

Legal Reconstruction of Corruption Act in Indonesia to Realize a Just Law Enforcement

Gunarto^{1*}, Margono², Sri Endah Wahyuningsih¹

¹Faculty of Law Sultan Agung Islamic University Semarang, Indonesia

²Doctorate Student of Faculty of Law Sultan Agung Islamic University Semarang, Indonesia

DOI: [10.36348/sijlcj.2022.v05i10.003](https://doi.org/10.36348/sijlcj.2022.v05i10.003)

| Received: 29.08.2022 | Accepted: 08.10.2022 | Published: 11.10.2022

*Corresponding author: Gunarto

Faculty of Law Sultan Agung Islamic University Semarang, Indonesia

Abstract

The main problem studied in this research is what are the weaknesses in the Enforcement of Corruption Act in Indonesia and how the legal construction based on justice value using a constructivism paradigm with a sociological juridical approach to solve research problems by examining secondary data and primary data by finding the legal reality experienced in the field as well as qualitative descriptive methods, namely where the data obtained are then arranged systematically so that a comprehensive picture will be obtained, where later the data will be presented descriptively. The Result Shows that The weaknesses of criminal justice regulations against corruption in the Indonesian legal system consist of the Substance Factors of the Supreme Court Law No. 1 of 2020 only limit the scope of application of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Law, The Legal Structure Factor, namely the composition of the Corruption Court judges, which consists of career judges and ad hoc judges, often does not focus on handling corruption cases because there are career judges who also handle other cases, And then The legal culture factor, that is the attitude of the people who regard corruption cases as a thing of the past and ignorant, the strong culture of reluctance. In order to tackle this, It is necessary to reconstruct the criminal justice regulations against corruption in order to realize fair law enforcement, namely through the establishment of a new permanent expansion of PERMA No. 1 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for the Criminalization of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Corruption Law in order to better reach other articles of corruption and reconstruct Article 10 paragraph (5) of Law No. 46 of 2009 concerning the Corruption Act Court to "The term of office of ad hoc judges is for a period of 5 (five) years and is proposed to be reappointed every 5 (five) years by the Supreme Court".

Keywords: Legal Reconstruction, Corruption Act, Enforcement, Justice Value.

Copyright © 2022 The Author(s): This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial use provided the original author and source are credited.

INTRODUCTION

Efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia have been carried out since Indonesia's independence, especially during the reform era. As an effort to improve the eradication of criminal acts of corruption, it is manifested in the form of reforming the legal substance related to corruption and its structure by establishing a special institution tasked with eradicating corruption. Renewal of the legal substance is carried out by changing the law on corruption which was originally based on Law Number 3 of 1971 replaced by Law Number 31 of 1999 Junction Law Number 20 of 2001 (Corruption Law). The Indonesian government has established a special commission tasked with preventing and eradicating corruption, namely the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). In addition, a Corruption Court (hereinafter referred to as the Corruption Court) has been established based on

Law Number 46 of the year 2009 Corruption Court (hereinafter referred to as the Corruption Court Law).

The existence of the Corruption Court is very important in eradicating corruption because in addition to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement against corruption, also considering that at the examination stage in court there is a legal proof process by the judge to determine the defendant's mistakes so that his actions can be accounted for which the public prosecutor has charged him with.

Based on the provisions of Article 5 of the Anti-Corruption Law, the Anti-Corruption Court is the only court authorized to examine, hear, and decide cases of criminal acts of corruption.

The provisions of Article 3 of the Anti-Corruption Law essentially state that the Corruption

Court is domiciled in every district/city capital whose jurisdiction covers the jurisdiction of the district court. However, based on the provisions of Article 35 Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (2) of the Anti-Corruption Law, during its transition period, the Anti-Corruption Court was established for the first time at every district court in the provincial capital whose jurisdiction covers the province's jurisdiction. This provision causes legal gaps in eradicating criminal acts of corruption if it is only carried out by the Regional Corruption Court domiciled in the provincial capital. This is because the work area of the Corruption Court is so wide that it causes many corruption cases to be tried, requires large costs and a large number of judges, and requires a long time in the process of examining a case.

