (The Dragon in the Room, Online, 2018). The second main goal deals with the deepening of cooperation and achieves win-win results at the level of importation and exportation of goals and services including wide range of internal investments with Chinese logic of equal profitability (Chinese Government Policy Paper, 2009, online). The third goal was aimed to draw on each other country's strength, on the context of bilateral relations to boost common progress and intensify exchanges close to contemporary challenges of the 21st Century. The fourth goal entails that the "one China principle" be respected is the political basis for the establishment and development of relations with LAC and regional organisations (Chinese Government Policy Paper, 2009, online).

The second most important issue to reinforce effective relations with LAC was the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an expression of China's growing global role of the 21st Century announced the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The Chinese authorities estimated that total funding for the BRI could amount to a trillion U.S dollars depending on the magnitude of the projects executed in different countries. This was accompanied with massive financial support (Chinese Government Policy Paper, 2009, online).This helped to adjust World economic order out of the hands of the neo-colonial actors and to challenges the U.S in her previous back yard of hemispheric ambitions (McKinsey and Company, online).

Thirdly, the Creation of Economic Commission of Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC) - China and introduction of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC), which took place in Santiago on January 22, 2018 ((McKinsey and Company, online). Its contribution has been more noticeable in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This document is a contribution by the ECLAC and CELAC (The Second Ministerial Meeting China-CELAC, online) based on the 2015 Chinese Government announced of US$ 500 billion (Alicia Barcena, 2018) and US$ 250 billion held in 2015 and October 17 to 18, 2017 respectively. The BRI prospects for bilateral cooperation in the fields of science, technology and innovation (Gallagher K *et al*., Bloomberg, 2017, Nah Thomas F, 2016) with potential countries of the region was a favorable initiative to the above forums. The above draw our attention to the reality of LAC natural resources spotted by China for radical exploitation.

2. The Potential Natural Resources of LAC Targeted for Chinese Industrial Consumption in the 21st Century

Natural resources are defined as those resources which do not need the manual help for their existence. They occur naturally without the actions of humankind. Magnetic, electrical, gravitational forces and properties are associated with the natural resources. Many countries are blessed with the natural resources and Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela are appropriate examples used in this study as indicated on table number one below.

Table 1: The Potential of Selected LAC Countries in Terms of Natural Resources which Fostered International Economic Relations with China

No.	Countries	Potential Natural Resources	Number
1	**Antigua and Barbuda**	Cotton, petroleum, hydropower, wood, limestone, building stone, clay, and barite	8
2	**Argentina***	lead, zinc, tin, copper, iron, ore, manganese, petroleum, uranium, and lithium	10
3	**Bahamas**	Pine forest, blue, holes, largest flats, aragonite, salt ponds. Sponges, the reefs, crystal clear seas, powder-sand beaches	11
4	**Barbados**	Energy resources and oil	2
5	**Belize**	arable land potential, timber, fish, sugar, fresh fruit, seafood, organic meats	07
6	Bolivia *	Tin, natural gas, petroleum, zinc, tungsten, antimony, silver, iron, lead, gold, timber, hydropower.	**12**
7	Brazil *	bauxite, gold, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, platinum, tin, rare earth elements, uranium, petroleum, hydropower, timber.	**14**
8	Chile	copper, timber, iron ore, nitrates, precious metals, molybdenum, hydropower	9
9	Colombia	petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds, hydropower	9
10	**Costa Rica**		
11	Cuba *	cobalt, nickel, iron ore, chromium, copper, salt, timber, silica, petroleum, arable land	**10**
12	Dominica	timber, hydropower, arable land, nickel, bauxite, gold, silver	7
13	**Dominican Republic***	Nickel, bauxite, gold, silver, fish, forests, arable land. ferronickel, sugar, gold, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, meats, consumer goods, gypsum, iron ore, platinum, the rock salt	19
14	Ecuador	petroleum, fish, timber, hydropower	4
15	El Salvador	hydropower, geothermal power, petroleum, arable land	4
16	Grenada	timber, tropical fruit	
17	Guam	Aquatic, wildlife (supporting tourism), fishing (largely undeveloped)	3
18	Guatemala	petroleum, nickel, rare woods, fish, chicly, hydropower	6
19	Guyana	bauxite, gold, diamonds, hardwood timber, shrimp, fish	6
20	Haiti	bauxite, copper, calcium carbonate, gold, marble, hydropower, arable land	7
21	Honduras	timber, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron ore, antimony, coal, fish, hydropower	11
22	Jamaica	bauxite, gypsum, limestone	3
23	Mexico	petroleum, silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc, natural gas, timber	8
24	Nicaragua	gold, silver, copper, tungsten, lead, zinc, timber, fish	8
25	Panama	copper, mahogany forests, shrimp, hydropower	4
26	Paraguay	hydropower, timber, iron ore, manganese, limestone	5
27	Peru*	copper, silver, gold, petroleum, timber, fish, iron ore, coal, phosphate, potash, hydropower, natural gas	12

