

Italian Hegemonic Hopes of Glory, God, and Gold (3Gs) Versus Gross Ambitions of Exploration, Expropriation and Exploitation (3Es) to Global Shameful Atrocities (GSA) Against Ethiopia 19th- 20th Centuries

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Abstract

The present paper deals with Italian imperialism in the Horns of Africa generally known as East Africa focusing on the most destructive and dangerous homicide and atrocities committed against Africans in view of the previous disappointment and defeat registered during the late 19th Century in the first Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895-1896 to the famous Yekatit 12 Affairs of 1937 caused by Marshall Rodolfo Graziani during the first half of the 20th Century. This is very important because a country which claimed to be the Holy Land of the Catholic Church with its international aggressive leaders at the time allowed their colonial diplomatic agents to massacred almost 30,000 Africans in Ethiopia during the 1930s with house burnt to ashes. What have the Italian been thinking of this atrocities and all along other pre-colonial and colonial crimes against humanity? It is true that Italian Fascism and Nazism of Germany committed terrible crimes against humanity in the face of the First and Second World Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45 respectively. The scrutiny of specialized sources pertaining to this question urged us to use a historical analytical approach to present our argument and the realities of appeasement policy developed by the British and French which granted much opening to such human slaughtering of the 20th Century by frequently yielding to the demands of the aggressors and aggressive statesmen of the 1920s and 1930s whose end results were the two major global wars fought in the World history. In fact, international relations, international affairs, world affairs and international politics become more interesting when going through any study concerning the Italian Benito Mussolini and German Adolf Hitler in the context of international anarchy, aggression and mass killings with references to the blames and war guilt clauses of the Paris Peace Settlement of 1919 and its aftermaths with much bloodshed in the colonial territories for the Italian National Prestige and Aggrandizements in the Overseas Colonies (INPAOC) located in East Africa. Therefore, an attempt of national prestige and consolidation of 3Gs ended up GSA in their quests for 3Es.

Keywords: Latin America, Caribbean, natural resources, hegemony, hyper exploitation, neo-colonial actor, radical engagement, acquisition, investment.

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INTRODUCTION

Italian gross Imperialism ambitions dates back to ancient Rome, and the Latin notion of mare nostrum ("Our Sea", referring to the Mediterranean) has historically been the basis for Italian imperialism, especially during the fascist era. During the Middle Ages and the modern period, the Republic of Venice and the Republic of Genoa controlled networks of "colonies" in the Mediterranean region known as the Venetian Empire and the Genoese Empire respectively. Between the 15th and 16th centuries, Italian explorers contributed to the colonial enterprises of other European countries in the

Americas: Cristopher Columbus from Genoa served Spain, Amerigo Vespucci from Florence served Portugal, the Cabot brothers from Venice served England, and Giovanni da Verrazzano from Florence served France. However, no Italian power took an active role in the scramble for the Americas, with the notable exception of the Pope who acted as an arbiter between European colonial powers during the Renaissance. The geographical position of Italy, located in the center of an internal sea, without an open free access to the ocean, contributed to this purely Mediterranean policy (Palumbo Patrizia, 2003). Ferdinand I, Grand Duke of Tuscany, made the only Italian attempt to create a colony in the Americas, in

what is now French Guiana, organizing in 1608 an expedition to explore the north of Brazil and the Amazon river in 1608 under the command of the English captain Robert Thornton. However, Thornton, on his return from the preparatory expedition in 1609, found Ferdinand I dead and his successor, Cosimo II, was not interested in the project. In 1651, Giovanni Paolo Lascaris, Italian nobleman and Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaller of Malta (at the time a vassal state of the Kingdom of Sicily), possessed four Caribbean islands: Saint Christopher, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy, and Saint Croix, which were colonized from 1651 until 1665. No other colonial attempt in the ocean was made and, by 1797, the Venetian and Genoese possessions in the Mediterranean were lost.

The First Italo-Ethiopian War (1895-1896) ended in disaster for the would-be colonizer; at the Battle of Adowa, Italian troops were ambushed by the army of then-Ethiopian monarch Menelik II, resulting in the loss of more than 3,000 Italian soldiers, the single biggest loss of European lives during the scramble for Africa (Anthony Luongo, 2019). The loss was so embarrassing for Italians that the Francesco Crispi government collapsed when the news was received. The pain of Adowa stuck with some Italians, especially as other European states conquered all of Africa except for Ethiopia and American-supported Liberia (Strang 2013a). Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia was not the first Italian conflict with the east African state. As the Scramble for Africa heated up, Italy likely felt driven to invade by competition with other European empires as well as the typical mantra of European imperialism, "Glory, God, and Gold". In 1889, Italy took advantage of the uncertain situation created by the death of Emperor Yohannes IV to occupy the Highlands with the aid of Eritrean auxiliaries. ... On 1 January 1890, the Italian king announced the creation of the colony of Eritrea, taking its name from the ancient Greek name for the Red Sea, Erythreus. Eritrea was officially declared an Italian colony on January 1, 1890, by the royal decree of Umberto I. Italy's presence in Eritrea started when an Italian monk purchased land in Assab on behalf of an Italian shipping company in 1869. That land and more that was purchased by the shipping company was then sold to the Italian government in 1882. With Italy's conquest of Massawa in February 1885, it quickly consolidated its footing on the Eritrean coastline and areas farther inland. Italy continued with its plan to create a settler colony and faced various forms of protest and resistance. Italy confronted these challenges militarily, politically, and diplomatically. Eventually, Italy steered the process to the delineation of borders between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1889, resulting in the colonization of Eritrea. In the disorder that followed the 1889 death of Emperor Yohannes IV, Gen. Oreste Baratieri occupied the highlands along the Eritrean coast and Italy proclaimed the establishment of

a new colony of Eritrea (from the Latin name for the Red Sea), with capital Asmara in substitution of Massawa. In the Treaty of Wuchale (It. Uccialli) signed the same year, King Menelik of Shewa—a southern Ethiopian kingdom—recognized the Italian occupation of his rivals' lands of Bogos, Hamasien, Akkele Guzay, and Serae in exchange for guarantees of financial assistance and continuing access to European arms and ammunition (Pergher, Roberta, 2017). His subsequent victory over his rival kings and enthronement as Emperor Menelek II (r. 1889–1913) made the treaty formally binding upon the entire country. Once established, however, Menelik took a dim view towards Italian involvement with local leaders in his northern province of Tigray; while the Italians, for their part, felt bound to involvement given the regular Tigrayan raiding of tribes within their colony's protectorate and the Tigrayan leaders themselves continued to claim the provinces now held by Italy. Negotiations with the French over a railway brought things to a head: the Italian—but not Amharic—version of the Treaty of Wuchale had prohibited Ethiopia with foreign negotiations except through Italy, effectively making the realm an Italian protectorate. Secure both domestically and militarily (thanks to arms shipments via French Djibouti and Harar), Menelik denounced the treaty in whole and the ensuing war, culminating in Italy's disastrous defeat at Adwa, ended their hopes of annexing Ethiopia for a time. During the late twentieth century Assab would become Ethiopia's main port, but it was long overshadowed by nearby Djibouti, whose railway (completed to Dire Dawa in 1902) permitted it to quickly supplant traditional caravan-based routes to Assab and Zeila. Massawa remained the primary port for most of northern Ethiopia, but its relatively high customs dues, dependence on caravans, and political antagonism limited the volume on its trade with Ethiopia (Chisholm, Hugh, 1911).

In October 1935 Italian troops invaded Ethiopia – then also known as Abyssinia – forcing the country's Emperor, Haile Selassie, into exile. Ignoring protests from the League of Nations, the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini proclaimed a new Italian empire in East Africa, comprising Ethiopia and the pre-existing territories of Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. Following early successes by Italy's ally, Germany, in the Second World War, Mussolini declared war on Britain in June 1940. This meant that, British possessions in East Africa, as well as British-controlled Egypt and the vital supply route of the Suez Canal, were now threatened. The Italians attacked border posts in Kenya and Sudan, and captured British Somaliland in August. The Italian Viceroy, the Duke of Aosta, then ordered his troops to halt, allowing the initiative to pass to the British. General Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief Middle East, planned a three-pronged counter-offensive to dismantle Italy's East

African Empire. His force was outnumbered, but he had air support from the Royal Air Force (RAF). In January 1941 Lieutenant General William Platt led forces from Sudan into Eritrea. The Italians quickly retreated and, in March, Indian and British troops won an important victory at Karen (Tareke G, 2009).

I. THE ORIGINS OF ITALIAN 3GS VERSUS 3ES TO GSA

The aggressive establishment of Italian colonial empire from began in Africa during the late 19th Century comprised four main dimensions namely: Colonies, Protectorates, Concessions and Dependencies (CPCD) of the Kingdom of Italy (KI) moved the country from attempted National Prestigious Ambitions (NPA) to National Disgraceful Tendencies (NDT) of the 20th Century in the first ever famous Black African independent country. This total colonial challenged of Italians aggression began with their attacks and defeat during the Adowaa Battle in 1896 to another total defeat by the forces of Haile Silesia during the Second World War of 1939-1945. This beginning and an end marked what is described in this study as from 3Gs through 3Es to GSA in the 20th Century international affairs concerning the question of aggressive statesmen like Benito Mussolini. However, Italian colonial possessions in Africa included Eritrea, Somalia, Libya and Ethiopia. Following the advent of the Fascist system under Benito Mussolini, Things were no longer going to be the same in the face the Italian dissatisfaction out of the Paris Peace Conference and the rate of disarmaments decision of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 with the parity ratio of 5:5:3 for Britain, France and Italy Thereafter the Italian aggressive leader sought to increase the size of Italian empire and to satisfy the claims of Italian irredentists by encouraging Systematic Demographic Colonization (SDC) with 165,000 Italians in East Africa in 1939. As the Second World War started in the same year Italy decided to ally with Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler as another international aggressor of the Century. Then in 1940, Italian aggressive leader ordered the occupation of British Somaliland and western Egypt which were lost to the invading Allied forces in 1943. In 1947, Italy officially relinquished claims on its former colonies. Only the territory of Somalia was eventually turned into a United Nations (UN) Trust Territory under Italian administration until 1960 marking the end of Italian colonization in Africa.

1.1 The Roots of Italian Gross Imperial Failures

The Kingdom of Italy began its attempts to establish colonies in the Horn of Africa in the 1880s. The first phase of the colonial expansion concluded with the disastrous First Italo-Ethiopian War and the defeat of the Italian forces in the Battle of Adwa, on 1 March 1896, inflicted by the Ethiopian Army of Negus Menelik II, aided by Russia and France. In the following years, Italy abandoned its expansionist plans

in the area and limited itself to administering the small possessions that it retained in there: the colony of Italian Eritrea and the protectorate (later colony) of Italian Somalia. For the next few decades, Italian-Ethiopian economic and diplomatic relations remained relatively stable. On 14 December 1925, Italy's fascist government signed a secret pact with Britain aimed at reinforcing Italian dominance in the region (Pankhurst Richard, 1969). London recognised that the area was of Italian interest and agreed to the Italian request to build a railway connecting Somalia and Eritrea. Although the signatories had wished to maintain the secrecy of the agreement, the plan soon leaked and caused indignation by the French and Ethiopian governments. The latter denounced it as a betrayal of a country that had been for all intents and purposes a member of the League of Nations. As fascist rule in Italy continued to radicalise, its colonial governors in the Horn of Africa began pushing outward the margins of their imperial foothold. The governor of Italian Eritrea, Jacopo Gasparini, focused on the exploitation of Teseney and an attempt to win over the leaders of the Tigre people against Ethiopia. The governor of Italian Somaliland, Cesare Maria de Vecchi, began a policy of repression that led to the occupation of the fertile Jubaland, and the cessation in 1928 of collaboration between the settlers and the traditional Somali chiefs (Andall Jacqueline *et al.*, 2005).

Britain and France, preferring Italy as an ally against Germany, did not take strong steps to discourage an Italian military buildup on the borders of Italian Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Because of the German Question, Mussolini needed to deter Hitler from annexing Austria while much of the Italian Army was being deployed to the Horn of Africa, which led him to draw closer to France to provide the necessary deterrent. King Victor Emmanuel III shared the traditional Italian respect for British sea power and insisted to Mussolini that Italy must not antagonise Britain before he assented to the war. In that regard, British diplomacy in the first half of 1935 greatly assisted Mussolini's efforts to win Victor Emmanuel's support for the invasion (Bosworth R. J. B. 2002). On 7 January 1935, a Franco-Italian Agreement was made that gave Italy essentially a free hand in Africa in return for Italian co-operation in Europe. Pierre Laval told Mussolini that he wanted a Franco-Italian alliance against Nazi Germany and that Italy had a "free hand" in Ethiopia (De Grand A. 2004). In April, Italy was further emboldened by participation in the Stresa Front, an agreement to curb further German violations of the Treaty of Versailles. The first draft of the communique at Stresa Summit spoke of upholding stability all over the world, but British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, insisted for the final draft to declare that Britain, France and Italy were committed to upholding stability "in Europe", which Mussolini took for British acceptance of an invasion of Ethiopia. In

June, non-interference was further assured by a political rift, which had developed between the United Kingdom and France, because of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. As 300,000 Italian soldiers were transferred to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland over the spring and the summer of 1935, the world's media was abuzz with speculation that Italy would soon be invading Ethiopia (Baer G. W. 1967). In June 1935, Anthony Eden arrived in Rome with the message that Britain opposed an invasion and had a compromise plan for Italy to be given a corridor in Ethiopia to link the two Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa, which Mussolini rejected outright. As the Italians had broken the British naval codes, Mussolini knew of the problems in the British Mediterranean Fleet, which led him to believe that the British opposition to the invasion, which had come as an unwelcome surprise to him, was not serious and that Britain would never go to war over Ethiopia (Campbell, Ian 2017).

1.2 How Italians Colonial Agents Found themselves in East Africa from the late 19th Century

The history of Eritrea which gave the Italians future opportunities during the 19th Century to manifest her pre-colonial and colonial ambitions coupled with much atrocities can be dated as far back as 6000 BC and enormously rich with diverse natural complexities. The origin of the name Eritrea is the word erythraean, Greek for "red" (in reference to the Red Sea). In about 338 AD, Christianity was introduced in Eritrea. And the year 615 brought Islam to Eritrea. The strategic location it inhabits has not only been a source of enrichment but also the root of many of its tribulations. Eritrea's geographical location made it a vital trading route, even during the first millennium BC. Qohaito, found on one of the plateaus of Eritrea, was just one of the thriving ancient trading cities. For centuries, many Eritrean and foreign rulers and empires struggled for control of this region in order to exert power and influence over the trading route, ultimately leading to the establishment of Italian Eritrea in 1890 (Simona Berhe, 2020). In 1889, Italy took advantage of the uncertain situation created by the death of Emperor Yohannes IV to occupy the Highlands with the aid of Eritrean auxiliaries. On 1 January 1890, the Italian king announced the creation of the colony of Eritrea, taking its name from the ancient Greek name for the Red Sea, Erythraeus. Italian Eritrea (Italian: Colonia Eritrea, "Colony of Eritrea") was a colony of the Kingdom of Italy in the territory of present-day Eritrea. The first Italian establishment in the area was the purchase of Assab by the Rubattino Shipping Company in 1869, which came under government control in 1882. Occupation of Massawa in 1885 and the subsequent expansion of territory would gradually engulf the region and in 1889 borders with the Ethiopian Empire were defined in the Treaty of Wuchale. In 1890 the Colony of Eritrea was officially founded (Shinn, D. H *et al.*, 2013). In 1936 the region was integrated into Italian East Africa as the Eritrea

Governorate. This would last until Italy's loss of the region in 1941, during the East African campaign of World War II. Italian Eritrea then came under British military administration, which in 1951 fell under United Nations supervision. In the autumn of 1869 he, together with Admiral Acton, was sent by the government to the Red Sea to choose a suitable port and arrange for its sale. This he did by paying a small deposit to the Danakil chiefs at Assab Bay in return for their promise to sell their territory to him on his return. Meanwhile, the government had been in touch with Raffaele Rubattino, whose company was planning to establish a steamship line through the newly opened Suez Canal and the Red Sea to India. It was agreed that the company would buy the territory in its own name and with its own funds, but should undertake to use it in the national interest. Sapeto returned to the Red Sea on behalf of the company, completed the purchase and bought more land to the south. (By March 1870, an Italian shipping company had thus become claimant to territory at the northern end of Assab Bay, a deserted but spacious bay about half-way between Annesley Bay to the north and Obock to the South. However, the area, — which had been long dominated by the Ottoman Empire and Egypt— was not settled by the Italians until 1880. Two years later, Italy formally took possession of the nascent colony from its commercial owners (Lowe C. J 2002).

