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Original Research Article

Evaluating Global Finance Depolarization: Euro's Chance to Overtake US Dollar as Leading Reserve Currency Despite Competition from Chinese Yuan and Emerging Alternatives

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Abstract

The global financial system is now undergoing considerable instability, raising critical issues about the durability of reserve currencies. This article examines the probability of the euro surpassing the United States dollar as the predominant reserve currency, particularly in the context of heightened economic volatility and the emergence of new rivals, such as the Chinese Yuan, striving for more significance in the global market. This paper specifically examines the possibility of the euro surpassing the United States dollar. This article employs a mixed-methods approach to evaluate the competitiveness, credibility, and limitations of predominant reserve currencies. It does this by integrating actual reserve data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) with theoretical concepts derived from dominant stability theory, network effects, and institutional trust. The data indicate that the dollar's supremacy has been progressively declining, from over 70% of global reserves in 2000 to around 58% by mid-2024. Robust legal frameworks, monetary credibility, and comprehensive financial markets collectively enhance the prosperity of the euro, which constitutes almost twenty. (20%) percent of the total. The Eurozone, meanwhile, persists in facing challenges such as the lack of a fiscal union and the disunity of political leadership within the bloc. The Chinese Yuan accounts for only four (4%) percent of world foreign currency reserves, notwithstanding programs like the Belt and Road and enhanced central bank swap lines promoting its utilization. China's persistent objective of sustaining a depreciated Yuan to bolster its international economic competitiveness presents a considerable obstacle. Because the Yuan cannot be converted into other currencies and there is uncertainty over its value over the long term, foreign central banks are unable to maintain considerable reserves of the Yuan. The continued existence of concerns over capital restrictions, decreased financial transparency, and political participation has led to widespread pessimism regarding the Yuan's potential to continue functioning as a reserve currency despite these factors. Based on what the study found, it seems unlikely that there will ever be a single currency that is the most important one in the world. This suggests that there is a multipolar system in which the euro, the Yuan, and digital currencies like the e-CNY and the digital euro all function together in a framework for international monetary policy that is becoming more decentralized and strategically split. These changes have big effects that might change not just how the world is run but also the trade strategy and macroeconomic policy that are already in place. These changes also make life harder for civilizations that are in other regions of the planet.

Keywords: Reserve currency transition, U.S. dollar decline, Eurozone financial system, Chinese Yuan, currency devaluation, central bank, digital currencies, financial multipolarity, geopolitical finance, Currency trustworthiness, Global reserve diversification.

INTRODUCTION

Comprehensive Overview, Contextual Background, and Research Objectives of the Study

The fact that there is only one reserve currency has a big effect on global financial services. This dominance has an effect in many areas, such as trade payment, the independence of monetary policy, and geopolitical strategy. Since the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the United States dollar has been able to maintain its straightforward position as the major reserve currency. This has been made possible by several factors, including the strength of financial markets, the liquidity of institutions, and the integrity of institutions. Despite this, there are signs that depolarization is beginning to emerge. The euro is commonly considered a competitive alternative as the Chinese Yuan progressively makes its way into the international currency arena.

Recent discoveries suggest that these alterations may extend beyond mere scholarly speculation. The IMF's COFER database shows that the dollar's share in reserves has dropped from around 70% in 2000 to about 58% by 2024. The euro's share has stayed consistent at about 20%, and the Yuan's part has gone up a little (IMF Working Paper, 2018). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has called this a "pivotal moment," pointing to trade tensions, geopolitical fragmentation, and the US's use of dollar-based sanctions as stressors and reasons for global central banks to diversify (Carstens, 2025).

Nevertheless, although its relevance is growing, the euro is confronted with basic problems. As a result of political unwillingness to further integrate fiscal policies, progress toward broad global adoption has been hampered (Letter, Financial Times, 2025). Financial markets continue to be fragmented among member states. Concurrently, China's efforts to strengthen the Yuan, which include initiatives such as Belt and Road trade agreements, central bank swap lines, and the CIPS payment system, are undermined by persistent capital controls and a strategy of maintaining the Yuan's undervaluation to boost exports, which brings about a reduction in the Yuan's credibility as a reliable reserve asset (Brookings, 2025; FT commentary, 2025).

The question, therefore, arises: Will the euro occupy this developing vacuum, or are we transitioning into a multipolar reserve currency epoch? This study finds that although the euro is the most formidable competitor, complete substitution of the dollar is unlikely. There is a possibility that many currencies and digital technologies may coexist in the future, as shown by the systematic diversification of reserves. The autonomy of monetary policy, the dynamics of international trade, and the global balance of power are all severely impacted because of this transformation.

Research Objectives

1. To examine whether factors such as economic processes, political systems, and financial institutions enhance or diminish the probability of the euro surpassing the dollar as the preeminent reserve currency globally.
2. To examine the fundamental reasons for the restricted global acceptability of the Chinese Yuan, concentrating on factors such as capital restrictions, transparency, and China's strategy of currency depreciation to bolster exporters.
3. Analyze the prevailing trend of currency diversification, emphasize the rising use of central bank-issued digital currencies, and assess the potential impact of these developments on the dynamics of global reserve currencies in the next decades.

Research Questions

1. What political, economic, and institutional reasons could establish the euro as a significant competitor to the US dollar in the context of global reserve currencies?
2. In what manner does China's monetary policy affect the Yuan's potential to become a leading global reserve currency, notwithstanding China's considerable economic clout?
3. In what ways are digital technologies, such as central bank digital currencies, and alterations in international collaboration facilitating the transition to a multipolar reserve currency system?

Background and Industry Trends

Background and Industry Trends: In-Depth Analysis of Historical Context, Current Developments, and Emerging Patterns Shaping the Industry Landscape.

Since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Bretton Woods system, the United States dollar has continuously served as the primary reserve currency on every continent. It has been said by Eichengreen 2011), that the United States of America is the most powerful nation in the world. One of the primary reasons for this is that the country's political and economic climate is stable, the country's financial markets are huge and liquid, and the dollar plays a major role in global trade. The dollar was still an important part of global financial services after the Bretton Woods Agreement fell apart in the early 1970s. The dollar was still the most widely used currency for foreign exchange reserves, commodity prices, and international transactions. It was the preferred way to trade.

For the purpose of gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the changes that have occurred in the landscape of reserve currencies over the course of the last twenty years, it is essential to develop a map of the important events that have influenced this shift. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was demonstrated that the euro had developed into a valid alternative to the dollar of the United States. Because of the global financial crisis of 2008, different countries and investors had to find alternate ways to solve problems. People lost faith in the dollar because of this; in 2016, the Chinese Yuan became more global as it was included in the International Monetary Fund's basket of Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This was a major advance ahead in the process. "The inclusion of the Yuan in the IMF's SDR basket in 2016 marked a turning point in its internationalization. This recognition positioned the Yuan as a formal reserve asset for the first time, but its impact has been constrained by persistent capital controls and managed exchange rates." Prasad, E. (2021).

A number of factors have contributed to the acceleration of this diversification over the course of the previous five years. These factors include geopolitical upheavals, the posture of the United States on sanctions, and the rapid creation of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), such as the digital euro and the electronic Chinese Yuan, among others. The occurrence of these occurrences is illustrative of the steady change that the global financial system is making towards a framework that is more multipolar and technologically advanced. Prasad, E. (2021).

The United States has been able to exercise influence through mechanisms such as sanctions, monetary policy spillovers, and control over international financial infrastructure because of the position of the dollar, which has provided the United States with enormous geopolitical power (Tooze, 2021). However, many believe that the dominance of the dollar also results in global imbalances and places the global economy in an excessively vulnerable position to decisions made within the United States (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2009).

The Rise of the Euro and Its Strategic Position:

Since its introduction in 1999, the euro has rapidly risen to become the second most significant currency in the world. In addition to being a political initiative with the goal of enhancing European unity, the establishment of this organization was also conceived as a financial plan to provide an alternative to the dollar (McNamara, 2008). According to the European Central Bank (2023), the euro is currently responsible for around twenty percent (20%) of the world's reserves and is widely utilized in international lending and bond issuance, particularly in Africa and some regions of Eastern Europe.

Table: Share of Global Foreign Exchange Reserves by Currency (Selected Years)

Year	Dollar (%)	Euro (%)	Chinese Yuan (%)	Others (%)
2000	70	18	0.5	11.5
2010	62	27	1.5	9.5
2020	59	21	2.8	17.2
2024	57	20	3.7	19.3

Source: *IMF COFER Database (2024), ECB (2023)*

Graph bellow displays the historical trends in the percentage of foreign currency reserves held in US dollars, euros, and Chinese Yuan between the years 2000 and 2024.



Figure 1: Illustrates Global foreign exchange reserve composition (1999–2024). The chart illustrates the decline of the U.S. dollar's dominance, gradual growth of the euro, and the emergence of the Chinese Yuan as a minor reserve currency

Source: IMF COFER (2024)

This is done to better visualize the changing dynamics of global reserve currencies. This graph illustrates the progressive decline in the dominance of the United States dollar, the consistent presence of the euro as the second most widely used reserve currency, and the gradual yet steady rise of the Yuan.

Even if the US dollar's share has declined from over 70% in 2000 to roughly 57% in 2024, the graph above demonstrates that it is still the most valuable currency in the world by a large margin. In the early 2000s, the Euro initially went up, but it finally settled at 20% since the structure of the Eurozone was not working. Even if the Yuan is getting stronger, its proportion is still rather small. This suggests that there are still concerns with convertibility, capital limits, and the legitimacy of financial policy.

The US dollar, the euro, and the Chinese Yuan stack up against each other in terms of five important factors that affect their status as global reserve currencies: market liquidity, political stability, currency convertibility, institutional integration, and trade utilization. The US dollar is number one overall because it is quite popular and has a lot of institutional backing. The euro is doing well, but political and fiscal differences are getting in the way. The Yuan's poor performance is mostly due to a lack of capital and worries about policy transparency, even if it is being used more in trade.

A comparison of the US dollar, the euro, and the Chinese Yuan reveals the many factors that determine reserve currency status. The figure shows that the dollar is still doing better than its competitors in most areas, especially when it comes to how easy it is to trade, how easy it is to convert, and how liquid the market is. The euro is a good currency because it can be exchanged for other currencies and is well-integrated into the market. However, the euro is an unstable currency since there is no common fiscal authority and there is political division. There are still structural problems that keep the Yuan from being utilized more widely as a reserve asset, even as its use in business and integration into institutions is rising at an amazing rate. Some of these hurdles are limitations on capital and limited convertibility. This comparative structure points out that a currency's dominance is influenced not only by the economy's magnitude but also by institutional trust, market accessibility, and the ramifications of geopolitical issues.

On the other hand, the euro's importance on the world stage has been hindered by various obstacles. In contrast to the United States of America, the European Union does not have a coherent fiscal policy that is coherent and is experiencing institutional fragmentation with its institutions. Divergences in banking regulation, debt ratios, and political agendas across member states impair investor confidence and degrade the reputation of the euro as a worldwide reserve that can be relied upon completely (Siklos, 2020).