The question that often arises from the community is why in various relatively similar cases of corruption, it turns out that the sentences or punishments for corrupt convicts differ from one court decision to another. Moreover, if the punishment for a convict of corruption turns out to be relatively light compared to other convicts, terms the weight of state financial losses incurred by the convict is greater (Wahyu, 2018).

The existence of the role of judges is expected to reduce cases of criminal acts of corruption that can ensnare the perpetrators with policies in the form of severe and targeted judge decisions. The judge will impose a sentence on the perpetrators of corruption by looking at the articles violated by the perpetrators. Before making a decision in a criminal case, the judge must first pay attention to the elements in a criminal law article and it must be proven that he has committed the act he is accused of. After that, if the defendant is proven to have committed a crime and violated a certain article, the judge analyzes whether the criminal act can be accounted for by the defendant. So that if the defendant has been proven to have committed a criminal act in accordance with the indictment and in accordance with criminal responsibility, the judge can determine the criminal sanctions that can be imposed on the defendant. In determining the criminal sanctions to be imposed on the defendant, the judge must consider whether the decision is in accordance with the purpose of the sentence or not and in accordance with the applicable laws or not (Wahyu, 2019).

However, in practice judges as law enforcers in Indonesia still have not given good decisions, the problem is in the form of an imbalance between the expected legal aspects (*das sollen*) and aspects of the application of existing laws in society (*das sein*). Based on the records of Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) in 2019-2020 there were 134 corruption defendants released or their sentences reduced through cassation or review in the Supreme Court. ICW also averages that the sentences given by corruptors are only around 3

years and 6 months in prison, which is classified as a light sentence (Yusyanti, 2015).

On this basis, the author has the thought that there should be no disparity in the judge's decision, not only articles 2 and 3 of Law Number 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption as amended by Law Number 20 of 2001 concerning Amendments to the Law. -Law Number 31 of 1999 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, which was made a Perma, but other corruption crimes also need regulation regarding punishment.

The Corruption Court also needs to have judges with integrity and professionalism. That being a judge for the crime of corruption is certainly not enough just to have integrity, but one should also be professional internally in the Court to support professional work, so the author wishes that the former Head of the District Court and also the Chairman of the Corruption Court, to be changed / now to the Head of the Corruption Court, have his own chairman or at least a deputy chairman of the District Court specifically for the Tipikor Court, as well as the Career Judge who handles cases corruption is exempt from other cases, as well as the Substitute Registrar who assists the trial and must also deal specifically with corruption cases because extraordinary cases must be handled extraordinarily. Because in practice, if Career Judges and Registrars are still handling other cases, of course, time and thoughts become divided so that the results are not optimal, not as expected in eradicating corruption (Pramono, 2021).

The author realizes that the regulation is contrary to the independence of judges (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 48 of 2009) concerning Judicial Power. In this Law what is meant by? Judicial power is the power of an independent state to administer the judiciary in order to enforce law and justice based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, for the sake of the implementation of the State of Law of the Republic of Indonesia. But corruption is an extraordinary crime, so for the sake of justice, of course, this is very much needed.

Based on this, the author feels this problem needs to be raised in a study titled "Legal Reconstruction Of Corruption Act In Indonesia To Realize A Just Law Enforcement" where the authors raise 2 (two) main issues as follows:

1. What are the weaknesses of the Corruption Act regulations against corruption in the Indonesian legal system?
2. How is the Legal Reconstruction Of Corruption Act In Indonesia To Realize Just Law Enforcement?

METHOD OF RESEARCH

This study uses a constructivist legal research paradigm approach. The constructivism paradigm in the social sciences is a critique of the positivist paradigm. According to the constructivist paradigm of social reality that is observed by one person cannot be generalized to everyone, as positivists usually do.

This research uses descriptive-analytical research. Analytical descriptive research is a type of descriptive research that seeks to describe and find answers on a fundamental basis regarding cause and effect by analyzing the factors that cause the occurrence or emergence of a certain phenomenon or event.

The approach method in research uses a method (*socio-legal approach*). The sociological juridical approach (*socio-legal approach*) is intended to study and examine the interrelationships associated in real with other social variables (Toebagus, 2020).

