

# ‘Nietzsche, the Philosopher and Politician’, By Alfred Baeumler

Juan Sebastián Gómez-Jeria, (Ph.D)<sup>1,2\*</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Free Researcher, Glowing Neurons Group, CP 8270745, Santiago, Chile

<sup>2</sup>Faculty of Sciences, University of Chile, Las Palmeras 3425, Santiago 7800003, Chile

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\*Corresponding author: Juan Sebastián Gómez-Jeria

Free Researcher, Glowing Neurons Group, CP 8270745, Santiago, Chile

## Abstract

Following one of our research lines, we present here the first English translation of ‘Nietzsche, the philosopher and politician’, one of the masterpieces written by Professor Dr. Alfred Baeumler. We repeat what Baeumler said in this text: *I have tried to lay bare the ground plan of a buried temple and roll some column drums on top of each other. I hope others will undertake the reconstruction of the complete building.* This task continues.

**Keywords:** Alfred Baeumler, Friedrich Nietzsche, Übermensch, Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Antichrist, Heraclitus, Immanuel Kant, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Ludwig Feuerbach, René Descartes, Arthur Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner, Otto von Bismarck.

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## INTRODUCTION

*Je tente de me servir de ma plume comme d'un fusil* (Bokov & Ligny, 2019). We present here what we are almost sure is the first translation into English of Baeumler’s masterpiece ‘Nietzsche, the philosopher and politician’ (Baeumler, 1931). A must for the serious scholars.

For the effects of presentation, this is the order of appearance. The order of this translation is the following: Preface, Introduction, I. The Philosopher. 1. Realism. 2. Being and Becoming. 3. Consciousness and Life. 4. Perspectivism. 5. The Will to Power. 6. The Heraclitean World 7. Dionysus. The Eternal Recurrence (Note). II. The Politician. 1. Germanic Basic Attitude. Relationship to Rome 2. The Antichrist. Protestantism and Catholicism 3. Rousseau. Against Democracy and Socialism 4. Culture and State, Hegel. 5. Bismarck. Against the Christian ‘Reich’ 6. The Good European (Epilogue). *Note that all unattributed quotes are from Volumes IX-XIV of the large octavo edition of Nietzsche’s works.* The citation of pages refers to the original text. We expect that the next edition will be in the form of a book, and, at that moment, these citations will be revised. Some footnotes in the original 1931 text were inserted inside the text as ‘Original footnote’.

This text and the previous ones are diamonds in the rough (Gómez-Jeria, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c, 2023d,

2023e, 2023f, 2024a, 2024b). This means that they are the first attempts to produce a definitive English (and Spanish) edition(s).

### Preface

In this writing, Nietzsche is treated as a thinker of European rank and put alongside Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. He himself read neither Descartes nor Leibniz nor Kant properly: he grasped the systems of these thinkers solely in their context with the Christian tradition and opposed them. It is not about the precision and richness of his historical knowledge, but about the greatness and significance of his historical existence that comes to terms with those systems.

One will miss in my portrayal the colorful play of colors that one is used to from other depictions. But here it is not about the poet and writer, but about the philosopher and politician Nietzsche. He who tries to put the varying statements of the writer on one level and then seeks to unite them again within one level of interpretation, he can only arrive at a unified picture by making Nietzsche into an inconsistent one. The real unity of this well-hidden Nietzsche and work reveals itself only to him who knows how to distinguish foreground and background, polemics and philosophy. I believe that through my interpretation I make some key concepts clear and thus say something seminal about the last of the great European thinkers.

The two perspectives of 'philosophy' and 'politics' do not indicate arbitrary cross-sections through Nietzsche's work, but they are the necessary starting points for a methodical interpretation of the overall phenomenon. In the section 'Philosophy' I restrict myself essentially to epistemology and metaphysics; I am not concerned with fullness, but solely with making the unity of the train of thought visible everywhere. The application to the individual areas of the human-historical world, such as lifestyle and upbringing, art, psychology, philosophy of history, would be a task in itself.

*I have tried to lay bare the ground plan of a buried temple and roll some column drums on top of each other. I hope others will undertake the reconstruction of the complete building.*

Dresden, January 1931.

## INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche has so far always been understood, and misunderstood, from the standpoint of Christianity. He was taken as the perfecter of Master Eckhart or Luther, he was conceived as a prophet, a believer or at least as one struggling for faith. Even his atheism and his enmity towards Christianity were only seen from there: he was just an apostate, and the more vehemently he declared himself against everything Christian, the more one thought to be certain of his inner confession to the faith of the fathers, which he only wanted, could not get away from. The pious regarded his life as the passion of a godless man, his suffering as the consequence of his unbelief. The men of the world, on the other hand, found this suffering inspiring, the outbursts of the recluse intoxicating.

*The misunderstandings to which Nietzsche's life work has been exposed cannot be gone into here. The reason for the improbable extent of these misunderstandings lies partly in the nature of the work itself. Nietzsche's published writings indeed show very different faces, and for an observer who only knows them, it is difficult, even if not impossible, to see the unity of the life's work. But if one adds the unpublished writings, the unity of Nietzsche's production becomes very clear very quickly. One perceives a writer who from the very beginning goes his way with the greatest certainty, without knowing it himself. At first glance it may seem as if he was enthusiastic about art one time, science another time, the Greeks another time, the French another time, always extreme, always fickle, equally vehement in grasping as in condemning. As if the man who exemplified loyalty to a great task like hardly any other had played the not seriously meant role of a lyrical-ecstatic Judas! What does reality look like? While in the period of his most exuberant hopes for Wagner and the coming German culture, the young Nietzsche writes down for himself alone in his sharpest pen the harshest psychological truths about Richard Wagner, a few years later, during the period of his psychological and skeptical*

*aphorism books, which are so cold and dismissive outwardly, he does not give up his highest hope. Nothing progresses one-dimensionally in him, he is never merely a mood character, someone who experiences aesthetically. A hidden will directs all his steps. Every single work that he publishes is not the naive expression of a particular state of his soul, but each of these works pursues an intention, with each individual one the author wants to strike and convince certain people, evoke a specific effect. Therefore each of the works has a different tone, a different sound and style. Each book is an artistically stylized action, it turns against someone, against something, and can only be properly understood from this goal. One cannot therefore simply take Nietzsche's 'views' from these works. Exactly as the intention demands, the author creates light and shadow: he praises where in truth he knows himself superior, yes he even praises the enemy; he stabs and ridicules those with whom he runs on one track. But this never happens senselessly or arbitrarily, everything is determined by the one task. What he really wants he only ever lets one guess. What he gives immediately is always foreground; he is a master of the foreground. He can be so because he is unshakably certain of his background. Nietzsche writes under pseudonyms: Schopenhauer, Wagner, Dionysus, the free spirit, Zarathustra are his masks.*

Nietzsche knows how to make extraordinarily effective use of moods of the moment and ideas, impressions and experiences. But what always leads is the hidden pathos of his being. There is something uncanny about the art with which he knows how to hide himself, with which he creates foregrounds around himself. *Sometimes he himself becomes anxious about 'this whole uncanny hidden life' that he leads.*

Many colorful lights and colors play over such a work. This colorfulness has its basis in the sensitivity of its author. But at the same time it is also evidence of art and will. The colors are distributed and chosen with wisdom; a closedness of being, a oneness of will, as is otherwise only found in active natures, hides behind it. *He who does not see the matter around which Nietzsche's whole life revolved, for him his phenomenon dissolves into lyrical fragments and aphorisms. But for him to whom this matter has become visible (here lies the difficulty), the event Nietzsche is also clear. Nietzsche and his matter are one; unity, not multiplicity is the character of this life.*

For centuries Europe has been under pressure. It is as if since the end of the Middle Ages it has been looking for something that it cannot find: a form of life, a lost unity and certainty of existence. This Europe calls itself Christian; but alongside it, it is all kinds of other things: Greek and Roman, Indian and Chinese, philosophical and aesthetic, scientific and technical, martial and commercial. Properly considered, it itself does not really know what it actually is, and therefore it anxiously and restlessly seeks forms and concepts in all

ages and cultures. The people of this Europe live out their lives in a thousand uncertainties and contradictions. *Everyone tries to come to terms in their own way: one kneels before the sacraments, as people did in the Middle Ages, another tries to freshen up his Protestantism with modern ideas, others throw themselves into the arms of the arts or ascetic science.* Political and social 'problems' arise, no one surveys them anymore, no one knows the way in or out anymore.

From the sun-bathed crowd, standing out against the dark cloud wall of an uncertain future, working, chatting, and enjoying, a man detaches himself. Just one sentence comes from the lips of this man with the far-seeing eye: 'God is dead'. *He does not get up and say: there is no God. He says: God is dead.* He says: God is no longer believed in. Modern man is chaos, he no longer has a unified soul, if he believed in God, this chaos would not exist. But it does exist, therefore God is dead. No one pays attention to the speaker; his closest friends consider him a fool. *'The greatest events have the most difficulty reaching human feeling: for example, the fact that the Christian God is dead, that in our experiences no heavenly goodness and education is expressed any more, no divine justice, no immanent morality at all'*.

That is terrible news, which will still take a few centuries to reach the feeling of Europeans: and then for a while it will seem as if all weight has gone out of things. That is Nietzsche's experience: things have lost their center of gravity. And that is his horror: no one notices, no one sees the fearfully gaping void. The old values have received an additive that makes them worthless, but that does not disturb the citizens. *They only note that values have become 'problematic'*. Everything turns into a problem, God himself becomes an idea, sometimes even a problematic idea. The less one believes, the more one speaks of God. In place of a silent belief in God, an eloquent religion or even a garrulous religiosity has emerged. Then someone appears who is too proud to turn unbelief into a 'religious problem'. He has the courage to look into the void, he has the power to ask: What now? What unspeakable foolishness in the face of this unique situation to speak of a 'prophet', as if there could be a prophet without a God whom he proclaims. Certainly, the temptation to become a creator god brushed past Nietzsche at times. He invented Dionysus: Dionysus against the Crucified. But he also found the role of the prophet ridiculous ('As for me, who occasionally feel in myself the ridiculousness of a prophet ...') and must therefore be strictly separated from the short-winded myth-inventors from his 'Dionysian' poetic entourage.