28	Puerto Rico	some copper and nickel; potential for onshore and offshore oil	4
29	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	hydropower, arable land	2
30	**Santa Lucia**	oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, and the forest	5
31	Trinidad and Tobago	petroleum, natural gas, asphalt	3
32	Uruguay	arable land, hydropower, minor minerals, fish	4
33	Venezuela *	petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, gold, bauxite, other minerals, hydropower, diamonds	8
		TOTAL NUMBER OD ESSENTIAL NATURAL RESOURCES	**225**

SOURCE: These statistics are based on my personal calculations considering the most important natural rsources which moved Chinese radical engagement in the LAC regions. It is compiled with information concerning the thirty three countries of LAC economic profiles and World Fact Book of Natural Resources all consulted online on October 10 2019 and April 20 2020. The Work of A Nation. The Center of Intelligence. On line, Information from specific countries profile of natural resources online.; Grenada Natural Resources, Agricultural Products, Land Use and ...www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/Grenada/Natural_Resources/; Grenada Natural resources income - data, chart The Global Economy ...https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Grenada/Natural_resources_in...; https://emarekpanama.weebly.com/natural-resources.html.*Indicate countries with Chinese high interests of cooperation and intensive exploitation of natural resources as seen on the above table.

It should be noted that China possesses a good number of natural resources as well. But due to her large industrial capacities, the rate of demand and supply of her finished products, China joined the race for competition and to amass wealth like the Western capitalist actors formerly operating in the region. This among other challenges pushed her to embark with LAC relentlessly. Therefore her main natural resources include: coal, iron ore, petroleum, natural gas, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, rare earth elements, uranium, hydropower potential (world's largest), arable land. But these natural resources are not enough for the consumption of home industries because of her large industrial capacities in the 21st Century. In order to benefit from foreign raw materials or import in large quantities she decided to be offering soft loans to facilitate the acquisition of investments in many sectors of the economy ahead of this study. China's main focus in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Bolivia, Peru and Dominican Republic are justified by the lucrative natural resources as seen on table no.1 above.

3. The Origins of Sino-LAC Soft Loans and Profitability of South – South Cooperation

This sections handles the Ills of LAC loans obtained from Western Capitalist Countries and IFIs during the second half of the 20th Century, the Meaning of Chinese Soft Loans and how they are different from those granted by IFIs and Western capitalist countries, the realities of Chinese soft loans granted to LAC Countries during the 21st Century and twenty main exportation of agricultural products to China by LAC Countries in search of foreign currencies to boost National Income and Gross Domestic Products (GDP).

3.1. The Ills of the LAC loans obtained from Western Capitalist Countries and IFIs

In the 1960s and 1970s, many LAC countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, borrowed huge sums of money from international creditors for industrialization, especially infrastructure programmes (History of Latin America, online 2018). These countries had soaring economies at the time, so the creditors were happy to provide loans. Initially, developing countries typically garnered loans through public routes like the World Bank. After 1973, private banks had an influx of funds from oil-rich countries which believed that sovereign debt was a safe investment. Mexico borrowed against future oil revenues with the debt valued in US dollars, so that when the price of oil collapsed, so did the Mexican economy. Between 1975 and 1982, Latin American debt to commercial banks increased at a cumulative annual rate of 20.4 percent. This heightened borrowing led Latin America to quadruple its external debt from US$75 billion in 1975 to more than $315 billion in 1983, or 50 percent of the region's gross domestic product (GDP). Debt service (interest payments and the repayment of principal) grew even faster as global interest rates surged, reaching $66 billion in 1982, up from $12 billion in 1975. When the world economy went into recession in the 1970s and 1980s, and oil prices skyrocketed, it created a breaking point for most countries in the region. Developing countries found themselves in a desperate liquidity crunch (Felix David, 1990, History of Latin America).