Sources of data used include Primary Data and Secondary Data. Primary data is data obtained from field observations and interviews with informants. While Secondary Data is data consisting of (Faisal, 2010):

1. Primary legal materials are binding legal materials in the form of applicable laws and regulations and have something to do with the issues discussed, among others in the form of Laws and regulations relating to the freedom to express opinions in public.
2. Secondary legal materials are legal materials that explain primary legal materials.
3. Tertiary legal materials are legal materials that provide further information on primary legal materials and secondary legal materials.

Research related to the socio-legal approach, namely research that analyzes problems is carried out by combining legal materials (which are secondary data) with primary data obtained in the field. Supported by secondary legal materials, in the form of writings by experts and legal policies.

RESEARCH RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Weaknesses of the Corruption Act Regulations against Corruption in The Indonesian Legal System

In general, the issue of the formation of laws and regulations in Indonesia has rigidly regulated in Law Number 12 of 2011 jo. Law Number 15 of 2019 concerning the Establishment of Legislation. In this regulation, statutory regulations are defined as written regulations that contain legally binding norms in general and are established or determined by state institutions or authorized officials through the procedures stipulated in the legislation (Article 1 point 2).

If viewed from the perspective of organ theory and distribution of power, statutory regulation is closely related to the legislative function of the legislative organ. In this case, the formation of laws specifically becomes the monopoly of the authority of the DPR as a legislative organ, although, in its implementation, the constitution also gives the government an equal share of authority to submit draft laws up to the approval stage. In the context of legislation under the law, existing rules such as Law No. 12 of 2011 jo. Law Number 15 of 2019 also gives attributive authority to a number of state organs to form derivative regulations, for example, the president (Perpres and Government Regulations), Regional Governments (provincial/district/city regulations), the MPR, DPR, DPD and other state agencies.

On the other hand, theoretically, judicial power is not identical to legislative authority. Judicial power only relates to legislative authority in the context of monitoring the implementation of this function in the form of testing laws and regulations termed judicial review or *toetsing recht*. The judiciary's authority to examine laws and regulations is interpreted as a form of check and balance between the judicial and legislative organs. For example, the Supreme Court has the authority to examine statutory regulations under the law (Article 24A paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia).

In the Indonesian constitutional structure, the Supreme Court is one of the state institutions that holds judicial power as mandated by Article 24 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The Supreme Court is mandated with the duties and authority to adjudicate at the cassation level and examine the legislation under the law against the law, as well as other powers granted by law. Even though it is located as a judicial organ whose main function is to adjudicate and oversee the function of legislation (judicial review), the fact is, the Supreme Court regularly issues its own legal products in the form of Supreme Court regulations (PERMA) (Risa, 2021).

The juridical legitimacy for the Supreme Court's authority to issue PERMA, among others, is contained in the provisions of Article 79 of Law Number 14 of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court jo. Law Number 5 of 2004 in conjunction with Law Number 3 of 2009 (UU MA) which states that "*The Supreme Court can further regulate matters needed for the smooth administration of justice if there are matters that have not been sufficiently regulated in this law.*" Reflecting on the formulation of the article, there is a delegation from the Law to the Supreme Court which allows this institution to carry out other regulatory functions (*regelend*). In addition, Law No. 12 of 2011 jo. Law Number 15 of 2019 concerning Amendments to Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Establishment

of Legislation, also explains that one type of legislation is a regulation set by the Supreme Court.

One of them is PERMA Number 1 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for Criminalizing Articles 2 and 3 of the Corruption Eradication Law. In general, this PERMA contains guidelines or standards for imposing criminal penalties by judges on corruption offenses regulated in Articles 2 and 3 of Law 31 of 1999 jo. UU no. 20 of 2001. The standardization is divided into heavy and light categories of state losses as well as the extent of the mistakes, impacts, and benefits obtained by the perpetrators.

Regulations on the severity of the crime are considered by the judge, containing the order of categories of state financial losses, error rate, impact, benefits, range of criminal penalties, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and criminal penalties based on PERMA Number 1 of 2020). Aspects of state financial losses are classified into the heaviest, heavy, medium, light, and lightest categories based on a certain nominal (Article 6). Categorization also applies to the elements of the degree of error, impact, and profit (category, high, medium, and low). Meanwhile, in the high error aspect, the defendant will be qualified based on his role including a significant role, advocate, using advanced technology in the modus operandi, and carried out in a disaster or economic crisis on a national scale.