The Chinese Yuan: A Growing but Limited Player:

Over the past decade, the Yuan's importance in international trade has expanded. According to the graph above, the percentage of global trade exceeding eight percent is expected to expand from less than one percent in 2010 to more than eight percent in 2024.



Figure 2: Illustrates Distribution of global trade settlement shares in 2024, showing the dominance of the U.S. dollar (61%), followed by the euro (28%) and the rising role of the Chinese Yuan (11%).
Source: SWIFT RMB Tracker (2024)

The IMF introduced the Yuan to its SDR basket in 2016. The international currency enabled this expansion. The IMF introduced the Yuan to its SDR basket in 2016. The international currency enabled this expansion. World history first recognized the Yuan as a reserve asset. This honor was unprecedented. In 2016, the IMF added the Yuan to its SDR basket. The Yuan became a reserve asset worldwide for the first time. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a massive network of bilateral currency exchange agreements with Asia, Africa, and Latin American central banks were policy-oriented programs. Capital constraints and a less liquid market make the Yuan difficult to utilize. These improvements show that more people worldwide trust the Yuan, but that trust is still growing.

Recently, China has significantly advanced the international use of the Yuan. This is particularly accurate given that the International Monetary Fund incorporated it into its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in 2016. China has implemented many attempts to position the Yuan as a potential global currency. The Belt and Road Initiative, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and bilateral swap agreements with over thirty central banks constitute these endeavors (Subacchi, 2020).

However, despite these efforts, the Yuan continues to be a very tiny reserve currency, consisting of less than four percent (4%) of the total reserves worldwide (IMF COFER, 2024). The intentional policy of China to devalue the Yuan to sustain competitive exports is one of the primary causes for this scenario. Although it is beneficial for commerce, this behavior undermines worldwide confidence in the long-term value of the currency. Additionally, China continues to apply harsh capital controls, which have the effect of limiting the capacity to convert currencies and discouraging widespread adoption (Prasad, 2021).

Emerging Trends: Depolarization and Digitalization:

The global financial system is currently experiencing two transformational changes. Initially, depolarization, which signifies the dollar's loss of its top position, is indicated by central banks holding a broader range of reserves and the emergence of regional trade groups utilizing diverse payment methods (Aizenman *et al.,* 2022).



Figure 3: Illustrates Increasing diversification of central bank reserve holdings, showing reduced reliance on the U.S. dollar and stronger regional multipolarity in global finance.
Source: Aizenman *et al.,* (2022)

The emergence of digital currencies, especially central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) such as China's e-CNY and the EU's digital euro, is transforming the cycle of currency utilization and global transactions (BIS, 2023).

According to these trends, it is possible that the future of international reserves will not belong to a single, dominating currency, but rather to a multipolar system in which multiple main currencies, possibly including digital ones, share importance.

Scenario Analysis for 2025–2040 Currency reserves. Possible avenues for the US dollar, euro, renminbi, and digital currencies contemplating economic, technological, and geopolitical transformations

In the fact that the dollar continues to be the most valuable currency in the world, the global economy, financial technology, and military strategy are all seeing shifts in the balance of power that are occurring at a rate that is currently unprecedented. This might lead to fundamental changes. This section outlines three forecast scenarios, each based on current empirical trends, theoretical insights, and institutional reports (Eichengreen, 2019; BIS, 2023; Aizenman et al., 2022), to enhance comprehension of prospective outcomes. This might lead to fundamental changes. This section outlines three forecast scenarios, each based on current empirical trends, theoretical insights, and institutional reports (Eichengreen, 2019; BIS, 2023; Aizenman *et al.,* 2022), to enhance comprehension of prospective outcomes.

Scenario 1: Status Quo Continuation Dollar Dominance with Gradual Diversification

In this case, the U.S. dollar will still be the most important currency in global reserves, accounting for 55–60% of foreign exchange assets by 2040. There is some moderate diversification toward the euro and Yuan, but these are still secondary. The euro stays steady at about 20%, while the Yuan rises to no more than 7–9% (IMF COFER, 2024).

- **Drivers**: There is a sustained desire for dollar-based secure assets, deep capital markets in the United States, military dominance, and continued debt denominated in dollars.
- **CBDC Role**: The FedNow and digital dollar projects make payment systems more modern and efficient, but they don't change the way things work throughout the world.
- **Risks**: There is still global exposure to changes in U.S. interest rates and penalties, but monetary rivals haven't come up with many new ideas.

Scenario 2: Multipolar Reserve System Balanced Trifurcation

In this scenario, by 2040, the dollar, euro, and Yuan will each have a more equal proportion of global reserves (USD ~45%, EUR ~25%, CNY ~15%). The rest of the reserves are made up of gold, SDRs, and CBDCs.

- **Drivers**: Geopolitical realignment (such as the BRICS bloc), the adoption of the digital euro, China's opening of capital flows, and the growth of the CIPS network.
- **CBDC Role**: CBDCs are utilized in currency swap settlements and regional trade blocks, including the e-CNY and the digital euro.
- **Institutional Reforms**: The IMF's reserve basket grew, and new BIS-coordinated CBDC interoperability guidelines came out.

Scenario 3: Disruptive Digital Fragmentation and the Rise of Tech-Based Currencies

In this case, digital currencies and private or regional monetary networks are threatening traditional reserve currencies. The U.S. dollar is now less than 40% of the world's reserves. CBDCs (including e-CNY, the digital euro, and the BRICS digital currency) and tokenized gold or commodities make up 25–30% of the world's reserves.

- **Drivers**: Adopting CBDCs that work with each other, making progress in the regulation of stable coins, and investing in digital infrastructure in the Global South
- **CBDC Role**: The functions of SWIFT and dollar clearance are brought to the forefront by this type of currency that may be programmed across international borders.
- **Risks** The United States' financial power has decreased, and there has been more volatility, currency fragmentation, and governance challenges.

Under three alternative scenarios, the table below illustrates probable changes in the distribution of global reserve currencies. These scenarios are as follows: the continued dominance of the United States dollar, the formation of a multipolar reserve system, and a disruptive move towards the fragmentation of digital currencies. According to Aizenman *et al.,* (2022), Prasad (2021), and BIS (2023), the estimates are based on prevalent patterns, data from institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements), and theoretical models about hegemonic currency shifts and technological disruption.



Figure 4: Illustrates Projections for global reserve currency shares by 2040 under three scenarios Status Quo, Multipolar, and Digital Fragmentation. The U.S. dollar remains dominant in the Status Quo path, while multipolar and digital fragmentation scenarios highlight increasing roles for the euro, Yuan, and other currencies.
Source: Adapted from Aizenman *et al.,* (2022) and BIS (2023)

The next twenty years of the international monetary system will depend a lot on how stable geopolitics is, how well institutions work, and how quickly new technologies are adopted. Describes three possible situations for global reserve currency shares by 2040. In the current situation, the dollar stays ahead with about 54% of the vote, while the euro and Yuan barely gain a little. In the multipolar situation, the Eurozone becomes more integrated, and the Yuan may be exchanged for more things, which makes the shares of the three major currencies more equal. In the digital fragmentation scenario, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and regional payment systems become widely used. This makes it less likely that one currency would be the most important and more likely that other regional or commodity-backed assets will be more important. This picture shows that dollar leadership may continue, although its relative superiority could drop a lot in some situations.

Table 1: Reserve Currency Shares in Various Forecast Scenarios (2040) are presented in the Following Table

Global Currency Reserve Scenarios

Currency	Scenario 1: The Status Quo	Scenario 2 Multipolararlty	Scenario 3 Digital Distruption
USD	58%	<45%	<40%
EUR	20%	25%	20%
CNY	7%	15%	18%
Other (JPY, GBP)	10%	8%	7%
CBDCs/Other	5%	7%	15–20%
CBDCs/Other	5%	7%	(inctud gold stablacoins)

Sources: IMF COFER (2024), BIS (2023), Prasad (2021), Aizenman *et al.,* (2022), Author's projection

This table demonstrates how the future of reserve currencies could diverge depending on geopolitical alignment, CBDC adoption, and institutional reforms. In a status quo scenario, dollar dominance persists with limited diversification. Under a multipolar model, the euro and yuan significantly increase their reserve shares, supported by digital infrastructure and capital market reforms. In the digital disruption scenario, interoperable CBDCs and tokenized assets take market share away from traditional fiat currencies. This makes the reserve environment more volatile but also more spread out. These tendencies indicate how crucial it will be to have good governance, legitimacy, and cooperation in order to set up the new global monetary order.

CBDCs: Opportunities and Barriers in the Global Reserve Landscape

A major transformation in the global monetary system has occurred as a result of the introduction of central bank digital currencies, often known as CBDCs. The arrangement of foreign reserves and the stability of the domestic financial system are both affected by this shift, which has repercussions for both of these areas. The next paragraphs contain a comprehensive analysis of the major opportunities and restrictions that characterize the evolving function of CBDCs in global finance. This analysis encompasses both positive and negative aspects.

1. CBDCs as Catalysts for Payment Modernization:

Central Bank Digital Currencies, sometimes referred to as CBDCs, provide a means of modernizing financial systems by avoiding the utilization of conventional infrastructures such as SWIFT and correspondent banking networks. This allows for the modernization of traditional financial systems. People often say that traditional processes are lengthy, expensive, and not very clear. In addition to this, they are frequently ineffective. CBDCs, on the other hand, make it feasible to settle transactions in a manner that is practically instantaneous, reduce the costs of transactions, and improve the transparency of international financial operations. CBDCs are able to solve inefficiencies that are present in both domestic and international transactions, according to the Business Intelligence Survey (2023). This is accomplished by providing real-time gross settlement capabilities in addition to the capability to configure functionality.

2. Enhancing Financial Inclusion and Policy Transparency:

One of the most important aspects of CBDCs is their ability to significantly improve access to digital currency that is sponsored by the government in regions that have a considerable amount of financial exclusion. CBDCs have the potential to provide a safe and effective method of conducting business in developing countries, where the use of mobile devices regularly outpaces access to traditional banking services. According to Prasad (2021), the facilitation of targeted fiscal interventions, such as direct stimulus payments, and the strengthening of anti-money laundering initiatives are both made possible by the traceability of CBDC transactions. Nonetheless, the same traceability engenders apprehensions over privacy and surveillance, particularly in totalitarian regimes.

3. Boosting Reserve Currency Attractiveness:

It is possible that the deployment of a CBDC that has been methodically developed have the potential to improve global confidence and functionality in economies that already have reserve currencies in place. In the areas of international loans, trade invoicing, and the management of foreign reserves, the strengthened digital infrastructure contributes to the currency's increased efficiency and appeal. Kiff *et al.,* (2020) argue that digital currencies have the potential to act as "trust amplifiers" provided they are backed by the credibility of institutions and well-defined regulatory frameworks. Digital currency development is being utilized by both the European Central Bank and the People's Bank of China in order to improve their respective countries' ability to compete on the global stage.