The aim of invading Ethiopia was to boost Italian national prestige, which was wounded by Ethiopia's defeat of Italian forces at the Battle of Adowa of 1896, which saved Ethiopia from Italian Colonisation Ambitions (ICA) (Nicolle David, 1997). The Italian aggressive Statesman used as main justification to effectively invaded Abyssinia during the late 1930s. In fact, historians have frequently been doubting why Italy was so backward at her colonization strategies? Towards the African Continent as opposed other European colonisers like British, German and French? As the result of lateness, in her colonization game to be able to compete with the firmly established empires that were already occupying most of Africa the ambitions of INPAOC took precedent in view of the antiquity as Italy was the homeland of the Romans and the metropolis of the Roman Empire. In fact, Rome itself was founded as a Kingdom in 753 BC and became a Republic in 509 BC, when the monarchy was overthrown in favour of a government of the Senate and the People making Italy an example of such a system in human history (Kallis, Aristotle A, 2000).

The Italian East Africa (IEA) also known as Africa Orientale Italiana, (AOI) was an colony located in the Horn of Africa formed in 1936 with the merging of Italian Somalia, Italian Eritrea, and the newly occupied Ethiopian Empire, conquered in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. Italian East Africa was divided into six governorates. Eritrea and Somalia, Italian

possessions since the 1880s, were enlarged with captured Ethiopian territory and became the Eritrea and Somalia Governorates. The remainder of "Italian Ethiopia" consisted the Harar, Galla-Sidamo, Amhara, and Scioa Governorates. Fascist colonial policy had a divide and conquer characteristic and favored the Somali and Tigrayan peoples in order to weaken the Amhara people who had been the ruling ethnic group in the Ethiopian Empire (Le Houérou, F., 1994). During the Second World War, Italian East Africa was occupied by a British-led force including colonial units and Ethiopian guerrillas in November 1941. After the war, Italian Somalia and Eritrea came under British administration, while Ethiopia regained its independence. In 1950, occupied Somalia became the United Nations Trust Territory of Somaliland, administered by Italy from 1950 until its independence in 1960. Meanwhile, occupied Eritrea became an autonomous part of Ethiopia in 1952, gaining full independence in 1993 after a long struggle. However, the famous Yekatit 12 Affairs of 1937 refers to the reaction of Italian soldiers who destroyed native settlements in Addis Ababa, with nearly 30,000 Ethiopians slaughtered as animals while their houses burnt down to ashes with principal Colonial Administrative Order (CAO) directed by then Italian East African Viceroy known as Marshall Rodolfo Graziani. This massacre of Africans was later qualified with a famous name known as Yekatit 12. Thereafter, its main conspirator Graziani was also adjectivised as "the Butcher of Ethiopia" in the history of Italian colonisation in East Africa. To that effect, the strong Italian aggressive leader, Benito Mussolini replaced him with Prince Amedeo, Duke of Aosta with much instructions in using positive conciliatory policy towards the natives and obtaining more strategic methods of pacifying Ethiopia (Fuller, Mia, 2016).

1.3 The Beginning of an Italian Strongman and International Aggrandizement Foreign Policy Ambitions in the Colonial Possessions

In this study, Benito Mussolini is considered as an Italian Strongman (IS) due to several adventures he undertook in the name of National Prestige (NP) beginning from 1922. The IS promoted profound positive changes to the Colonial Government in IEA when taking the case of Eritrea. After il Duce declared the birth of Italian Empire in May 1936, Italian Eritrea (IE) was enlarged with Northern Ethiopia's regions and Italian Somaliland were merged with the conquered Ethiopia in the New Italian East Africa (NIEA) administrative territories. Therefore, the Fascist era of the 1930s was characterized by imperial expansion in the name of a New Roman Empire (NRE) with Eritrea chosen by the Italian Government to be the industrial centre of IEA (Palla Marco 2000). This move was followed by series of projects which could be more beneficial to the metropolis as follows: After the establishment of new transportation and communication

methods in the country, Italians started to set up new factories which in turn made due contribution in enhancing trade activities. The newly opened factories produced buttons, cooking oil, and pasta, construction materials, packing meat, tobacco, hide and other household commodities needed by the colonial population in particular and the locals. For example, in 1939, there were about 2,198 factories and most of the employees were Eritrean citizens, whose majority migrated from villages to work in those factories. The establishment of industries also made an increase in the number of both Italians and Eritreans residing in the cities. The number of Italians residing in the country increased from 4,600 to 75,000 inhabitants and with the involvement of Eritreans in the industries, trade and fruit plantation was expanded across the nation, while some of the plantations were owned by Eritreans (Barrera G., 2003).

However, Mussolini's Government considered the colony as a strategic base for future aggrandizement and ruled accordingly, using Eritrea as a base to launch its 1935–1936 campaign to conquer and colonize Ethiopia. Even in Second World War, the Italians used Eritrea to attack Sudan and occupy the Kassala region using the best Italian colonial troops called Eritrean Ascari, as stated by Italian Marshall Rodolfo Graziani and Legendary Officer Amedeo Guillet. Furthermore, after World War I, service with the Ascari become the main source of paid employment for the indigenous male population of Italian Eritrea. During the expansion required by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1936, 40% of eligible Eritreans were enrolled in these colonial troops. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham advanced North from Kenya into Italian Somaliland, while a third force crossed from Aden to retake British Somaliland by amphibious assault. These then linked up and pushed deep into Ethiopia. (Le Houérou, F., 1994 ; M. Hale · 2012). During the Second World War, Ethiopian men gather in Addis Ababa, heavily armed with captured Italian weapons, to hear the proclamation announcing the return to the capital of the Emperor Haile Selassie in May 1941. In April British troops entered the capital Addis Ababa, and Haile Selassie returned in triumph on 5 May. The Duke of Aosta chose to fight on, and led his men to the mountain stronghold of Amba Alagi, near the Eritrean border. Here they held out for a further two weeks before surrendering. British troops use a bulldozer to pull down a fascist stone monument at Kismayu in Italian Somaliland, 11 April 1941. The last Italian troops in East Africa were defeated at the Battle of Gondar in November 1941. But several thousand escaped to wage a guerrilla war until September 1943, when Italy surrendered to the Allies. The Eighth Army, formed in September 1941, was a diverse formation made up of units from all corners of the British Empire, with infantry divisions coming from Australia, New Zealand,

South Africa and India. In 1940, Italy's fascist dictator Benito Mussolini wanted to expand his African Empire. His forces in Ethiopia attacked neighbouring British possessions, but in 1941 were expelled and defeated. When fighting commenced in North Africa in June 1940, the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Air Headquarters Egypt immediately mounted bombing missions against Italian targets in Libya and helped repel the Italian offensive into Egypt. (Gian Luca Podestà, 2015). The case of Asmara was emblematic. In 1934 Asmara had a population of about 3,500 Italians and 12,000 Africans. In 1939 Italians had risen to 48,000 whilst Africans were 36,000. In just five years the total population had increased fivefold, whilst the proportion between Italians and indigenous people had been reversed. This was an unprecedented phenomenon, determined by the economic importance of the city as a logistic base for the war. Asmara became the financial hub of the new Italian empire, where all major Italian companies had opened branches, as well as the seat of hundreds of new business enterprises born after the conquest of Ethiopia. Social life in Asmara was pulsating just like that of any other European town. During the day the heart of the city throbbed with business, both in the street markets and in the new Italian districts, where the offices of trading and industrial companies could be found. At night, social life moved to the ever expanding number of entertainment and leisure facilities. New dancehalls, restaurants and bars were being opened everywhere. The working men's clubs and numerous sports and recreational societies, supported by local government and by the PNF, organised the colonists' free time. In Eritrea, near the strategic hubs where companies and the army had located their logistic bases, new urban agglomerates rose from scratch, such as Dek'emhare and Nefasit, with plenty of restaurants and clubs, patronised by military personnel, workers and by the Italian nouveaux riches who, as Indro Montanelli denounced in his book "XX Battaglione Eritrea" (20th Eritrean Battalion) lived a upper-class lifestyle, which went against the Fascist imperial ethos, thus betraying the ideal purpose of the African wars (Gian Luca Podestà, 2015).

The conquest of Ethiopia radically modified Italian colonial policy, shifting it onto another level, that of the empire. The empire, in Mussolini's opinion, was above all a spiritual goal towards which Italians should strive in order to avoid the fate of decadent Western people. The meaning attributed to the term transcended the mere material increase in the size of conquered territories, assuming an almost metaphysical character. Fascism's idea of empire conceived a new totalitarian colonial policy, which included some common guidelines for the colonies (such as the racial hierarchy and the school programmes), thus overcoming the historical, political and cultural heterogeneity of the various dominions, and also taking into account that one of the principal objectives was to

create large Italian communities overseas. To highlight the differences between the fascist model and the classic colonialism of the other European powers, and underline its communitarian outlook, jurists defined the fascist empire as a *corpus mysticum* made up of several parts which, however, «although they all concurred to reach the same common goals and though each obtained its own advantage»¹, were not on the same level: first came Italy and Albania, followed by Libya and the Italian islands in the Aegean sea; AOI came last. Of course the elements concurring to make up the hierarchy of dominions were mainly racial and cultural. The administration of the territories was also differentiated: the Aegean Sea and Albania, which was part of the imperial community as an autonomous and independent entity associated to Italy, depended on the Foreign Ministry, whilst Libya and AOI depended on the Ministry for Italian Africa (Ministry of Colonies until 1937), which had purposely changed its name to underline the new way to conceive the relationship between the colonies and the motherland. Between 1936 and 1940, in all its overseas possessions, including Albania and Rhodes, the fascist regime elaborated demographic colonization plans for the transfer of Italian colonists. The emigration of select Italian families represented one of the cornerstones of fascist policy. The common traits, which bore witness to the universal vocation of imperial policy (whose objectives were chiefly the shaping of the new Italian colonists as well as raising the degree of "Italianness" of indigenous populations), concerned the creation of schools both for Italian and autochthonous students; archaeological research; the diffusion of newspapers and magazines (including some in the local languages), the cinema, theatres and the radio; the spreading of Western and/or typically Italian lifestyles and leisure pastimes; the planning of an overseas Italian architecture; the founding of cultural and sports institutions (Gian Luca Podestà 2015).

In Addis Ababa, the situation was different as the capital of the empire was due to become, in Mussolini's opinion, the most beautiful and futuristic city in Africa as the beacon of the new fascist civilization. Paradoxically, Mussolini had declared that the empire's true wealth consisted of Italian people's work, the new economic situation managed to involve a consistent part of the African population too. Both the State and private businesses needed labour. In 1940 estimates recorded 750,000 African workers employed in constructions, road-building and agriculture. If we add those recruited by the armed forces and those working for private businesses, their number surpasses one million, about 10 percent of the estimated African population. In the agricultural sector too, the planned emigration of Italian farmers had been suspended for financial reasons, deeming more opportune to involve African farmers and their families in co-partnership agreements. In the road-building sector, despite

Mussolini's orders to avoid intermingling between the races, at the end of 1938 thousands of Africans were still working side by side with Italian workers. As regards authorization for the most relevant economic activities (those with company capital over 500,000 lire), the entertainment and oil businesses with any capital investment as well as transport enterprises (with at least ten vehicles), the Ministry for Italian Africa (MIA) had sole charge, though it reached its decisions after asking for the opinion of the various Councils. According to statistics, in May 1939, 1,140 companies with a registered capital over 500,000 lire had obtained a license; 499 of these were already active in the empire. Out of which, 407 had already set up industrial facilities, while the rest only created commercial networks. Most companies worked in the various sectors as follows: building 193, mechanics and metallurgy 59, foodstuffs and drinks 48, transports 38, chemicals 34, construction materials 29 and timber 25. As many as 28 licenses were granted to the entertainment industry like cinemas and theatres. To alleviate at least partially the housing problem and create the premises for future tourist development, the State created the East African Hotel Construction Company (EAHCC) established to build hotels in the largest cities (Podestà Gian Luca, 2007).

Mussolini constantly urged the need to increment the number of families, in order to balance the ratio between the two sexes. Il Duce was obsessed with racism. He was above all horrified by the sexual promiscuity of Italian workers and soldiers with African women, about which since 1935 he had been receiving hundreds of alarming reports that deplored the increase in the birth of mixed-blood children; he had even discussed this subject with the foreign press. The issuing of racial legislation, from spring 1937 onwards, was a consequence of the decision to force settlers to take their families with them to the colonies. Unfortunately the problem was not so easy to solve, because African towns did not yet possess a sufficient number of homes or the necessary services. The management of the demographic colonization program was delegated to the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (ONC, the War Veterans' National Organization) and to some regional bodies depending on the PNF. Until 1940, according to data published by the Italian press, the farmer families already settled in their plot were 854, whilst more reliable sources reduce their number to 377. Most Italians of course lived in the towns. But the increasing number of new arrivals between 1936 and 1938 caused great difficulties to colonial governments, who were totally unprepared as regards housing and other urban services water, electricity, gas and transport (The Ministry for Italian Africa 1938).

In all cities, but especially in Addis Ababa, Asmara and Massawa, a thriving black market of rented houses and rooms developed at the hands of both

Italians and Africans. In Eritrea, near the strategic hubs where companies had dislocated their logistic quarters during military operations, there materialised almost out of nothing some new urban agglomerates, such as Dek'emhare and Nefasit 23. It is difficult to formulate any judgement on Italian East Africa's economic system. Certainly the empire had helped Italy to come out of the Depression; it is also just as evident, however, that the colonial economy, because of the way it was structured, could have survived only if supported by a high level of public expenditure. Its long term prospects, on the contrary, would have been problematic. But as I have said, Mussolini's objectives were mainly of a political and ideological-spiritual nature. However, if as a "myth" for mobilising the nation the empire had succeeded, it is also true that the ambitious project of social engineering dreamt by Il Duce (of which the imperial towns were an important element) was not proceeding according to his wishes. As we have noted as regards racial policy, it was as if there were two models existing in parallel in the creation of imperial society: on one hand Mussolini and his totalitarian directives irradiating from Rome, on the other the élite of colonial civil servants who held more traditional views along classic colonialist lines. It is instead interesting to note that, given the importance attributed to symbolic factors by the fascist regime, the innovating and revolutionary spirit of modern architects – real technocrats devoted to regenerating traditional society – coincided to a greater extent with the totalitarian utopia (The Ministry for Italian Africa 1938).