As interest rates increased in the United States of America and in Europe in 1979, debt payments also increased, making it harder for borrowing countries to pay back their debts. Deterioration in the exchange rate with the US dollar meant that Latin American governments ended up owing tremendous quantities of their national currencies, as well as losing purchasing power. The contraction of world trade in 1981 caused the prices of primary resources (Latin America's largest export) to fall. While the dangerous accumulation of foreign debt occurred over a number of years, the debt crisis began when the international capital markets became aware that Latin America would not be able to pay back its loans (Felix David, 1990). As much of Latin America's loans were short-term, a crisis ensued when their refinancing was refused. Billions of dollars of loans that previously would have been refinanced were now due immediately. The banks had to somehow restructure the debts to avoid financial panic; these usually involved new loans with very strict conditions, as well as the requirement that the debtor countries accept the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There were several stages of strategies to slow and end the crisis. The IMF moved to restructure the payments and reduce government spending in debtor countries. Later it and the World Bank encouraged opened markets. Finally, the US and the IMF pushed for debt relief, recognizing that countries would not be able to pay back in full the large sums they owed. The debt crisis of 1982 was the most serious of Latin America's history. Incomes and imports dropped; economic growth stagnated; unemployment rose to high levels; and inflation reduced the buying power of the middle classes. In fact, in the ten years after 1980, real wages in urban areas actually dropped between 20 and 40 percent. Additionally, investment that might have been used to address social issues and poverty was instead being used to pay the debt (Devlin Robert et al, 1995). In response to the crisis, most nations abandoned their import substitution industrialization (ISI) models of economy and adopted an export-oriented industrialization strategy, usually the neoliberal strategy encouraged by the IMF, although there were exceptions such as Chile and Costa Rica, which adopted reformist strategies. A massive process of capital outflow, particularly to the United States, served to depreciate the exchange rates, thereby raising the real interest rate. Real GDP growth rate for the region was only 2.3 percent between 1980 and 1985, but in per capita terms Latin America experienced negative growth of almost 9 percent. Between 1982 and 1985, Latin America paid back US$108 billion (Devlin Robert et al, 1995). After decades of low-level commercial interaction, China and LAC significantly ramped up their economic relationship in the 2000s. China has jumped to first place as an export destination for many countries, and it is a major source of imports for all countries in the region (Peter G. Peterson, 2014).

3.2. The Meaning of Chinese Soft Loans and How they are Different from other International Financial Institutional Loans

By definition, a soft loan (Soft Loans ...economictimes.indiatimes.com › soft... 2018), is basically a loan on comparatively lenient terms and conditions as compared to other loans available in the market. These easier conditions might be in the form of lower interest rates and prolonged repayment duration. The repayment of these soft loans might also include interest holidays. This process of extending soft loans is also known as soft financing or concessional funding. As the loans extensions are at much easier terms, these are generally not provided by private financial institutions. They are primarily provided by government agencies taking the example of the Chinese Government frequent extension of soft loans owing by Third World Countries in return for which they offered Beijing oil exploration opportunities in their territories. China is in the midst of a rapid push to gain economic and political ascendancy across the globe and it is splashing out billions of dollars in concessional loans to developing countries in the process. Poorer nations are lured by China's offers of cheap loans for transformative infrastructure projects. Then, when these countries are unable to keep up with their repayments, Beijing can demand concessions or other advantages in exchange for debt relief (Sean Mantesso, 2018). In his speech during the consultation event with the private sector and other stakeholders, dubbed Dominguez said allegations that the current administration is putting the country into deep pit is “totally unfounded.” He explained that the loans extended by foreign countries, particularly by Japan and China, are “soft loans at the lowest possible interest rates and the longest possible term” (Joann Villanueva, Clark, Pampanga quoted Carlos Dominguez III, 2018). Therefore, examples of Chinese soft loans granted to LAC below were based on the above considerations. They are different from those of the other International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank in that conditionalities were often targeted towards the Bretton Woods Institution modalities linking to forceful Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) spearheaded by the United States, Britain and France among others. Those SAP measures imposed by the Western capitalist countries strongly pushed most Third World Countries to the position of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiatives.

According to Thomas Lum of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) offered an initial estimate of the scope and purpose of China’s aid and Government sponsored investment activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. In this report, we expand upon those findings, assessing the scale, trends, and composition of China’s foreign aid and Government Sponsored Investment Activities (FAGIA) in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia. We find such programs have burgeoned in recent years, with emphasis on development of increased foreign supplies of energy resources, as well as supplies of ferrous and nonferrous minerals. Loans finance many of these programs and feature substantial subsidization, but are also accompanied by rigorous debt-servicing conditions that distinguish China's foreign aid from the grant financing that characterizes development aid provided by the United States and other nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Thomas Lum, 2009). The FAGIA structure and size are broader than development assistance programmes conducted by the United States and other nations Western capitalist nations and IFIs. Official Chinese sources explicitly distinguish three categories of FAGIA: grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. The first two are funded by China's state finances, while the Export-Import Bank (EX-IM Bank) of China funds the third. Many of these programmes fall below the grant element of at least 25 percent that characterizes foreign aid programmes of other nations and also have requirements that goods purchased for them be at least 50 percent of Chinese origin. Prior to 2000, China's FAGIA was distinctly limited in scale and content, as, indeed, was China's role in the global economy. Since then, several contributors have reshaped the scale, content, and destinations of this aid. As a result of its remarkable and sustained economic growth, China's shares of global trade and global product increased, as did the resources available to expand its FAGIA (China's Foreign Aid, FAGLA, 2020, online). As future growth of the Chinese economy depends on increasing supplies of natural resources, especially energy-related resources Chinese soft loans became very important tools of moderating and consolidating international political economic relations with LAC as seen below.