Regarding the material for PERMA Number 1 of 2020, Muzakir's view (Boyoh, 2015) is that the arrangement is not quite right. This is because the PERMA can reduce the independence of judges in adjudicating a corruption case. Independence itself can be interpreted as the freedom, independence, and flexibility of judges to exercise their authority in examining, adjudicating, and deciding cases.

The independence of judges is very decisive and reflects the quality of a court decision that is free and independent for the sake of law enforcement and justice. In making a decision, the judge is not allowed to be intervened by any party. Article 5 paragraph (1) of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that judges are obliged to explore, follow, and understand legal values and a sense of justice that live in society.

Article 8 paragraph (2) of Law Number 48 of 2009 states that judges are also obliged to consider the good and evil characteristics of the accused. Regarding this matter, Binsar Gultom stated that *"the judge's decision is only accountable to God Almighty and to himself. He is not accountable to his superiors, like the public prosecutor. Once the independence of judges is strong, the Supreme Court as the highest supervisory institution for the administration of all judicial bodies,*

must not reduce the freedom of judges in examining and deciding cases."

The views of Mudzakkir and Atmasasmita in Kaufman (2016) according to the author are acceptable because basically the content of PERMA is not a facultative provision. The consequence of stipulating the provisions for criminalizing corruption in laws and regulations is that it is binding in nature. Thus, the judge has no other choice but to be guided by Articles 12, 13, and 14 in imposing a sentence on the defendant in a corruption case, giving the impression that PERMA will *"dictate"* the freedom of judges in trying and deciding cases. This kind of concern is very logical, especially since Kaufman has once reminded us that if we want the judicial power to remain independent as the purpose of the separation of powers in the constitution is, then we must reject even laws that have good intentions but reduce the capacity of judges to provide impartial justice.

However, it should be noted that the independence of judges is not an independent variable. As Ferejohn once stated that judicial independence is an idea that consists of two aspects, namely internal (normative) and external (institutional) aspects. Normatively, independence is a quality that is expected to always exist in a judge, but they are also human beings who will not always be objective when faced with many cases that have an impact on the lives of many people. On the one hand, this aspect of independence may also be eroded by personal feelings and desires. For this reason, according to Ferejohn (1998), internal independence within judges needs to be fortified with the right institutional system.

From this point of view, the position of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 is precise as a form of institutional protection or external support for the independence of judges. In fact, the disparity in sentencing occurs due to many factors, including the absence of sentencing guidelines (*strafstoetingsleiddrad*) in the Criminal Code which is the reason for the many disparities in sentencing that occur without rational reasons.

In addition, the strong character of civil law means that there is no obligation for judges to be bound by previous judges' decisions (jurisprudence) or as stated in the principle of *stare decisis et quita non movere*. Thus, even in similar cases, judges have free will to make decisions based on their authority.

Based on this, the formation of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 has a strategic position and role as an effective solution in minimizing the occurrence of criminal disparities in eradicating corruption. At least, even if there is a disparity in sentencing, then the gap is not too far away, and judges have a juridical footing in imposing sentences.

However, the author highlights the provisions of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 which should not be regulated through PERMA but instead included in the revision agenda of the Anti-Corruption Law. This results in the potential regulatory overlap. This opinion is quite logical, considering that PERMA only plays a role in filling the legal vacuum of material that has not been regulated in the Supreme Court law. However, it does not mean that there are no limitations on what materials may be regulated in PERMA. If you look at the provisions of Article 79, the scope of the PERMA regulation is only limited to the administration of justice related to procedural law.

Thus, the legislators have indirectly provided signs so that the PERMA material does not take material that should be the material of the law. In terms of legislation theory, the content of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 can indeed be seen as not in line with the theory of the hierarchy of norms as stated by Kelsen and Hans Nawiaski in (Prang, 2011).