The first Italian race law (R.D. 880/1937) made 'relations of a conjugal nature' between a citizen and a colonial subject of Italian East Africa (and madamato in particular) a crime, punishable by up to five years imprisonment. Marriage between Italian and colonial citizens was banned on November 17th, 1938 (R.D. 1728/1938). In 1939 the 'Penal sanctions for the defense of racial prestige against the natives of Italian Africa' (L. 1004/1939) provided a comprehensive legal framework for racial segregation and colonial life was fully segregated up to the point that in 1940 a law forbade to Italian fathers to pass on their citizenship to their Africa-Italian children. As well, the Fascists' vociferous campaign in the late 1930s against mixed-race unions and miscegenation (*métissage*) indirectly attests to the magnitude of the size and social impact of the phenomenon. Another piece of indirect evidence is the large number of mixed-race children born at the time (Barrera G., 2003).

2. ITALIAN COLONIAL ATROCITIES AGAINST IEA POPULATION

2.1 General Mobilisation Towards Committing War Crimes and Failed Ethiopian Offensive

With war appearing inevitable, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie ordered a general mobilisation

of the Army of the Ethiopian Empire: His declaration was as follows:

"All men and boys able to carry a spear go to Addis Ababa. Every married man will bring his wife to cook and wash for him. Every unmarried man will bring any unmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him. Women with babies, the blind, and those too aged and infirm to carry a spear are excused. Anyone found at home after receiving this order will be hanged" (Othen, Christopher, 2017).

Selassie's army consisted of around 500,000 men, some of whom were armed with spears and bows. Other soldiers carried more modern weapons including rifles, but many of them were equipment from before 1900 and so were obsolete.^[36] According to Italian estimates, on the eve of hostilities, the Ethiopians had an army of 350,000–760,000 men. Only about 25% of the army had any military training, and the men were armed with a motley of 400,000 rifles of every type and in every condition. The Ethiopian Army had about 234 antiquated pieces of artillery mounted on rigid gun carriages as well as a dozen 3.7 cm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns. The army had about 800 light Colt and Hotchkiss machine-guns and 250 heavy Vickers and Hotchkiss machine guns, about 100 .303-inch Vickers guns on AA mounts, 48 20 mm Oerlikon S anti-aircraft guns and some recently purchased Canon de 75 CA modèle 1917 Schneider 75 mm field guns (Rainer Baudendistel, 2006). The arms embargo imposed on the belligerents by France and Britain disproportionately affected Ethiopia, which lacked the manufacturing industry to produce its own weapons. The Ethiopian army had some 300 trucks, seven Ford A-based armoured cars and four World War I era Fiat 3000 tanks. The best Ethiopian units were the emperor's "Kebur Zabagna" (Imperial Guard), which were well-trained and better equipped than the other Ethiopian troops. The Imperial Guard wore a distinctive greenish-khaki uniform of the Belgian Army, which stood out from the white cotton cloak (shamma), which was worn by most Ethiopian fighters and proved to be an excellent target. The skills of the Rasas, the Ethiopian generals' armies, were reported to range from relatively good to incompetent. After Italian objections to the Anschluss, the German annexation of Austria, Germany sent three airplanes, 10,000 Mauser rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition to the Ethiopians (Strang G. B. 2013a).

The serviceable portion of the Ethiopian Air Force was commanded by a Frenchman, André Maillet, and included three obsolete Potez 25 biplanes.^[39] A few transport aircraft had been acquired between 1934 and 1935 for ambulance work, but the Air Force had 13 aircraft and four pilots at the outbreak of the war. Airspeed in England had a surplus Viceroy (Strang G. B. 2013a). Racing plane, and its director, Neville Shute, was delighted with a good offer for the "white elephant"

in August 1935. (The agent said that it was to fly cinema films around Europe. When the client wanted bomb racks to carry the (flammable) films, Shute agreed to fit lugs under the wings to which they could attach "anything they liked". He was told that the plane was to be used to bomb the Italian oil storage tanks at Massawa, and when the CID enquired about the alien (ex-German) pilot practices in it Shute got the impression that the Foreign Office did not object. However, fuel, bombs and bomb racks from Finland could not be got to Ethiopia in time, and the paid-for Viceroy stayed at its works. The emperor of Ethiopia had £16,000 to spend on modern aircraft to resist the Italians and planned to spend £5000 on the Viceroy and the rest on three Gloucester Gladiator fighters. There were 50 foreign mercenaries who joined the Ethiopian forces, including French pilots like Pierre Corriger, the Trinidadian pilot Hubert Julian, an official Swedish military mission under Captain Viking Tamm, the White Russian Feodor Kononov and the Czechoslovak writer Adolf Parlesak (Strang G. B. 2013b). Several Austrian Nazis, a team of Belgian fascists and the Cuban mercenary Alejandro Del Valle also fought for Haile Selassie. Many of the individuals were military advisers, pilots, doctors or supporters of the Ethiopian cause; 50 mercenaries fought in the Ethiopian army and another 50 people were active in the Ethiopian Red Cross or nonmilitary activities. The Italians later attributed most of the relative success achieved by the Ethiopians to foreigners. The Italian propaganda machine magnified the number to thousands to explain away the Ethiopian Christmas Offensive in late 1935 (Sbacchi, Alberto, 1977).

The Christmas Offensive was intended to split the Italian forces in the north with the Ethiopian centre, crushing the Italian left with the Ethiopian right and to invade Eritrea with the Ethiopian left. Ras Seyum Mangasha held the area around Abiy Addi with about 30,000 men. Selassie with about 40,000 men advanced from Gojjam toward Mai Timket to the left of Ras Seyoum. Ras Kassa Haile Darge with around 40,000 men advanced from Dessie to support Ras Seyoum in the centre in a push towards Warieu Pass. Ras Mulugeta Yeggazu, the Minister of War, advanced from Dessie with approximately 80,000 men to take positions on and around Amba Aradam to the right of Ras Seyoum. Amba Aradam was a steep sided, flat topped mountain directly in the way of an Italian advance on Addis Ababa. The four commanders had approximately 190,000 men facing the Italians (Barrera Giulia, 2003). Ras Imru and his Army of Shire were on the Ethiopian left. Ras Seyoum and his Army of Tigre and Ras Kassa and his Army of Beghemder were the Ethiopian centre. Ras Mulugeta and his "Army of the Center" (Mahel Sefari) were on the Ethiopian rights (Mockler Anthony, 2003). The Ethiopian offensive was defeated by the superiority of the Italian's weaponry (artillery and machine guns) as

well as aerial bombardment with chemical weapons, at first with mustard gas. The Ethiopians in general were very poorly armed, with few machine guns, their troops mainly armed with swords and spears. Having spent a decade accumulating poison gas in East Africa, Mussolini gave Badoglio authority to resort to Schrecklichkeit (frightfulness), which included destroying villages and using gas (OC 23/06, 28 December 1935); Mussolini was even prepared to resort to bacteriological warfare as long as these methods could be kept quiet. Some Italians objected when they found out but the practices were kept secret, the government issuing denials or spurious stories blaming the Ethiopians (Spencer John H. 2006). The Italians captured Amba Aradam and destroyed Ras Mulugeta's army in the Battle of Amba Aradam (Battle of Enderta). The Ethiopians suffered massive losses and poison gas destroyed a small part of Ras Mulugeta's army, according to the Ethiopians. The armies of Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum were destroyed at the Second Battle of Tembien. Those of Ras Imru was attacked, bombed and defeated in what was known as the Battle of Shire. In the battles of Amba Aradam, Tembien and Shire, the Italians suffered about 2,600 casualties and the Ethiopians about 15,000; Italian casualties at the Battle of Shire being 969 men. The Italian victories stripped the Ethiopian defences on the northern front, Tigré province had fallen most of the Ethiopian survivors returned home or took refuge in the countryside and only the army guarding Addis Ababa stood between the Italians and the rest of the country (Spencer John H. 2006).

On the night 26 June, 1936 members of the Black Lions organization destroyed three Italian aircraft in Nekemte and killed twelve Italian officials, including Air Marshal Vincenzo Magliocco after the Italians had sent the party to parley with the local populace. Graziani ordered the town to be bombed in retaliation for the killings as Magliocco was his deputy (Nicolle David, 1997). Local hostility forced out the Patriots and Desta Damtew, commander of the southern Patriots, withdrew his troops to Arbogona. Surrounded by Italian forces, they retreated to Butajira, where they were eventually defeated. An estimated 4,000 Patriots were reportedly killed in both engagements, 1,600 of whom—including Damtew—after being taken prisoner. On 19 December, Wondosson Kassa was executed near Debre Zebit and on 21 December, Aberra Kassa and Asfawossen Kassa were executed in Fikke. In late 1936, after the Italians tracked him down in Gurage, Dejazmach Balcha Safo was killed in battle. On 19 December, Selassie surrendered at the Gojeb River (Shinn, D. H *et al.*, 2013).

In February 1937, following many murders of Italian and Eritrean soldiers and an assassination attempt on Italian East Africa's Viceroy, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, Italian soldiers raided the

famous Ethiopian monastery Debre Libanos. The plotters of the assassination had taken refuge at the monastery of the Italian troops and executed the monks and nuns. Afterwards, Italian soldiers destroyed native settlements in Addis Ababa, which resulted -according to Ethiopian estimates- in nearly 30,000 Ethiopians being killed and their homes left burned to the ground. The massacre has come to be known as Yekatit 12. After the massacres, Graziani became known as "the Butcher of Ethiopia". He was subsequently removed by Mussolini and replaced by Prince Amedeo, Duke of Aosta, who followed a more conciliatory policy towards the natives, obtaining a huge success in pacifying Ethiopia. (Baer, George W. 2013). By the eve of the Italian entry into the Second World War (January/February 1940) the Ethiopian guerrillas were still in control of some areas of Harar and the Galla-Sidamo Governorate. Amedeo's conciliatory efforts obtained that Abebe Aregai, then the last leader of the "Arbegnoch" (as the guerrilla fighters were called in Ethiopia) made a surrender proposal to the Italians in the spring of 1940 (after the 1939 surrender of Ethiopian leaders Zaudiè Asfau and Olonà Dinkel). The Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940 and British influence blocked the surrender proposal. Bahru Zewde, "A History of Modern Ethiopia", second edition (James Currey, 2001).

When the British army conquered Eritrea in January 1941, most of the infrastructure and the industrial areas were extremely damaged and the remaining ones (like the Asmara-Massawa Cableway) were successively removed and sent toward India and British possessions in Africa as a war booty. The following Italian guerrilla war was supported by many Eritrean colonial troops (like the "hero" of Eritrean independence, Hamid Idris Awate) until the Italian armistice in September 1943. Eritrea was placed under British military administration after the Italian surrender in World War II (Negash, Tekeste, 1987). The Italians in Eritrea started to move away from the country after the defeat of the Kingdom of Italy by the Allies, and by the time of the British census of 1949 Asmara had only 17,183 Italian Eritreans of a total population of 127,579. Most Italian settlers left for Italy, with others to United States, Middle East, and Australia. The British maintained initially the Italian administration of Eritrea, but the country soon started to be involved in a violent process of independence (from the British in the late forties and after 1952 from the Ethiopians, who annexed Eritrea in that year). During the last years of World War II some Italian Eritreans like Dr. Vincenzo Di Meglio defended politically the presence of Italians in Eritrea and successively promoted the independence of Eritrea. He went to Rome to participate in a Conference for the independence of Eritrea, promoted by the Vatican. After the war Di Meglio was named Director of the "Comitato Rappresentativo Italiani dell' Eritrea"

(CRIE). In 1947 he supported the creation of the "Associazione Italo-Eritrei" and the "Associazione Veterani Ascari", in order to get alliance with the Eritreans favorable to Italy in Eritrea. As a result of these creations, he cofounded the "Partito Eritrea Pro Italia" (Party of Shara Italy) in September 1947, an Eritrean political Party favorable to the Italian presence in Eritrea that obtained more than 200,000 inscriptions of membership in one single month. Indeed, the Italian Eritreans strongly rejected the Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea after the war: the "Party of Shara Italy" was established in Asmara in 1947 and the majority of the members were former Italian soldiers with many Eritrean Ascari (the organization was even backed up by the government of Italy). The main objective of this party was Eritrean freedom, but they had a pre-condition that stated that before independence the country should be governed by Italy for at least 15 years. With the Peace Treaty of 1947 Italy officially accepted the end of the colony. As a consequence the Italian community started to disappear, mainly after the Ethiopian government took control of Eritrea. However some Italo-Eritrean were welcomed by the Ethiopian government, like the brothers Italo Vassalo and Luciano Vassalo, champions of football who won the 1962 African Cup of Nations. (Agatha Ramm, "Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power in the Red Sea, 1868-1885" (The English Historical Review, 1944).

Table 1: Italian Ethiopian Governor Generals During Atrocities

No.			
1	Pietro Badoglio	1936	GG
2	Rodolfo Graziani	1936–1937	GG
3	Amedeo di Aosta	1937–1941	GG
4	Pietro Gazzera	1941	AGG
5	Guglielmo Nasi	1941	AGG

Sources: Compiled with informations from: Rhodes A, 1968; Sbacchi A, 1997, Trento G. 2007 and Fink C. 1996.

2.2 Proper Atrocities in the Addis Ababa Massacre Yekatit 12 Affair of Italian Colonial Agent

The Second Italo-Ethiopian War, also referred to as the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, was a war of aggression which was fought between Italy and Ethiopia from October 1935 to February 1937. In Ethiopia it is often referred to simply as the Italian Invasion and in Italy as the Ethiopian War. It is seen as an example of the expansionist policy that characterized the Axis powers and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations before the outbreak of the Second World War. On 3 October 1935, two hundred thousand soldiers of the Italian Army commanded by Marshal Emilio De Bono attacked from Eritrea (then an Italian colonial possession) without prior declaration of war. At the same time a minor force under General Rodolfo Graziani attacked

from Italian Somalia. On 6 October, Adwa was conquered, a symbolic place for the Italian army because of the defeat at the Battle of Adwa by the Ethiopian army during the First Italo-Ethiopian War (Nicolle David, 1997). On 15 October, Italian troops seized Aksum, and the obelisk adorning the city was torn from its site and sent to Rome to be placed symbolically in front of the building of the Ministry of Colonies created by the Fascist regime. Exasperated by De Bono's slow and cautious progress, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini put General Pietro Badoglio in his place. Ethiopian forces attacked the newly arrived invading army and launched a counterattack in December 1935, but their poorly armed army could not resist for long against the modern weapons of the Italians. Even the communications service of the Ethiopian forces depended on foot messengers, as they did not have radio. This was enough for the Italians to impose a narrow fence on Ethiopian detachments to leave them unaware of the movements of their own army. Nazi Germany sent arms and munitions to Ethiopia because it was frustrated over Italian objections to its policy towards Austria.^[1] This prolonged the war and diverted Italian attention away from Austria. The Ethiopian counteroffensive managed to stop the Italian advance for a few weeks, but the superiority of the Italians' weapons (particularly heavy artillery and aviation) prevented the Ethiopians from taking advantage of their initial successes. In fact, Commanders of the war on the side of Ethiopia were six in number namely: Haile Selassie 1, Imru Haile Selassie, Kassa Haile Darge, Seyoum Mengesha, Mulugeta Yeggazu, Desta Desta Damtew and Nasibu Emmanuel. On the side of Italy, there were Benito Mussolini, Emilio De Bono, Pietro Badoglio, Rodolfo Graziani, Giovanni Messe, Hamid Idris Awate and Olol Dinle (Mockler Anthony, 2003; online websites).