3.3. The Realities of Chinese Soft Loans Granted to LAC Countries during the 21st Century

In fact, an assessment of China's engagement within the period indicated that her loan granted to LAC governments between 2005 and 2016 stood at US$ 141 billion strongly supported by China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EX-IM Bank) (K. Gallagher *et al*., 2017). The CDB participated in about 80% of the loans to LAC within the same period. The main countries in the region that received Chinese funding possesses natural hydrocarbon deposits and so the terms of some of the loan agreements include a counterpart commitment of supplying petroleum products to China as the main conditionality of granting such loans. It is true that the conditionalities of granting loans is too harsh and could facilitate the draining of LAC resources to the advantage of China. At the same time LAC leaders still deemed it necessary to request and obtain the loans with low rate of interests as compared to those granted by the capitalist West. The breakdown of those loans made between 2005 and 2016 reveals that most of the funding targeted to five countries of LAC were as follows percentages: Bolivarian 93, Venezuela 44, Brazil 26, Ecuador 12 and Argentina 11 (Bloomberg, ECLAC, 2019, online), from the highest to the lowest. This exceeded the amount of funding that LAC received from institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America (DBLA), which over the same period granted sovereign credits to the region in the amounts of US$ 117.8 billion, US$ 85.5 billion and US$ 55.1 billion, respectively. main recipients of Chinese financing, 2005-2016 (Millions of dollars) 50, 99, 130, 150 , 170, 395, 1 000, 1 800 , 2 600, 3 500, 15 300, 17 400, 36 800, 62 200 0, 10 000, 20 000, 30 000, 40 000, 50 000, 60 000, Peru, Bahamas, Guyana, Chile, Barbados, Costa Rica, Mexico, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela according to the twelve countries presented above (Latin America and the Caribbean Statistis, online).

Chinese financing in the region is focused on infrastructure and energy. Chinese banks funnel more than half their total lending in the region into infrastructure, almost a third is spent on hydrocarbons and power generation and distribution and the rest is used for trade funding, budgetary support and other mixed projects China is playing a rising role in financing the region's economies and economic development by exploring new forms of cooperation with LAC countries since her admission into the World Trade Organisation in 2001. It should be noted that the rate of interest of those loans may be higher but not as those of the neo-colonial actors from Western Europe. Lower risk premiums were also guaranteed as borrowing countries wishing to export their products to China as indicated on table no.2 below as a means of paying off their debts."Loan-for-oil" deals seems to be a mixture of both soft and hard power approaches employed by China which are similar to that of the former colonial actors and can be charge for new forms of colonialism as ushered by most international relations analyst on the question of China's –LAC IER of the 21st Century. Such instruments have been used to channel over US$ 74 billion in just four years. The main recipients have been Bolivia, Venezuela, with six loans from 2008 amounted to US$ 44 billion to Brazil in 2009, US$ 10 billion to Ecuador, four loans since 2009, for a total of US$ 5 billion (Kreps Sarah,2014). The interest rates on Chinese loans could be slightly higher than other market options for many of the region's countries; that is not always the case, however, especially for countries with more restricted access to international capital which is true for several of China's leading borrowers. The lowest interest rates seen with 2 percent were granted by the Export-Import Bank of China in loans to the Plural-national State of Bolivia and Jamaica in 2010, which China posts on its books as part of its New financing instruments have been introduced, which will encourage use of the RENMINBI (China's Official Development Assistance, 2018, online). The significant growth in flows of Chinese finance into the region since 2005 is on account of an economic and political strategy adopted by the country's Government. The loans made by the major Chinese development banks to Latin American governments are primarily the result of the strategy of diversifying the countries' foreign exchange reserves, with a view to promoting the international use of the Chinese currency, the Renminbi. They also support a strategy of directing and assisting Chinese enterprises to invest in natural resources. (Kreps Sarah, 2014). Similarly, another financial instrument that China has used in LAC since 2009 are the currency swap agreements it has struck with four of the region's central banks (those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Suriname) for a total of close to US$ 49 billion. These agreements were intended to facilitate trade and investment in Yuan, but they were also introduced to improve financial conditions through the use of the loans as a relief measure against the weakening of foreign exchange reserves as the case of Argentina in 2015. China's (First CELAC, 2015; Second Ministerial Meeting: China-CELAC Forum, 2018).

3.4. Twenty Main Exportation of Agricultural Products to China by LAC Countries

Table two below is a clear indication of twenty main agricultural products imported by China from LAC countries which helped to raise the value of individual country's national income with much injections into the economy especially by producing countries of LAC.