4. Strategic De-Dollarization and Monetary Autonomy:

CBDCs are being actively utilized by countries such as China in order to reduce their reliance on the United States dollar and in addition to existing financial networks such as SWIFT. It is possible to develop a foundation for cross-border trade settlements that avoid channels controlled by the United States of America through the integration of China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) with the electronic Chinese New Year (e-CNY) (Subacchi, 2020). In accordance with Beijing's main goal of de-dollarization, which is to defend itself from sanctions and improve its geopolitical and monetary independence (Prasad, 2021) these developments fit with Beijing's strategy.

5. Lack of Cross-Border Interoperability:

There is a lack of standardization for cross-border interoperability, which is a significant disadvantage of commodity trading centers (CBDCs). Despite the fact that some pilot initiatives, such as the BIS's Project mBridge, have investigated restricted interlinking among countries, there is currently no unified framework that can integrate digital currencies across a variety of regulatory, legal, and technical landscapes (BIS, 2023). Because CBDCs may result in fragmentation rather than coherence within the global monetary system in the absence of such coordination, the efficacy of CBDCs as universal reserve assets may be diminished as a result.



Figure 5: Illustrates Major Cross-Border CBDC Interoperability Projects

6. Legal Uncertainty and Cyber security Risks:

Regulation, data privacy, legal jurisdiction, and platform security are all complex issues that arise as a result of the adoption of CBDCs. As a result of the creation of a CBDC, central banks are required to take on new responsibilities as operators of digital infrastructure, which increases their susceptibility to cyber-attacks and technological failures. Furthermore, there is a lack of clarity in the law about the finality of settlements, the enforcement of laws across international borders, and the rights of users to their data, particularly in jurisdictions that have poor rule-of-law institutions (Tooze, 2021; Prasad, 2021). As a result of these ambiguities, sovereign wealth funds and central banks are dissuaded from including CBDCs in their reserve holdings.



Figure 6: Legal Uncertainty and Cyber security Risks in CBDCs

7. China's e-CNY: Technical Maturity, Strategic Concerns:

Currently, China's electronic Chinese New Yuan (e-CNY) is the most advanced Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) in terms of experimental implementation. This includes applications in both local retail experimentation and international commerce. Despite this, there have been concerns surrounding state surveillance, financial constraints, and limited convertibility, all of which have impeded wider worldwide acceptance. The Yuan's limited market accessibility and the absence of transparent administration continue to be obstacles that prevent it from reaching its full potential as a reserve currency (Prasad, 2021). This is despite the fact that the Yuan is technologically accomplished.

8. The Digital Euro: Institutional Fragmentation Challenges:

The digital euro plan is hampered by the fragmentation of institutions within the Eurozone, despite the fact that it is strategically desirable from both a technical and legal standpoint. One of the factors that hinders the currency's worldwide status is the absence of a unified fiscal policy, as well as the political diversity that exists among the member states. In addition, discussions over the protection of personal information, the disintermediation of commercial banks, and the legal framework of the digital euro are preventing progress toward its implementation (Siklos, 2020; ECB, 2023). The capacity of the euro to fully leverage CBDC innovation in order to enhance its reserve status is hindered with the presence of these restraints.

9. Gradual Reshaping of the Global Reserve Landscape:

Although CBDCs are not expected to quickly replace traditional reserve currencies, the ongoing development of these currencies will result in a transformation of the procedures used to allocate reserves on a worldwide scale. In the realm of currency rivalry, they bring a fresh facet of programmability, accessibility, and digital resilience to the table. According to Aizenman *et al.,* (2022) and the Bank for International Settlements (2023), the possibility of a future that is defined by multipolar reserve systems, in which digital currencies perform some functions alongside fiat currencies, is becoming increasingly plausible. This new development brings to light the growing importance of global collaboration, the standardization of technical standards, and the alignment of governance.



Figure 7: Illustrates Comparative analysis of China's e-CNY and the EU's digital euro. The graph highlights technical maturity, governance models, and global adoption challenges of CBDCs.
Source: BIS (2023); Prasad (2021); ECB (2023).

Using a comparison of two main state-sponsored digital currency initiatives China's e-CNY and the European Union's digital euro this table highlights the possible influence that CBDCs could have on the dynamics of global reserve markets. There is a significant difference between the two in terms of their governance frameworks, privacy assumptions, and institutional limits, despite the fact that both aim to modernize international payments.

Table 2: Comparison of e-CNY and Digital Euro Projects

CBDC Feature Comparison

Feature	e-CNY (China)	Digital Euro (European Union)
Pilot Stage	Advanced (crask beyour-pkicls angaing)	Mid fo-advanced (in public contrination phase)
Monetary Authority	People's Bank of China (PBoC)	European Central Bank (ECB)
Institutional Trust	Limited (state contrail lisit ber eparency)	Moderate fo High (ECB indopendence)
Privacy & Data Concerns	Hiah (capital controls remain)	Lower
Goovertibility	Limited (capital controls remain)	Fully convertible
Interoperabilify Readiness	Gtrategic de-dollarization	Financial inhevation, eure competitiveneas
CiPS integration in progress	CiPS integration in progress	Still under technical design review

Sources: BIS (2023); Prasad (2021); ECB (2023)

The purpose of this comparison is to underscore the diverse trajectories that CBDCs could pursue, contingent upon their institutional design and strategic objectives inside their organization. The electronic Chinese Yuan is different from the digital euro since it is more limited by legal rules and the process of reaching internal agreement inside the EU. The electronic Chinese Yuan, on the other hand, shows China's top-down, geopolitically focused approach. Both of these attempts show that designing digital currency is not just a technological challenge; it also shows how political systems and economic goals work.

As global use increases, the interoperability and regulation of CBDCs will be crucial in ascertaining whether they function solely as local instruments or evolve into trustworthy elements of international reserve portfolios.

Broader Scope:
Inclusion of Other Major Reserve Currencies and Developing Regions

The US dollar and the euro are generally the major themes of discourse concerning the global financial system, but a full examination should also look at other key reserve currencies. Some of these include the Japanese yen, the British pound sterling, the Swiss franc, and the Chinese Yuan which is also known as (renminbi), which is becoming increasingly important. The issuing nations' political and economic strength may be seen in the distinct roles that each of these currencies plays in international trade, central bank reserves, and financial markets.

Since it is now included in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket possessed by the International Monetary Fund, the Chinese Yuan has become an increasingly significant currency. The ascension of the Yuan to the status of an international currency will bring about a change in the way money is used in the region, particularly in some regions of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The reason for this is that China is expanding its Belt and Road Initiative and strengthening its financial links with nations that are still in the process of developing (BIS, 2023).

As a result of the fact that developing areas often have less established financial markets and less control over their own money, these regions are more sensitive to changes in reserve currencies and changes in policy. A significant number of countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa continue to either closely manage their currencies or connect them to the dollar or the euro of the United States. As a result, they are susceptible to shocks that come from the outside. Furthermore, the utilization of digital currencies, regional payment systems, and other strategies for conducting business may gradually reduce the degree to which their monetary system is dependent on a single type of currency.

It is important to look at how new reserve currencies and the growing importance of developing economies interact with traditional economies of finance when trying to determine the future of the global monetary system. This wider reach makes it easier to see new patterns, figure out dangers, and create policy frameworks that are open to everyone and reflect the fact that the global economy is now more than one country.

To examine how the composition of global foreign currency reserves has shifted over time, a clearer understanding of how important reserve currencies are in impacting the economy of the whole world. The figures obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are presented in the table below. These numbers demonstrate the amount of each currency that is held by central banks all over the world. The gradual changes that have been made in favor of other currencies, particularly the Chinese Yuan, have shown a little but significant diversification of reserve assets. Even if the euro and the US dollar continue to control a significant portion of the market, this is still the case.

Table 3: Composition of Global Foreign Exchange Reserves by Currency (Last 10 Years)

Year	USD (%)	EUR (%)	JPY (%)	GBP (%)	CNY (%)	Others (%)
2015	65.0	20.6	3.6	4.4	1.0	5.4
2020	59.0	21.2	5.9	4.7	2.3	6.9
2024	58.4	20.3	5.4	4.6	3.0	8.3

***Data Source: IMF COFER** (Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves)*

The table above shows the US dollar's share in global reserves has gone down from 65.0% in 2015 to 58.4% in 2024. This shows that global reserves are slowly being rebalanced. The euro's value has stayed very constant, although the Japanese yen and the British pound have also seen some small changes. The number of Chinese Yuan in official reserves has tripled over the past 10 years, which is a sign that the currency is becoming more broadly recognized. China's economic progress and smart financial diplomacy are almost certainly to blame for this. When discussing the operation of the global monetary system, it is even more important to take into consideration the currencies of countries that are not part of the Western world.

The Chinese Yuan, which is sometimes called the renminbi, is becoming more and more popular in many countries throughout the world. People are always trying to make the monetary system better, which is a good thing.



Figure 8: The Chinese Yuan's proportion of cross-border transactions grew from less than 0.5% in 2009 to around 6% in 2023. Important events include the Yuan's inclusion in the IMF's SDR basket in 2016 and policy-driven projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and bilateral swap agreements.
Source: IMF COFER (2024), BIS (2023)

The graphic above shows the Yuan's share in global trade settlement has steadily grown, from less than 1% in 2010 to more than 8% in 2024. The 2016 SDR addition was a turning moment that showed the Yuan was a global reserve asset. There were policy-driven programs like the Belt and Road Initiative and a network of swap agreements with central banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the years that followed. This trend implies that people are starting to trust the Yuan more, which might mean that it will play a greater role in global banking.

Regional Reserve Strategies in Emerging Markets:

The primary focus of the discussion over reserve currency is the competition between big nations, with the United States of America, the European Union, and China being the primary competitors. Nevertheless, developing regional coalitions are becoming increasingly involved in the process of formulating strategies for the diversification of reserve resources. Attempts are being made by regional institutions and coalitions to experiment with currency pooling, alternative payment networks, and localized digital infrastructure in order to improve monetary sovereignty and lessen reliance on the United States dollar or the euro.

According to Aizenman *et al.,* (2022) and the Bank for International Settlements (2023), these regional policies are a part of a larger trend of monetary multipolarity, which involves the modification of reserve requirements in order to facilitate commerce and protect nations from geopolitical security concerns.

BRICS+: Toward Strategic Monetary Coordination:

The BRICS group, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has been speaking out more and more about how important it is to cut down on the world's reliance on the U.S. currency. This has led to talks about a BRICS reserve currency or a shared settlement system, which might be backed by a group of member currencies and supported by CBDC networks that work together (Prasad, 2021). China and Russia have pushed for settling trade between their countries in Yuan and rubles. India and Brazil, on the other hand, have looked at using local currencies to pay for things. These changes are not yet official, but they show that there is a coordinated plan to establish monetary space outside of Western-dominated systems like SWIFT and the IMF's SDR basket (Subacchi, 2020).