Essentially, the theory of hierarchical norms idealizes that legal regulations are arranged in stages and systematically from the highest to the lowest, where lower rules must be sourced and must not conflict with higher rules.³⁰ In this context, the formation of PERMA Number 1 in The year 2020 formally has sufficient legitimacy based on the attribution of Article 79 of the Supreme Court Law and Law no. 12/2011 which recognizes PERMA as a type of legislation. However, materially, the substance of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 does not have a foothold/link from its parent law, namely the Anti-Corruption Law and the Criminal Code.

There are no provisions for a delegation from the Anti-Corruption Law regarding criminal guidelines which will be further regulated in other regulations. In other words, the contents of the provisions of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 regulate something completely new and are not based on the order of the Act. In fact, a material for legislation ideally comes from a higher regulation and can at the same time become a source of law for the regulations under it. The solution to this problem is that the government and the DPR must immediately schedule changes to Law Number 31 of 1999 jo. Law Number 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption. In the revision, lawmakers can add provisions regarding sentencing guidelines as a reference for judges, or include provisions regarding the delegation of sentencing guidelines to be regulated in Supreme Court regulations. Thus, PERMA Number 1 of 2020 has a clear legal basis, both in terms of the authority to form and the substance of its regulation.

Unfortunately, this Perma limits the scope of application of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Corruption Eradication Law which is limited to losses, impacts, and benefits. This regulation should also reach out to

criminals, such as law enforcers or state civil servants who commit corruption, and bribery so that there is a scheme of punishment for them. Therefore, the author suggests that this Perma should not only limit Article 2 and Article 3 but also other articles. Because, according to the author, disparities often occur in other forms of corruption, such as bribery, and gratuities. The Supreme Court needs to create other laws that are similar but with different clauses. For example, Article 5 and Article 12 of the Corruption Eradication Law.

2. Legal Reconstruction Of Corruption Act In Indonesia To Realize Just Law Enforcement

The criminal act of corruption is an extraordinary crime (extraordinary crime) This PERMA 1 2020 sentencing guideline contains regulations on how the stages must be carried out by judges in imposing criminal penalties (penalty or *straftoeming*) against cases in Article 2 and Article 3 of the Law on Eradication corruption. As for what is meant by the provision of punishment (*straftoemeting*) in this sentencing guideline, it refers to the provision of the main punishment in cases of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Law on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of corruption, namely: death penalty, imprisonment, and/or fine.

The application of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for the Criminalization of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Law on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes is normatively only devoted to corruption crimes contained in Article 2 and Article 3 of the Corruption Crime Act because in general Article 2 and Article 3 is a criminal act of corruption that is very common in Indonesia. Therefore, the application of this regulation is only applied to article 2 and article 3 of the corruption law number 31 of 1999 concerning the eradication of corruption as amended by law number 20 of 2001 concerning amendments to law number 20 of 2001. 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption Crimes.

As a legal product from the judiciary, Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2020 has a strategic position as a legal reformer in the field of criminalization of corruption. From a formal perspective, the formation of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 has a strong juridical basis based on the attribution of the Supreme Court Law and the Law on the Establishment of Legislations to fill legal voids in the judicial system. However, from a material perspective, the substance of PERMA does not have strong legitimacy from the Corruption Eradication Law because there is no delegative provision to further regulate criminal guidelines in the form of PERMA. In the perspective of the study of legal politics, the establishment of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 is the Supreme Court's response to fill the legal vacuum due to the absence of guidelines for criminalizing corruption perpetrators which have led to widespread criminal disparities, thus having a close relationship in realizing

legal certainty and justice for the community. However, the substance of the regulation does not appear to be fully capable of realizing legal certainty, which can be seen from the limited scope of the regulation only in Articles 2 and 3 of the Corruption Eradication Law. In addition, there is no firm provision from the Supreme Court for judges who do not comply with the PERMA provisions. In terms of justice, the formulation and classification of punishment in PERMA Number 1 of 2020 does not only use consideration of state losses (nominal) as an indicator, but also aspects of profits, roles, and proportional impacts. If applied consistently and consistently, it can realize the justice expected by the community and anti-corruption activists. In the future, it is hoped that the government can revise the provisions of the Anti-Corruption Law in order to provide clear legitimacy for the existence of PERMA Number 1 of 2020. In addition, the existence of this PERMA needs to be followed up with synergistic policies from other law enforcement agencies such as the prosecutor's office and the KPK, through the preparation of regulations regarding guidelines for prosecuting corruption.