Table 2: Twenty Main Products of LAC Imported by China in 2016 Value in Millions of U.S Dollars and Share Percentages of Total Production Exported

Ranking	Types of Products Exported to China	Amount(millions of U.S dollars	Benefits to GDP
1	Soybeans	17. 328	21.8
2	Copper ore and concentrates	12 .439	15.6
3	Iron ores and concentrates	10 .203	12.8
4	Refined copper (copper cathodes)	8. 371	10.5
5	Oil	7. 038	8.8
6	Chemical wood pulp, non-coniferous	2 .025	2.5
7	Beef, boneless cuts, frozen	1 .353	1. 7
8	Unrefined copper; copper anodes for electrolytic refining	1. 125	1. 4
9	Poultry cuts and offal, frozen	998	1. 3
10	Flours, meals and pellets, of fish or crustaceans	917	1. 2
11	Chemical wood pulp, coniferous	868	1. 1
12	Cane sugar, raw	827	1. 0
13	Cherries, fresh	671	0.8
14	Silver ores and concentrates	585	0.7
15	Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	584	0.7
16	Copper waste and scrap	573	0.7
17	Lead ores and concentrates	441	0.6
18	Zinc ores and concentrates	425	0.5
19	Gearboxes for tractors, vehicles for more than 10 people	403	0.5
20	Tourism vehicles	381	0.5
	Total top 20 products	**67 554**	**84**

Source: Compiled with information from different sources of thirty three countries agricultural profiles and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the *United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database* (COMTRADE), Document, and p.42.

From table two above, it can be noticed that the region runs a sizeable agricultural trade surplus with China, totaling almost US dollars 23 billion in 2016. The share of agricultural products in the region's exports to China has also been on the increase over the current decade in percentages up from 20 in 2010 to 30 in 2016. The share of the region's total agricultural shipments to the world bought by China has also risen sharply, from under 3 in 2000 to 13 in 2016. Similarly, the region's weight within China's agricultural imports has increased markedly, from 16 in 2000 to 26 in 2016. That share is almost equal to that of Canada and the United States combined, and is higher than that of competitors such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 14 percent or that of Australia and New Zealand combined to 10 according to ECLAC, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) findings and statistics within the period.

4. China's Acquisition and Investments in Specific sectors of LAC Economy as a Means of Exploitation and Assessments

This section tackles lucrative sectors of LAC countries spotted by Chinese Government and investors which they considered more profitable to them to fuel in financial resources for future benefits. While majority of the population of the region looks at such ventures to be more exploitative having negative effects since domestic investors lacked enough capital to compete with their Chinese counterparts in the contemporary heavy business investments. It further brings out some net assessments of Sino-LAC relationship.

4.1. Spotted Lucrative Acquisition and Investments Projects

However, Chinese companies invested in the most lucrative sectors in LAC with vast majority of acquisitions of 88% were in the energy and mining sectors, which went from nonexistent before 2010 to making up 5% of the total announced by China between 2011 and 2016 (ECLAC, FDI, Bloomberg). Most importantly, close to US$ 90 billion have entered the region from China between 2005 and 2016, representing approximately 5% of Foreign Development Assistance (FDI). However, the information available suggests that it is quite likely that there will be a marked increase in both the absolute value and in China's share in the FDI inflows to the region in 2017. Investment by Chinese companies in LAC in 2017 was above US$ 25 billion Global Development; ECLAC Bulletin, 2018) with Brazil alone receiving about 55% of investments made by Chinese companies in the region from 2005 to 2017 Peru, 17%, and Argentina, 9% in the same period (Global Development, 2018) largely on account of higher prices for oil and other commodities. Between 2013 and 2016, the value of the region's exports to China fell by 25%, which was more than twice the 11% drop in the region's imports from China: that was largely due to the end of what was known as the commodities super cycle. The region's trade with China traditionally runs a deficit, and the figure for 2017 has been calculated at close to US$ 67 billion (Bureauhttps://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html12 Jul 2018).

Table 3: China: Major Acquisitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016-2017

Year	CorporationValue (millions of dollars)	Assets acquired	Asset location	Sector
2016	China Molybdenum Co. Ltd.1 500	Anglo American-niobium and phosphates	Brazil	Mining
	China Three Gorges Corporation 1 200	Duke Energy International, Brazil Ltda.	Brazil	Energy
	Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd. 450	Azul S.A. (23.7%)	Brazil	Transport
January to November 2017	-GIC Pte Ltd (Singapore), Brookfield -Infrastructure Partners LP (Canada), -China Investment Corporation (China) 5 200	Nova Transportadora Do Sudeste SA (90%)	Brazil	Energy
	State Grid Corporation of China 10 290	CPFL Energia SA (100%)	Brazil	Energy
	State Power Investment Corporation 2 250	Sao Simao Hydroelectric Power Plant Brazil	Brazil	Energy
	CITIC Agricultural Industry Fund 1 100	-Management Co Ltd Dow Agro Sciences Sementes BiotecnologiaBrasilLtda	Brazil	Chemicals
	Shandong Gold Mining Co Ltd			
	Barrick Gold Corporation960	Gold mine in Veladero (50%)	Argentina	Mining

Source: Compiled with information from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Bloomberg. In addition to traditional investments, China and the countries of Latin America and Caribbean. Online, 2019.