If one wants to historically characterize Nietzsche's phenomenon, then one must say: *it signifies the end of the Middle Ages. Only with Nietzsche is the Middle Ages really at an end, and the fact that this has not yet come to consciousness is what all the misunderstandings are based on that the phenomenon of Nietzsche still encounters.* What follows the end of the

proper Middle Ages, considered in depth, are only two events: the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. What connects to these two movements, and what seemingly brings up a 'new age', the Enlightenment and Romanticism, only repeat these two movements: the Enlightenment is a daughter of the Reformation (with a predominance of the enthusiastic element), Romanticism in turn means the revival of the Counter-Reformation (Here I am not speaking of that almost pagan 'Heidelberg Romanticism' that I described in my Bachofen introduction, but of Romanticism as a spiritual-political movement in Europe that had and has the restoration of the Christian state as its goal). One should not cite the German classics: this classicism is only a moment between Enlightenment and Romanticism, a subjective event, not a spiritual-political one, an event of form, not an event in the reality of things, hence also without consequence and transformative power. The German bourgeoisie, which took this event for a real and historical one, is not coincidentally collapsing today... *That Nietzsche signifies the end of the Middle Ages means: he is neither Enlightener nor Romanticist. He stands beyond the parties and is therefore understood by neither the epigones of the one nor the other.* The adherents of Romanticism, the defenders of the Christian-Germanic state, feel him to be an apostate and agitator, at best a tragic revolutionary; those belonging to the party of the Enlightenment claim him for precisely that reason as their own, as a standard-bearer of progress, as a European stylist and freethinker. But if anything can be proven with every touch upon his work, then it is this, that both are wrong: he is neither an arbitrary denier of God and revolutionary, for that his awareness of the historical moment is too sharp, his realistic prudence too great, nor is he an Enlightener in any form, moralist, humanist or pacifist. He forcefully opposes aesthetic and political romanticism. In democracy, however, he saw not his actual opponent. *For here he recognized under the guise of scientific and political slogans the more modern and therefore more dangerous form of Christianity.*

As far as Christian Western culture reaches, so far also reaches the official validity of the concept of love and the concepts derived from it of pity and tolerance. The significance of the Enlightenment rests on the fact that through it the concept of *caritas* was transferred into the secular realm. Against Rousseau, against the 18th century with its intellectual-moral optimism, with its sentimental belief in the harmony of reason, virtue and happiness, with its tendentious philosophy of tolerance, Nietzsche fought most vehemently all his life. Basically, according to a note in 'The Will to Power,' we good Europeans are waging a war against the 18th century (Will to Power, 117). But this war against the 18th century is only the negative side of the philosophy of the will to power. *So far the foreground of destruction has been observed too one-sidedly, Nietzsche's position as a fighter has been seen in isolation, without reference to the tremendous metaphysics of the background. Even*

*Zarathustra was supposed to be only a preparation for the metaphysical main work!* This main work puts the world before us in precise visions. ‘The Will to Power’ is a genuine philosophical system, a strict context of thoughts, but ‘strictness’ is not to be sought here in the logical concatenation of the parts among each other, but in the internal coherence and consistency of the whole. *Nietzsche thought intuitively, each of his ideas is an intuition, each of his concepts comes from the heart, each of his thoughts is a spark from one and the same glowing center.* Nietzsche's work consisted in collecting such sparks. *When he returned from his lonely walks or was on the way, he wrote down his intuitions in flying pen strokes.* What remained was only redaction. Nietzsche did not know problems that are locked in cages and fed every day to be observed. If one wants to judge his work, one must perform for oneself the logical work of piecing it together, for which he had no time. For judging, formal perfection cannot be decisive, but only the inner coherence of the concepts. The pre-Socratic philosophers also left behind no elaborated systems. *What must be crucial is that the coherence of concepts is present and can be made logically clear at any time.*

This philosophy is unknown, even its name is unknown. It was natural for Nietzsche himself to speak of a ‘Dionysian’ philosophy. *But his philosophical main work and his teaching are more fittingly named after a Greek philosopher who really lived than after a god whom a philosopher invented in distress; we call the image of the world that Nietzsche envisioned not Dionysian, but Heraclitean.* This is a world that never rests, that is change through and through; but change means struggling and conquering. Heraclitus of Ephesus, from whom comes the saying: ‘War is the father of all things’, was from the beginning the thinker whom Nietzsche felt to be a primal kinsman, whom he venerated above all others at all times in his life. *To see the world and man in the Heraclitean way means for him to see them as they are: inexhaustible and inexhaustible, creating and giving birth from the depths of the unknown, producing shapes that emerge from the mixing jug of existence according to a law of eternal justice, battling each other, asserting or perishing themselves in this battle.* If one wants a formula for this worldview, one might call it heroic realism.

## I. The Philosopher

### 1. Realism

‘Once one said God when one gazed upon distant seas; but now I taught you to say: Übermensch.

God is a surmise; but I want your surmising not to reach any farther than your creative will.

Could you create a god? So keep silent before me about all gods! Well however could you create the Übermensch’.

(On the Blessed Islands).

*Here is the first great philosopher of realism.*

One should not think here of any conceptual realism, nor

of any empiricism or sensualism of whatever kind, how far behind Nietzsche does Feuerbach lie!, it is a realism of its own origin, a realism with which a new section in European philosophy begins. This realism stems from the deepest depths of Nietzsche, hence from where also the concept of the Übermensch stems. For the Übermensch is a realistic conception, he gives the earth a meaning. ‘*The Übermensch is the meaning of the earth*’ (Zarathustra's preface). This concept should lead us back from ‘otherworldly hopes’ into the realm of life and creativity. ‘The heart of the earth is of gold’ (Zarathustra, Of Great Events). The concept of the Übermensch is a formula for the attitude of heroic this-worldliness, an attitude that is not yet characterized when one says: ‘to love this life with all its suffering’. The heart of the earth is of gold: with this the great confidence in existence, the faith in the world is expressed that is always only the mirror image of an individual's faith in himself and his historical mission.

The this-worldliness of Nietzsche's philosophy must be seen as one with its heroic determination. Therein lies Nietzsche's Germanicism, which is expressed in him not only in the political sphere: this philosophy is heroic and this-worldly at the same time. Nietzsche is no freethinking atheist: he knows the ‘god-forming instinct’; indeed he admits that this instinct occasionally comes alive in him ‘untimely’ (Will to Power, 1038). He denies himself this instinct. There is something in him that forbids him today to speak of God. *God: today that means the degradation of man, the forfeiture of his will, the abrogation of all virtues.* That is why Zarathustra must be godless: because the earth must be won back. ‘There are a thousand paths that have never been trodden, a thousand states of health and hidden islands of life. Man and human-earth are inexhaustible and unfathomable. Watch and listen, you loners! Winds with secret wing beats come from the future; and good tidings rise to his ears. Dead are all gods: now we want the Übermensch to live’ (On bestowing virtue).

To battle for the earth Zarathustra sets out, his undertaking is heroic, his soul heroic. ‘*What qualities one must have to do without God, what one must be oneself to feel such a deicide justified: strong, courageously self-assured, boundlessly rebounding, iron, mighty...*’ (Beyond Good and Evil, section 164). For this heroic deed, this liberation from transcendence into life, Zarathustra remains alone. He says farewell to the people: doubly alone he travels into the mountains. He knows: ‘The least solitary are the great creators. The legacy they left behind and the company they keep still today testify that Godliness was in this, that they knew how to be alone’ (Beyond Good and Evil, section 164).

‘What qualities one must have in order to do without God, what one must be oneself to feel such a deicide justified: strong, boldly self-assured, boundlessly resilient, iron, mighty...’. For him, in the age of science

it is a man's honor not to believe in God; conscience, decency demand it of him. The European morality that grew out of belief in God itself turns against this belief at its height.

Nietzsche's realism is a consequence of truthfulness and courage. Written on its banner is: Error is cowardice (Will to Power, section 429). Like a hero, like a lonely fighter who has been placed by fate on a post that all considered lost, Nietzsche finds his philosophy. There was perhaps only one among his contemporaries who felt similar to himself, not by chance did the philosopher of the new realism struggle with this One as hardly with any other. In the notes that Nietzsche's friend, the church historian Franz Overbeck made, in which he sought to demonstrate the incompatibility of Christianity with modern scientific culture, there is also a section on Bismarck's religion. There we read: 'About his religion Bismarck has as a rule and with the loyalty to himself characteristic of great men proudly kept silent, most eloquently in his Thoughts and Memories'. A hint of this hidden religiosity Overbeck finds in the letter Bismarck wrote to his wife upon entering the diplomatic service (1851): 'I am God's soldier. Where He sends me, there I must go, and I believe that He sends me and cuts my life as He needs it'. Here we can look into the roots of his religiosity, Overbeck adds, '...his religion lay in the soil of his self-esteem...' (Franz Overbeck, 'Christianity and Culture', posthumously published by E. H. Bernoulli. Basel 1919, pp. 153 f). It is the self-esteem of heroic natures, which is one with the feeling of fate. From the same self-esteem and self-consciousness Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' emerged.

'The humanitarian God is not demonstrable from the world known to us: thus far one can today drive and compel you, but what conclusion do you draw from this?' 'He is not demonstrable to us': *Skepticism of cognition*. You elders fear the conclusion; 'From the world known to us a completely different God would be demonstrable, one who is at least not humanitarian and, in short, you hold fast to your God and invent for Him a world that is not known to us' (Will to Power, 1036).

It is the pathos of cognition that drives Nietzsche to proclaim the 'true God'. The world in which we live, and the Christian God are in contradiction with one another, so the world and cognition must yield, concludes modern man. So the idea of God must yield, Nietzsche concludes. He wants to free the world from the curse that lies upon it. Through the philosophers this curse has been brought to the formula: the world we have to deal with is a world of deception and illusion; behind it lies the world of things-in-themselves, the true world. The former is a world of the senses, of stone and of becoming, the latter is a world of reason, of truth and of being. To expose 'the true world' as a fiction that is Nietzsche's concern as a philosophical thinker.

## 2. Being and Becoming

The restoration of the real world, a *restitutio in integrum* in every sense, is the task. Nietzsche fights Eleaticism, whose greatest propagator was Plato. 'Christianity is Platonism for the people', says the preface to Beyond Good and Evil. Of the older Hellenes Plato is separated by the lack of 'courage before reality'. 'Plato is a coward before reality, consequently he takes refuge in the ideal' (Twilight of the Idols). Since Plato, the philosophers have lacked a sense of history, i.e., a notion of becoming. They see everything rigidly, fixedly; they think they are paying honor to a thing when they 'dehistoricize' it, endeavor to observe it sub specie aeterni, in short, when they mummify it. That is their 'Egyptianism'. Plato strayed from the Greek basic instincts, he succumbed to Oriental influences by making the philosopher into a 'concept idolater', i.e., a kind of priest. The senses, 'which are immoral anyway', deceive us about the true world: therefore the philosophers posit a world of ideas in its place (Twilight of the Idols).