ASEAN and Regional Payment Integration:

For the purpose of interlinking cross-border payment systems, the central banks of ASEAN, which are located in Southeast Asia, have undertaken programs. Specifically, this includes the compatibility of QR-code payment systems as well as bilateral local currency settlement systems. For the purpose of transaction settlements, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia have been using their national currencies, which has eliminated the need to convert to dollars. The aforementioned steps are not only technological breakthroughs; rather, they are a component of a more comprehensive plan that aims to improve the efficiency of commerce within the region, mitigate the risks associated with currency fluctuation, and enhance economic stability (BIS, 2023). Despite the fact that these local systems do not yet constitute a reserve currency framework, they do make it possible for individuals to lessen their reliance on the dollar and lay the groundwork for the future accumulation of currencies.

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Pan-African Payment System:

It is a significant step toward reducing reliance on the dollar in intra-African commerce that the creation of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) in Africa is taking place within the context of the African Continental Free commerce Area (AfCFTA). The research on multi-currency clearing systems is currently being carried out by a number of countries, including Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, among others. Some of these systems may involve the implementation of digital currencies issued by central banks, such as the eNaira, depending on the specific conditions.

Despite the fact that it is still in the early stages of deployment, the PAPSS system makes it feasible for African nations to make payments in real time which are denominated in their respective national currencies. (Prasad, 2021) This helps to address the persistent issues of currency imbalance, exorbitant transfer fees, and a lack of dollars through the implementation of this solution. These programs are significant examples of the regionalization of monetary policy, which is customized to the particular vulnerabilities and aspirations of economies located in the Global South economies. These programs are designed to improve the economic situation in such countries.

A Bottom-Up Realignment:

These regional strategies represent a grassroots restructuring of the global monetary system, in which emerging nations are no longer merely passive recipients of monetary policy spillovers from the United States and European Union. Regional blocs are strengthening their capacity to independently manage reserves by creating payment systems, swap lines, and potential CBDC corridors tailored to their own regions. These initiatives do not now serve as comprehensive replacements for reserve currencies; instead, they represent a strategic shift towards localized monetary sovereignty, a core element of the ongoing trend of reserve depolarization (Aizenman *et al.,* 2022; BIS, 2023).

The table that follows provides a detailed description of certain regional actions that are intended to reduce reliance on dominant reserve currencies, improve payment infrastructure, and increase monetary independence. The aforementioned measures serve as a demonstration of the active participation of regional blocs in the underlying trend of depolarization of the global financial system.

Table 4: Regional Reserve Strategies and Currency Initiatives

Global Strategies to Reduce Dollar Dominance

Region / Bloc	Key Initiative(s)	Primary Goal(s)	Reserve Currency Imp	Excerve Countries	Example Countries
BRICS+	Discussions on BRICS reserve currency; bilateral yuan/ ruble trade	Reduce dollar dependence: enhance strategic autonomy	Growing yuan use; bypassing SWIFT in bilateral trale	Growing yuan use; bypassing SWIFT in trade rilo	China, Russia, Brazil, India
ASEAN	QR-code interoperability; local currency settlement	Boost regional trade; reduce FX transaction costs	Weakens dollar's role in African intra-trade	Weakens dollar's role in African intra-trade	Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand
AfCFTA / PAPSS	Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPS)	Facilitate local currency trade; remittance friction	Growing role of yuan in dollar-scarce economies	Growing role of yuan in dollar-scarce	Argentina, Brazil
Gulf Coop, Co (GCC)	Preliminary CBDC pilots and digital	Preliminary CBDC pilots and digi-corridor discussions	Interest in non-dollar oil invoicing (expein	Interest in non-dollar oil invoicing	UAE, Saudi A

Sources: BIS (2023); Prasad (2021); Aizenman *et al.,* (2022); Subacchi (2020); Author synthesis.

The table above shows how regional alliances that are growing are looking for practical alternatives to dollar-based organizations. None of these initiatives have completely replaced traditional reserves, but they are changing how money is used, especially in international trade and managing liquidity. This is happening a lot in the United States. These changes make the main point of the article stronger: that reserve depolarization is caused not just by rivalry between big powers but also by new ideas and strategic changes in the Global South.

Alternative Reserve Assets: Gold and Commodities in a Post-Dollar World:

Another important feature of global reserve diversification that is often missed is the growing use of alternative reserve assets, especially gold and some commodities. This is in addition to the move away from fiat currencies based on the dollar. To protect themselves from currency risk and systemic instability, the central banks of the globe, especially those in developing countries, have been buying more gold. This is happening because the world is becoming more divided politically and people are losing faith in banks that deal with fiat money. The latest information from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that the public sector bought more gold in 2022 and 2023 than it has in decades. The central banks of China, Turkey, and India were mostly to blame for this tendency that was getting worse. This is part of a wider goal to limit exposure to the US dollar because of money problems, worries about inflation, and the use of money as a weapon.

The fact that gold is not a currency, that it possesses worth in and of itself, and that it has been utilized as a store of wealth throughout history makes it exceptionally attractive. Gold is an extremely valued asset during times of monetary change because of the distinctive characteristics that it possesses. To put a complete geostrategic reserve plan into action, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and state-owned businesses have started to move their investments toward assets tied to commodities and physical resources. Among these resources are energy and rare earths. Because of these steps, it seems that the future of the international reserve system will be built on a multipolar currency framework and a multi-asset structure that includes fiat currency, gold, and resource-based instruments. Eichengreen (2011) asserts that confidence, with liquidity, is a fundamental element of the legitimacy of a reserve asset. Also, gold and other alternative assets are taking on that psychological and institutional role more and more.

This table compares the most important features and trends of traditional fiat currencies versus alternative reserve assets, with a focus on gold. This comparison is meant to highlight how important non-fiat assets are becoming in initiatives to diversify reserves. In a world without the dollar, it shows how institutional, economic, and strategic worries are affecting how central banks and sovereign wealth funds act more and more.

Table 5: Comparative Overview – Fiat vs. Non-Fiat Reserve Assets

Evolving Reserve Asset Strategies

Reserve Asset Type	Key Initiative(s)	Primary Characteristics	Recent Trends (2022–2024)	Strategic Advantages
Fiat Currencies	USD, EUR, CNY, JPY	Sovereign-issued, liquid, interest-accruing	Declining USD risare; moderate rise in CNY and ER	High liquidity, deep bond markets, policy alignmen
Gold	Bullion held by central banks	Non-yielding, non-sovereign, historically reliable	Record central bank purchases (e.g., China, India)	Hedge against inflation, sanctions and currency risk
Commodities	Oil reserves, rare earths	Tangible, unstable and susceptible to geopolitical situations	Growing role in SWF portfolios (e.g., Qatar, UAE)	Store of value, strategic autonomy
Sovereign Wealth Funds	State-backed investment vehicles	Strategies involving a mix of assets (including stocks, commodities, and	Diversifying beyond Western markets and dollar exposure	Long-term stabilization and fiscal resilience

The table and its text show a comparative view that shows how the makeup of reserve assets is changing. People are starting to respect non-fiat assets like gold and commodities because they are neutral in terms of geopolitics, stable as a store of value, and resistant to financial penalties. This is true even if fiat currencies are still the most common when it comes to liquidity and policy use. Central banks are changing their strategies not only for different currencies but also for different asset classes. This shows that they have a broad, multi-asset plan for keeping the global economy stable. This is happening because the global monetary authority is becoming less centralized.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Comprehensive Evaluation of Existing Research, Theoretical Perspectives, and Empirical Studies Relevant to the Topic.

Over the past several decades, there has been a substantial evolution in the discussion of global reserve currencies. Changes in economic policy, geopolitical dynamics, and financial innovation have influenced this evolution. According to Eichengreen (2019), many academics agree that the dominance of the United States dollar, although it has a historically robust nature, is susceptible to challenges that might result in a global currency system that is more diverse or fractured. According to hegemonic stability theories, a dominating currency can reap the benefits of widespread usage, abundant liquidity, and trustworthiness that originates from trustworthy institutions. Cohen (2015) and Kindleberger (1981) were responsible for formulating theories.

Frequently, research on the euro draws attention to the distinctive dual character of the currency, which is both a political initiative and an economic reality. Research highlights the problems provided by Europe's fragmented fiscal policies and political heterogeneity, which hinder its capacity to fully replace the dollar (McNamara, 2015; Feldstein, 2017). Although its formation was intended to challenge the dominance of the dollar, studies highlight the challenges that are created by these factors.

The Chinese yuan, on the other hand, has attracted an unusual amount of scholarly attention as a possible competitor to the reserve currencies that are now in use. Capital restrictions, restricted market openness, and Beijing's interventionist monetary policies, which include controlled currency depreciation to maintain export competitiveness, are among the primary obstacles that are identified by Subacchi (2020) and Prasad (2021). These characteristics provide a credibility gap that makes it more difficult for the yuan to become internationalized, even though China's economic status is expanding.

Emerging research also investigates the influence that digital currencies have on the existing monetary system on a worldwide scale. Researchers are investigating the potential of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) to alter the dynamics of reserve currency and cross-border payments. These currencies provide alternatives to existing systems that are controlled by a small number of currencies (BIS, 2023; Kiff *et al.,* 2020). According to Aizenman *et al.,* (2022), these trends are frequently seen as driving the move toward a multipolar currency system. This literature provides a foundation for comprehending the complicated issues associated with depolarization in global finance and informs the analytical framework for this study.

Table 6: Summary of Key Literature Findings

Author(s)	Topic	Key Findings	Relevance to Paper
Eichengreen (2019)	Dollar dominance & challenges	Dollar dominance faces diversification pressures	Sets context on hegemonic currency trends
Kindleberger (1981), Cohen (2015)	Hegemonic stability theory	Dominant currency benefits from liquidity & trust	Theoretical foundation
McNamara (2015), Feldstein (2017)	Euro challenges	Political fragmentation limits the euro's global role	Explains Eurozone constraints
Subacchi (2020), Prasad (2021)	Yuan internationalization	Capital controls & managed devaluation hinder Yuan growth	Highlights China's currency policy issues
BIS (2023), Kiff *et al.,* (2020)	Digital currencies	CBDCs may accelerate a multipolar currency system	Emerging monetary technological trends

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The article is based on a lot of ideas that are related to each other and help explain how reserve currencies spread and flourish over the world. The Hegemonic Stability Theory asserts that a dominant economic power is frequently the predominant impact on the international monetary system. This is the case whenever the theory is applied. According to the theory that is put up in this investigation, the United States of America has been able to successfully maintain its position as the most powerful nation on the international scene (Kindleberger, 1981; Gilpin, 2001). This is due to the fact that it has been able to maintain its position as a leader in international trade, as well as its military power, its stable institutions, and its control over important financial systems. It is because of this that the United States dollar has been able to maintain its status as the most widely used currency in the world.

This demonstrates a significant correlation with network theory, which highlights the influence of incumbency in currency utilization. The value of a currency is enhanced by self-reinforcing variables like liquidity, trust, and transactional simplicity (Cohen, 2015). This occurs after money achieves broad adoption. The continued dominance of the United States dollar, notwithstanding the relative growth of other economies, is elucidated by this phenomenon.