From table three above, it can be notice that China's focus within the period was based on Brazil and Argentina in terms of major acquisitions in the mining, energy, chemical and transport sectors, including infrastructure projects (Berkeley, Trade: China Discovers Latin America). With regard to Chinese public banks, the amount of financing provided to Latin America and the Caribbean since 2010 has exceeded the individual loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) reach an average of US$ 14.1 billion per year between 2011 and 2016 (Berkeley, Trade). Most of these loans and credit lines were calculated in percentages estimated to be 93 were received by the infrastructure sector, which includes oil and coal extraction 31.0, transport 12.2 electricity and gas 6.8 and other economic infrastructure items undifferentiated line items across multiple sectors, 42.8 (Angel Melguizo, 2018). Lastly, other regional investment funds were established between 2014 and 2015, namely, the US$ 20 billion China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund and the US$ 10 billion Special Loan Programme for China-LAC Infrastructure Project. This opens up plenty of space for cooperation to the mutual benefit of all[1].The scale of Latin America's borrowing from China in the past decade is astounding: Venezuela with $62 billion, Brazil, $42 billion, Argentina, $18 billion; and Ecuador, $17 billion (China and Latin America: Connected and Competing, 2014, online). Some clear examples includes, hydropower of Chinese acquisitions. In LAC, countries working with China on the construction of dams includes Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela (Latin America – Foreign ... https://foreignpolicy.com, 2018) as LAC populations were actually in need which could not be properly made available by the former colonial masters in their practices of neo-colonial ambitions[2]. "The amount of electricity devoted to rural electrification is miniscule compared to other uses," wrote last fall, continuing that "hydropower is already unreliable and is projected to become much more so in light of climate change and projected shifts in rainfall patterns"(https://www.weforum.org/.../it-s-time-for-a-new-era-of-china-).

In spite of the above profitable advantages enjoyed by LAC countries in her radical commitment with China, the latter also experienced rapid economic growth due to the availability of raw materials extracted from the South American Continent in 2000, annual rate varies in percentages ranging from of 8.5, 2010, China's economy grew at an annual rate of 10.6 and represented close to 9.2 of global GDP. Since 2010, only 1 percent point a year to the global GDP growth rate and in 2016 accounted for more than 40 percent of the global consumption. With the famous practice of Dollar Diplomacy by U.S with regional hegemonic theory towards LAC did not challenged China in any way to surrender her international exploitative agenda in South America.[3] In addition, However, Britain's growing economy capacity and neo-colonial intentions in South America left her in the cold as China was bent to discard the outdated logic of exclusive sphere of influence diplomacy as well as the Spanish, Portuguese and French Multinational Corporations in LAC (Alan K. Manchester, 2018). By 1913, British investment had grown five-fold in a span of 30 years, and Britain purchased a large share of all Latin American exports (primarily raw materials). According to historian Alan K. Manchester, in the early 1800s Britain enjoyed economic "preeminence" in the region. The levers of power in this "imperialism of free trade" were not armies, but diplomats and money. Consequently, the affairs of Latin American governments were in large part influenced by European, and even more centrally, British economic interests which have been freely operating their intensive neo-colonial agenda to suit their national interests.

4.2. Critical Assessment and the Way Forwards of Sino-LAC Relationship During the 21st Century IPER

With critical minds, China portrayed an upper hand in the conduct of her relations with LAC Countries due to the high level of technology as compared to regional development. The Chinese leader mathematical formula of exploitation of the region is a serious setback because leaders have not yet fully disclosed those hidden agenda of win-win radical engagements. For years now, China has been criticized by governments, the media, international, and regional organizations for its rather singular focus on LAC's commodities like minerals, oil and soy and for relatively low levels of foreign direct investment in the region. Chinese officials often justified commodities-focused engagement by pointing out obvious trade complementarities between China and LAC. But the "1+3+6" and "3×3" frameworks seemingly concede the point that the China-LAC economic ties have been limited in scope (Margaret Myers, 2015). They seek to otherwise define the China-LAC relationship – moving away from a commodities-focused narrative, if not from commodities-based engagement altogether. As China contends with economic shifts at home, these frameworks also pave the way for China's top communications, infrastructure, IT, and other high-tech firms to establish new markets, contracts, and partnerships in Latin America – a goal already clearly articulated in China's recent overseas investment policy. If it comes to pass, China's promise of enhanced economic engagement in strategic sectors could mean good things for some LAC nations. Latin American governments would of course be best served by also formulating their own policies – numeric or otherwise – to guide Chinese investment to strategic industries. According to Barbara Kotschwar in 2014, "China's economic impact on the Latin American region has been uneven". China's rapid industrialization and high growth rates underlie a voracious appetite for commodities, and a strong demand from China and its Asian supply chain partners has led to a significant increase in the prices of many commodities exported by LAC countries. This would result in a reproduction of neocolonial/neo-dependent relationships, where the asymmetric nature of the relationship in terms of the relative importance of bilateral trade to each partner, the

[1] Ibid.