'With the highest reverence I set aside the name Heraclitus when the other tribe of philosophers discarded the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he discarded their testimony because they showed things as if they had duration and unity'. Heraclitus too thereby did wrong to the senses: the senses do not lie at all. It is we who first place the lie into them, e.g., the lie of the unity, of the thing-like, of substance, of duration. It is precisely 'reason,' of which we are so proud, that is the cause of our falsifying the testimony of the senses. The senses show us becoming, passing away, change, but that is reality. So they do not lie. 'But with this Heraclitus will be eternally right that being is an empty fiction. The 'apparent world' is the only one: the 'true world' is merely added on...' (Ibid).

Nietzsche takes the side of the 'error' of the senses and of becoming against the truth of reason and of being. It has infinitely harmed his magnificent conception that in presenting his fundamental thought he did not get away from this opposition. For this led to him always speaking of 'error' where he meant truth. This circumstance is to blame that one could see a skeptic, a relativist, a philosopher of the 'as if' in him. Whoever wants to understand his philosophy must be able to abstract from the polemical form of some key concepts. When Nietzsche sides with error, he means 'error', i.e., what idealistic philosophers declare error is meant. But that is precisely the truth! Through our senses we have access to the world-in-itself. Our body takes in things as they are in themselves, because it itself is a thing-in-itself. In countless passages of his works Nietzsche pointed to the anti-Christian, anti-Platonic, anti-idealistic basic character of his teaching. Our whole philosophy, he says, has theologians' blood in its veins. Everywhere theologians' instinct and theologians' arrogance are at work where one claims a right 'to look down on and estranged from reality'.

*'The idealist, just like the priest, has all the great concepts in his hand and now plays them out against the senses and knowledge'* (Antichrist, 8).

*Christianity is a form of hostility to reality* (Antichrist, 27; also 30; 47). Idealism is the heir of Christianity: the idealist flees from reality (Ecce homo, Why I Am a Destiny). It is the morality stemming from Christianity, the 'Circe of the philosophers', which leads the thinkers astray. They were always concerned with saving the freedom of the will, making man responsible, behind this wish lurks an 'instinct for punishing and judging', the psychology of free will is an invention of the priests. It is based on a false interpretation of what goes on inside us when we 'want' something. We believe we are the cause when we want something, we think we are catching 'causality in the act'. But for the doer, we credit our consciousness, the 'mind', our ego, the 'subject' (Such an assertion would of course presuppose that our will, our consciousness, can set something in motion).

But that is an error! The will moves nothing, it merely accompanies processes, it can also be absent (Twilight of the Idols). If this is not recognized, then all processes are interpreted as an act (an act of man or God), all events become a doing, i.e., consequence of a will and thus lose their innocence. In place of the actual flow of events we now believe we see 'things', which are only figments of our consciousness, which externalizes its own identity into the flow of events, creating 'things' that do not even exist. The resting, 'existent' thing is a fiction, a fiction of consciousness. There are no identical things, everything is in flux. Consciousness, identical with itself, creates these things in its own image. It is we who have created the thing, i.e., the ever-identical thing, the subject and the predicate, the deed and the object, substance and form. 'The world appears logical to us because we first made it logical' (Will to Power, 521).

Fundamentally, this is Kant's doctrine: the intellect prescribes laws to nature. But with one crucial difference. Kant believed that the flow of events was disorderly, meaningless and worthless, that only the categories of the intellect give form to the sensory material grasped in space and time, thereby creating meaning and order. Nietzsche, on the other hand, seeks to prove the logical processing we perform on the world as a necessity posited with our existence, as a kind of fiction of our imagination. The logical elaboration of reality is merely a condition for us to be able to live in this world, to be able to find our way around in it. Indeed, Kant is not very far from this opinion either: in the 'Critique of Judgement' he repeatedly emphasizes that it is solely 'our' (human) intellect of which the critique speaks. But the contrast lies in the fact that Kant seeks all cognition on the path away from the senses, while for Nietzsche the senses, the body, are the real organon of cognition. Therefore, while he can acknowledge the logical articulation of the world as our achievement, he

must evaluate this achievement differently from Kant. Consciousness, says Nietzsche, presents us with a 'world of identical cases', but thereby it removes us from reality. In thinking, we do not freeze the 'true' world as an interconnection of concepts, genera, forms, purposes, laws, but in so doing we merely construct a world in which our existence is made possible. 'In so doing, we create a world that is predictable, simplified, comprehensible, etc. for us'. Forms, genera, laws, ideas, purposes are fictions; we must beware of imputing a 'false reality' to them. For then we imagine that events 'obey' these forms, laws and ideas, whereas they are in fact self-willed and innocent! We introduce an artificial division into events, a division between that which does and that to which the doing conforms, but this separation of the what and the to which does not correspond to any factual state. It is invented so that we can see something permanent in the events, for form, law is regarded as something permanent and therefore more valuable.

But form is merely invented by us, beneath all forms life flows on incessantly, and no matter how often 'the same form is reached', this does not mean that it is the same form, but something new always appears (Will to Power, 521).

This aspect must be maintained: there is nothing permanent in the real world that we could cling to, the stream of events rushes past us and by us unceasingly. This world is a world of decay. It takes strength to endure the sight of this happening. An image of a world filled with permanent, 'existent' forms springs from a slackening of this strength. He who feels the strength within himself to assert himself in the great becoming and passing away, by organizing the piece of world around himself, can endure the gaze into the becoming. He who does not feel this power within himself attempts to place a meaning inherent in the becoming, for then he does not need to create it. The Heraclitean world is thus the opposite of a strong will: 'He who is unable to place his will into things, the will-less and impotent one, at least places a meaning into them, i.e., the belief that a will is already inherent in them. It is a measure of the power of the will, to what extent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one is able to live in a meaningless world: because one organizes a small piece of it oneself' (Will to Power, 585).

From this peak we take a look at the farthest peaks of Nietzsche's thought landscape. As a student of Heraclitus, he has destroyed the world of being; he has demonstrated that assuming an inherent will or purpose in events indicates a slackening of the constructive force, that assuming a God who gives meaning to events reverses all values; he has affirmed, deified the becoming, the 'apparent world' as the only real one. What then is truth, the will to truth? Truth cannot be an awareness of something that would be inherently fixed and determined, which we would only have to absorb and comprehend. *There is truth only for us, insofar as in the*

*eternally flowing we make something firm, create limits, define.* 'The will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, a bringing out of the human eye of that false character, a reinterpretation of it into the existent. 'Truth' is therefore not something that would be there and would have to be found or discovered, but something that has to be created and that provides the name for a process, even more for a will to overwhelm that in itself has no end: to impose truth as a processus in infinitum, an active determining, not an awareness of something inherently fixed and determined. It is a word for the 'will to power'. Life is founded on the presupposition of a belief in something permanent and regularly recurring; the more powerful life is, the wider the seemingly existent, as it were painted world must be' (Will to Power, 552).

### 3. Consciousness and Life

What are we to imagine under an 'active determining', an 'overwhelming' and 'creating'? The question leads into the center of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. Not consciousness determines and creates, but the body. It is of nobler descent than consciousness, also with regard to cognition. All errors of previous epistemology are based on the fact that the cognitive function has been attributed to the unity of consciousness, while it actually belongs to the unity of the body. Man feels himself as a unity before he becomes conscious of himself as a unity. *If I have a unity in myself at all, says Nietzsche, then it certainly does not lie in the conscious I and in feeling, willing, thinking, but somewhere else: in the preserving, appropriating, excreting, supervising cleverness of my whole organism, of which my conscious I is only a tool.* The I-feeling must not be confused with the 'organic feeling of unity'.

The order which we produce through our concepts must not be confused with the much older order that arises around us through the activity of the animated body. 'We were creative beings long before we created concepts'. The concept is later than the form, abstraction is preceded by the image. *'Man is a creature that forms shapes and rhythms; he is skilled in nothing better, and it seems he takes more pleasure in nothing than in inventing forms'*. Our perceiving is an original appropriating; the essential happening therein is an action, indeed a forcing into form. We are thoroughly active to the very ground of our perception, *'only superficial people speak of 'impressions'*. Man perceives in a rejecting, selecting, shaping manner. 'There is something active in the fact that we accept a stimulus at all and that we accept it as such a stimulus. It is characteristic of this activity not only to set forms, rhythms and sequence of forms, but also to assess the created structure in terms of incorporation or rejection. Thus arises our world, our whole world'; and to this world which belongs to us alone, first created by us, there corresponds no in-itself of things, but it itself is our sole reality. Cognition is an expression of the organic basic function of the drive of assimilation. *The essence of*

*abstraction does not consist in an omission, but rather in an emphasizing, highlighting and intensifying.*

Nietzsche does not deny the activity of consciousness. He also describes it in a way that makes the difference between this activity and the basic cognitive function clear. Logic, he says, is tied to the condition: 'given there are identical cases'. From this, however, Nietzsche does not draw the conclusion that there is another kind of active determining, overwhelming and shaping besides the organic-sensual one, but rather lets himself be carried away to the assertion that through this presupposition reality is being 'falsified' (even sensual image creation could be called a 'falsification'! The word makes no sense since there is no 'true' world anyway). Here Nietzsche is seduced by the wish to completely suppress the consciousness that other philosophers have so immoderately overvalued. He would have to acknowledge two kinds of abstraction, two kinds of unity, two different basic functions of cognition. But he brushes up against the insight that thinking is an analysis as opposed to 'shaping' yet does not arrive at it. Instead, he tends to conceive of 'small reason', i.e., what we ordinarily call intellect or reason, as emerging from the 'great reason' of the body. *Accordingly, the unity of consciousness would only be a derivative of the organic feeling of unity. Among other things, I trace this fallacy back to the tremendous impact Darwin had on Nietzsche.* This fallacy is the source of his biologism, i.e., the tendency to trace everything, including consciousness, back to vital processes. *Consciousness, however, is not to be understood as a function of life, it is of a different kind than life. Only if consciousness is something other than life, only if it opposes the stream of events, can there be any cognition at all.* Nietzsche also brushed up against this idea but did not develop it. His whole concern is to recognize the significance of the body, including for cognition. 'Whoever has gained some idea of the body, how many systems work together at the same time, how much is done for and against each other, what subtlety there is in the equalization etc., will judge that all consciousness, by comparison, is something poor and narrow: that no mind comes anywhere near being sufficient for what would have to be accomplished here by the mind ...'. Therefore, he concludes, we must reverse the order of rank, everything conscious is only second-rate, the mental is only a 'sign language of the body'.