Those war commanders and their soldiers inflicted losses on both sides to a total of 382,800 civilians killed between 1935 and 1941. Contemporary figures show that about 1,148 Italian army and Blackshirts were killed, 125 died of wounds, 31 missing and for the Ethiopian about 1,593 Eritrean troops killed and 453 civilian workmen killed, are considered suspect. The historical Italian atrocities were committed on 19 February 1937 known as the Yekatit 12 according to the Ge'ez calendar merely as a result of attempted assassination of Marshal Graziani by Eritrean rebels Abraham Deboch and Mogos Asgedom in Addis Ababa. Those rebellion action was not committed by the Ethiopians but the later suffered the consequences from a well manipulated plan coined by the Chief Colonial Agent. The campaign of reprisals visited by the Italians upon the population of Addis Ababa has been described as the worst massacre in Ethiopian history... Estimates vary on the number of people killed in the three days that followed the attempt on Graziani's life. Ethiopian sources estimated that 30,000 people

were killed by the Italians, while Italian sources claimed that only a few hundred were killed. (Rainer Baudendistel, 2006). A 2017 history of the massacre estimated that 19,200 people were killed, 20 percent of the population of Addis Ababa. Over the following week, numerous Ethiopians suspected of opposing Italian rule were rounded up and executed, including members of the Black Lions and other members of the aristocracy. Many more were imprisoned, even collaborators such as Ras Gebre Haywot, the son of Ras Mikael of Wollo, Brehane Markos, and Ayale Gebre, who had helped the Italians identify the two men who made the attempt on Graziani's life. According to Mockler, "Italian carabinieri had fired into the crowds of beggars and poor assembled for the distribution of alms; and it is said that the Federal Secretary, Guido Cortese, (Sbacchi A. 1997). Even fired his revolver into the group of Ethiopian dignitaries standing around him." Hours later, Cortese gave the fatal order as follows: "Comrades, today is the day when we should show our devotion to our Viceroy by reacting and destroying the Ethiopians for three days. For three days I give you "carte blanche" to destroy and kill and do what you want to the Ethiopians." Italians doused native houses with petrol and set them on fire. They broke into the homes of local Greeks and Armenians and lynched their servants. Some even posed on the corpses of their victims to have their photographs taken. The first day of the massacre has been commemorated as "Yekatit 12" (Ethiopian 19 February) by Ethiopians ever since. There is a Yekatit 12 monument in Addis Ababa in memory of these Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression (Sbacchi A. 1997).

The Italians resumed the offensive in early March. On 29 March 1936, Graziani bombed the city of Harar and two days later the Italians won a decisive victory in the Battle of Maychew, which nullified any possible organized resistance of the Ethiopians. Emperor Haile Selassie was forced to escape into exile on 2 May, and Badoglio's forces arrived in the capital Addis Ababa on 5 May. Italy announced the annexation of the territory of Ethiopia on 7 May and Italian King Victor Emmanuel III was proclaimed emperor. The provinces of Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) were united to form the Italian province of East Africa. Fighting between Italian and Ethiopian troops persisted until February 1937. Italian forces continued to suppress rebel activity until 1939. War crimes were committed by both sides in this conflict. Italian troops used mustard gas in aerial bombardments (in violation of the Geneva Conventions) against combatants and civilians in an attempt to discourage the Ethiopian people from supporting the resistance. Deliberate Italian attacks against ambulances and hospitals of the Red Cross were reported. By all estimates, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian civilians died as a result of the Italian invasion, including during the reprisal Yekatit

12 massacre in Addis Ababa, in which according to Ethiopian sources as many as 30,000 civilians were killed. Such brutal and massive Italian reprisals against Ethiopians have been described by some historians as constituting genocide. Crimes by Ethiopian troops included the use of dum-dum bullets (in violation of the Hague Conventions), the killing of civilian workmen (including during the Gondrand massacre) and the mutilation of captured Eritrean Ascaris and Italians (often with castration), beginning in the first weeks of war (Second Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1937, online).

In February 1937, following an attempt on the life of Rodolfo Graziani, educated Ethiopians, already having been distrusted by colonial government authorities and many having already been placed in concentration camps, became victims of state-sponsored mass murder, with much of the intelligentsia of Ethiopia being executed and the remainder exiled to penal colonies on Italian-controlled islands in the Mediterranean Sea. Fascist education in the colony proved to be a failure in the end, with only one twentieth of Italian colonial soldiers possessing any literacy. During World War II, which saw the liberation of Italian East Africa from Fascism, few Africans displayed any loyalty to the Fascist state that the state's schools had so fervently tried to instill, and Ethiopia post-World War II found itself impoverished of skilled workers due to the very limited and propagandistic education provided to its non-Italian inhabitants under Mussolini's rule (Knox MacGregor, 2005). Italian Ethiopia (in Italian: *Etiopia italiana*), also known as the Italian Empire of Ethiopia, was the territory of the Ethiopian Empire which was occupied by Italy for approximately five years. It emerged as an Italian colonial construct in the 19th century, superimposed over indigenous populations. The military preparation for the aggression of Ethiopia of October 1935, with the related sudden increase of the European population, contributed in making the urban planning of Asmara even more difficult. In the early 1930s Asmara was still a small town of 18,000 inhabitants, out of which 3,000 (17%) were Italians. In 1938 the size of Asmara's population had skyrocketed to 98,000 inhabitants and the Italian community had increased dramatically to 53,000 (54%). This sudden demographic growth reflected the fact that in the colonial perspective, Asmara had changed its political and strategic function and was now, together with the town of Dekamhare, the main operational and logistic headquarter for military activities launched by Fascism against Ethiopia from the so-called Scacchiere nord (the Northern Operational Theatre) (Fornaciari 1937; Fossa 1938). Therefore, it was urgent for the fascist regime to accommodate this mass of population, safeguarding, at the same time, criteria of racial prestige by avoiding embarrassing promiscuity between indigenous and Italian populations.

2.3 Confusion about War Casualties by Former Italian War Men and Legislative Members

In 1968, Colonel A. J. Barker wrote that from 1 January 1935 to 31 May 1936, the Italian army and Black shirt units lost 1,148 men killed, 125 men died of wounds and thirty-one missing; about 1,593 Eritrean troops and 453 civilian workmen were also killed, a total of 3,319 casualties. In a 1978 publication, Alberto Sbacchi wrote that these official Italian casualty figures of about 3,000 were an underestimate. Sbacchi calculated that by May 1936, 10,000 Italian soldiers had been killed and 44,000 had been wounded; from 1936 to 1940, there an additional 9,555 men killed and 144,000 sick and wounded. Total Italian casualties from 1935 to 1940 according to these calculations were about 208,000 killed or wounded. Based on 1,911 Italians killed in the first six months of 1940, Ministry of Africa figures for 6 May 1936 to 10 June 1940 are 8,284 men killed, which Sbacchi considered to be fairly accurate. In *Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935–1941* (1997), Sbacchi wrote that the official total of Italian casualties was unreliable, because the regime desired to underestimate Italian losses. There was a lack of reliable statistics because confusion during the invasion made it difficult to keep accurate records and the Statistical Bulletin had ceased to provide data on fatalities (Sbacchi A, 1997, 1978 and 1977). Field hospital records had been destroyed, inventories dispersed, individual deaths were not reported and bodies were not repatriated to Italy. Unpublished reports listed 3,694 military and civilian fatalities among 44,000 casualties and from May 1936 to June 1940, there were another 12,248 military and civilian fatalities in 144,000 casualties. In a memorandum submitted to the Paris conference in 1946, the Ethiopian government enumerated 275,000 men killed in action, 78,500 Patriots killed in hostilities during the occupation from 1936 to 1941, 17,800 women and children killed by bombing, 30,000 people killed in the massacre of February 1937, 35,000 people died in concentration camps, 24,000 Patriots killed in obedience to orders from summary courts, 300,000 people died after their villages had been destroyed, a total of 760,300 deaths (Baudentistel Reiner, 2006).

Haile Desire for exile and confrontations in the League of Nations General Assembly

Haile Selassie sailed from Djibouti in the British cruiser HMS Enterprise. From Mandatory Palestine Selassie sailed to Gibraltar en route to Britain. While still in Jerusalem, Haile Selassie sent a telegram to the League of Nations which read as follows:

We have decided to bring to an end the most unequal, most unjust, most barbarous war of our age, and have chosen the road to exile in order that our people will not be exterminated and in order to consecrate ourselves wholly and in peace to the preservation of our

empire's independence... we now demand that the League of Nations should continue its efforts to secure respect for the covenant, and that it should decide not to recognize territorial extensions, or the exercise of an assumed sovereignty, resulting from the illegal recourse to armed force and to numerous other violations of international agreements (Born Lij Tafari M. 1936).

The Ethiopian Emperor's telegram caused several nations to temporarily defer recognition of the Italian conquest. On 30 June, Selassie spoke at the League of Nations and was introduced by the President of the Assembly as "His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia" ("Sa Majesté Imperiale, l'Empereur d'Ethiopie"). A group of jeering Italian journalists began yelling insults and were expelled before he could speak. In response, the Romanian chairman, Nicolae Titulescu, jumped to his feet and shouted "Show the savages the door!" ("A la porte les sauvages!"). Selassie denounced Italian aggression and criticised the world community for standing by. At the conclusion of his speech, which appeared on newsreels throughout the world, he said "It is us today. It will be you tomorrow" (Clark D. K, 1959). France appeased Italy because it could not afford to risk an alliance between Italy and Germany; Britain decided its military weakness meant that it had to follow France's lead. Selassie's resolution to the League to deny recognition of the Italian conquest was defeated and he was denied a loan to finance a resistance movement. On 4 July 1936, the League voted to end the sanctions imposed against Italy in November 1935 and by 15 July, the sanctions were at an end. On 18 November 1936, the Italian Empire was recognised by the Empire of Japan and Italy recognised the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, marking the end of the Stresa Front. Hitler had supplied the Ethiopians with 16,000 rifles and 600 machine guns in the hope that Italy would be weakened when he moved against Austria. By contrast, France and Britain recognised Italian control over Ethiopia in 1938. Mexico was the only country to strongly condemn Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia, respecting Ethiopian independence throughout. Including Mexico, only six nations in 1937 did not recognise the Italian occupation: China, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the Republic of Spain and the United States (Ian Campbell, 2019). Three years later, only the USSR officially recognised Selassie and the United States government considered recognising the Italian Empire with Ethiopia included. The invasion of Ethiopia and its general condemnation by Western democracies isolated Mussolini and Fascist Italy until 1938. From 1936 to 1939, Mussolini and Hitler joined forces in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. In April 1939, Mussolini launched the Italian invasion of Albania. In May, Italy and Nazi Germany joined in the Pact of Steel. In September 1940, both nations signed the Tripartite Pact along with the Empire of Japan (Calvitt Clark J, 1999).

US military analysis concluded according to Smart that, "Chemical weapons were devastating against the unprepared and unprotected Ethiopians".

Haile Selassie in his report to the League of Nations described it:

....Special sprayers were installed on board aircraft so they could vaporize over vast areas of territory a fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of 9, 15, or 18 aircraft followed one another so that the fog issuing from them formed a continuous sheet. It was thus that, as from the end of January 1936, soldiers, women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes, and pastures were drenched continually with this deadly rain. In order more surely to poison the waters and pastures, the Italian command made its aircraft pass over and over again. These fearful tactics succeeded. Men and animals succumbed. The deadly rain that fell from the aircraft made all those whom it touched fly shrieking with pain. All those who drank poisoned water or ate infected food also succumbed in dreadful suffering. In tens of thousands the victims of Italian mustard gas fell (Angelo Del Boca).

Historian Angelo Del Boca condemned the use of gas, but argued that it had only a minimal effect on Italian war aims. Ethiopian troops used Dum-Dum bullets, which had been banned by declaration IV, 3 of the Hague Convention (1899) and began mutilating captured Eritrean Askari (often with castration) beginning in the first weeks of war. Some hundreds of colonial Eritrean Ascaris and dozens of Italians suffered these amputations, often done before death as allegedly happened to 17 Italian workers emasculated in Gondrand in February 1936. While in exile in England, Haile Selassie had sought the support of the Western democracies for his cause but had little success until the Second World War began. On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on France and Britain and attacked British and Commonwealth forces in Egypt, Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland. In August 1940, the Italian conquest of British Somaliland was completed (Baer G. W., 1967). The British and Selassie incited Ethiopian and other local forces to join a campaign to dislodge the Italians from Ethiopia. Selassie went to Khartoum to establish closer liaison with the British and resistance forces within Ethiopia. On 18 January 1941, Selassie crossed the border into Ethiopia near the village of Um Iddla and two days later rendezvoused with Gideon Force. On 5 May, Selassie and an army of Ethiopian Free Forces entered Addis Ababa. After the Italian defeat, the Italian guerrilla war in Ethiopia was carried out by remnants of Italian troops and their allies, which lasted until the Armistice between Italy and Allied armed forces in September 1943. The treaty signed in Paris by the Italian Republic (Repubblica Italiana) and the victorious powers of World War II on 10 February 1947, included formal Italian recognition of Ethiopian independence and an agreement to pay \$25,000,000 in

reparations. Since the League of Nations and most of its members had never officially recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, Haile Selassie had been recognized as the restored emperor of Ethiopia following his formal entry into Addis Ababa in May 1941. Ethiopia presented a bill to the Economic Commission for Italy of £184,746,023 for damages inflicted during the course of the Italian occupation. The list included the destruction of 2,000 churches, 535,000 houses, the slaughter or theft of 5,000,000 cattle, 7,000,000 sheep and goats, 1,000,000 horses and mules and 700,000 camels (Srivastava Neelam, 2008).

3. DIVIDED PERCEPTION AND MACHIAVELLI ASPECTS OF ITALIAN AGGRESSION OF ETHIOPIANS

This section brings out clear similarities and evidences which can justify Machiavelli's inspirations of Italian colonial agents in their missions of 3Gs versus 3Es operations in the entire East African region and Ethiopia in particular as our main focus. Italian offensive and Ethiopian defensive strategies contributed to Italians movements towards the grave of colonization during the Second World War.