[2] China–Latin America relations are relations between the People's Republic of China and the countries of Latin America. ... Only the United States was a large trading partner. .... /01/latin-america-divided-over-ties-with-china-growing suspicions-over-chinese-presence-in-latin-america.php, Fitch Ratings, It's time for a new era of China-Latin America business relations ... https://www.weforum.org/.../it-s-time-for-a-new-era-of-china-latin-america-business-relations/.

[3] Ibid.

composition of trade flows, and the balance of FDI flows exhibits many characteristics of typical center-periphery relations. Political goals dictate economic structures, which can have unexpected political and economic consequences. In fact, the TPP of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, Mao Tse-Tung's Collectivisation style, Decollectivisation to the 4Modernisations of Deng, Hu Jintao's six-point proposal on cross-Strait relations and the recent past Premier Li introduction of a new numerical mathematical policy of international interaction in the World of Globalization refers to as the "3×3" Model for Sino-Latin America economic cooperation during his visit were strictly appreciated by Margaret Myer in 2015. These mathematical strategies are what made two decades of South-South cooperation more profitable following the 21st Century calculations on win-win strategies initiated by the Chinese Government and foreign policy making agencies. The Western countries were caught unaware inside what they calculated to be dangerous traps towards the wrong and delay tactics of economic growth and development LDC where they long held them hostile with slavery, slave trade, colonization and new patterns of neo-colonialism. Thanks to smart Chinese soft power approach in flushing them partially out of those countries for development to regain its glory.

CONCLUSION

However, Sino- LAC international relations spanning between 2001 and 2020 have been more valuable as compared to what they experienced during the last 40 years of the 20th Century chaeracterised with Cold War calculated and confusion between Capitalist and Communist World backed by USA and USSR respectively. The mechanism of neo-colonialism with its institutional arrangements and agents were still able to held LDC captive in their development agenda in spite of leaders' initiatives to advance with the realities of their communities. The realistic results of the four modernizations introduced by Deng Xiao Ping in the late 1980s paved new patterns of Chinese radical engagement and specific foreign policy objectives towards different parts of the World following her admission in the WTO in 2001. China also gained greater chances of extending her economic tentacles towards LAC following terrorist attack of U.S on September 11, 2001 thereby marking the conservative end of exclusive sphere of influence at the end of the Post-Cold War era. For China, the end have justified the means as John G. Stoessinger quoted Napoleon in his book the Might of Nations, World Politics in Our Times in 1990. His analysis was so timely because the 1990s marked the end of bipolar international system following the collapsed of communism in Eastern Europe and the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union into Commonwealth Wealth of Independent States. But Communism did not collapse in China; instead China resorted to new forms of socialist-Capitalist economic system with the adoption of Marxist-Leninist strategies towards the 21st Century. As a result of China's smart and soft foreign policy approach. Although, the Chinese approach within the period of study proved more realistic than those previously adopted by the U.S and Western Europe especially through exploitation of resources without a pertinent compensation packages to help reinforce economic growth and development of different countries targeted for unholy extraction and exploitation of natural resources.

On the other hand, China also opened new opportunities for LAC investors to carry out their investment activities in potential Chinese towns although with much less substantial. Examples includes firms from Brazil and Mexico such as Embraer, Marcopolo, Grupo Bimbo, and Gruma are seeking new ways to invest in China—both through on-the-ground plants and by developing new relationships with Chinese suppliers and clients. This is what the Western capitalist countries failed to do during their period of strong hegemony and domination in terms of political economic relations with LAC during the Cold War. Stronger cultural and educational ties are seen at all levels in LAC counties, municipalities, cities, and across the public, private, and academic sectors. Public and private schools are increasingly teaching Mandarin Chinese. Student exchanges between universities are growing, and new cooperation agreements are seeking to promote common research agendas and establish bi-national projects. [4]Several business organizations and universities have established joint centers in China to promote their common interests and improvement institutional relations as well. It can be noted here that China's involvement in LAC's regional organizations is also a critical avenue for Chinese engagement with the region which brought new packages of her engagements. Nonetheless, Sino-LAC political and economic interactions were rather limited until the beginning of the 21st Century, restricted to some political and cultural exchanges between politicians and scholars (Jiang, 2006) and an almost irrelevant bilateral trade that represented only 1% of Latin America's exports and less than 1 percent of its imports in the 1990s (Kotschwar, 2014). Nevertheless, the thirty-three countries of the region should not just allow China to dictate her new style of hegemonic exploitation of natural resources as raw materials to heavy industrial consumptions at home but should in return train citizens and transfer of new mode of technological facilities to the exploited countries of South America in towards the third decades of the 21st Century as the first two decades have not been totally satisfactory as she acted in a way slightly similar to former colonial actors of the

[4]Confucius Institute: Promoting Language, Culture and Friendliness," *Xinhua*, October 2, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/02/content_5521722.htm.

region I terms of massive exploitation of natural resources to her advantage.