The world of the spirit would thus be a symbolic representation of the world of the body. In addition, Nietzsche has another conception according to which the spirit is seen as a means and tool in the service of higher life, the enhancement of life (Will to Power, 664). Two thoughts confront each other here: the mental as a symbol and the spirit as a tool of the body. Only in the second view does that emerge which Nietzsche is really concerned with: the degradation of the conscious spirit in favor of the unconscious activity of the body. This tendency culminates in the statement that all conscious

action is more imperfect than the unconscious one. 'All perfect action is precisely unconscious and no longer willed; consciousness expresses an imperfect and often morbid personal state' (Will to Power, 289).

This theory of knowledge is characterized by the turn against consciousness. *Consciousness has been overvalued by some philosophers; in Nietzsche there is no overlooking but rather a turn against consciousness.* He lets another unity take the place of the unity of consciousness and actually carries through this basic idea. Behind the turn stands his whole world view, his transvaluation of all values. This realistic theory of knowledge is directed against the 'priestly and metaphysical falsifications' of the senses (Will to Power, 820), which puts the whole human body in place of Kant's 'unity of apperception'. This body is more than a work of art, it is an artist, a unity that creates forms and rhythms. Nietzsche develops the entire theory of knowledge as it were out of a transcendental aesthetics of the body, transcendental logic recedes completely into the background. But one should not think that one can therefore dismiss this theory of knowledge as an aestheticism! What connects the body's perceptive creativity with art are the senses and shaping. From this it does not follow that cognition is 'only' an artistic process (although Nietzsche's relegation of logic could lead to such a conclusion), but rather that in the structure of the body, in the activity of the artist and in the activity of cognition the same organizing force manifests itself. Nietzsche clearly and loudly expresses his sympathy for artists, but only because they are more right than idealistic philosophers have been so far. 'In the main I side more with artists than with all philosophers so far: they did not lose the great path on which life moves, they loved the things 'of this world', they loved their senses' (Will to Power, 820).

Seen from the history of philosophy, Nietzsche's turn against consciousness represents the most emphatic attack on the Cartesianism of modern philosophy (also in this respect Nietzsche resumes Ludwig Feuerbach's struggle). *Descartes is the progenitor of idealistic philosophy; since him, the proposition holds: the idea we have of our soul is more certain and more distinct than that which we have of our body* ('Princ. Phil.' I, 8). Kant does not maintain this distinction, but he goes even further in the direction taken when he puts external, bodily appearances on the same level as internal psychic ones, insofar as both are only phenomena and say nothing about the nature of things in themselves (Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. p. 68 f). *The distance that Descartes had placed between soul and body is now placed by Kant between the soul and the body on the one hand and things in themselves on the other.* Without knowing it, Nietzsche follows Kant's critique by putting inner and outer world on the same level and emphasizing the phenomenality of the inner world (Will to Power, 477). Only for him the word 'phenomenality' no longer makes sense, for he is no

idealist. Basically he only wants to say: the inner world has no advantage over the outer one, there is no distancing from things in themselves, for there is no more self that would separate us from the body and from the world. Where there is an I, there is also a 'body' as something alien to the I. Not by chance, however, Nietzsche does not speak of the body but of the living body. The body is the inanimate body, opposite which stands the abstract unity of consciousness; the unity of the living body, on the other hand, is the will to power. Only since Descartes founded the philosophy of consciousness have philosophers had a 'body'. Nietzsche abolishes the philosophy of consciousness and restores the doctrine of the unity of the living body, which is basically Greek. 'Essential: to proceed from the living body and use it as a guide. It is the far richer phenomenon which allows for clearer observation. Belief in the living body is better established than belief in the spirit' (Will to Power, 532).

Nietzsche's theory of knowledge is the most important achievement of anti-Cartesianism in modern philosophy. Anti-Cartesian trains of thought have certainly been voiced before him; basically all empiricists are enemies of Cartesianism. However, Nietzsche is no ordinary empiricist. *His realism is not based on the assertion that all our knowledge begins with experience, but on the proof that the body is a unity superior to consciousness.* The empiricist is refuted by Cartesian philosophy before he begins. Nietzsche, on the other hand, takes hold at a point that Cartesian philosophy does not reach. Of course, he has not always escaped the danger that threatens all anti-Cartesianism. When the 'soul' is detached from its connection with 'God', when consciousness no longer occupies the dominant position given to it by the idealist, then man falls back into the cosmos. *The task would be to define him as a cosmic being without letting him perish in the all, to see him in connection with nature without being misled by the idea of his 'smallness' in comparison to the size of the world outside him into false conclusions.* For quantity is not decisive after all. For the idealistic philosopher, man's outstanding position within the corporeal world is secured in advance by the qualitatively different, incorporeal consciousness. But as soon as the standpoint of consciousness is surrendered, the question arises as to what still distinguishes man from other beings. He, who just a moment ago was the 'lord of creation', is now swallowed up by the abyss of things, by the cycle of becoming and passing away.

At a very early date, Nietzsche became aware of this consequence of anti-Cartesianism. The posthumous fragment entitled 'On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense' (1873) begins with the characteristic words: *'In some remote corner of the universe poured out into innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and mendacious minute in 'world history'; but still only a minute'.* All the consequences resulting from



the relativity of man to a cosmic being are drawn here with merciless consistency. Since the intellect is regarded only as a 'means' for the preservation of the individual, the drive for truth appears as a riddle. The riddle is solved by Nietzsche defining that to be 'truthful' means to lie in a style that is binding for all. *Truth is defined as a 'sum of human relations'*. It is disputed whether the conception of the world that man has can be called in any way 'more correct' compared to that of the lizard or the insect, since every standard for this is lacking. *We produce the ideas of space and time with the same necessity with which the spider spins its web; we do not know a world other than our own.* The equation of man's conception of the world with that of any random animal seems to be the necessary consequence of every anti-Cartesianism. This consequence has never been extensively refuted by Nietzsche. From his middle period there is that expressive aphorism (Wanderer, 14), in which rings the sigh: 'Our haste in the world! Oh, it is a far too improbable thing!', and in which the drop of life in the world is called insignificant for the overall character of the immense ocean of becoming and passing away. Indeed, even the phrase about the 'eruptive skin disease' of our planet can be found here. 'Perhaps the ant in the forest imagines just as foolishly that it is the purpose and intention of the existence of the forest, as we do when we almost involuntarily connect the extinction of mankind in our fantasy with the end of the earth'.

The nihilism that speaks from these statements is of course not based on a failure of Nietzsche's intellect but is more deeply grounded. What is at issue here is the cardinal problem of philosophy, the question of man: how is this question answered by a thinker who keeps his gaze fixed on the eternal becoming and passing away? You see, the adherents of Cartesianism will cry, man and truth perish, Nietzsche's philosophy refutes itself! Such a conclusion would be premature. Let us not forget that Nietzsche's theory of knowledge is before us only in fragments. If we want to come to a judgment, we must examine these fragments for their exploitability: such an examination shows that relativistic conclusions by no means necessarily follow from Nietzsche's starting points. His main thoughts can be accepted without man perishing in the flood and the concept of truth losing its meaning. From a posthumous note dating from the time of 'The Gay Science' and marked with the catchword 'Main thought!', it is evident that Nietzsche, in some moments, raised himself to a height of objective thinking where every relativistic tendency died away. *In the first part of the note in question, the thought is repeated that there is no individual truth, only individual errors, indeed the individual itself is called an error.* Nietzsche then continues: 'But I distinguish: the imagined individuals and the true 'life systems', of which each of us is one; one throws both into one, while 'the individual' is only a sum of conscious sensations and errors, a belief, a little piece of the true-life system or many little pieces thought together and fabricated together, a 'unity' that does not stand up. We are buds on a tree, what do we

know about what we can become in the interest of the tree! But we have a consciousness as if we wanted and should be everything, a fantasy of the 'I' and all 'non-I' Ceasing to feel oneself as such a fantastic ego! Learning step by step to discard the supposed individual! ... Beyond 'me' and 'thee'! Feeling cosmically!'

From this juxtaposition of 'imagined individuals' and 'true life systems' a different conception of man follows than the relativistic one, which always has the individual in view. The concluding words 'feeling cosmically' also point to this. 'Magnificent discovery: not everything is incalculable, undetermined! There are laws that remain true beyond the measure of the individual!' The tracing back of all human doing and driving, all acting and inventing to vital processes must not be a conception that annihilates man, it depends on what one understands by 'life'. Life viewed as a cosmic fact would resist any relativization. If one grasps it only as an empirical fact, as the biologist does, then Nietzsche's philosophy must appear as one single tremendous biologism. Such an interpretation, however, becomes altogether unlikely when one considers what significance the concept of 'life' has in Nietzsche's work as a whole.

*As is evident from countless passages, for Nietzsche 'life' means not an empirical-physiological but a metaphysical, indeed even a 'Dionysian', i.e., divine phenomenon.*

#### 4. Perspectivism

If there is a thinker besides Heraclitus to whom Nietzsche's philosophy comes close, then it is Leibniz. The system of the will to power is erected on a monadological basic view: the world consists of a sum of force units; from whose conflict an equilibrium arises at every moment. Each of these points of force conceives the world according to its own force quantum, there is therefore no 'truth' that is universally binding. The static truth for all is replaced by a general dynamism and perspectivism. Truth dissolves into an immense abundance of perspectives of individual force centers on a whole. Even Leibniz's definition of the monad as a 'miroir vivant' is applied by Nietzsche at one point (admittedly without acknowledging the borrowing): 'we are living mirror images'. In the 'Nachlass', one finds a characterization of Leibniz in which he appears almost like a doppelgänger of Nietzsche: he is called dangerous, a true German who needs foregrounds and foreground philosophies, daring and mysterious.

Leibniz is the originator of the system of pre-established harmony: every monad is a substance in itself and yet from the beginning integrated into the universal system of supreme wisdom and goodness. It is entirely active force, yet there is never a struggle between these individual forces, for the substances do not touch each other: they stand in a preordained harmony to each other.

In Nietzsche, by contrast, struggle is the only reality; equilibrium, harmony, is the problem. His system is monadological, but not harmonistic. It signifies the tremendous attempt to understand all happening, all movement, all becoming as 'a settling of force- and power-relations, as a struggle' (Will to Power, 552). In this respect, Nietzsche's doctrine stands at the opposite end of the diameter from Leibniz's doctrine as the last great attempt to philosophically justify the Christian God.

We have to distinguish two kinds of relativism. *Biological relativism speaks of the 'environment' of a particular living being or species; it relates the individual being and its world to the existing greater world. This relativism is also found in Nietzsche, but it is suspended by a deeper and more fundamental relativism according to which the whole world is nothing other than a totality of actions.* The organic being thus no longer stands helpless and small opposite the immense soulless universe, but its life represents a special case of what happens in the world at all. Thereby the possibility opens up that a peculiar dignity accrues to organic life: it is conceivable that in the organism the universal essence of the world attains its most perfect representation. From this consequences for the theory of knowledge would also have to be drawn. Nietzsche did not draw these consequences; his theory of knowledge is a torso.