3.1. Offensive and Defensive Disagreements of Italian Evils Committed Against Ethiopians

Historians are still divided about the reasons for the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1935. Some Italian historians such as Franco Catalano and Giorgio Rochat argue that the invasion was an act of social imperialism, contending that the Great Depression had badly damaged Mussolini's prestige, and that he needed a foreign war to distract public opinion. The historians such as Pietro Pastorelli have argued that the invasion was launched as part of an expansionist program to make Italy the main power in the Red Sea area and the Middle East. A middle way interpretation was offered by the American historian MacGregor Knox, who argued that the war was started for both foreign and domestic reasons, being both a part of Mussolini's long-range expansionist plans and intended to give Mussolini a foreign policy triumph that would allow him to push the Fascist system in a more radical direction at home. Unlike forty years earlier, Italy's forces were far superior to the Ethiopian forces, especially in air power, and they were soon victorious. Emperor Haile Selassie was forced to flee the country, with Italian forces entering the capital city, Addis Ababa, to proclaim an "Italian Empire of Ethiopia" by 5 May 1936 (Spenser John F. 2006). Some Ethiopians welcomed the Italians and collaborated with them in the government of the newly created Italian Empire, like Ras Seyoum Mengesha, Ras Getachew Abate and Ras Kibbede Guebret. In 1937 the friendship of Seyoum Mengesha with the Italian Viceroy Prince Amedeo, Duke of Aosta enabled this Ras to play an influential role in securing the release of 3,000 Ethiopian POWs

being held in Italian Somaliland. The Italian victory in the war coincided with the zenith of the international popularity of dictator Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime, during which colonialist leaders praised Mussolini for his actions. Mussolini's international popularity decreased as he endorsed the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany, beginning a political tilt toward Germany that eventually led to the downfall of Mussolini and the Fascist regime in Italy in World War II. Italian East Africa was formed on 1 June 1936, shortly after the conquest, by merging the pre-existing colonies of Italian Somaliland and Italian Eritrea with the newly conquered territory. The maintenance and creation of Ethiopian colonies was very costly. Fascist colonial policy in IEA had a divide and conquer characteristic. To weaken the Orthodox Christian Amhara people who had run Ethiopia in the past, territory claimed by Eritrean Tigray-Tigrinyas and Somalis was given to the Eritrea Governorate and Somalia Governorate (Pankhurst Richard, 1972).

The most important railway line in the African colonies of the Kingdom of Italy, the 784 km long Djibouti-Addis Ababa, was acquired following the conquest of the Ethiopian Empire by the Italians in 1936. The route was served until 1935 by steam trains that took about 36 hours to do the total trip between the capital of Ethiopia and the port of Djibouti. In 1938 following the Italian conquest, train speed was increased with the introduction of four high capacity railcars "type 038" derived from the model Fiat ALn56. These diesel trains were able to reach 70 km/h and so the time travel was cut in half to just 18 hours: they were used until the mid-1960s. At the main stations there were some bus connections to the other cities of Italian Ethiopia not served by the railway. Additionally, near the Addis Ababa station was created a special unit against fire that was the only one in all Africa. However Ethiopia and Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI) proved to be extremely expensive to maintain, as the budget for the fiscal year 1936-37 had been set at 19.136 billion lira to create the necessary infrastructure for the colony. At the time, Italy's entire yearly revenue was only 18.581 billion lira. The architects of the Fascist regime had drafted grandiose urbanistic projects for the enlargement of Addis Ababa, in order to build a state-of-the-art capital of the Africa Orientale Italiana, but these architectural plans -like all the other developments- were stopped by World War II. Their propagandistic nature was especially apparent in history textbooks issued to African children, which entirely omitted any discussion of events such as Italian disunity, Giuseppe Mazzini's "Young Italy" movement, the revolutions of 1848, or Giuseppe Garibaldi's Expedition of the Thousand and instead stressed the "glories" of the Roman Empire and those of the Italian state that claimed to be its successor (Page, Melvin E *et al.*, 2006).

Glorification and lionisation of Mussolini and his "great work" likewise pervaded them, while periods during which Libya and other then-Italian possessions had been controlled by older, non-Italian empires, such as the Ottoman Empire, were portrayed through an unflattering lens. Use of the Fascist salute was mandatory in schools for African children, who were constantly encouraged to become "little soldiers of the Duce", and every day there was morning ceremony at which the Italian flag was hoisted and patriotic songs were sung. Italian children, whose education the Fascist government prioritised over that of Africans, received education similar to that in Fascist Italy's metropole, though with some aspects of it tailored to the local situation in East Africa. Fascist Italy sought to neutralise any educational institutions which provided instruction to Africans beyond the level expected by Fascist ideology, in particular the secondary education network that prior to the Italian invasion had prepared and enabled a relatively small but significant amount of Ethiopians to study abroad at universities in Europe (G Trento, 2007).

It should be noted that Haile Selassie's global prominence was due to his position as a very loyal client of the West much like the Shah of Iran and Mobutu of Zaire. These clients maintained power through repression and the murder and silencing of true patriots. Unlike Selassie however, history accurately remembers Shah Reza Pahlavi and Mobutu Sese Seko as tyrants. Yet, efforts are underway to depict Selassie as a pan-Africanist and a visionary. Some have campaigned vigorously for his statue to be erected in front of the African Union building in Addis Ababa. Sadly, the African Union has acceded to the request. Selassie often took undeserved credit for others' contributions (De Grand A. 2004). One example was Lorenzo Tazaz, an Eritrean, who enhanced Selassie's image during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. While the emperor was in exile in Bath, England, Tazaz secretly slipped into Ethiopia and organised the Arbegnoch (patriots). He recruited 2,000 or so Eritreans who had fled Italian colonial rule to fight for Ethiopia from their refugee settlements in Kenya. He also smuggled weapons for the Arbegnoch. A famous speech delivered by Selassie, famed for developing his aura as statesman and defender of his people, at the League of Nations in 1936, is widely believed to have been written by Tazaz. The emperor eventually repaid Tazaz by demoting him from his position as Foreign Minister. He died soon after in 1947 in suspicious circumstances. Although some researchers defined him as a "demonised as a dictator." Does Selassie deserve to be depicted as a dictator? The historical record provides a decisive answer. First, it is well-established that he spent \$35 million for celebrating his 80th birthday during the Wollo famine. He travelled widely, visiting the United States many times, only stopping once in Jamaica in 1966 (Mockler Anthony, 1984). Perhaps less

well-known are Selassie's crimes and his associates, such as Assefata Kassa in Eritrea. These are too numerous and ghastly for the scope of this piece. For further reading on this, I recommend Michela Wrong's book titled *I Didn't Do it For You. How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation*. Similarly, the autocrat is remembered in Tigray for inviting the British Royal Air Force to bomb the region in 1943 to quell what came to be known as the first Woyane Rebellion. He consolidated his power by weakening the provinces after Italy's defeat by the British in 1941. He was also harsh towards those Ethiopian patriots who fought against the Italians while he fled to Britain. For example, Belay Zeleke, a national war hero was hung on his orders. Unfathomably, Teddy Afro recently praised both Selassie and Belay Zeleke during an appearance at the Millennium Hall in Addis with the Eritrea President Isaias and Ethiopia PM Abiy in the audience. It seems unconscionable to praise a murderous traitor and his victim, too. The parable of Polish writer Ryszard Kapuscinski: *The Emperor, Downfall of an Autocrat* is an accurate depiction of the real Selassie (Mockler Anthony, 1984).

The romantic rewriting of Selassie's legacy, and the distorted history of other Ethiopian monarchs have significant relevance for current Ethiopian politics. Selassie's legacy needs to be exposed in light of attempts by musicians, historical revisionists in the diaspora, foreign beneficiaries and politicians to control the narrative through false representations. This cannot be dismissed as benign and harmless because of the role music plays in creating what the theorist of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, calls 'imagined communities' and its crucial role in political organising. Music heightens and releases endorphins creating a sense of belonging among people with shared sentiments which can lead to collective action. The misplaced form of Black Nationalism created by Rastafarians, in giving reverence to a man who never deserved it, is therefore harmful. I celebrate the addition of reggae to UNESCO's 'Intangible Cultural Heritage' list while taking exception to the claim: "its contribution to international discourse on issues of injustice, resistance, love and humanity underscores the dynamics of the element as being at once cerebral, socio-political, sensual and spiritual." The record of reggae is rather more nuanced and mixed, particularly in reference to the place given to Selassie. It is often said that the victors or the powerful are the ones who write history. History is ill served when popular celebrities and musicians motivated by religion or some kind of hyper-nationalism misrepresent the past. This is offensive to the victims and divisive for communities who need genuine solidarity (Yohannes Woldemariam).

I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people, and the assistance promised to it eight months ago, when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in

violation of international treaties. There is no precedent for a Head of State himself speaking in this assembly. But there is also no precedent for a people being victim of such injustice and being at present threatened by abandonment to its aggressor. Also, there has never before been an example of any Government proceeding to the systematic extermination of a nation by barbarous means, in violation of the most solemn promises made by the nations of the earth that there should not be used against innocent human beings the terrible poison of harmful gases. It is to defend a people struggling for its age-old independence that the head of the Ethiopian Empire has come to Geneva to fulfil this supreme duty, after having himself fought at the head of his armies' I pray to Almighty God that He may spare nations the terrible sufferings that have just been inflicted on my people, and of which the chiefs who accompany me here have been the horrified witnesses. It is my duty to inform the Governments assembled in Geneva, responsible as they are for the lives of millions of men, women and children, of the deadly peril which threatens them, by describing to them the fate which has been suffered by Ethiopia. It is not only upon warriors that the Italian Government has made war. It has above all attacked populations far removed from hostilities, in order to terrorize and exterminate them (Haile Selassie Legacy, 2019, online).

At the beginning, towards the end of 1935, Italian aircraft hurled upon my armies bombs of tear-gas. Their effects were but slight. The soldiers learned to scatter, waiting until the wind had rapidly dispersed the poisonous gases. The Italian aircraft then resorted to mustard gas. Barrels of liquid were hurled upon armed groups. But this means also was not effective; the liquid affected only a few soldiers, and barrels upon the ground were themselves a warning to troops and to the population of the danger. It was at the time when the operations for the encircling of Makalle were taking place that the Italian command, fearing a rout, followed the procedure which it is now my duty to denounce to the world. Special sprayers were installed on board aircraft so that they could vaporize, over vast areas of territory, a fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of nine, fifteen, eighteen aircraft followed one another so that the fog issuing from them formed a continuous sheet (Cushman Laurent, 2012). It was thus that, as from the end of January, 1936, soldiers, women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes and pastures were drenched continually with this deadly rain. In order to kill off systematically all living creatures, in order to more surely to poison waters and pastures, the Italian command made its aircraft pass over and over again. That was its chief method of warfare. These first lines of Haile Selassie's speech might refer to the New Ethiopia, but it was indicative of the world. Acknowledging the atrocities committed and calling on his people not to seek revenge, the Emperor continued:

Today is the day on which we defeated our enemy. Therefore, when we say let us rejoice with our hearts let not our rejoicing be in any other way but in the spirit of Christ. Do not return evil for evil. Do not indulge in the atrocities which the enemy has been practicing in his usual way, even up to the last moment....." Haile Selassie had returned to power, and with him he brought hope, integrity and an ethical and moral co Haile Selassie, de that not only made him invincible in foreign policy, but a legend for all time and a champion of reconciliation (Haile Selassie, 1936).

3.2 Aspects of Machiavelli's Practices of Italian Massacre of Ethiopians

Fascism a form of radical authoritarian nationalism became popular in the early twentieth century and was thought to be the perfect regime of the century among several country leaders in Europe. The Italian fascist leader, Mussolini, was the one of the main leaders of the ideological movement. That the first half of the twentieth century was a period full of war substantially supported the development of Mussolini's Fascist ideas, but radical authoritarian nationalist Fascism's ideological origin goes right back to the fifteenth century, the Italian Renaissance. Furthermore, Benito Mussolini's fascist ideas were influenced by many Italian politicians, one is the writer of *The Prince*, Nicola Machiavelli. Just as many other Italian intellectuals, Machiavelli throughout his life supported the idea of Italy becoming a republic (Fernandez-Armesto, 1996). The thirst of becoming a republic was planted into many Italians right back from Machiavelli's age, the fifteen century, until the fascist twentieth century and it consequently gave birth to harmful ideals (Leonard Afinchie, 2014). Many people back at the time of Renaissance Italy thought of unifying the nation with the rule of one leader. Nevertheless, the fruition of it took a lot more time than expected. This need can totally be interpreted as one of the general principles of Fascism. Fascism wanted to unify the nation through totalitarian state with the devotion to the 'need' of a strong leader. Fascists found stronger nations expanding their borders by dispensing lower nation's reasonable (Holt, E, 1971). Machiavelli explains in his masterpiece, *The Prince*, targeting the leader, that Italy is in the need of a totalitarian regime in order to somewhat become successful. "People are the prince's servants and have obligations to him, so they aren't easily corrupted; and if they are corrupted they can't be much help because they can't carry the people with them. So whoever attacks the Turk (An example of a strong nation) must reckon on finding a united people, and will have to rely on his own strength rather than on divisions on the other side" (Jonathan Becket, 2010).

In October 1922, Mussolini stated that "the government had arisen without parliamentary approval", in his speech he warned and offered the public to defend and develop the revolution of the

Fascists by confessing: "I could have won completely. But I set limits to myself. With 300,000 armed youth ready for anything and waiting mystically for my command, I could have punished all those who had talked ill of fascism." " I could have locked up Parliament and formed an exclusively fascist government. But, at least for now, I have not wanted to." The speech of Mussolini's can be compared to the Machiavellian idea that public would hold on to a strong, autocratic, and scary leader. "If they need help they are sure to fail, and won't achieve anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force they aren't running much risk. That's why armed prophets always conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. And along with all this there is the fact that people don't stay steady: it's easy to persuade them of something, but hard to keep them persuaded. When they stop believing in their new prince, force must be used to make them believe; and provision for doing that must be made beforehand" (Jonathan Becket, 2010). Machiavelli clarified the need of prestige for a Prince and wrote how one could acquire prestige: "...A prince also gains prestige from being either a true friend or an outright enemy, i.e. says openly which side he favours in any conflict." Machiavelli's thesis has similarities to Mussolini strategy of earning respect and prestige from the people in his early years. "Mussolini realised – partly from experience, partly by instinct- that in order to be accepted by all as the supreme leader, he had to please those who had not been entirely convinced by his performance so far, and inevitably to disappoint some of his supporters." The views of the country began to matter to Mussolini whom had begun a fresh fascist regime. The views of the country mattered to the leader more than those of the party by 1923. He wanted to hold the view of that the country had become ungovernable, or at least it could not be governed as it was in the old way from that moment. Mussolini's stratagem takes a Machiavellian manifest as base. "...A strong and energetic prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving his subjects hope that the trouble will soon be over, scaring them with tales of the enemy's cruelty, and moving nimbly to protect himself from those of his subjects who seem to him to be too bold." (Mussolini B. 1924).