Our finding in this study shows that China developed smart strategies to realize her radical engagement with LAC through the formulation of a set of foreign policy goals towards the Countries of South American Continent. The initiation of developmental projects, the Belt - Road Initiative (BRI) and creation of ECLAC, acquiring best acquisitions and investments in different sectors of the economy in different countries especially in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela rendered Western European presence more useless and in an unstable situation of continuous Exploration, Extortion and Exportation (3Es) of existing natural resources without a proportionate benefits to the countries involved. However, all these did not materialized without challenges from the U.S and former neo-colonial actors from Western Europe (Enrique Dussel Peters, online, 2018) as they envied South-South Cooperation as opposed to North-South intimidating international cooperation of the 21st Century. China is poised to grow its presence and linkages with LAC. It means that individual countries have to initiate effective measures to ensure that the result is long-term benefits to the present and younger generation that can acted as mechanisms for the promotion of culture of peace and nation building in the 21st Century. The Confucius Institute of China stood as a major challenging international tool with diverse approaches used in the promotion and consolidation of Chinese cultural values around the World and LAC in particular. This is one of the best method in our findings which can continuously encourage other backward African countries which are still late in their development agenda because of Western European manipulations in the context of neo-colonialism. The mantles of retarding economic growth and development in LDC were broken by the Chinese style of HEP although the USA as one is still in position of Hyper International Political Power (HIPP) which the later does not possessed. Chinese soft power approach (Nye. 2003), is a big lesson to those using hard power to subdue LDC in the Post-Cold War era (Njuafac K. F, 2020). That notwithstanding, we encourage policy makers of those LAC countries as well as in other remote part of the World to move closer to Chinese path of South-South relations as opposed dangerous mechanisms put in place in the conduct of North South cooperation with advanced cheating mentalities in the name of globalization of the 21st Century. This is justified by the fact that, when evaluating to brief interaction of China-LAC international political economic relations, much have been realized within the two decades under study as compared to European merger era of the previous and recent Centuries.

Biography of the Author

Dr. Njuafac Kenedy Fonju is a holder of a Doctorate / Ph.D in History with specialisation in the History of International Relations obtained from the University of Yaounde I, Cameroon in 2012. He has been lecturing since 2007, as a Part-Time Lecturer (2007-2015), Assistant Lecturer (2015-2017) and presently a Senior Lecturer in the University of Dschang, Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences, Department of History and Archeology since November 2017. He delivers lectures in the History of International Relations and Political History in the Post-Graduate and undergraduate levels. Dr. Kenedy has been lecturing courses such as Africa in International Relations, China from the Communist Revolution to Market Economy, Communist World in International Relations, Inter-American Relations and Black Problems in the Americas, Conflict Resolution and the Culture of Peace, Issues and Challenges of the Commonwealth of Nations and Political Elites in Colonial Black African Countries, the Politics of empowerment of Minorities in the World since the 20th Century, and History of Political Thought since Machiavelli. He is also lecturing Introduction to Bilingualism, Introduction to language and Nation-Building, the History of Bilingualism in the World, National and International Business in Bilingualism in the Department of Bilingual Letters of the University of Dschang. In addition, He also delivers lectures concerning scientific English in the Departments of Physics and Earth Sciences in the Faculty of Sciences of the same institution. His broader research interests include emerging powers and their foreign policy strategies and strength in the 21st Century specifically China and United States as hyper-economic powers of the 21st Century with the Super Stars of Asia. He is the author of twelve scientific articles focusing on Asia, China, Eastern and Western Europe, U.S.A, Africa and the Challenges of international terrorism in the World with two scientific international communication papers presented and have also edited two books on the African Gulf of Guinea with two prefaces written in the two volumes of 2017 and 2018. He has also saved as the Divisional Secretary of the former Cameroon National Elections Observatory of Lebialem Representation, Elections Supervisor, Election Monitor, and Trainer of Trainers of Polling Stations Delegate from 2002 to 2007. He was also appointed Secretary of Alou Council Tenders Board for the Awards of Public Contract in the municipality from July 20, 2016 to April 2, 2019. Presently, he is a Municipal Councilor of Dschang Urban Council since February 9, 2020 Municipal Elections in Cameroon, spokesman of the Municipal Group, appointed Referral in the implementation of Bilingualism (English and French) in the Dschang Municipality and recently, Rapporteur of the Commission of National, International Decentralised Cooperation of Development and Communication within the forty-one (41) Councillors of Dschang Council since December 2020. Presently, Team Leader of Diaspora Studies in RUASD and Secretary of the upcoming international conference scheduled for November 2021 on Migration challenges of Africa-America and Africa-Europe Diasporas in the 21st Century.

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