The application of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 to the disparity of criminal acts of corruption must be applied in its entirety in accordance with applicable regulations so that the application of PERMA Number 1 of 2020 to the disparity of criminal acts of corruption must be completed according to the applicable rules so that it can carry out the implementation of the regulation effectively and the application of regulation number 1 of 2020 should not only be applied to Article 2 and Article 3 of the corruption law, but also to other corruption articles, with the hope that the disparity in sentencing can be reduced.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the research, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The Weaknesses of the Corruption Act in Indonesia can be seen in Perma No. 1 of 2020 only limits the scope of application of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Corruption Eradication Law which is limited to losses, impacts, and profits. This regulation should also reach out to criminals, such as law enforcers or state civil servants who commit corruption, and bribery so that there is a scheme of punishment for them. Therefore, the author suggests that this Perma should not only limit Article 2 and Article 3 but also other articles. Because, according to the author, disparities often occur in other forms of corruption, such as bribery, and gratuities. The Supreme Court needs to create other laws that are similar but with different clauses. For example, Article 5 and Article 12 of the Corruption Eradication Law.
2. The Legal Reconstruction of criminal justice regulations against corruption in order to realize fair law enforcement, namely through the establishment of a new regulation or the expansion of Regulation Number 1 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for the Criminalization of Articles 2 and 3 of the Law on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption in order to better reach the articles of criminal acts and other forms of corruption and by reconstructing Article 10 paragraph (5) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 46 of 2009 concerning the Court of Criminal Acts of Corruption into “*The term of office of ad hoc judges is for a period of 5 (five) years and it is proposed to be reappointed every 5 (five) years by the Supreme Court*”.

REFERENCES

- Amrizal, J. P. (2011). Implikasi Hukum Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi, *Kanun: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum*, 13(1), 77-94. <https://doi.org/10.24815/kanun.v13i1.6233>.
- Diana, Y. (2015). *Strategi Pemberantasan Korupsi Melalui Pendekatan Politik Hukum, Penegakan Hukum dan Budaya Hukum*, E-Journal Widya Yusticia, 1(2).
- Faisal. (2010). *Menerobos Positivisme Hukum*. Rangkang Education, Yogyakarta, p.56.
- Irving, R. K. (2016). The Essence of Judicial Independence. *Columbia Law Review*, 80(4), 671-701.
- John, F. (1998). *Independent judges, dependent judiciary: explaining judicial independence*, S. Cal. L. Rev. 72 (1998), p. 353.
- Masyelina, B. (2015). Independensi Hakim Dalam Memutus Perkara Pidana Berdasarkan Kebenaran Materiil, *Lex Crimen*, 4(4), 120.
- Pramono, B. (2021). Legal Politics of Corruption Criminal Enforcement in Indonesia. *International Journal of Social Science and Human Research*, 4. 10.47191/ijsshr/v4-i4-32.
- Hermawan, H., Noerteta, R. S., & Theja, H. S. (2021). Independensi Hakim Memutus Perkara Tindak Pidana Korupsi dalam Perspektif Perma No. 1 Tahun 2020 Jo. Undang-undang No. 48 Tahun 2009. *Al-Qanun: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pembaharuan Hukum Islam*, 24(1), 145-169.
- Pratama, T. G. W. (2020). The urgency for implementing crytomnesia on Indonesian copyright law. *Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 5(10), 508-514. DOI:10.36348/sjhss.2020.v05i10.001
- Widodo, W., Budoyo, S., & Pratama, T. G. W. (2018). The role of law politics on creating good governance and clean governance for a free-corruption Indonesia in 2030. *The Social Sciences*, 13(8), 1307-1311.
- Wahyu, W., & Toebagus, G. (2019). *Poverty, Evictions And Development: Efforts To Build Social Welfare Through The Concept Of Welfare State In Indonesia*, 3rd International Conference On Globalization Of Law And Local Wisdom (Icglow 2019). Dx.Doi.Org/10.2991/Icglow-19.2019.65