Machiavelli's *Prince* starts with an ulterior Italian patriotism, but ends with a strong Nationalist suggestion."...Main thing you have to do—the foundation of everything else—is to provide yourself with your own army, because no mercenaries or foreign auxiliaries can possibly be more loyal, more reliable, better soldiers, than your own citizen soldiers will be. And good as each individual citizen soldier will be, taken together as a unit they will be even better when they find that they are commanded, paid, and honoured by their prince. That's the sort of army you must have if foreigners are to be beaten back by Italian virtù (Arnold J. Lien I). " All of Benito Mussolini's war politics in the

Second World War especially between the years 1943 and 1945 were set up on the idea of individual freewill of participation. For example, Mussolini's Italian Social Republic army that later on became the puppet state of the Nazi Germany, was actually consisted of Mussolini's own fanatic fascism supporters. This let Mussolini set up an army as Machiavelli explained the ideal (Sassoon D, 2008). Consequently, Benito Mussolini was greatly influenced from, one of the biggest humanists in my opinion, Benito Mussolini interpreted Machiavelli's teachings, and used them in a very reverse way as a leader which led to in humanist acts among a simple Italian society that sought unification for many years. Even though Mussolini's acts as a fascist dictator are incomparable with Adolf Hitler, he did apply his self-absorbed measurements to the public, such as forbidding hand shaking because it seemed bourgeois, and banning all rival political parties and opposition newspapers. Finally, we should also put in mind, as a result of Mussolini's reverse interpretations of Machiavellian thoughts, in contrast to Machiavelli's examples of successful princes and leaders, Mussolini failed in succeeding (Leonard A Finchie, 2014).

According to Margot Asquith in 1924, Mussolini has been the target of many able pens, but it remains for Margot Asquith to present a new picture colored by her own virile and not unassertive temperament. At least the picture is interesting. She tells of a visit to Rome and of her interest in learning of the general opinion of the Premier. Mussolini told me his views of what was most likely to develop nations, and pointed out to me, with youthful energy and unquestioning belief, that Italy was at its greatest when there were perpetual internal feuds—family fighting against family, State against State, quartier against quartier, but that he was not really fond of force. In his view it could only be morally justifiable under three conditions. I pulled my chair closer to his and felt sure I should hear theories of profound and! Machiavellian sophistry to justify some of the violent and foolish actions of the Kalian Government, but with the kindest of expressions—and I thought a slight, twinkle in his eye—he asked me searchingly if our Government had always been, guiltless of using force. Feeling guilty and remembering “Official Reprisals in Ireland,” I hastily urged him to give me his three conditions. “Well,” he said, “my first condition is. Important; it must be chivalresque— nothing behind-hand, all done in the open. (2) It must be like good surgery—pour guérir et non pas pour détruire. (3) Above all, force must be used at the rigut moment, neither too soon nor too late.” Machiavelli faded away, and I saw in front of me a lonely, vital, energetic man, full of belief in himself, and not impervious to the opinion of other people. I have an enbeglamored mind, and have seen too many pocket Napoleons and public favorites to be easily imposed upon, and I left the Palazzo Chigi feeling I had

seen a very rare man. No one can double that Mussolini, in spite of fundamental defects, has done great things for Italy. My fear for him would be that like all converts, or pervers, his new Faith may make him forgetful of is old, and this is a great danger. Repression is not power. Liberty without order can never be freedom; but order without liberty is demoralizing, and it remains to be seen whether force does not defeat its own ends and ultimately produce the same state of affairs in-Italy that Fascism was created to destroy (Margot Asquithin, 1924).

3.3Mussolini imagination about Glory and God in Relations to 3Gs versus 3Es

According to Gooch G.P. the doctrine of Mussolini and his school rests ultimately on their view of human nature. “The essence of a State,” said Treitschke,” is firstly, power; secondly, power; thirdly, power.” Dr. Gooch contrasts with this Burke's description of the State as a partnership in all, art, all science and all perfection. It is just because they believe that their view of human nature is truer, that liberals have faith in the ultimate success of political systems which allow of its free play and exercise. But Dr. Gooch points out that the sphere of conflict is no longer the nation but the world. For science has thrown mankind into a unity which gives to the relations of States a greater significance than the unity created by the Christian theology of the Middle Ages. Or perhaps we may say that it has created a world in which civilization must collapse unless it can bring to life the idea that underlay the old unity of faith. For a series of national States, each pursuing its own selfish advantage as its one exclusive aim, must create in this world just such a confusion and discord as are produced in the State when different classes and different interests so behave. The world just before the War presented in this aspect a, spectacle not unlike that which faced Machiavelli when he looked, at Italy four centuries earlier. From this disorder there are only two methods of escape open to mankind. Machiavelli's remedy would: demand a super-Borgia, able to create and control a universal Government, making of the world what a successful Borgia might have made of Italy. The alternative remedy is to build up an international order in which what we call power-polities are controlled by organized moral force. In the nineteenth century efforts were made to substitute some. Kind of moral power for the rule of the stronger, by thinkers like Kant and the Abbe Saint Pierre, and by statesmen from the time of the Tsar Alexander to that of Gladstone. The shock of the War gave a new strength to this demand, and the League of Nations is the result. Its weakness is the inability of many who think themselves sincere in admiring and serving it to grasp all that is implied in it. ‘Its main principle is the establishment of public law. No more than the law of the State does it demand Christian perfection from all its members (J. L. Hammond, 1935).

Nevertheless, the inspiration of Benito Mussolini about Glory was gotten from Machiavelli writings and putting in full practice in a global National Prestigious motives which tracked Italy into GSA over Africans. At its height, the metropolis of Ancient Rome was the largest city the world had ever seen. Its white monuments and temples stunned visitors, while Roman culture and values were exported throughout a vast Empire, conquered through impressive military might and linked via an extensive bureaucracy and highly developed infrastructure. The 'Glory of Rome' or the 'Glory that is Rome' could refer to any or all of these characteristics. The 'Eternal City' developed a mythic quality, facilitated as much through self-reverential propaganda as much as factual achievement (Colin Ricketts, 2018). Here are 5 quotes on the 'Glory of Rome', some ancient, some modern and not all expressing admiration: Who on Earth is so careless or lazy that he would not wish to learn how and under what form of government almost all of the inhabited world was conquered and became subject to the rule of Rome in less than 53 years. Polybius. It is not without good reason that gods and men chose this place to build our city: these hills with their pure air; this convenient river by which crops may be floated down from the interior and foreign commodities brought up; a sea handy to our needs, but far enough away to guard us from foreign fleets; our situation in the very centre of Italy. All these advantages shape this most favoured of sites into a city destined for glory. Roman historian Titus Livius Patavinus (64 or 59 BC – AD 17), or Livy, recounts the geographical advantages that helped make Rome destined for glory. Behold the man who conceived a great desire to be king of the Romans and master of the entire world, and accomplished this. Whoever says that this desire was honourable is a madman, since he approves of the death of the laws and liberty, and considers their hideous and repulsive suppression glorious. Here Roman politician, philosopher and celebrated orator Marcus Tullius Cicero clearly states his opinion of Julius Caesar, juxtaposing the values of those who supported the dictator against his own Republican ones. Rome is our point of departure and of reference; it is our symbol, or if you like, it is our Myth. We dream of a Roman Italy, that is to say wise and strong, disciplined and imperial. Much of that which was the immortal spirit of Rome resurges in Fascism. In a statement written on 21 April 1922, traditional anniversary of the founding day of Rome, Mussolini evokes the concept of Romanità or 'Roman-ness', linking it to Fascism.

The Mostra Augustea or Augustan exhibited the imperial Roman idea was not extinguished with the fall of the Western Empire. It lived in the heart of the generations, and the great spirits testify to its existence. It endured the mysticism throughout the Middle Ages, and because of it Italy had the Renaissance and then the Risorgimento. From Rome, restored capital of the

united Fatherland, colonial expansion was initiated and achieved the glory of the Vittorio Veneto with the destruction of the empire that had opposed the unification of Italy. With Fascism, by the will of the Duce, every ideal, every institution, every Roman work returns to shine in the new Italy, and after the soldiers' epic enterprise in the African land, the Roman Empire rises again on the ruins of a barbaric empire. Such a miraculous event is represented in the speech of the great, from Dante to Mussolini, and in the documentation of so many events and works of Roman greatness. —Mostra Augustea 434 (14). From 23 September 1937 to 4 November 1938 Mussolini used an exhibit called the Mostra Augustea della Romanità (the Augustan Exhibit of Roman-ness) in order to equate Italy's Fascist Regime with the continuing glory of Ancient Rome under Emperor Augustus. The last room of the exhibit was named 'The Immortality of the Idea of Rome: The Rebirth of the Empire in Fascist Italy'. The above quote is from the exhibition catalogue's explanation of this room. In fact, questions are frequently asked whether the glory of Rome really a myth? Researchers responded that "Rome is our point of departure and of reference; it is our symbol, or if you like, it is our Myth. We dream of a Roman Italy, that is to say wise and strong, disciplined and imperial. Much of that which was the immortal spirit of Rome resurges in Fascism. Mussolini's foreign policy aimed to restore the ancient glory of the Roman Empire by expanding Italian colonial possessions and the fascist sphere of influence. In the 1920s, he ordered the Pacification of Libya, instructed the bombing of Corfu over an incident with Greece, established a protectorate over Albania, and incorporated the city of Fiume into the Italian state via agreements with ...Nationality: Italian, Cause of death: Execution by firing squad, Years of service: 1915–1917 (active) and Political party: National Fascist Party (1921–1943). For the Glory of Mussolini. Two-thirds of the Italian killed and wounded in Ethiopia are native black troops, or Askaris. Reports from Italian sources and from Ethiopian alike confirm the fact that in all fighting thus far, white Italians, with vast circumspection, have sent their native subjects ahead in the attacks to do and (Urbana Daily Courier 29 online).

In fact, Mussolini there move From Anti-Church preceptor to Pro-Church (God) imaginations when he decided to opened and consolidate relations with various authorities in order to build up his aggrandizement and booster national prestige with the application of Machiavelli's principles. As a socialist youth, Mussolini declared himself an atheist and railed against the Catholic Church, going so far as to say that only idiots believed Bible stories and that Jesus Christ and Mary Magdalene were lovers. He even authored an anti-clerical pulp novel. But after taking power, Il Duce began working to patch up that relationship. He outlawed freemasonry, exempted the clergy from

taxation, cracked down on artificial contraception, campaigned for an increased birth rate, raised penalties for abortion, restricted nightlife, regulated women's clothing and banned homosexual acts among adult men. Despite having many mistresses himself, he also put in place harsh punishments for adultery. In 1929 Mussolini signed an agreement with the Vatican under which the Church received authority over marriage and was compensated for property that had been seized decades earlier. Pope Pius XI afterwards referred to Mussolini as the "man whom providence has sent us." Nonetheless, tensions between the two eventually resurfaced over such things as Mussolini's racial laws, where were similar to those in Nazi Germany (Bettmann Archive, on line). Mussolini launched his first military action in 1923 when he bombarded and briefly occupied the Greek island of Corfu. Several years later, he authorized the use of concentration camps and poison gas to help put down a rebellion in Libya, which at that time was an Italian colony. Poison gas was again used illegally during the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936, after which Il Duce declared that Italy finally had its empire. "It is a fascist empire, an empire of peace, an empire of civilization and humanity," he purportedly said. Three years later, Italy invaded and annexed Albania. In addition to those wars of expansion, conflict-loving Mussolini also propped up right-wing dissidents. During the Spanish Civil War, for example, he supplied troops and arms to General Francisco Franco's Nationalist movement. Having already snatched away Libya and Ethiopia, Allied forces invaded Italy proper in 1943 and began dropping bombs on Rome. On July 25 of that year, King Victor Emmanuel informed Mussolini that he would be replaced as prime minister. Il Duce was then arrested and imprisoned in various places, including a remote mountain ski resort from which German commandos rescued him a month and a half later. From September 1943 to April 1945, Mussolini headed a puppet government in German-occupied northern Italy. At the end of the war, he tried to sneak over the Swiss border wearing a German greatcoat and helmet. But an Italian partisan recognized him and shouted out, "We've got Big-Head!" Mussolini was executed the following day, and his corpse was strung upside down in a Milan square (Jesse Greenspan, 2021).

CONCLUSION

Battle of Adwa, Adwa also spelled Adowa or Italian Adua, (March 1, 1896), military clash at Adwa, in north-central Ethiopia, between the Ethiopian army of Emperor Menilek II and Italian forces. The Ethiopian army's victory checked Italy's attempt to build an empire in Africa. The victory had further significance for being the first crushing defeat of a European power by African forces during the colonial era. From the mid-19th century, Ethiopia was an aggregate of semi-independent kingdoms, which were presided over by the Ethiopian emperor. The 1889 death of

Emperor Yohannes IV was followed by great disorder as his potential successors fought for ascendancy. The Italians had supported Sahle Miriam of Shewa (Shoa) in the years prior to this, supplying him with modern weaponry, ammunition, and funds that helped him acquire military strength. He used that strength to incorporate smaller Ethiopian kingdoms under his rule and, after Yohannes IV's death, to secure his claim to the title of emperor, taking the name Menilek II. Additional ties of cooperation between Italy and Menilek were evident in the Treaty of Wichale (Ucciali), signed on May 2, 1889, which included Italy's promise to provide a much-needed loan to Ethiopia. The treaty also included Ethiopia's recognition of Italy's claim over the neighbouring coastal colony of Eritrea. One aspect of the treaty that would later lead to conflict was Article XVII, reportedly interpreted by Menilek as meaning that Ethiopia could choose to utilize the Italian government in dealing with other foreign powers. Italian premier Francesco Crispi interpreted it as meaning that Ethiopia must utilize the Italian government, thereby implying the declaration of an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1896).

Italo-Ethiopian War, (1935–36), an armed conflict that resulted in Ethiopia's subjection to Italian rule. Often seen as one of the episodes that prepared the way for World War II, the war demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations when League decisions were not supported by the great powers. Ethiopia (Abyssinia), which Italy had unsuccessfully tried to conquer in the 1890s, was in 1934 one of the few independent states in a European-dominated Africa. A border incident between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland that December gave Benito Mussolini an excuse to intervene. Rejecting all arbitration offers, the Italians invaded Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. Under Generals Rodolfo Graziani and Pietro Badoglio, the invading forces steadily pushed back the ill-armed and poorly trained Ethiopian army, winning a major victory near Lake Ascanghi (Ashangi) on April 9, 1936, and taking the capital, Addis Ababa, on May 5. The nation's leader, Emperor Haile Selassie, went into exile. In Rome, Mussolini proclaimed Italy's King Victor Emmanuel III emperor of Ethiopia and appointed Badoglio to rule as viceroy (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1935–1936). In response to Ethiopian appeals, the League of Nations condemned the Italian invasion in 1935 and voted to impose economic sanctions on the aggressor. The sanctions remained ineffective because of general lack of support. Although Mussolini's aggression was viewed with disfavour by the British, who had a stake in East Africa, the other major powers had no real interest in opposing him. The war, by giving substance to Italian imperialist claims, contributed to international tensions between the fascist states and the Western democracies. It also served as a rallying point,

especially after World War II, for developing African nationalist movements (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1935–1936). The Italian army at the Battle of Adwa (Adua), killing about 5,000 Italian troops. This disaster forced Crispi to resign and ended Italy's colonial adventures for some years. It was widely seen in Italy as a disgrace to the whole political system and to Italy's aspirations to great-power status.