One more helpful perspective is provided by institutionalism. It emphasizes the significance of rule-based institutions that are open and transparent, such as autonomous central banks, open capital accounts, and legal enforcement mechanisms, in the process of establishing trust in a reserve currency. To compare the euro and the Yuan, this framework is frequently utilized. Although the euro has a reasonably open institutional framework, it is plagued by political fragmentation. While everything is going on, the Yuan is being held back by China's opaque government, state-driven banking system, and regulated exchange rate regime (Prasad, 2021).

The study utilizes the idea of financial depolarization, defined as the gradual distribution of reserve currency status among several contenders rather than the direct substitution of one hegemon for another. This is the theoretical framework adopted by the paper. Depolarization is often accelerated by systemic shocks, technological innovations like digital currencies, and political efforts to de-dollarize economies, particularly by governments pursuing strategic autonomy (Tooze, 2021; Aizenman *et al.,* 2022). These elements chiefly facilitate the hastening of depolarization.

This approach from many angles makes it easier to understand the changing monetary environment in a more complex way. It recognizes that a reserve currency status is affected by more than simply the size of the economy. Trust, convertibility, geopolitical strategy, and technical progress are all factors.

When trying to obtain a better grasp of the growing dynamics of the transition of the global reserve currency, it is helpful to imagine the interplay of structural forces that both accelerate and impede movement toward a more multipolar system. This is because these forces are both accelerating and preventing movement. A framework for interpreting the elements that are contributing to the formation of the international monetary system is provided by the conceptual model that is presented that follows. This is a clear illustration of the underlying factors and restrictions that are influencing the depolarization of reserve currencies.

This theory sums up the two things that are making the change from an economy that is based on the dollar to one that has more than one reserve currency. Despite the fact that technological innovation, geopolitical realignment, and multilateral initiatives are pushing the system toward multipolarity, persistent structural barriers, like the dollar's network advantages and a lack of institutional faith in alternatives, slow down and limit the change. It is expected that the final result will be a global reserve system that is both powerful and broken apart, with many huge currencies being used in many different places and for many different purposes at the same time.

Network Effects and Historical Currency Transitions:

It is essential to have a solid understanding of network effects in order to have a complete comprehension of the elements that contribute to the acquisition and maintenance of dominant reserve status by particular currencies. Cohen (2015) says that the initial adoption of a currency in international trade and finance commences a cycle of utilization that is self-reinforcing and continues to grow. Lock-in effects are caused by this usage cycle, which makes the transfer to alternative currencies more expensive and time-consuming for businesses that operate on a global scale. The United States dollar continues to maintain its dominance, as seen by this phenomena, despite the fact that the geopolitical and economic situations are always shifting.



Figure 9: Drivers, Constraints, and Potential Outcomes of Changes in the Global Reserve Currency System

The theoretical perspective point, historical parallels are utilized to offer major insights and to make understanding of difficult topics easier. Beginning in the early 1900s, the United States dollar became the primary reserve currency used all over the world. Previous to that, it was the pound sterling of the United Kingdom. A study conducted by Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012) examined this shift. In this case, the global currency hierarchy has changed throughout time because of the effects of economic power, geopolitical influence, and network externalities. To judge the current multipolar currency system and guess what might happen with new reserve currencies in the future, you need to know everything about this historical event.

Historical Currency Transitions as a Comparative Lens:

Changes in monetary systems have occurred over the course of history, as seen by the transition from the British pound sterling to the United States dollar as the primary reserve currency of the globe. According to the findings of the research conducted by Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012) and Bordo *et al.,* (2019), these changes do not occur all at once. When both old and new reserve currencies are used at the same time, they occur over a lengthy period of time and are caused by the use of both currencies simultaneously.

Beginning in the late 1800s and continuing into the early 1900s, Britain's pound was the most widely used currency in the world. This transpired as an outcome of Britain's position as the principal trade nation on the international stage. The capital markets in London are robust and liquid, and the city's currency is stable and backed by gold. As a result of the conclusion of World War I, the economy of the United States saw expansion, but the economy of the United Kingdom experienced decline, and its political power decreased. This led to a shift in the balance of power around the world. The Bretton Woods agreement, which made the dollar much more essential made the tendency much stronger during both World Wars, reaching its peak in World War II.

This historical precedent reveals three dynamics relevant to the current environment:

Figure 10: Historical Pound → Dollar Shift	Figure 11: Present Dollar → Multipolar Shift
Economic ascendance of the U.S. after Britain's relative decline	Rise of the Eurozone and China alongside U.S. fiscal and trade imbalances
Technological advances in finance (telegraph, transatlantic cables) enabling wider currency usage	Digital payment systems, CBDCs, block chain enabling non-dollar transactions
Gradual diversification — pound still significant well after dollar's rise	Ongoing diversification toward euro, Yuan, gold, and digital assets



The main difference today is that there is no clear successor. The dollar took the pound's position as the only global reserve currency. Now, though, it looks like there may be a multipolar system where many major currencies, possibly including digital ones, are kept in reserve portfolios. This makes the rate of change slower and the result less definite, but the basic ideas behind network effects, institutional trust, and geopolitical impact are still the same.

METHODOLOGY

Detailed Research Design, Data Collection Procedures, Analytical Techniques, and Validation Strategies.

This study employs a qualitative, comparative analytical methodology grounded in the analysis of secondary data. The primary objective is to ascertain whether the euro can surpass the United States dollar as the dominant global reserve currency, while the secondary objective is to examine the structural constraints of the Chinese Yuan and the feasibility of a multipolar reserve system.

The results of this study came from a lot of different reliable sources. Reports from international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), to get information. These sources are backed up by scientific studies that have been peer-reviewed, working papers, and macroeconomic statistics to give a whole and evidence-based picture.

The period of emphasis is from the year 2000 to the year 2025, it encompasses significant events such as the global financial crisis that occurred in 2008, the debt crisis that occurred in the Eurozone, China's participation in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket utilized by the International Monetary Fund, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the present acceleration of the development of digital money.

Comparing different cases is an essential part of this process. This study evaluates the United States dollar, the euro, and the Chinese Yuan based on a set of criteria generated from previous research. These criteria include economic size, liquidity, institutional trust, currency convertibility, geopolitical leverage, and digital innovation readiness. We examine these factors regarding the patterns of cross-border settlement, foreign exchange transaction shares, and trends in reserve accumulation.

Table 7: Key Evaluation Criteria for Reserve Currency Status

Criteria	US Dollar US	Euro EU	Chinese Yuan CN	Source/Indicator
Economic Scale	Largest GDP	Second-largest bloc	Second-largest GDP	IMF, World Bank
Liquidity	Very High	High	Moderate	BIS Triennial FX Survey
Institutional Trust	Strong	Moderate	Limited	World Governance Indicators, Transparency Index

Criteria	US Dollar US	Euro EU	Chinese Yuan CN	Source/Indicator
Currency Convertibility	Full	Full	Limited	IMF Article IV Reports
Geopolitical Leverage	High	Moderate	Growing	Foreign Policy Journals
Digital Innovation Readiness	Moderate	Growing	Advanced	BIS Reports on CBDCs

Using the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) payment reports, and the European Central Bank (ECB) statistics, the research tracks how the use of different currencies and central bank actions change over time. A comparison is made over time between the trends in trade payments made in the yuan, loans given in euros, and the global share of dollars to highlight the shift in reserve preferences happening in the real world. A comparison is made over time between the trends in trade settlements denominated in yuan, lending based on euros, and the global dollar share to emphasize the change in reserve preferences that occurs in the real world. This method allows an objective evaluation of whether the global financial system is evolving toward a post-dollar epoch or maturing into a more diversified, multipolar framework. This is achieved by integrating theoretical insights with actual patterns.

It is essential to acknowledge that this study does not include any direct contributions from policymakers, currency strategists, or financial experts. But it does use a thorough qualitative and comparative method, as well as institutional databases and peer-reviewed literature. A large part of the analysis is based on secondary data that was collected from many different places. The International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, and research done by universities are some of these sources. All of these sources were used to bring the data together.

The lack of original qualitative data constrains the interpretive depth of the study, especially concerning the understanding of the political factors, legal constraints, and institutional attitudes that affect decisions related to the management of reserve currency and the execution of CBDC. Prasad (2021) and Tooze (2021) emphasize that the shift to a multipolar financial system necessitates the establishment of macroeconomic foundations, the perspectives of elites, the administration of strategic risks, and the alteration of policy philosophies.

In the future, it might be beneficial for researchers to conduct semi-structured interviews with officials from central banks, consultants from the International Monetary Fund, or leaders of task forces for digital currencies. This would allow for the acquisition of valuable insights into the decision-making processes that are involved in the practical application of reserve currencies. In a similar spirit, survey data from reserve managers, sovereign wealth funds, and development finance organizations might be leveraged to expand the structural analysis by providing insights into attitudes and behaviors. This would be a similar approach to the previous one.

A better understanding of the following would be gained through conducting interviews with officials from the European Central Bank, the People's Bank of China, and smaller central banks that are taking part in currency swaps or CBDC pilots (for example, Nigeria, Argentina, and Brazil). Would shed light on:

- Internal debates over reserve diversification
- Risks and motivations behind digital currency innovation
- Attitudes toward U.S. financial dominance and sanctions risk

Incorporating these voices will enhance the study's empirical foundation and align academic viewpoints with policy realities, which will make the article more useful for global financial institutions.

Quantitative Statistical Analysis of Reserve Currency Drivers:

This study used a statistical model to examine the correlation between significant structural elements and a currency's proportion of global foreign exchange reserves, in addition to qualitative and historical data. This gives us a way to test the hypotheses we talked about before using data.

Model Overview

From the year 2000 to the year 2024, the use of panel data that encompasses the three primary reserve currencies, which are the United States dollar (USD), the euro (EUR), and the Chinese Yuan (CNY).
The dependent variable is each currency’s share of total global reserves (IMF COFER data).

Table 8: The independent variables capture the factors most often cited in reserve currency research:

Variable	Description	Source
Convertibility	Currency that can be fully changed? (1 = yes; 0 = no)	IMF
Capital Openness	The score on the Chinn-Ito KAOPEN index	Chinn & Ito (2023)
Institutional Trust	A mix of indicators for governance and openness	World Bank, Transparency Intl.
Bond Market Size	Sovereign bond market as a percentage of GDP	BIS, ECB
CBDC Development	Pilot/launch stage advanced? (1 = yes, 0 = no)	BIS
Trade Integration	Part of world trade that is billed in that currency	UNCTAD, WTO

Empirical Analysis and Data Modeling

Objective

An empirical inquiry into the factors that determine reserve currency status is presented in this article. This section is intended to supplement the qualitative and theoretical conclusions that were discovered in this research. The purpose of this study is to determine whether macroeconomic and institutional variables, such as the capacity to convert currencies, market liquidity, political stability, and technological innovation, can provide a statistical explanation for the distribution of global reserves among the United States dollar, the euro, and the Chinese Yuan.