Since we only know the world from our individual standpoint, we fall into error upon error when we take our perspectives as 'true', i.e., as universally binding. 'Our world' is sheer appearance, it is something produced by the creative in us. All that lives has such a creative center, and everything that is its 'external world' merely represents the sum of its evaluations. But these evaluations stand in some relation to its existence-conditions, they are 'physiological requirements for the preservation of a certain kind of life' (Jenseits, 3).

*Each individual being is surrounded by an 'apparent world' created by its evaluations.* The philosopher still recognizes even this world as real, i.e., as belonging to total reality. Consequently, for him the distinction between a 'real' and an 'apparent' world loses its meaning [Original footnote. It has been established that Nietzsche adopted the concepts of real and apparent world, perspectivism and semiotic cognition from the book of the philosopher Gustav Teichmüller entitled 'The Real and the Apparent World' (cf. H. Voss, 'Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik' 1913, p. 106 ff). From this, however, one should not conclude a dependence of Nietzsche on Teichmüller in terms of content. The book in question appeared in 1882. As early as 1873, in the fragment on truth and lies in an extra-moral sense, Nietzsche sketched a relativism that contains in germ the later perspectivism of Nietzsche's. Undoubtedly Nietzsche owes Teichmüller's book a sustained stimulus, in terms of content he comes to opposite conclusions. His references to Teichmüller's formulations will not

*surprise one who knows Nietzsche's way of working: he is always related to someone, always in struggle].* Every single existence with its perspectives constitutes 'the world'.

'Every force-center has its perspective for the rest, i.e., it's quite determinate valuation, its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The 'apparent world' thus reduces itself to a specific kind of action upon the world that starts from a center. Now there is no other kind of action: and the 'world' is only a word for the total play of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction.....of each particular against the whole... No shadow of right remains here to speak of appearance...' (Will to Power, 567).

The existent is that which has effect upon us, which proves itself by its effect. *'To exist' means: I feel myself affected by it as existent.*

'Appearance' is thus for Nietzsche only a word for the reality related to a subject, i.e., but for the 'real and only reality of things'. *With the word appearance nothing further is expressed than the inaccessibility of this reality for logical procedures and distinctions.* Appearance is appearance solely in relation to 'logical truth', which is possible only in an imaginary world.

The concept of appearance is therefore a consequence of Nietzsche's realism for him. 'I do not see 'appearance' in contrast to reality, but on the contrary take appearance as the reality that resists transformation into an imaginary 'world of truth'. A specific name for this reality would be 'will to power', namely designated from within and not from its elusive Proteus nature'. 'The will to power' creates the world anew in every moment, interprets it anew in every moment. It appears most powerful in organic beings: 'The essential thing in organic beings is a new interpretation of events: the perspectival inner multiplicity which is itself an event'.

'The interpretive character of all happening. There is no event in itself. What happens is a group of phenomena selected and summarized by an interpreting being'.

The reality that concerns us is thus the result of an interpretation. Kant's epistemological critique ultimately arrives at the same conclusion. But in Kant, it is reason that interprets; in Nietzsche, it is the living force. This does not signify a difference in degree, but one in kind. For reason is unitary, and to this one reason corresponds the one world of science. Nietzsche, on the other hand, seeks to understand the manifold world, and he finds that there is no world without specific forces, each of which has its own specific way of reacting: a world without action and reaction would be just another word for nothingness (Will to Power, 567).

But how is knowledge still possible in such a world? Does everything here not dissolve into the actions of specific, i.e., unknowable, forces? Every being is sheer action, every being interprets from out of itself, and is thus blind to the others: do we not on this path fall into the abyss of agnosticism, which is the necessary consequence of animal limitation?

We stand before the core question of the philosophy of 'will to power'. The fragmentary nature of the work is felt here to be particularly painful. Nevertheless, with the help of the other Nachlass, an answer by Nietzsche can be reconstructed. *One should never forget that also in the seemingly so lifeless field of epistemological critique Nietzsche always has an opponent in mind.* If this opponent is logical idealism and optimism, relativism must be brought out by Nietzsche. This relativism does not arise from a despair of the possibility of knowledge but is a reaction of probity to the falsehoods of consciousness philosophy. The philosophy of consciousness has logicalized the world, it has laid a net of concepts over reality and thus concealed reality from our sight. *In place of eternal becoming it has posited a fictitious, rigid being. In the logically rectified world there exist only relations-in-themselves, relations of dependence, which find their formulation in the so-called 'laws of nature'.* When two phenomena follow each other unchangeably, we assume a lawful relation between them, and unnoticed this relation, this 'law', takes the place for us of the reality of these two phenomena and their succession. We substitute for reality a relational formula and now believe the next time on the basis of this formula to see the 'same phenomenon'. But with that we have robbed real happening of its unrepeatability and uniqueness; we have interpreted it from without, not from within. An 'external' behavior we call a mechanical one: what is only 'mechanically' regulated is precisely externally regulated. As 'externally regulated' the whole mechanistically interpreted world presents itself to us. Nietzsche, the philosopher of will to power, who sees the world from within, must become the opponent of the mechanistic explanation of the world. *Indeed, here lies the tremendous significance of his system: it is the first philosophical system that overcomes the mechanistic worldview dominant since the Enlightenment.*

All interpretations, all phenomena, all laws, it says in the 'Will to Power', are symptoms of an internal happening (Will to Power, 619). The 'law,' which formulates regular happening, says nothing about the reality of the whole phenomenon: it only raises the question of where it comes from that something repeats itself here, it is a conjecture that a 'complex of forces that are initially unknown, and force-triggering' corresponds to the formula (Will to Power, 629). To accept that forces here obey a 'law' would mean to rob happening of its innocence, for the expression law 'has a moral aftertaste'. It is about something completely different from obedience: 'The invariable succession of certain

phenomena proves no 'law,' but a relationship of power between two or more forces' (Will to Power, 631). 'The degree of resistance and the degree of overpowering, which is what all happening is about ... There is no law: every power draws its ultimate consequence at every moment. Precisely that there is no alternative, on that rests calculability' (Will to Power, 634).

Nietzsche thus does not deny the possibility of a certain predictability of happening, he only denies the existence of 'laws'. For in the concept of law one thinks of a lawgiver who demands obedience, and of one who obeys as if it were out of deference to the law. The law further corresponds to a rigid, uniform world: nothing new is possible under the law. But real happening brings something new at every moment: 'At no moment is oxygen exactly the same as in the previous one, but something new: even if this newness is too subtle for all measurements...'. *There exist neither fixed forms nor fixed qualities:* 'The tree is something new at every moment: we assert the form because we cannot perceive the finest, absolute motion: we introduce a mathematical average line into the absolute motion...'. So instead of the law not lawlessness steps in, but the 'average line,' instead of 'truth' comes 'probability': 'There are as few 'things' as there can be 'absolute cognition'. In place of basic truths I posit basic probabilities, provisionally adopted guidelines according to which one lives and thinks. These guidelines are not arbitrary but corresponding to an average of a habituation. Habituation is the consequence of a selection that my various affects have made, all of which wanted to feel good and preserve themselves in the process'. According to the above quoted aphorism 634 of the 'Will to Power' we can extend this thought beyond the sphere of the organic being: for the total happening there are indeed no basic truths, but basic probabilities, i.e., happening does indeed not obey any 'law' but still always the same uniform outcomes arise because every power 'draws its consequence' at every moment. We may only not assume that now 'the same thing happens' a second and third time: the outcome is in fact always new.

Life, the will to power, makes a new throw at every moment. The individual events do not follow one another like the links of a chain but succeed one another freely like the throws when playing with dice.

When Nietzsche replaces truth with probability, he does not put an indeterminate chaos in place of order but replaces a false concept of order with a more correct one. His philosophy rejects the concept of an exact calculability of what happens, it claims that our cognition of nature is only a prediction of probable outcomes. It thus puts in place of an allegedly causally determined world a world of events that succeed one another independently, purely 'coincidentally', just as do the throws when playing with dice. We know that this coincidence also has its order: with the observation of this order we enter into the vast and wonderful realm of

probability calculation. Nietzsche did not know probability calculation, but his philosophy points to it. Among the indications that allow us to expect that the longest period of misunderstanding his philosophical system is over belongs the fact that modern science more and more frees itself from the shackles of the causal worldview. Considerations and calculations of probability await an ever-growing importance, and with that the insight into the significance of that thinker who already made this turn decades ago on the basis of his metaphysical premises may also grow.

In modern natural science, probability calculation is applied to happening for the same reasons for which Nietzsche already combatted the mechanistic interpretation of the world. One has discovered the world of the infinitesimally small, which lends itself to neither calculability nor logicalization in the classical manner. There only remains to posit 'average lines'. *Average values, probabilities take the place of 'exact' determination.* With that precisely what Nietzsche demanded has happened: the world becomes free from the compulsion of the 'law'. The divestment of the causality concept for our cognition is the widely visible expression of this process. The causal relation between two processes seems always the same, something here 'repeats' itself. The number, however, which designates a probability result, leaves open precisely the possibility on which for Nietzsche everything depends: that the event progresses a little differently each time because it indicates each time the outcome of a struggle that has just taken place. Nature is always a different one, 'there is no second time'.

From this perspective it first becomes understandable what high significance accrues to Nietzsche's rejection of 'causalism'. 'Two successive states, one cause, the other 'effect', is false. The first state has nothing to effect, the second nothing has effected it. *It has to do with a struggle between two elements unequal in power: a new order of forces is achieved, according to the measure of power of each one.* The second state is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect): the essential is that the factors engaged in the struggle emerge with different quantities of power' (Will to Power, 633). Happening is neither effected nor effecting, the 'cause' is fabricated in addition to happening. The basic presupposition thereby is the belief in the recurrence of identical cases. The causal interpretation is thus a consequence of the logicalization of the world based on the standpoint of consciousness. *Reality knows no identical but only similar cases. Through logicalization the character of life, i.e., of will to power, is robbed from the world.* 'All struggle, all happening is a struggle, needs duration. What we call 'cause' and 'effect' leaves the struggle out and thus does not correspond to happening'. In the causally determined world, identical cases seem to be subjected in lasting obedience to the 'same law'; real, living happening, however, is nothing but an unceasing

process of power quantifications. The organism would be definable as a *'lasting form of processes of power quantifications, where the various antagonists for their part grow unequally'* (Will to Power, 642).