The origins of the Italian colonial empire was the purchase in 1869 of Assab Bay on the Red Sea by an Italian navigation company which intended to establish a coaling station at the time the Suez Canal was being opened to navigation. This was taken over by the Italian government in 1882, becoming modern Italy's first overseas territory. Italy's search for colonies continued until February 1886, when, by secret agreement with Britain, it annexed the port of Massawa in Eritrea on the Red Sea from the crumbling Egyptian Empire. Italian annexation of Massawa denied the Ethiopian Empire of Yohannes IV an outlet to the sea. At the same time, Italy occupied territory on the south side of the horn of Africa, forming what would become Italian Somaliland.¹ However, Italy coveted Ethiopia itself and, in 1887, Italian Prime Minister Agostino Depretis ordered an invasion, leading to the Eritrea War. (Theodore M. Vestal, Algora, 2005). This invasion was halted after the loss of five hundred Italian troops at the Battle of Dogali. Depretis's successor, Prime Minister Francesco Crispi signed the Treaty of Wuchale in 1889 with Menelik II, the new emperor. This treaty ceded Ethiopian territory around Massawa to Italy to form the colony of Italian Eritrea, and – at least, according to the Italian version of the treaty – made Ethiopia an Italian protectorate. Relations between Italy and Menelik deteriorated over the next few years until the First Italo-Ethiopian War broke out in 1895, when Crispi ordered Italian troops into the country. Vastly outnumbered and poorly equipped, the result was a decisive defeat for Italy at the hands of Ethiopian forces at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. The Ethiopians were supported by Russian advisers and equipment, as well as by a unit of Russian volunteers. The death toll was 6,889, including 4,133 Italians. The Ethiopians counted at least 4,000 dead and 10,000 wounded. Total Italian, Eritrean, and Somali deaths, including those from disease, were estimated at 9,000 (Mia Fuller, 2017).

One element of liberal explanations of the war is the desire to unify the Italian public behind the Fascist regime, through both economics and projecting national power. This “Glory, God, and Gold” reasoning linked the Italian conquest to earlier European conquests in Africa (Bosworth, 2002). Mussolini may not have even passed glory on that list; De Grand writes that Colonial Minister Lessona found that “To Mussolini the political result of proclaiming the empire was enough.” The failure at Adowa was close in the

memory of Italians as a sign of inferiority, a feeling that could only be overcome with successful conquest in Africa (De Grand 2004). Mussolini also believed that the economics of conquest would unify Italians, seeing that “...industrialists would profit directly, the middle class would have increased opportunities for jobs in the bureaucracy, while agricultural labourers could dream of the chance to have land of their own” and the possibility of diverting attention from economic policy failures (Strang 2013b). Joining its European peers in Africa, the distributed economic gains, and avenging the loss of the First Italo-Ethiopian War would rally the Italian public behind the regime and Fascism. This would legitimate the regime and allow the Fascists to pursue their totalitarian regime with the complicity of the Italian people. Racism was another rallying point of public opinion. Mussolini's public and private writings indicate concern with the death of white civilization. He was intensely concerned with demographic stagnation; Ethiopia represented a chance for Italians to “settle the highlands” and reverse their declining birthrate (Bosworth, 2002). He dismissed Africans as backwards peoples, and conquest was a chance for Italian civilization to expand its greatness and use properly the resources that African ‘savages’ had wasted. Italian advisers worried that the intent of Haile Selassie to modernize the Ethiopian state would preclude Italian expansion, thus the invasion could not wait, even arguing that conditions were more favorable for invasion now than in the 1890s (Strang 2013b). This represented a contradiction in Italian thought: the Ethiopians were somehow both dangerously backwards and dangerously modern. The conquest of Ethiopia also represented an opportunity for a laboratory of fascism. As Mussolini consolidated control and looked outward for territorial gains, he wished to avoid mass domestic dissent. This was especially true of desired social engineering projects, an important aspect of distinctly Fascist totalitarianism (De Grand 2004). As liberalism predicts, the spectre of domestic politics influenced Italy's actions on the world stage. If Italian attempts to dictate society from the top-down and it stirs unrest in Ethiopia, the trouble could be avoided completely in Italy. Finally, liberal arguments indicate that the League of Nations was constructed so that Mussolini knew that other powers costs of compliance were higher than the cost of cheating the rules. Therefore, the League of Nations must have been a poorly constructed institution. Italy recognized that Britain and France viewed Italy as necessary to constrain nascent German power (Robertson 1977). There was no recourse for these powers, so the British and French decided to cheat the rules, which the Italians recognized and took advantage of (Keohane 2016). Neorealists charge that Mussolini was primarily interested in amassing power and ultimately ensuring Italy's survival. After consolidating his power at home, “Mussolini turned his attention to the development of Italian prestige abroad

and the assertion...to a place among the great powers of Europe” (Baer, 1967; Anthony Luongo, 2019).

Often relegated to the margins of history, the Italo-Ethiopian War (October 1935-May 1936) brought the world home for America’s Black communities. It awakened many people to sentiments of belonging and allegiance that transcended national boundaries and sparked mass protests. Outside the United States, the war also galvanized many in the Black diaspora to the stakes of anti-racist and anti-fascist struggles. The mass reaction to the invasion of Ethiopia merits attention at a time when a new generation is engaging in sustained protest of racial injustice, and authoritarian aggression is on the rise. Ethiopia had a special significance for many in the Black diaspora. It was an ancient center of Christianity, and the Ethiopianism religious movement of the late 19th century drew on biblical reference to the country’s special role in fostering African nationalism and independence. Ethiopia also stood as a symbol of anti-imperial defiance and African modernity. In Adwa, in 1896, Ethiopians forced Italian armed forces to retreat, putting an end to Italy’s first attempt to occupy the country. Haile Selassie, then in his fifth year as emperor, also enjoyed global fame. He inspired Rastafari, a cultural and religious movement that considered him as a messianic figure. For millions, the invasion of Ethiopia imperiled Black freedom and dignity everywhere (Ruth Ben-Ghiat, 2020). For the fascists, occupying Ethiopia was not merely payback for that humiliating defeat 40 years earlier, but a chance to implement dictator Benito Mussolini’s plan to make Italy an agent of white racial rescue. The fascist regime famously persecuted leftists and ethnic and religious minorities, but it also acted to correct perceived threats to the hegemony of white civilization. In 1927, years before Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Mussolini warned that white people could face extinction, while “black and yellow people” were “at our doors,” armed with “a consciousness of the future of their race in the world.” Italy had occupied Somalia, Eritrea and Libya in Africa prior to World War I, but now Ethiopia, slated for population by Italian settlers, would show the world a fascist vision of total racial domination. In the meantime, overwhelming military force, including the deployment of 1,000,000 men and hundreds of tons of illegal poison gas bombs, would ensure victory. In this climate of emergency, Black and White anti-racists and antifascists came together around the world to organize. In London, Amy Ashwood Garvey led a rally with the Friends of Ethiopia organization. In St. Kitts and elsewhere in the British West Indies, protesters demanded British government action against Italy. In Jamaica, 1,400 men petitioned King George V to be able to enlist in the Ethiopian military. In the United States, Samuel Daniels, head of the Pan-African Reconstruction Association, toured major American cities to recruit volunteers. Soon the State Department reminded community leaders it was

illegal for American citizens to fight for a foreign power. Yet two Black pilots, Hubert Julian and John Robinson, found their way to Ethiopia to assist (Ruth Ben-Ghiat, 2020).

Mussolini believed in government ownership and government control of the economy. But he originated an economic system refer to as Economic Fascism (EF) that was acclaimed in his heyday, influenced U.S. economic policy during the 1930s following the consequences of the Great Depression of 1929. He became outraged when socialists opposed Italian entry in World War I, because he figured that Italy could emerge from the war with an empire like Great Britain, France and Germany. So he blended nationalism with socialism and came up with economic fascism. This involved private ownership and government control of the economy. Individuals continued to own their property and their businesses, but without the right to do what they wanted. Government told everybody what they must do and not do. “Anti-individualistic,” Mussolini wrote, “The Fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the State and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with the State. It is opposed to classical liberalism [or libertarianism, as it’s also called] that denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of the State... If classical liberalism spells individualism, Fascism spells government.” Individualism seemed to be the ideology that Mussolini and fellow fascists hated the most. They repeatedly disparaged it, referring to “the evil influence of individualism... the debacle of individualism... the individualistic conception of life in which man is subject only to the rule of his animal nature... individualism led to class struggle and national wars... [by contrast] fascism is an idealistic philosophy of life... the citizen in the Fascist State is no longer a selfish individual who has the anti-social right of rebelling against any law of the Collectivity.” Mahatma Gandhi called Mussolini “one of the great statesmen of our time.” In the mid-1920s, Winston Churchill met Mussolini and said: “If I had been Italian, I am sure I would have been with you from the beginning.” The British playwright George Bernard Shaw declared that “socialists should be delighted to find at last a socialist [Mussolini] who speaks and thinks as responsible rulers do” (Jim Powell, 2012).

However, Mussolini’s EF was based on ten dimensions namely: First, it begins with the belief that all of us owe unconditional allegiance to our nation-state that, according to fascist theoretician Mario Palmeri, will achieve “a new and higher form of life founded upon the basis of a fairer distribution of good things among the various classes... The state must be a social, political, economic, moral and religious organism built as a pyramid, and at the top is the national hero, the greatest man of his time.” Mussolini

is credited with originating the totalitarian formula: “all is for the state, nothing is outside the state, and nothing and no one are against the state.” Second, EF is a variety of socialism — individual rights may be routinely suppressed in the name of “social justice,” “national greatness” or some other utopian ideal. The Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises pointed out that “the economic program of Italian Fascism did not differ from the program of British Guild Socialism as propagated by the most eminent British and European socialists.” See, for example, Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (1920).” Third, when government becomes dysfunctional, because of runaway spending, unsustainable debt, a war gone wrong or other crises, people often clamor for a strong man to restore order. Mussolini recalled the horrors that led him to seize power: “We saw passing before our eyes the dreadful panorama of chaos and of evil forces which had broken into a gallop, tragic beyond words to one who loved his country.” Fourth, politicians know better than private citizens what should be done. “Government alone,” Mussolini insisted, “is in the right position to see things from the point of view of the general welfare.” The government’s responsibility is to determine how much money is invested, how and where it should be invested and how the results will be judged (Barrera Giulia, 2003). In Italy after 1925, all this was done through government-controlled cartels, such as the National Fascist Confederation of Industry, the National Fascist Confederation of Agriculture, the National Fascist Confederation of Commerce and the National Fascist Confederation of Banking. Fifth, with so much at stake, a strong man must not be hampered by an archaic constitution that unreasonably limits his power. If a constitution makes it difficult for a strong man to appoint his cronies to high positions, he should disregard the constitution and appoint them anyway — challenge adversaries to stop him! Similarly, a strong man should disregard laws or judicial decisions that interfere with his ability to carry out his program. A strong man must follow the command of his conscience to make a power grab. Sixth, political leaders must be willing to play hardball. Mussolini seemed to admire the German statesman Otto von Bismarck who famously remarked, “Not through speeches and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be decided, but by blood and iron.” Mussolini recalled his battles against communists: “It was time for chivalrous violence to beat the violent forces of evil on the very ground they had chosen... Fascism, a unique lighthouse in a sea of cowardice and compromise, engaged itself in battles... the iron necessity of violence was confirmed.” Mussolini didn’t see any reason to tolerate publishers with politically incorrect views (Bosworth R. J. B, 2002). He bragged, “I abolished the subversive press whose only function was to inflame men’s minds. Not a day goes by that we do not feel in Italian life how much good has been

wrought by these measures against the forces of disintegration, disorder and disloyalty.” Seventh, the most effective way to attract political support is to give away other people’s money. Monthly payments are better than a lump sum, since monthly payments encourage dependence. Bismarck observed, “Whoever has a pension for his old age is far more content and far easier to handle than one who has no such prospect.” Mussolini doubled the number of bureaucrats, in part, to put intellectuals on the public payroll so they would have incentives to praise him endlessly. He subsidized friendly newspapers, providing paychecks for many journalists. Eight build up political slush funds by awarding subsidies, tax breaks, tariff protection and regulatory carve-outs for capitalist cronies. They will become dependent on continued special favors (Bosworth R.J.B, 2005).

During the 1930s, reportedly three-quarters of Italian businesses were dependent on special favors, and they were anxious to make more political contributions. Ninth, seduce the media. Journalists tend to be wowed by power, they love to be flattered, and they enjoy writing about colorful personalities and dramatic spectacles. Mussolini organized the October 1922 March on Rome, when tens of thousands of fascists gathered in major cities and moved toward the capital. This intimidated King Victor Emmanuel who decided that the least bad option was to avoid a violent coup by asking Mussolini to form a government. After he did that, he began to consolidate his power. His regime produced a bewildering number of parades, ornate uniforms, photo ops and mass gatherings. Public works construction proceeded apace all over Italy — some 400 bridges, 4,000 miles of roads and grandiose buildings for fascist party offices, post offices and sports arenas. Mussolini vowed that within five years, Italy would become “as powerful as it was in the times of the Augustan empire.” Tenth, be humble. People don’t like arrogance. Truth be told, Mussolini was never very humble, but he pretended. That was better than nothing. In his autobiography, he wrote, “I was certainly not moved by a desire for egotistical political domination. I obeyed the positive command of my conscience, not any opportunism. I have always had a vision of life which was altruistic” (Jim Powell, 2012). To the above, Mussolini championed Italy national prestige but facilitate the country to hell according to Powell in 2012 with regard to Rome as the capital and religious capital of World Catholicism. Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini, born on July 29, 1883 at Dovia di Predappio, Forlì, Italy. For a brief time, Mussolini worked as a schoolmaster. Mussolini went by the nickname “Il Duce” (“the Leader”). Mussolini and his mistress were executed on April 28, 1945, their bodies hung on display in a Milan plaza. Place of death, Mezzegra, Italy. “Il Duce” (“the Leader”). “Iron Perfect”. Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini, who went by the nickname “Il Duce” (“the

Leader”), was an Italian dictator who created the Fascist Party in 1919 and eventually held all the power in Italy as the country’s prime minister from 1922 until 1943. An ardent socialist as a youth, Mussolini followed in his father’s political footsteps but was expelled by the party for his support of World War I. As dictator during World War II, he overextended his forces and was eventually killed by his own people in Mezzegra, Italy (Schivelbusch, W. 2003).

Machiavelli would be blamed for inspiring Henry VIII to defy the pope and seize religious authority for himself. William Shakespeare would cite Machiavelli as “the murderous Machiavel” in Henry VI, and many of his characters would embody Machiavellian traits. Philosopher Edmund Burke would describe the French Revolution as bearing evidence of the “odious maxims of a Machiavellian policy.” In the 20th century, some would point to Machiavelli as playing a role in the rise of dictators like Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Hitler kept a copy of *The Prince* by his bedside and Stalin was known to have read and annotated his copy of the book (Dover, 1992, Nick Spencer, 2012). Business leaders have looked to the work as a cutthroat approach to getting ahead, and the book has been called the “Mafia Bible” with gangsters, including John Gotti, quoting from its pages. Some scholars have questioned whether Machiavelli intended that readers take him at his word. Instead, they propose that *The Prince* was actually a satirical work and intended as a warning of what could happen if power is left unchecked. But most take it at face value as a cold-blooded blueprint for how to gain and hold onto power. Francis Bacon, the English statesman-scientist-philosopher, was among those who appreciated Machiavelli’s frank reflections early on, writing in 1605, “We are much beholden to Machiavel and others that write what men do and not what they ought to do” (Erica Benner, 2017; Michael Arditti, 2008).