Hypotheses

To frame this empirical analysis, the following hypotheses are proposed:

- H1: Institutional trust, capital account openness, and currency convertibility are positively associated with a currency's share in global foreign exchange reserves.
- H2: The euro's reserve share is positively influenced by EU bond market development and digital currency innovation (e.g., digital euro).
- H3: The Yuan reserve share is constrained by capital controls, limited transparency, and strategic depreciation policies.

Data and Variables

As far as panel data is concerned, this study makes use of three key reserve currencies: the United States dollar (USD), the euro (EUR), and the Chinese Yuan (CNY). These three currencies are referred to as the "three primary reserve currencies." All of the years 2000 through 2024 are included in the statistics. The reserve share of each currency is the dependent variable. It is measured as a percentage of the total world foreign currency reserves (**Source:** IMF, Foreign Exchange Reserves of Foreign Countries).

To test the relationship between reserve currency shares and their underlying drivers, the following variables were selected based on their consistent identification in international finance literature. These variables serve as independent predictors of a currency's global adoption and are measured using data from reputable institutional sources. The table below outlines the operational definitions and sources for each variable used in the proposed empirical model.

Table 9: Key Variables for Analyzing Global Reserve Currency Determinants

Variable	Definition	Source
Reserve Share	% of global reserves held in a currency	IMF COFER
Currency Convertibility	Dummy: 1 = fully convertible, 0 = otherwise	IMF Annual Reports
Capital Account Openness	Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN)	Chinn & Ito (2023)
Institutional Trust	Composite index of Transparency & Rule of Law	World Bank WGI, Transparency Intl.
Bond Market Size	% of GDP in sovereign bond issuance	BIS and ECB Statistics
CDC Development	Dummy: 1 = advanced pilot stage, 0 = none/early stage	BIS (2023)
Trade Integration	% share of global trade denominated in each currency	UNCTAD, WTO

These factors were chosen to represent both structural and policy-driven aspects of currency strength. The addition of capital account openness, convertibility, and institutional trust shows what is needed for a currency to be reliable. In the changing world of digital finance, bond market depth and CBDC readiness are two more dynamic or emergent factors that might affect how appealing a currency is. The model tries to give a full picture of what causes changes in global reserve allocation by integrating conventional indicators with technology and geopolitical measurements.

Country Case Studies on Reserve Diversification and CBDC Engagement:

In order to have a comprehensive knowledge of the implications of reserve currency depolarization and the part that CBDCs play in this transition, it is essential to conduct an analysis of responses at the national level. Altering their reserve management policies, diversifying their currency holdings, and participating in experimental digital currency networks are all things that a number of rising and medium-sized nations are doing. The dynamics of global reserves are frequently influenced by the actions of major nations such as the United States of America, the European Union, and China. Within this portion of the article, the topic of discussion is the manner in which particular nations are reacting to and guiding changes in the values of global currencies.

Russia: Accelerated De-Dollarization under Sanctions Pressure:

Russia is a prime example of how geopolitical shocks can hasten the process of diversifying reserves. Following the introduction of Western sanctions as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, the Bank of Russia made considerable reductions to its reserves of United States dollars while simultaneously increasing its investments in gold, euros, and the Chinese Yuan (Carstens, 2025; Aizenman *et al.,* 2022). As of the year 2022, around 17% of Russia's foreign reserves were comprised of the Yuan. This was a huge increase from the previous five years, when it was less than three percent (IMF COFER, 2024).

The Russian Federation has begun using the Yuan for certain energy contracts in an effort to strengthen its partnership with China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). According to Subacchi (2020), this modification is the result of a shift in strategy as well as the advent of digital alternatives to the framework that is centered on the dollar. These actions illustrate how the separation of reserves is accelerated by the fragmentation of the financial system and the exclusion of specific geographical regions.

Argentina: Bilateral Swap Agreements and Yuan Settlement:

Argentina is attempting to stabilize its reserves by utilizing China's bilateral currency exchange arrangements. This is due to the fact that Argentina is having difficulty acquiring dollars and that inflation is rampant. In the year 2023, Argentina went ahead and started using the Yuan for certain commercial activities. Consequently, this resulted in a decreased reliance on the currency for basic imports. The Chinese government's involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its promotion of Yuan internationalization through swap lines both serve to further strengthen China's reliance on Yuan liquidity.

However, the utilization of the Yuan in Argentina demonstrates that emerging states that are confronted with macroeconomic challenges are increasingly inclined to diversify their foreign currency holdings and embrace non-Western monetary alternatives (Aizenman *et al.,* 2022). The Yuan continues to be an inadequate choice for a convertible reserve asset.

Nigeria: CBDC Innovation and Regional Trade Currency Leadership:

Nigeria is a developing country that is working on innovative concepts for CBDCs. When it comes to innovation, other developing countries should look to this one as an example. The Nigerian government was able to reach this aim in 2021 by making the eNaira, which is the electronic form of the naira currency. Nigeria is attempting to make it easier for more people to use financial services. For example, it is making its payment system more efficient and using the electronic naira to make it easier for African countries to trade with each other. A country in Africa is adopting a digital currency that was issued by the central bank for the first time in history.

Despite the fact that the eNaira is still underutilized, it is clear that countries that do not have reserve currencies view digital currencies as a way to exercise more control over their financial systems and reduce their reliance on currencies such as the dollar or the euro (BIS, 2023). Nigeria has indicated that it is interested in participating in BRICS+ projects that investigate alternate payment methods to SWIFT (Tooze, 2021).

Brazil and BRICS+: Regional Currency Networks and De-Dollarization Dialogue:

Brazil, one of the founding nations of the BRICS alliance, has taken part in discussions regarding the establishment of a unified reserve or settlement currency for all of the countries that are members of the global economic bloc. Although this currency has not yet been created, the concept suggests that there is widespread discontent with the dominant position of the dollar and a desire for a multipolar financial system that is more equal (Aizenman *et al.,* 2022). The fact that Brazil is willing to work with China on currency swaps and participate in conversations about the interoperability of digital currencies, such as mBridge, is evidence that the country is open to the implementation of novel systems.

The instances provided here show that reserve diversification is no longer just a theory; it is now happening, especially in nations that are having problems with either political or economic challenges. People are starting to see digital currencies, both domestic (like the eNaira) and international (like the e-CNY), as useful tools. Structural issues include things like capital controls, problems with convertibility, and problems with digital infrastructure. The comments from several nations indicate that the transition to a multipolar and digitalized reserve system is presently occurring, rather than merely existing in principle (BIS, 2023; Prasad, 2021).

The table below shows the reserve diversification techniques and CBDC-related changes in a few nations. It talks about their main reasons for doing things, the steps they took, and the bigger effects on the changing global reserve system.

Table 10: Reserve Diversification and CBDC Strategies in Selected Countries

Country	Key Action(s)	Motivation(s)	Currency Shift /CBDC Use	Implication for Depolarization
Russia	Reduced USD holdings; increased yuan and gold; joined CIPS	Sanctions, exclusion from SWIFT, strategic alignment with C a	Yuan share in reses-ves rose sharply post-2014	Illustrates geopolitical acceleration of de-dollarization
Argentina	Bilateral yuan s-wuan agreenents trade settlement in yuan	Dollar shortages, inflation instabili-ty, access to Chinese credit	Increased yuan use in bilateral trade	Illustrates geopolitical acceleration *or-de-dolarizatisan
Nigeria	Launched eNaira CBDC for retail and potential trade use	Financial inclusion, payment moderni-zation, regional leadership ambitio	Domestic CBDC adoption; interest in BRICS currency dialogue	Highlights proactive CBDC use by non-re-serve economies
Brazil	BRICS dialogue on alternative reserve currency; swap agreements witth China	Reduce dollar dependence, regio nanicy autonomy regional mone-tary autonomy	Exploring cross-border digital initiatives e-CNY tested in cross-border tradė: integrated with CIPS	Indicates multipolar ambitions within major emerging blocs

Source: IMF COFER (2024); BIS (2023); Prasad (2021); Aizenman *et al.,*(2022); Subacchi (2020); Tooze (2021).

The following table provides an illustration of the ways in which geopolitical shocks, structural imbalances, and strategic objectives are forcing states to enhance the diversification of their reserves. The paper's assertion that depolarization is currently taking place at the national level is supported by the introduction of bilateral swap agreements, CBDC pilots, and regional digital currency initiatives. These developments represent a fundamental shift in global monetary coordination and provide evidence that suggests this transition is occurring.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In-Depth Examination of Research Findings, Interpretation of Results, and Theoretical Implications.

The escalating geopolitical tensions, evolving trade patterns, and advancements in financial technology are all contributing to the present reassessment of the global currency system. The euro and the Chinese yuan have become significant alternatives to the United States dollar; yet each currency possesses distinct benefits and drawbacks within its monetary system. This section of the essay explores the potential for the euro to exceed the dollar, while also doing a thorough investigation of the factors that have prevented the Yuan, despite China's economic strength, from posing a significant challenge.

Table 11: Comparative Institutional and Economic Features of Leading Reserve Currencies

Criteria	U.S. Dollar (USD)	Euro (EUR)	Chinese Yuan (CNY)
Reserve Share (2024)	-59%	-20%	-3.5%
Currency Convertibility	Fully convertible	Fully convertible	Limited convertibility
Institutional Trust	High	Moderate	Low to Moderate
Use in Global Trade	Extensive	Moderate	Growing
Capital Account Openness	Fully open	Mostly open	Restricted
Monetary Policy Transparency	High	Moderate	Low
Fiscal Union/Coordination	Unified (Federal)	Fragmented (EU-level)	Centralized (Authoritarian)
Digital Currency Development	In progress (FedNow)	Advanced (Digital Euro)	Advanced (e-CNY pilot)
Geopolitical Influence	Very High	Moderate to High	High (Regional)

The Euro's Structural Strengths and Persistent Challenges:

In comparison to the United States dollar, the euro is now the most reliable alternative. The European Union can capitalize on a substantial and strong economic bloc, robust institutions like the European Central Bank, and extensive financial markets. The utilization of euro-denominated assets is prevalent in finance, particularly in trade financing, lending, and bond issuance throughout various regions of Europe, North Africa, and parts of Asia (ECB, 2023).

The political instability that exists in Europe, on the other hand, makes it difficult for the euro to completely replace the dollar. Conflict management is made more difficult by the absence of a single fiscal strategy, chronic disputes between member states, and divergent monetary agendas (Feldstein, 2017). International trust in the long-term stability of the euro is diminished because of these factors. Even though the euro's market share in foreign reserves has been hovering around 20%, it is still much lower than the dominant market position of 58% (IMF COFER, 2024).

Initiatives to implement a digital euro might augment the currency's international prominence, especially for cross-border transactions. Until fiscal unity is resolved, the euro is more likely to function as a secondary reserve currency rather than a complete hegemonic substitute.

The Yuan's Potential and Strategic Constraints:

China has intentionally sought to internationalize the Yuan through bilateral swap agreements, the Belt and Road Initiative, and its incorporation into the IMF's SDR basket. The central bank has introduced its digital currency (e-CNY) and invested in payment alternatives like CIPS to diminish dependence on SWIFT (Subacchi, 2020).