The individual center of force, as was said earlier, interprets the world from out of itself. We can now describe the kind of 'interpretation' more precisely. That which interprets is the will to power. *To 'interpret' is just another word for a means to become master over something.* Sheer differences in power that existed could not feel themselves as such. 'There must be a something that wants to grow that interprets every other something that wants to grow according to its value'. This something that wants to grow, the will to power, is what demarcates and determines rank, which posits differences in power at all in the first place (Will to Power, 643).

On the basis of the necessary perspectivism, every center of force constructs from out of itself the entire remaining world, but to construct means: to measure, feel, shape at/on itself, at/on its own power (Will to Power, 636).

## 5. The Will to Power

Nothing has stood so much in the way of understanding Nietzsche's philosophy as the title of his main philosophical work. One believed to know what 'will' and what 'power' is and interpreted the title accordingly. In truth nothing is so difficult to understand and paraphrase as what Nietzsche actually means with the words 'will to power'. Understanding starts in the moment when one gives up linking the concepts 'will' and 'aim/goal'. The will to power is not a will that has power as its aim/goal, that 'strives' after power. The will is also not directed at 'something', all these conceptions falsify the reality of willing. Insofar as aims and goals exist, they are posited by the will, stand in its service and hence cannot be something outside of it, toward which it 'strives'. It itself does not strive toward any goal, it itself is eternal becoming that names no goal. This becoming is a struggle.

What then is willing? Nietzsche explains: 'Willing as such is the same as wanting to become stronger, wanting to grow, and also wanting the means thereto' (Will to Power, 675). Strength is no goal of the will because it is the will itself. The will thus 'wants' only itself: so far the explanation gives no offense. The 'growth,' however, could be understood as a passive process, then Nietzsche's image of the world would be fundamentally misunderstood. Growth is no 'process': by growth Nietzsche understands rather a doing, it is nothing other than a consequence of victories. Causalism is rejected by Nietzsche because it conceals the world as struggle; for the same reason he turns against teleology: the seeming purposiveness in happening is merely the consequence of will to power: every victory sets an

order; 'becoming stronger involves orders that seem similar to a purposiveness-design' (Will to Power, 525).

The will has no goal that would lie outside of it, it is not at all 'for itself': 'will' is only an expression for the respective overall state of a being. In humans it looks like this: willing is commanding, but commanding is an effect, and this effect is a 'sudden explosion of forces'. The path of the will is marked by nothing but explosions of forces. What we understand by 'willing' in the narrower sense, conscious will, is only an accompanying phenomenon of the essential, which is an outflow of force. 'Willing is only incidental'. Conscious will accompanies the actual will which always has the infinite before it and hence is 'free'. It is thus not 'free' because it 'sets itself goals', but on the contrary, because it has no goal, because, seen from consciousness, it always goes into the dark. To want something does not mean to 'strive for' a goal, but it means: 'to do an experiment in order to find out what we can do; about that only success or failure can instruct us'. All willing is thus in truth a being-able-to: it is an attempt of power. With that, traditional theory of will is abandoned, and Nietzsche can say: 'There exists no will at all, neither a free nor an unfree one. Under certain circumstances an action follows upon a thought: together with the thought arises the effect of commanding, to it belongs the feeling of freedom that one commonly localizes in the 'will itself' (while it is only an accompanying phenomenon of the will)'. That which is called willing is a prejudice: fact is solely that something happens through us. The regularity of this happening leads us to the belief: what we do regularly is what we 'will'; therefore we are free. 'The fact is: 'in this or that case I tend to do this'. The illusion is: this or that case has arisen, I now want to do this'. When someone is surprised by his own actions, as in the case of passion, then he doubts his freedom, and one speaks perhaps of demonic influences. In such cases our superficial psychology of will fails. The question is: out of what is action taken? The for what? Where to? is something secondary. Action can be taken out of pleasure, i.e., out of overflowing feeling of power, or out of displeasure, i.e., out of inhibition of the feeling of power. But in no case is action taken for the sake of happiness or benefit or in order to ward off displeasure: 'rather a certain quantity of force expends itself and seizes upon something in which it can vent itself. That which one calls 'goal', 'purpose', is in truth the means for this involuntary explosive process'.

From this follows a strictly anti-hedonistic conception of the essence of real willing. Pleasure and displeasure become something secondary: they are the oldest symptoms of all value judgments, but not their causes. Above all, pleasure does not arise from the 'satisfaction' of willing. Since there exists no 'goal' of willing, there exists also no final state in which willing could satisfy itself. Nothing was more hateful to Nietzsche's Nordic-tense nature than the Oriental idea of blissful repose, the concept of the 'Sabbath of Sabbaths'

of Augustine. *His doctrine of will is the most perfect expression of his Germanism.* 'Happiness ('pleasure') as the goal of action is only an intensifying means of tension: it must not be confused with happiness that lies in the action itself. Final happiness is quite specific; the happiness in the action would have to be designated by a hundred such specific images of happiness'. The 'in order that' is an illusion: the agent mirrors a happiness for himself that he wants to reap and over that forgets the actual driving force. The imagined goal is only there in order to heighten the desire for discharge to its highest point. 'An overflowing charged feeling of power exists: the imagined goal of the action anticipates the release and thereby excites even more to discharge: the subsequent action gives the actual release'.

We say we want 'something'; in truth something wants in us. This something mirrors an image, a goal to us that now works as motive, in truth it is always only the force that 'urges'. *All our actions, all our thoughts come unconnected, each one separately, out from the same depth of our self.* Consciousness only looks on. 'Everything that enters consciousness is the last link of a chain, a conclusion. That one thought would be directly cause of another thought is only apparent. The actual connected happening plays itself out below our consciousness: the appearing rows and successions of feelings, thoughts, etc. are symptoms of the actual happening! Under every thought hides an affect. Every thought, every feeling, every will is not born from one specific drive, but it is an overall state, an entire surface of the whole consciousness and results from the momentary power constellation of all the drives that constitute us, thus of the currently reigning drive as well as of those obeying or resisting it. The next thought is a sign of how the overall power situation has shifted in the meantime'. Every action is separated by an infinity from the 'pale conscious image' that we have of it during execution. 'Purposes are signs, nothing more'. 'Whereas otherwise the copy is inferior to the original, here, in contrast, the lived, in the feeling of power, freedom, pleasure that goes with it, is vastly different from any picture that can be made of what has been lived'. While consciousness believes it makes the decision and directs, from its viewpoint, really the commanding comes from somewhere else: 'it decides only that whatever decided steps into consciousness. The one who commands is in turn commanded'.

One must gauge at this decisive rejection of the pleasure-displeasure principle the worth of the Nietzsche interpretations in which the philosopher of will to power is opposed to the pessimist Schopenhauer as Dionysian hunter of pleasure. Nietzsche's philosophy moves beyond the pleasure and displeasure principle and thus also beyond the contrast between optimism and pessimism.

To the model the copy usually follows; here, in contrast, a kind of copy precedes the model. In truth we

never fully know what we do, for example when we want to take a step or want to utter a sound. Perhaps this 'wanting' is only a pale shadow of what is really already in becoming, a following depiction of our being able and doing: sometimes a thoroughly false one, where we do not seem able to do what we want'.

Into the most everyday notions the concept of purpose and will corrupts all reality for us. Everywhere we find a purposiveness of nature, but that which we 'will' and that which we do are something different. No bridge leads across. 'I eat in order to sate myself', but what do I know of what satiation is! In truth, satiation is reached but not willed, the momentary sensation of pleasure at every bite, as long as hunger is there, is the motive: not the intention 'in order to', but an attempt at every bite whether it still tastes. Our actions are attempts whether this or that drive takes pleasure in it, up to the most intricate, playful expressions of the urge toward activity that we misinterpret and misunderstand through the theory of purposes.

There exists only a terminological, not a factual contradiction when Nietzsche sometimes wholly denies will and then speaks of will to power after all. What he denies is conscious, goal setting will that belongs to the fabricated beings of the 'inner world'. The basic principle of his psychology therefore is: 'Sensation and thinking are sufficient here. Willing as something third is an illusion'. *Will to power is not a willing but a being-able-to; it is the really working unity in whose place idealism allows consciousness to be active.* The mistake of previous philosophers was to ascribe to the unity of consciousness what in reality, as Nietzsche calls it, the unity of power effects. In the concept of will to power modern anti-Cartesianism reaches its high point. Therefore the main work also bears this concept as title.

The 'monstrous errors' of idealism can be systematically summed up as follows (Will to Power, 529). *The basic mistake is the 'nonsensical overestimation of consciousness' from which a unity, a being has been made that feels, thinks, and wills.* This being is called 'spirit'. Everywhere purposiveness, system, coordination appear, this spirit is assumed as 'cause'. Consciousness emerges as the highest kind of being, as God. Everywhere that there is effect, the effect of a will is assumed. The true world appears as spiritual world and thus is only accessible through the 'facts of consciousness'. Cognition is grasped as activity of consciousness. From these basic assumptions, consequences of decisive importance are drawn. These consequences are: Every progress lies in the direction of becoming conscious; and becoming conscious is retrogression; one approaches reality through logic, one removes oneself from it through the senses; approaching 'spirit' means approaching God; everything good must stem from spirituality, must be fact of consciousness; progress toward the better can only mean progress in becoming conscious.

Like Ludwig Feuerbach before him, Nietzsche sees in the philosophy of spirit from Descartes to Hegel a daughter of Christian theology. His critique of consciousness and will is simultaneously a critique of the Christian interpretation of the world. The idealistic conception of the world is only a 'philosophical-moral cosmology and theodicy'. It proceeds from highest values and goals that life serves, but with that a means ('spirit') is misunderstood as purpose, while life is degraded to a means for it in reversal. Everything is judged from the conscious world of spirit. Yet the 'conscious world' cannot serve as starting point of values: an 'objective valuation' is necessary. Not spirit can form the starting point of all our evaluations because spirit, as doer (e.g., in our thinking), is fabricated. Our thoughts, too, stem from the depth of the overall unity that we are. What steps into consciousness is always already something derived and often something deceptive. Reality spreads out in immeasurable depth beneath the surface world of consciousness. It is no chaos but the well-ordered realm of will to power. 'In view of the immense and threefold interworking back and forth, as the total life of every organism represents it, its conscious world of feelings, intentions, value estimations is a small corner. We lack all right to posit this piece of consciousness as purpose, as why? for that total phenomenon of life: *becoming conscious is evidently only one means more in the unfolding and enhancement of life. Therefore it is foolishness to posit pleasure or spirituality or morality or some particularity of the sphere of consciousness as highest value: and perhaps even to justify the 'world' out of them*' (Will to Power, 707).