The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him.” “It is not titles that honor men, but men that honor titles.” “Whoever believes that great advancement and new benefits make men forget old injuries is mistaken?” “The best fortress is to be found in the love of the people, for although you may have fortresses, they will not save you if you are hated by the people.” “Where the willingness is great, the difficulties cannot be great.” “There is no other way to guard yourself against flattery than by making men understand that telling you the truth will not offend you.” (Erika Andersen, Forbes.). “Everyone sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are.” Years after writing *The Prince*, Machiavelli penned *The Art of War*, a treatise written in the form of a dialogue between a military expert and citizens. *The Art of War* discusses the role that citizens have in supporting and using military troops to the

citizens’ advantage, the role of training and the best use of artillery in disarming one’s enemies. Drawing on themes he introduced in *The Prince*, Machiavelli also notes how deception and intrigue are valuable military strategies. But Machiavelli would not find an audience for his work before his death and Florence was not restored to its former glory in his lifetime. France, then Spain and Austria, invaded Italy and its warring city-states were unable to defend themselves, leading to nearly 400 years of dominance by outside rulers. Eventually, *The Prince* was published in 1532, five years after Machiavelli’s death (Nick Spencer, 2012). Over the centuries that followed, the principles it espoused would trigger outrage as well as admiration and establish Machiavelli as a controversial and revolutionary political thinker. In 1559, all of Machiavelli’s works were placed on the Catholic Church’s “Index of Prohibited Books.” The recently formed Protestant Church also condemned *The Prince*, and it was banned in Elizabethan England. Nonetheless, the book was widely read, and its author’s name became synonymous with cunning and unscrupulous behavior (Heather Lehr Wagner, 2006). According to Machiavelli, the ends always justify the means—no matter how cruel, calculating or immoral those means might be. Machiavelli’s guide to power was revolutionary in that it described how powerful people succeeded—as he saw it—rather than as one imagined a leader should operate. As leaders rapidly rose and fell, Machiavelli observed traits that, he believed, bolstered power and influence. In 1513, after being expelled from political service with the takeover of Florence by the Medici family, Machiavelli penned his outline of what makes an effective leader in *The Prince*. Unlike the noble princes portrayed in fairy tales, a successful ruler of a principality, as described in Machiavelli’s writings, is brutal, calculating and, when necessary, utterly immoral (Machiavelli, 2018).

According to Adeyinka Makinde, *The Addis Ababa Massacre: Italy’s National Shame* is a magisterial work which deserves the attention of a wide audience as it provides a sober yet spellbinding narrative of one of the era’s greatest desecrations of humanity. Silvio Berlusconi’s description of the fascist regime’s internment camps as having been ‘like holiday camps’ does not reflect the brutal circumstances in operation at the concentration camps, where Ethiopians were sent during the period of Italian occupation: Danane in the Ogaden region and Nokra in the Dahlak Archipelago. The book offers confirmation of high-level Vatican support for the Italian conquest, which many priests considered to be a ‘holy mission’. For, while the rationales for the colonisation of Ethiopia encompassed the racial doctrine of subjugating a people considered as being of an inferior race, as well as serving as revenge for the Italian defeat suffered in 1897 at the Battle of Adowa, some within the higher echelons of the Roman Catholic Church considered the

Ethiopian Christian Orthodox Church to be a heretical institution. This research also exposes a chapter of Italian history which has been practically expunged. The unexpurgated truth regarding Italy's legacy of violent colonial rule in East Africa, as well as its military adventures in the Balkans, has never been made the subject of public debate (Paka Marco, 2000). A war crimes trial in East Africa along the lines of the ones in Nuremberg and Tokyo would have been considered impolitic given that it would in essence have presented a situation where black Africans were prosecuting white Europeans – an affront to the sensibilities of the time, when most of the black and brown world was still under European colonial rule. Ethiopia was thus denied membership of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Selassie's ostensible act of magnanimity in forbidding reprisals and calling for reconciliation can be understood as a pragmatic response to British pressure, consisting of the threat not to support Ethiopia in its claims over Eritrea and the Ogaden region if it insisted on pressing its claim for a war crimes trial (Palumbo Patrizia, 2003). He was also keen to recommence his programme of modernisation, in regard to which he would need Western assistance. Campbell's book provides clear and ineluctable confirmation of fascism's inherent tendency towards brutality and violence. The killing of Ethiopians began during the afternoon of Friday 19 February, almost immediately after Graziani was injured by a grenade attack carried out by two Eritreans, Moges Asgedom and Abraha Deboch. An official declaration promulgating three days of vengeance followed soon after and the author constructs, in harrowing detail, the methodology of revenge. Guns, knives, pick-axes and truncheons were handed out to 'repression squads' consisting of black-shirted militias and Italian civilians, who, working in concert with armed soldiers and carabinieri, attacked defenseless Africans (Pergher Roberta, 2017). The victims were stabbed, bludgeoned and incinerated. Flamethrowers were used to set fire to cottages dotted around Addis Ababa in which thousands of innocents – defenseless children, women and the elderly – were immolated. Campbell estimates that 18-19,000 people were killed in Addis Ababa out of a population of 100,000. The merciless and unrelenting nature of the violence is underlined by the fact that the pogrom continued even after Mussolini sent word for the killings to stop, on the day Graziani had awoken from his coma (Italy's Ethiopian massacre 2018).

As regards the colonial territories, the Italian balance sheet was somewhat unsatisfactory: Libya had been lost, Eritrea had been impoverished through the exploitation of its (scarce) resources, in Somalia the socio-economic context was in a state of collapse, and finally the Dodecanese was riven by tensions between its various ethnic communities. Rome's ambitions, among them the capture of Djibouti and the recognition of its influence over Ethiopia, had been brusquely

rejected by Paris and London, thereby bringing to light the deep disagreements between the three allies and Italy's own diplomatic and political weakness (Simona Berhe, 2020). In February 1937, following an abortive attack by a handful of insurgents on Mussolini's High Command in Italian-occupied Ethiopia, 'repression squads' of armed Black shirts and Fascist civilians were unleashed on the defenseless residents of Addis Ababa. In three terror-filled days and nights of arson, murder and looting, thousands of innocent and unsuspecting men, women and children were roasted alive, shot, bludgeoned, stabbed to death, or blown to pieces with hand-grenades. Meanwhile the notorious Viceroy Rodolfo Graziani, infamous for his atrocities in Libya, took the opportunity to add to the carnage by eliminating the intelligentsia and nobility of the ancient Ethiopian empire in a pogrom that swept across the land. In a richly illustrated and groundbreaking work backed up by meticulous scholarly research, Ian Campbell reconstructs and analyses one of Fascist Italy's least known atrocities, which he estimates eliminated 19-20 per cent of the capital's population. He exposes the hitherto little-known cover-up conducted at the highest levels of the British government, which enabled the facts of one of the most hideous civilian massacres of all time to be concealed, and the perpetrators to walk free (Ian Campbell, 2017).

Haile Selassie addressed the League of Nations in June of 1936. Read the "Appeal to the League of Nations" by Haile Selassie, June, 1936. Here is an excerpt: I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people, and the assistance promised to it eight months ago, when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties. There is no precedent for a Head of State himself speaking in this assembly. But there is also no precedent for a people being victim of such injustice and being at present threatened by abandonment to its aggressor. Also, there has never before been an example of any Government proceeding to the systematic extermination of a nation by barbarous means, in violation of the most solemn promises made by the nations of the earth that there should not be used against innocent human beings the terrible poison of harmful gases. It is to defend a people struggling for its age-old independence that the head of the Ethiopian Empire has come to Geneva to fulfil this supreme duty, after having himself fought at the head of his armies... What reply shall I have to take back to my people? (William Loren Katz).

There was a serious march in support of Ethiopia in USA organized by Pan-Africanists and Civil Rights activists. Frame still from the film *The Good Fight*. Ethiopia, one of the only two independent African nations at the time, was invaded on Oct. 3, 1935 by Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini. The

Italians committed countless atrocities on the independent African state. Poisonous gas, aerial bombardment, flame throwers, and concentration camps were all employed. Black outrage throughout the world was unified. The League of Nations, forerunner to the United Nations, was criticized sharply. From Kingston to Johannesburg, from Detroit to Ghana, from Port-of-Spain to Paris, Black men and women offered to go fight in defense of Ethiopia (From Black Facts). In *The Forgotten Fight Against Fascism*, William Katz describes the organized response by African Americans in the United States. In the midst of a worldwide "Great Depression," citizens in the distant United States were aroused to help Ethiopia. Black men trained for military action — an estimated 8,000 in Chicago, 5,000 in Detroit, 2,000 in Kansas City. In New York City, where a thousand men drilled, nurse Salaria Kea of Harlem Hospital collected funds that sent a 75-bed hospital and two tons of medical supplies to Ethiopia and Paul Robeson addressed a "Harlem League Against War and Fascism" rally and A. Philip Randolph linked Mussolini's invasion to "the terrible repression of Black people in the United States." A people's march for Ethiopia in Harlem drew 25,000 African Americans and anti-fascist Italian Americans (Barker A. J, 1971).

By the autumn of 1943, the Italian Empire and all dreams of an Imperial Italy effectively came to an end. On 7 May, the surrender of Axis forces in Tunisia and other near continuous Italian reversals, led King Victor Emmanuel III to plan the removal of Mussolini. Following the Invasion of Sicily, all support for Mussolini evaporated. A meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism was held on 24 July, which managed to impose a vote of no confidence to Mussolini. The "Duce" was subsequently deposed and arrested by the King on the following afternoon. Afterwards, Mussolini remained a prisoner of the King until 12 September, when, on the orders of Hitler, he was rescued by German paratroops and became leader of the newly established Italian Social Republic (Andall, Jacqueline *et al.*, 2005). After 25 July, the new Italian government under the King and Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio remained outwardly part of the Axis. But, secretly, it started negotiations with the Allies. On the eve of the Allied landings at Salerno, which started the Allied invasion of Italy, the new Italian government secretly signed an armistice with the Allies. On 8 September, the armistice was made public. In Albania, Yugoslavia, the Dodecanese, and other territories still held by the Italians, German military forces successfully attacked their former Italian allies and ended Italy's rule. During the Dodecanese Campaign, an Allied attempt to take the Dodecanese with the cooperation of the Italian troops ended in total German victory. In China, the Imperial Japanese Army occupied Italy's concession in Tientsin after getting news of the armistice. Later in 1943 the Italian Social Republic formally ceded control of the

concession to Japan's puppet regime in China, the Reorganized National Government of China under Wang Jingwei. The death of Benito Mussolini, the deposed Italian fascist dictator, occurred on 28 April 1945, in the final days of World War II in Europe, when he was summarily executed by an Italian partisan in the small village of Giulino di Mezzegra in northern Italy. In 1947, the Treaty of Peace with Italy formally ended the empire that was now totally defunct. There were discussions to maintain Tripolitania (a province of Italian Libya) as the last Italian colony, but these were not successful. In November 1949 the former Italian Somaliland then under British military administration, was made a 10-year United Nations Trust Territory under Italian administration (Trust Territory of Somaliland). On 1 July 1960, Somalia merged with British Somaliland to form the independent Somali Republic (Ben-Ghiat Ruth *et al.*, 2005).

Generally, Mussolini had a penchant for violence even as a youth. Born on July 29, 1883, Mussolini gained a reputation for bullying and fighting during his childhood. Mussolini was a socialist before becoming a fascist. Born to a socialist father, Mussolini was named after leftist Mexican President Benito Juárez. His two middle names, Amilcare and Andrea, came from Italian socialists Amilcare Cipriani and Andrea Costa. Italy's leaders never called on the military to stop Mussolini's insurrection. From 1920 to 1922, armed fascist squads faced minimal interference from the police or army as they roamed the country causing property damage and killing an estimated 2,000 political opponents. Contrary to popular belief, Mussolini did not take power in a coup. With Italy's leading non-fascist politicians hopelessly divided and with the threat of violence in the air, on October 29 the king offered Mussolini the chance to form a coalition government (Jesse Greenspan).

So all the thoughts of 3Gs and 3Es got him disappointed in the course of aggrandizing Italian Empire and increased rate of human slaughter in the course of colonial attacked and outbreak of the Second World War. His inspirations of using Machiavelli's principles as an Italian like himself have the whole of Italy tortured in the global context to the status of GSA of the first half of the 20th Century. The first ever African independent country which was undermined by Italians 3Es agents was once more restored to its original position. This justified why the first African Continental Mechanism known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed in the capital of Ethiopia-Addis Ababa. Some Italian military, former military men and legislators what their country leaders did as evils of massacre and condemned Italian war crimes against Ethiopians like Emus Hughes who Asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Philip Noel-Baker, which Italian generals are to be tried as

war criminals for atrocities committed under their orders in Abyssinia? He replied as follows: I understand that three months ago a representative of the Ethiopian Government saw the Secretary-General of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and that he was given the appropriate forms for submitting evidence. So far, I understand, no cases have yet been submitted either to the War Crimes Commission or to anyone else. Mr. Hughes further with questions: Is the Minister aware that the Moscow declaration of 6th November, 1943, stated that persons accused of war crimes would be tried on the spot where the alleged crimes had been committed; and will he say whether this does not apply to Africa as well as to Europe? Mr. Noel-Baker. I do not want now to debate the point put by my hon. and learned Friend. I understand that there is some doubt whether the United Nations War Crimes Commission would feel that they had jurisdiction over acts committed before 1939. These questions continued to be heated debate in the Italian Parliament until the 1980s and beyond. Which is a clear indication that Africans of the Ethiopian have legitimate claims over the massacred of their citizens by the Italian colonial troops ordered by principal colonial agents of 3Gs and 3Es.

Biography of the Author

Dr. Njuafac Kenedy Fonju is a holder of a Doctorate / Ph.D in History with specialisation in the History of International Relations obtained from the University of Yaounde I, Cameroon in 2012. He has been lecturing since 2007, as a Part-Time Lecturer (2007-2015), Assistant Lecturer (2015-2017) and presently a Senior Lecturer in the University of Dschang, Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences, Department of History and Archeology since November 2017. He delivers lectures in the History of International Relations and Political History in the Post-Graduate and undergraduate levels. Dr. Kenedy has been lecturing courses such as Africa in International Relations, China from the Communist Revolution to Market Economy, Communist World in International Relations, Inter-American Relations and Black Problems in the Americas, Conflict Resolution and the Culture of Peace, Issues and Challenges of the Commonwealth of Nations and Political Elites in Colonial Black African Countries, the Politics of empowerment of Minorities in the World since the 20th Century, and History of Political Thought since Machiavelli. He is also lecturing Introduction to Bilingualism, Introduction to language and Nation-Building, the History of Bilingualism in the World, National and International Business in Bilingualism in the Department of Bilingual Letters of the University of Dschang. In addition, He also delivers lectures concerning scientific English in the Departments of Physics and Earth Sciences in the Faculty of Sciences of the same institution. His broader research interests include emerging powers and their foreign policy

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- 34S 06barrera (ds).fm Page 425 Wednesday, September 10, 2003 8:45 AM Journal of Modern Italian Studies 8(3) 2003: 425–443 Mussolini's colonial race laws and state-settler relations in Africa Orientale Italiana (1935–41) Giulia Barrera Direzione generale per gli Archivi, Rome Abstract Why in Mussolini's empire were relations between colonizers and colonized regulated by the ... [nationalinterest.org](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot) › [blog](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot) › reboot World War II: How South Africa Helped Expel Mussolini From ... 2021-02-08.
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