Despite this, the Yuan continues to be a relatively minor participant in global reserves, accounting for less than four percent of government holdings (IMF COFER, 2024). Because China has made the intentional decision to devalue its currency to increase its export competitiveness, this is one of the key reasons. However, this reduces trust in the Yuan as a store of value, which is an essential characteristic of a reserve currency. This is even though it makes Chinese goods more appealing on the international market. Furthermore, foreign central banks are discouraged from holding substantial quantities of Yuan due to the existence of stringent capital restrictions, restricted convertibility, and a lack of institutional transparency (Prasad, 2021). China's economic magnitude, the Yuan cannot attain reserve currency supremacy without significant structural reforms, especially in the liberalization of financial markets and the assurance of currency stability.

Dollar Dominance and the Case for Depolarization:

The United States dollar continues to benefit from factors such as Global demand for safe assets, incumbency, and institutional credibility. The dollar's supremacy is bolstered by the high liquidity of the US Treasury markets and the broad use of dollar-denominated transactions internationally. Because of the dollar's centrality to international finance, the world economy is vulnerable to policy fluctuations, sanctions, and interest rate fluctuations that originate in the US (Tooze, 2021).

Consequently, several nations, particularly in the Global South, are diligently diversifying their currency reserves and trade settlement mechanisms. Regional blocs such as BRICS have investigated methods for trading in local currencies, while central banks are progressively amassing euros, Yuan, and gold to mitigate dollar exposure (Aizenman *et al.,* 2022).

These trends indicate the formation of a multipolar monetary system rather than a solitary change of power. In this situation, no single currency supplants the dollar entirely. A collection of reliable currencies, including the euro, Yuan, and perhaps digital alternatives, exerts worldwide influence.

Prospective Trends and Consequences

Expected Advancements, Emerging Prospects, and Their Potential Influence on the Domain.

The future of the world economy will be defined by decentralization, technological disruption, and the aspiration for more financial autonomy. A more diverse and competitive ecosystem of reserve currencies will emerge over time, even if the dollar maintains its position as the primary reserve currency. The changes that are supposed to happen in the future are just a sign of this shift. This section will examine the factors that may disrupt the global currency hierarchy. We will also see how these factors affect global banking in general.

Rise of a Multipolar Reserve System:

A multipolar reserve system is being gradually but steadily implemented, which is one of the most notable transitions that has taken place. To lessen their reliance on the dollar, central banks all over the globe are diversifying their foreign exchange reserves. They frequently include gold, euros, and Yuan in their holdings. Rather than being primarily driven by economic considerations, this diversification reflects wider geopolitical reasons. Countries are seeking to buffer themselves against sanctions imposed by the United States, shocks to interest rates, and financial instability that is linked to the domestic policies of the United States (Aizenman *et al.,* 2022).

This change will probably be good for the Euro, especially if the European Union makes its financial markets stronger and its tax system more connected. Also, the Yuan may get better, especially if China's economy grows thanks to the Belt and Road Initiative and investments in digital infrastructure. If basic changes aren't made, including fully opening capital accounts and making the currency more stable, the Yuan's growth may be limited, on the other hand.

Digital Currencies as Disruptive Forces:

Traditional reserve systems are subject to disruption by digital currencies, especially central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), which will be elaborated upon thereafter. The European Central Bank, the People's Bank of China, and other monetary authorities are expediting pilot programs for digital currencies (BIS, 2023). The objectives of these pilot projects are to enhance efficiency, decrease expenses, and bypass obsolete payment mechanisms, respectively. These Improvements in technology may make it easier to exchange currencies directly, which would mean that the dollar would be less important for business transactions. China is now testing its electronic Yuan (e-CNY) for usage across borders. This might let trading partners do business without having to change their money into dollars. But there are still a lot of problems to deal with, such as worries about privacy, problems with interoperability, and problems with governance. The European Union (EU) makes more fundamental changes, and a successful digital euro might make the EU look better to the rest of the world.

Factors Influencing Policy, Trade, and International Relations:

Policymakers need to do everything they can to avert these changes in the value of money from happening. Countries that want their currency to be more important across the world need to put money into making it easy to exchange, legally strong, and open. A multipolar reserve system makes it harder for investors to manage currency risk and build multinational portfolios.

If the dollar's power continues to fade, the US may have less power over the implementation of sanctions and the creation of global financial rules. On the other hand, it might strengthen regional authority and provide countries with more economic freedom, especially those that are still developing. On the other hand, a broken reserve system might make transactions more expensive, less efficient, and more volatile during times of crisis.

Given the current circumstances, it is highly improbable that a single reserve currency will retain significant importance in the future. On the other hand, global finance is changing to a system where many different currencies, especially digital ones, work together in various ways depending on where they are used, the current political situation, and economic factors.

Transition Risks in a Multipolar Reserve Currency System:

Diversification and strategic agility are two benefits that emerge from a multipolar reserve currency system, despite the fact that it simultaneously presents structural concerns. The fact that global liquidity is becoming more and more fragmented is another cause for concern. At the moment, the United States dollar is able to benefit from broad and cohesive markets, such as those found in U.S. Treasuries, which may be absent in other reserve currencies (Tooze, 2021). It is possible that the switch to various reserve assets may reduce market depth, which will make crisis response more difficult.

Furthermore, in the absence of a dominating anchor currency, there is a possibility that exchange rates will exhibit increased volatility. (Eichengreen, 2019) There is a possibility that the prices of currencies will react more dramatically to geopolitical events, policy divergences, or market sentiment, which will increase the level of uncertainty for international commerce and investment.

A lack of coordination is an additional risk that may occur. In a system that is decentralized, no single person is accountable for ensuring that the monetary order remains stable. According to (Borio & Disyatat 2017), this could make it more difficult or even impossible to respond to crises, which would make the system more vulnerable. The threat to developing economies is far higher. Numerous organizations are dependent on one or two reserve currencies, do not have effective capital markets, and have a difficult time mitigating the risk associated with currency fluctuations (Avdjiev *et al.,* 2018). It is possible that variety, rather than contributing to decreased instability, may contribute to growing instability in certain countries. That is something that ought to be taken into consideration. The establishment of solid legislative frameworks, the development of payment technologies that are interoperable, and the enhancement of coordination among central banks are all crucial components that must be present in order to guarantee a smooth transition to a multipolar system.

Underrepresented Reserve Currencies: Yen, Pound, and Franc:

The US dollar, the euro, and the Chinese Yuan are the most prevalent reserve currencies. Other currencies also play important roles in the global financial system, but not as much. The Swiss franc (CHF), the British pound sterling (GBP), and the Japanese yen (JPY) are just a few of the currencies that have large reserves and have been influential in world history.

The Japanese yen accounts for around five percent of the total reserves worldwide. The huge government bond market in Japan and the country's politically stable climate are the reasons for this. Despite the fact that Japan is experiencing a prolonged period of sluggish development, it remains appealing, particularly in East Asia, due to the fact that it is easy to conduct business and has large liquidity (IMF, 2024).

The British pound has always been an important currency since London is a major financial center and the UK has strong laws and institutions. It is also a good currency to keep in reserve. This is true because the legal system in the UK is believed to be very strong. There is still a lot of uncertainty about Brexit, but its share has stayed between 4 and 5 percent the whole time.

In times of market turbulence, central banks prefer the Swiss franc because it is stable, has limited inflation, and is a safe financial tool. Switzerland is a member of the European Union. This factor has a significant impact on financial crises, despite the fact that its proportion of reserves is very low.

In the event that you do not incorporate these currencies into your reserve analysis, you run the risk of missing out on the extensive variety of diversification tactics that central banks employ. According to Chinn and Frankel (2008), these well-known alternatives may nevertheless be able to provide stability buffers, particularly in situations where the dollar or euro is unstable due to market conditions. This is because of the growing multipolarity of currencies and the increasing fragmentation of geopolitical power.

The table below analyzes important market and institutional features of the Japanese yen, British pound, and Swiss franc to help us understand why these secondary reserve currencies are still important. These currencies don't compete with the dollar or euro in size, but they do offer useful diversification benefits because they are credible, easy to exchange, and strong in the market.

Table 12: Comparative Features of Secondary Reserve Currencies

Criteria	Japanese Yen (JPY)	British Pound (GBP)	Swiss Franc (CHF)
A contribution to the reserves of the world in the year 2024	~5.4%	~4.6%	<1%
The ability to convert currencies	Fully convertible	Fully convertible	Fully convertible
Institutional Trust	High	High	Very High
Liquidity	High (deep bond markets)	High (London FX markets)	Moderate
Use in Global Trade	Moderate	Moderate	Low
Status of Safe Haven	Moderate	Moderate	High

Source: IMF COFER (2024); BIS Reports (2023); Chinn & Frankel (2008)

The findings of this comparison show that these currencies have a lower percentage of reserves than either the euro or the dollar. Even so, they nevertheless offer convertibility, legal protection, and macroeconomic stability. Central banks often put more money into these currencies when the dollar is unstable or there are geopolitical worries to protect their investments. The fact that they are still in global reserves shows that multipolarity goes beyond just digital technology and currencies. Also included in this group are currencies that have been existing for a long time, are stable, and have a specific use in international finance.

Limitations and Areas for Further Research

Even though this study gives a thorough look at how reserve currencies are changing over time, it's important to remember that these currencies have some limits that might be looked at even more.

Absence of Primary and Empirical Data Analysis:

This study exclusively utilizes secondary data obtained from various international organizations and academic journals. It does not employ econometric modeling, forecasting, or any other new approaches to gather data. Eichengreen (2019) & Gopinath (2022) stress the importance of empirical research in identifying the causes of currency volatility and in confirming the predictions generated by theoretical models.

Narrow Currency Scope:

The United States dollar, the euro, and the Chinese Yuan are the primary focal points of the research. Other reserve assets that are pertinent to the topic, such as the Japanese yen, the British pound, and SDRs, are not included. Even though these currencies are considered secondary, Chinn & Frankel (2008) suggest that they make a significant contribution to the patterns of global diversification and should be included in reserve currency study efforts.

Superficial Exploration of CBDCs:

It is important to note that this article is only an introduction, even though digital currencies issued by central banks are usually considered to be highly innovative. The investigation of significant technological and governance issues, such as interoperability across borders, data protection, and platform architecture, is not carried out in a very detailed manner. Both the Bank for International Settlements (2023) & Kiff *et al.,*(2020) emphasize the relevance of these qualities in determining whether CBDC will be adopted and whether global financial systems will be integrated.

Lack of Scenario Modeling or Forecasting:

At this moment, there is no case study analysis or predictive modeling available; therefore, it is not feasible to show how the reserve currency system may change in response to macroeconomic or geopolitical events. This is a considerable problem because such modeling and analysis are not currently being conducted. Aizenman *et al.,*(2022) & Gourinchas and Rey (2021) underscore the significance of such models in understanding how stress events or policy adjustments affect currency prevalence.