Nietzsche treats the theological, moral, and hedonistic judgment and justification of life as on equal footing: they are 'fancies in interpretation' that measure life with factors of consciousness ('pleasure and displeasure,' 'good and evil'). Instead of understanding consciousness as tool and particular in the total life, the relation is reversed, and a spiritual world is applied as standard of life. All real acting coming from the depth of being appears distorted and falsified in this optics: instead of struggling vital unities one believes to see an imaginary world of consciousness unities moving straightforwardly, determined by spiritual values. That is the faulty perspective from a part upon the whole from which the tendency of idealistic philosophers emerges to imagine a 'total consciousness', a 'spirit', or a 'God'. Thereby meaning is displaced out of life, existence becomes a 'monstrum', something that must be condemned. 'Precisely that we have eliminated the purposive and means-setting total consciousness: that is our great relief... Our greatest reproach against existence was the existence of God...' (Will to Power, 707).

From this point Nietzsche's whole philosophical system can be surveyed. The unified basic thought of his theoretical as of his practical philosophy becomes visible here. The struggle against consciousness, against the

subject, will, spirit in the theoretical sphere corresponds to the struggle against distinguishing 'good' and 'evil', against 'guilt', 'bad conscience', and moral 'responsibility' in the practical sphere. Nietzsche must combat the Christian conception of God because through it the character of existence as he recognizes it is suspended: *'As soon as we imagine someone who is responsible for our being thus and so (God, nature) and hence attribute our existence, our happiness and misery to his intention, we corrupt the innocence of becoming. We then have someone who wants to achieve something through us and with us'* (Will to Power, 552).

The secret of the struggle Nietzsche wages against the concept of God is thereby spoken out. A fleeting note of the Nachlass reads: 'The refutation of God, properly only the moral God is refuted'. So it is only the priestly concept of God against which the struggle is directed, the God of the priests is dead. In our thinking there can only exist a God who leaves existence, eternal becoming its innocence. As if carved in hard stone stand here the words that circumscribe his religion of fate: 'No one is responsible for the fact that he exists at all, that he is thus and thus constituted, that he exists under these circumstances, in this environment. The fatality of his being is not to be disentangled from the fatality of everything that was and will be. He is not the consequence of an intention, a will, a purpose, the attempt is not undertaken with him to achieve 'an ideal of man' or 'an ideal of happiness' or 'an ideal of morality', it is absurd to want to unload his being onto some purpose' (Twilight of the Idols, the Four Great Errors). There exists no 'critique of being', for this would presuppose that we have a firm standpoint outside of being from which we can evaluate it. But in every evaluation itself this being is still there, whether we say yes or no to existence, we always only do what we are. All value estimations are only consequences and perspectives in the service of will to power (Will to Power, 675). But will to power is only another word for the innocence of becoming.

From this central concept Nietzsche elucidates his own will to philosophy and the paths of this will, he interprets himself with the help of a fundamental concept of his system:

*'How long has it been now that I have been conscious in myself of demonstrating the perfect innocence of becoming! And what strange paths have I pursued toward that goal! Once this seemed to me the right solution: that I declared, 'existence, as something of the nature of a work of art, is absolutely not under the jurisdiction of morality; morality itself belongs much more to the realm of creation'. Another time I said, 'all concepts of guilt are entirely worthless objectively; subjectively however all life is necessarily unjust and illogical'. A third time I gained denial to myself of all purposes and felt the unrecognizability of causal connections. And what was all this for? Was it not to create for myself the feeling of complete irresponsibility,*

*to place myself outside all praise and blame, independent of all before and now, in order to run toward my goal in my own way?'*

When Nietzsche made his first reflections about the work that was to become his actual philosophical main work, for which Thus Spoke Zarathustra was to mean only the 'vestibule', he wrote down for himself among other things also the title: 'The Innocence of Becoming. A Guide to the Redemption of Morality'. A more active, more highly charged one has displaced this title. But nothing is better suited to let what is essential be understood in its philosophical significance than that title which could never be misunderstood, that first draft title. This title wants to say: As soon as we posit a being independent of and above becoming, reality is robbed of its meaning. It becomes an 'apparent' world beside the real one, it becomes superfluous. The hypothesis of a 'true' being thus stands in the service of slandering the world. Becoming is in truth 'equal in value at every moment... expressed differently: it has no value at all, for something is lacking by which to measure it' (Will to Power, 708). There exists no counterpart of life from which existence can be reflected upon; there exists no instance before which life could be ashamed: therein consists the innocence of becoming. Life has no judge above it: 'one must recognize the absurdity of this existence-judging gesture' (Will to Power, 675). To determine what is, how it is, seems to the realist something infinitely higher, more serious than any 'it should be thus' (Will to Power, 333). 'A man as he should be: that sounds to us as absurd as 'a tree as it should be'' (Will to Power, 332). Morality contains nothing but desiderata, but precisely when man dreams up ideals for himself does he become small. 'One cannot have enough respect for man as soon as one views him with respect to how he manages to struggle through, endure situations, turn circumstances to his advantage, defeat opponents; in contrast, when one views man in terms of his desires, he is the most absurd beast...' (Will to Power, 335). In all desiring there is something feminine: it is as if man 'needed a refuge of cowardice, pettiness, weakness, sweetness, subservience to rest from his strong and manly virtues' (Ibid.).

From a philosophic point of view, the exclusion of any ideal end state by the concept of 'innocence' is particularly noteworthy. The presence of the present belongs to innocence: the 'present must never be justified for the sake of a future or the past for the sake of the present'. Therefore, it is necessary 'to deny an overall consciousness of becoming, an over-God, in order not to place what happens under the perspective of a sympathizing, jointly knowing and yet wanting nothing being' (Will to Power, 708). If such a being has once been imagined, if then the belief in the 'real' world behind the actual one, the belief in morality, the highest values and purposes of life has refuted itself by the logic of things, then a state is reached in which that fundamental error breaks out everywhere like a

pathogenic agent that was inoculated into a healthy body, then we face the phenomenon of nihilism, the treatment of which the main work was to begin with (Will to Power, 1 ff). *Nihilism means that the supreme values devalue themselves, nihilism is the logic of our ideals thought to an end* (Will to power, Preface).

It is commonly thought that Nietzsche did nothing more than register the fact of European nihilism, that he was essentially a critic, a mere destroyer who left it to others to build up. It is with these accusations as with the cheap findings of his 'atheism'. Nietzsche revealed nihilism on the ground of modern culture, he mercilessly unmasked the chaos of the modern soul; but he also erected a new image of the world and man in pure greatness. *His significance does not consist in the fact that he did what so many did before him, he also had weary hours: that he formulated 'new' values, 'new' ideals, but rather that he allowed us to look deeper into the depths of reality than any thinker before him.* He did not coldly and impotently describe the world of ruins that surrounds the man raised by idealism, but he also allowed the order to be seen that was always there and always will be. This demonstration of the eternal order of the world, which constitutes his actual philosophical achievement, is closely connected with his belief in fate. He only distorted the false order of consciousness to put the true order of the 'will to power' in its place in the realm of our thoughts, just as he denied the moral God the right to exist without fighting God.

## 6. The Heraclitean World

*Philosophy, which begins with the subject, the 'facts of consciousness', ends with the assumption of a collective consciousness or a world of spiritual values.* Every philosophy of 'objective value judgment' culminates in the statement that there is a 'total phenomenon of life', a unity of life from which all our thoughts and actions emerge. The will to power is just another name for this unity.

So under this will we have to understand not a subjective phenomenon, an effort of will or excitement of will, but something objective: the good order as the reality of life. The unity of the organism and the entirety of life, indeed of existence in general, are thereby regarded by Nietzsche as identical in essence. The immense difference that exists between the human body and the cosmos does not matter when we consider in both cases the structure that follows from the basic nature of the will to power, because both, body and cosmos, are infinitely articulated multiplicities, constituted by the will to power. 'We can take our body apart, and then we get exactly the same idea of it as of the starry sky, and the difference between organic and inorganic no longer catches the eye' (Will to Power, 676).

The 'soul', from which finally the 'subject' of the idealists emerged, may have been an attractive and mysterious idea, but perhaps, says Nietzsche, what we

are now learning to exchange it for is even more attractive and mysterious (Will to power, 659). [*Original footnote: Similar words of Novalis, which mean the opposite: 'The external is only an internal raised to mystery status'. Novalis starts from the inside, the outside is valid for him only as a symbol. His thought therefore presupposes that the inner is closer to us than the outer. Nietzsche thinks the other way around. Peace is no novel. To bring him into this context means to dispute his fateful position in the history of Europe and to deprive his philosophy of its meaning*]. 'The human body, in which the whole farthest and nearest past of all organic becoming comes alive again, through which, over which and beyond which an immense, inaudible stream seems to flow: the body is a more astonishing idea than the old 'soul''. 'Following the guide of the body' he wanders through the realms of nature and history. *The body is the most perfect illumination of the will to power, it is that phenomenon in which we find all the features of this will most purely pronounced. Basically Nietzsche's philosophy is a Hymn to the Reality of the Body. It is the philosophy of a genuinely Hellenic instinct.*

*But what is the body?* It is a political structure, an aristocracy (Will to Power, 660). Not in subjective ideas and moods, not in accidental volitions and motions does the will to power manifest itself, but in the 'structure of domination' that we call body. 'The greater complexity, the sharp demarcation, the juxtaposition of the fully developed organs and functions with the disappearance of the intermediaries, if that is perfection, then a will to power emerges in the organic process, by virtue of which commanding, shaping, governing forces continually increase the territory of their power and constantly simplify it again within that territory: the imperative growing' (Will to Power, 644). Life, as we have seen, is to be defined as a 'permanent form' of processes of power determinations, where the different fighters themselves grow unequally (see above p. 46).

This explanation is continued by Nietzsche in such a way that the political character of the organism becomes completely clear: 'Insofar as there is also resistance in obeying; self-authority is by no means given up. Likewise, in commanding there is an admission that the absolute power of the opponent has not been defeated, not incorporated, dissolved. 'Obeying' and 'commanding' are forms of the struggle game' (Will to Power, 642).

The struggle to which the philosophy of the will to power reduces all events is therefore not a meaningless rage of forces against each other. It bears an order within itself, and it is necessary to understand the idea of this order if one wants to understand Nietzsche's philosophy.

Again, the lack of closure of the system is painfully noticeable. But in the posthumous works there are pieces with which we can close this gap. In the organic being, says one record, not an iron being, a



subject wants to preserve itself, but the struggle itself wants to preserve itself, wants to grow and become conscious. *'What we call 'consciousness' and 'mind' is only a means and tool by means of which not a subject, but a struggle wants to preserve itself.* The human being is the testimony of what immense forces can be set in motion by a small being of multiple contents (or by a perennial struggle concentrated on many small beings). Beings that play with stars', so there is still something besides the struggle: it is that which lets the struggle 'perenniate', which makes possible the 'enduring form' of the living, which builds up the 'dominion-structure' of the body, that which prevents the combatants from destroying each other and the end from occurring. This can be nothing that lies outside the struggle, this assumption does not fit a system that wants to depict becoming 'from within'. It cannot be a 'law' that prescribes rules to the struggle, it can only be the equilibrium that establishes itself in and through the struggle itself, and thus maintains the struggle. 'The struggle as the means to equilibrium' is indeed the wording of one of the notes. The context of the 'will to power' demands that this proposition retain its meaning even when reversed; equilibrium is a means to struggle.