Limited Regional and Sectorial Perspectives:

The report inadequately addresses how various areas, particularly Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, are responding to or impacting global currency realignments. Subramanian (2015) &Avdjiev *et al.,* (2018) found that regional trade blocs and monetary alliances have more of an effect on the choice of reserve assets and payment systems.

Insufficient Analysis of Transition Risks:

This study does not adequately examine the various dangers that may accompany a shift toward multiple polarities, such as increased volatility, increased transaction costs, or a lack of liquidity in the global market, even if it does support such a shift. Additionally, Tooze (2021) & Borio & Disyatat (2017) caution that currency separation may increase the system's susceptibility to crises. This is something that must be considered.

Policy Recommendations

The study shows that CBDCs can be highly helpful, but like any tool, they only work well if they are developed and used correctly. The goal should be to get the most out of them without hurting anyone. These are some good ideas for governments, central banks, and companies that work around the world.

For Policymakers

- **Start small, scale smart:** Start with pilot programs before going nationwide. Pilots assist find problems with the design, technical issues, and user concerns early on.
- **Modernize the rulebook:** Make sure that the rules are up to date so that it is clear that CBDCs are legal tender. Also, make sure that consumer protections are up to date with the latest technology advances.
- **Put inclusion:** First, make sure that CBDCs work for everyone, even those who reside in rural areas or don't have good internet access. Being able to pay offline, for example, can make a major impact.

For Central Banks

- **Make it play well with others:** Make CBDCs that can readily work with current payment systems and, in the future, with digital currencies from other countries.
- **Protect the system:** You have to have cyber security. Put money into layered security, real-time monitoring, and procedures for how to respond quickly to potential security breaches.
- **Keep money stable:** To stop a precipitous drop in commercial bank deposits, think about putting limits on how much CBDC a person can retain or offering tiered interest rates.

For International Organizations

- **Get everyone on the same page:** Push for common standards so that CBDCs can work across borders without making anarchy of systems that don't work together.
- **Help those catching up:** It is important to provide developing countries with the resources, experience, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the safe and effective implementation of CBDCs.
- **Watch the ripple effects:** Keep a watch on how CBDCs affect exchange rates, capital flows, and financial stability, especially in areas that are related to each other.

CBDC Risk–Benefit Matrix

The following table provides a summary of the primary potential and hazards that are linked with CBDCs in a variety of different territories. With the goal of providing scholars and policymakers with a comprehensive and comparative understanding of the stakes involved, the purpose is to be accomplished.

Table 13: CBDC Risk–Benefit Matrix Across Regions

Region / Currency Bloc	Opportunities	Risks
Advanced Economies	- Faster, cheaper payments for businesses and consumers. - Stronger monetary policy tools for central banks. - Less dependence on a few private payment providers.	- Possible outflow of deposits from commercial banks. - greater vulnerability to dangers from the internet - Public concerns about data privacy.
Emerging Markets	- More people gain access to banking and digital payments. - Lower remittance costs for families. - Better cross-border payment options.	- Currency volatility if foreign CBDCs are widely used. - Gaps in digital infrastructure. - Risk of "dollarization" from external CBDCs.
Small / Island Economies	- New payment channels that reduce reliance on correspondent banking.	- Reliance on external CBDC systems.

	- Lower trade transaction costs. - In the event that disruptions occur, increased resilience.	- Limited ability to protect against cyber threats. - Vulnerability to policy shifts in larger economies.
Global Cross-Border Use	- Real-time international transactions. - Less dependence on SWIFT and other middlemen. - Lower costs for payments over the world.	- Geopolitical fragmentation of payment networks is a risk. - Unclear legal jurisdictions for disputes. - Potential misuse for illicit finance.

Source: Adapted from Federal Reserve Board (2022), *Central Bank Digital Currency FAQs*; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (2022), *The Federal Reserve Weighs Risks and Benefits of CBDCs*; Atlantic Council (2024), *Central Bank Digital Currency Tracker*; Bank for International Settlements (2021), *Annual Economic Report, Chapter III: CBDCs – An Opportunity for the Monetary System*; International Monetary Fund (2024), *Cyber Resilience of the Central Bank Digital Currency Ecosystem*; World Economic Forum (2023), *What are Central Bank Digital Currencies – Advantages and Risks?*; and Cato Institute (2023), *The Risks of Central Bank Digital Currencies*.

Although this matrix does not cover everything, it does demonstrate the most important elements that should be taken into account in a variety of situations. Achieving a balance between the threats to financial stability and the gains in efficiency is the most difficult problem for industrialized countries. The primary objective for economies with a smaller size and emerging markets should be to construct infrastructure and defenses against shocks from the outside world or excessive dependency on systems from other countries. The global usage of CBDC could make things more efficient, but it needs to be carefully coordinated to avoid fragmentation and holes in rules and regulations. This table should assist policymakers in coming up with and evaluating strategies in several areas.

CONCLUSION

Overview of Principal Discoveries, Research Contributions, and Suggestions for Subsequent Investigation.

The global reserve currency system is currently at a pivotal juncture of considerable importance. The supremacy of the United States dollar is being contested in a world marked by geopolitical uncertainty, financial innovation, and the strategic ambitions of other economic powers. This remains true despite the United States dollar's prevailing status in global banking. The dollar is distinguished by its institutional robustness, liquidity, and historical dominance as the principal currency. This article aims to examine the potential for the euro and the Chinese Yuan to contest the dominance of the dollar. Over the past several years, there has been a substantial amount of attention paid to the structural advantages, institutional impediments, and macroeconomic dynamics of both currencies.

The euro emerges as the most credible alternative when taking into consideration the enormity of the Eurozone's economy, the credibility of the European Central Bank, and the growing interest in reserve diversification. The nation's capacity to function as a unified global leader is being compromised by persistent political and fiscal disintegration within its borders. Notwithstanding its backing by the world's second-largest economy and significant strategic initiatives like the Belt and Road, the Chinese Yuan faces more fundamental issues. The issues encompass limited convertibility, insufficient transparency, and a regulated currency rate system influenced by export strategy. The Yuan is less favorable as a store of value, a crucial attribute of a viable reserve currency, due to China's deliberate strategy of currency depreciation to maintain trade competitiveness.

Many recent factors suggest that the global financial order may see a gradual depolarization rather than a sudden shift of power. As a result of these tendencies, multipolar currency dynamics are expanding, there is a growing demand for monetary autonomy, and the rapid development of digital currencies issued by central banks is occurring. In this hypothetical situation, the dollar would unquestionably continue to be an important pillar, while at the same time coexisting with regional currencies such as the euro and technologically sophisticated digital currencies such as e-CNY.

For this progression, policymakers, financial institutions, and investors from throughout the world need to get themselves ready. To be successful in the future environment of reserve currencies, economic scale will not be the only factor that will determine success; rather, institutional trust, monetary stability, legal transparency, and digital readiness will be even more important. Even though the dollar is not in imminent danger of being replaced, the period of unchallenged supremacy may be giving way to a global monetary system that is more sophisticated and diverse.

Way Forward

To make the switch to a more stable and fair reserve currency system easier, significant institutions and governments need to take deliberate steps that are specific to the requirements of each group of people. The global financial landscape is changing, and these changes must be made for this reason.

The European Central Bank (ECB) places a high priority on three primary goals: accelerating the adoption of the digital euro for cross-border and interbank transactions; enhancing the integration of the fiscal framework of the Eurozone through the use of common instruments and integrated crisis-response mechanisms; and strengthening the capital market union in order to increase the liquidity and attractiveness of assets denominated in euro.

The People's Bank of China (PBoC) needs to do several basic things to make the Yuan more important around the world. This means slowly making the capital account more open while keeping the economy stable, cutting back on direct government involvement in foreign exchange markets to make things more open, and making the law stronger to boost foreign investor trust.

The IMF and BIS are two examples of international financial institutions that play an important role in coordinating things. It is imperative that they work towards ensuring that digital currencies are compatible with one another, assist developing countries in diversifying their reserves and strengthening their institutions, and take responsibility for ensuring that global regulations governing digital assets and stable coins are consistent.

Despite the fact that this status is neither guaranteed nor permanent in any way, the United States of America continues to be the primary distributor of the reserve currency of the globe. In order for the United States to maintain the strength of the dollar, it is necessary for the country to demonstrate strategic leadership in the ever-changing global economy. In order to totally accomplish this goal, it is necessary to have both a powerful military and a robust economy. If one does not have the interest of others, then it is impossible to achieve the goal that has been established without their participation.

As a means of preserving the dominance of the dollar, the United States must:

Maintain Economic and Political Stability:
Maintaining fiscal policies that are solid, keeping a careful eye on the long-term viability of its debt, and addressing the internal political instability that weakens faith in institutions and the confidence of investors are all things that the United States of America needs to accomplish.

Leadership in Digital Finance and Fintech Innovation:
There is a shift occurring in the global economy toward digitalization. In addition to fostering innovative concepts in block chain technology, tokenized assets, and payment systems, the United States of America has to expedite the development of a digital dollar that is secure, quick, and open to all. By taking the initiative to set global standards for digital currencies and fintech strategies, ensure that democratic principles will have an impact on the path that global finance will take in the future.

Strengthen Cyber security and Financial Infrastructure:
The likelihood of cybercriminals launching attacks against financial markets increases as these markets become more integrated into digital. In order to maintain confidence in the system that is based on the dollar, it is essential to strengthen the financial infrastructure, both domestically and through collaboration with other nations.

Advocate for Reforms in Global Financial Governance:
To accommodate the requirements of a world with more than one power center, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) need to undergo transformations. It would be beneficial for the United States to back measures that would give developing and emerging nations a greater voice and representation. The current system would become more respectable and inclusive as a result of this, rather than pushing countries to explore for new possibilities.

For Rule-Based Multilateralism and Economic Diplomacy:
For the purpose of ensuring that the global economy is equitable and complies with the rules, the United States of America needs to collaborate closely with its partners and allies. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to advocate for free capital markets, maintain the independence of central banks, and fight against the use of the dollar as a weapon for political benefit, which has the potential to accelerate the rate at which de-dollarization is occurring.

Counter Strategic Adversaries through Values-Centric Engagement:
The digital yuan, BRICS currency frameworks, and international trade in currencies other than the dollar are some of the alternatives to the dollar that China and other countries are working to establish. In order to fight back, the United States of America needs to not only compete with other countries, but also engage with values, putting an emphasis on democratic governance, transparency, and the rule of law.

Promote Inclusive Global Advancement:
It is possible for the United States of America to strengthen the advantages that come with being a part of a financial system that is built on the dollar by strengthening its support for sustainable development, finance for climate change, and equal access to global capital. People should not only regard economic leadership to serve the interests of their own country, but

they should also consider it to serve the common good. This is because economic leadership serves both groups.

The goal should not be to stop other currencies from rising or to keep the dollar in charge at all costs. Instead, it should be to make the global monetary system more balanced and strong. A currency system that is based on laws and has strong institutions, common norms, and trustworthy currencies is preferable for a global economy that is interconnected and has many centers of power.

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