In the quoted sentence and its inversion, in my view, culminates the philosophical train of thought of the 'will to power'. When we read elsewhere that an equilibrium has never been reached, proving that it is not possible (Will to Power, 1064), this does not constitute an objection. For under the 'equilibrium situation' stagnation is to be understood ('if stagnation were possible, it would have occurred'), *the word 'equilibrium' here thus has a purely mechanical meaning. On the other hand, the proposition of struggle as a means of equilibrium has a metaphysical meaning.*

**To make this clear, it must be said what Nietzsche understands by struggle.**

Nothing stands in the way of understanding Nietzsche's philosophical system with such stubbornness as the prejudice, born of inadequate interpretation of his writings, that he 'changed' several times. *In truth, in the whole history of philosophy there are few thinkers who have pursued a single idea with such certainty from youth onward as Nietzsche.* One must not be deceived by the difference in mode of expression; in the following section this in itself completely enigmatic change of 'attitudes' will be explained: Nietzsche's writings are the works of a fencer; each individual work is to be understood from a respectively determined fencer's position. Behind the change of position remains the basic conception of the Heraclitean world unchanged. As it dawned on the youth, so the man presented it in the 'Will to Power' with the unfolded powers of his whole being. The agreement is so complete that we can even use sentences about Heraclitus from the fragment on 'Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks' in the interpretation of the Will to Power.

With truly wonderful determination the young Nietzsche knew how to keep himself free from the moral ideas of his time. From the very beginning he had access to a world that lay before him in pure clarity, untouched by the mendacious and effeminate concepts of bourgeois humanity. The youth sees a thunderstorm. Then he writes to a friend: 'What was that eternal 'you shall', 'you shall not!' How different the storm, the hail: free powers without ethics! (to v. Gersdorff on April 7, 1866). Not the form of eternal symbols: the joy of fighting and winning, the candid view of the world as an eternal struggle of forces alienates him from bourgeois morality. World more directly and deeply than the mystical-musical youth work on tragedy leads the little fragment on Börne's championship into his conception of life. To him, the championship seems to be 'the noblest Hellenic basic idea'. As he recognizes, the Greek genius allowed good Eris to prevail, nothing separates the Greek world so much from ours. How barbaric, how deeply bourgeois, but how true it is when he defines in that fragment: 'the cruelty of victory is the pinnacle of the joy of life'. One does not understand Nietzsche's life and writings if one does not observe what value the experience and concept of struggle and victory have for him. In the later preface to the writing that separated him from Wagner (Human, All Too Human), the most significant event of his life shines before us as an event of victory: '...a mysterious question-rich questionable victory, but still the first victory ...'. In the preface to 'The Gay Science', any philosophy that values peace higher than war is interpreted as a symptom of illness. And in 'Twilight of the Idols' (Morality as Anti-Nature) it says: '...One has renounced the great life if one renounces war ...'.

In bourgeois-humanitarian society, struggle is treated as something that should not be, at best, as something to be excused. In this society, love is considered the highest, a feeling, then, a state of mind, something subjective in any case, and above all something ambiguous, which can be understood as Eros, as sex or also as love of God. Nothing reflects the ambiguity, i.e., the inwardness of the bourgeois personality better than this slippery concept. Where amor and caritas clasp hands in the shadow of banks, that is the place of this society.

A single word from the young Nietzsche illuminates harshly the historical relativity of this theoretically constituted by 'love', practically by lies world: 'Envy is much more strongly pronounced among the Greeks. The concept of justice is much more important than with us: after all, Christianity knows no justice'. What does this word signify? Nietzsche must be quite at home in the depths of another cosmos in order to be able to utter it at all. After all, the Christian God is portrayed as the just judge, the life of the Christian is delimited by an act of divine jurisdiction, the Last Judgment.

*Iudex ergo cum sedebit,*

*Quidquid latet apparebit,  
Nil inultum remanebit.*

How does Nietzsche come to deny Christianity justice? Because he lives entirely in the Heraclitean idea of justice. Ultimately foreign and incomprehensible to him is the idea of a rewarding and punishing justice, indeed the idea of judgment in general, whereby there is a morally accused, an enthroned father and an objective verdict. This juridical way of thinking only paves the way for judgments according to the criteria of 'good' and 'evil'. *It belongs to a kind of people who are not active, who merely react.* The reactive human, the human of resentment, ultimately derives demands on others from 'justice'. But to be righteous is always a positive behavior: 'The active, attacking, overreaching human is still placed a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive one' (Genealogy of Morals, II, 11). The attacking human is closer to justice than the reactive one, because justice can be anything except what the reactive human would like to make of it: a means to abolish struggle, to equalize opposites, to peace. A legal system that would not be 'a means in the struggle of power complexes', but a means against all struggle, Nietzsche calls a life-hostile principle, a destroyer and dissolver of man, a sign of fatigue, an oblique path to nothingness (Ibid.). It is morality that teaches us to take this oblique path, the morality of the 'good and just', with whom lies the greatest danger for all human future (Zarathustra, Of Old and New Tablets, 27). Strictly speaking, justice becomes the virtue of the last humans: 'And when they say, 'I am just', it always sounds the same as, 'I am avenged!'' (Zarathustra, On the Virtuous). The vindictive human, the human of resentment, wants all humans to be equal. But Zarathustra teaches: 'for no human child is equal: so speaks justice' (Of the Scholars).

Inequality and struggle are the prerequisites of justice. This justice does not rule over the world, not over the turmoil of the combatants, it knows no guilt and no responsibility, no trial and no judgment: it is immanent in the struggle. Therefore it is not possible in a world of peace. Justice can only exist where forces freely measure themselves against each other. Under an absolute authority, in an order of things that knows a divine lord, in the realm of *Pax Romana*, there is no more justice, because there is no more struggle. There the world congeals into a conventional form. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees: justice is reborn anew from the struggle itself every moment, struggle is the father of all things, it makes the lord the lord and the slave the slave. So Heraclitus of Ephesus speaks. But that is also ancient Germanic view: in the struggle it turns out who is noble and who is not; through innate courage the lord becomes lord, and through his cowardice the slave becomes slave. Therein is also expressed the eternal justice: it structures and separates, it creates the order of the world, it is the originator of all rank.

*Thus from the core idea of Greek-Germanic metaphysics arises Nietzsche's great doctrine: that there is not one morality, but only a morality of masters and a morality of slaves (Beyond Good and Evil, 260).*

Justice is not restored by a forensic act, which is externally, but it establishes itself through the deeds by itself. If Schopenhauer's main work bears the title: 'The World as Will and Representation', Nietzsche's work could bear the title: 'The World as Deed and Justice' or shorter, expressing the latter: 'The World as Struggle'. This latter is just another version of the innocence of becoming. *The 'innocence' consists in the fact that with all doing there is no doer, but that something happens, that there is no 'subject', no purposes and no causal connections.* But 'doer' means the same as responsible agent. The real deed is thus actually excluded, for the real agent is a fighter, a power quantum that draws all consequences from its own power every moment. A power center is no responsible 'subject'. The decisive thing is the elimination of consciousness and responsibility: in this idea all the lines of Nietzsche's philosophy intersect. From it follows the non-forensic consideration of human existence. There is a judge of life only if there is a 'spirit'. The spirit not only confronts life, but it is above it and it is precisely by this that the innocence of the struggle is abolished. The struggle is now no longer decided by the struggling, but by a transcendent power for which not strength but 'good conscience' is decisive. If consciousness falls, so does the idea of responsibility and judgment, life regains its innocence.

Nietzsche's warlike nature manifests itself not only in his polemical writings, in his agonal relationship to Schopenhauer, Wagner and Bismarck, in the reckless courage with which he attacks the oldest and most revered; his warrior nature also determines the character of all his thoughts. The exclusion of forensic thinking is a necessary consequence of the fact that Nietzsche is a warrior down to his instincts. For it is warlike to live constantly in the face of an 'other', to constantly feel tension towards certain forces. *Force against force, which is the character of life.* On the other hand, it is priestly to judge and evaluate life from an absolute standpoint above life. The priest appeals to God, and thus he is released from the struggle. By virtue of the special relationship with God which he claims, he is right without having won.

The type of the priest thus stands directly opposed to that of the warrior. It is no coincidence that peoples like the Germans and the Greeks do not know priests in the sense of Mediterranean cultures. If the priest takes up the sword, he does not thereby become a warrior, but he becomes a crusader, a defender of the highest God, a fanatic. He fights for the Absolute, which wins in any case; if it does not win through him now, it will win later. It is clear that with such an appeal to the Absolute, the idea of justice or fate is impossible. For the

warrior there is no Absolute; he knows only his own strength and fate. The priestly and the martial system exclude each other.

Throughout his life, Nietzsche has lain in battle against two historical worlds: against the priestly-romantic and against the rational-enlightenment (Cf. above). His Heraclitean system gives us information about the profound necessity of the line management of these fronts.

The world of the priest and the world of the Enlightenment have in common that genuine struggle and justice do not occur in them. The priest judges and then wages wars of annihilation to execute the judgment he has declared divine. How different the world of the Enlightener appears in contrast, and yet an absolute is also worshiped here. In place of the genuflection before the Holy steps the embarrassed bow before reason. In both worlds the free struggle of forces is banned with a great spell. Forces and their opposites are not recognized at all by the Enlightener. He knows only rational beings with feeling and taste, subjects whose judgments can be corrected, educated, everything else is 'crude' nature. His highest concept is a harmony that excludes serious contradiction, real struggle. In place of the struggle of forces among themselves comes the reasonable and moral struggle of enlightened minds against the superstition, stupidity and malice of men. That is no longer struggle in the sense of the born warrior: *how could one fight if one knows one is right from the start?* how could one fight in a world where there is no struggle, where there are only degrees of understanding, enlightenment and education! Every power has its perspective, and it fights within this perspective. So there is no struggle for reason, for happiness, for progress. Victory has already been won, good is on one side, on the other is only evil. In this respect, the Enlightener is a secularized priest: as the latter stands in the light of God, so he stands in the light of reason.

But the Enlightener considers himself higher than the priest, he even surpasses him in orthodoxy. Which is possible because he has one thing ahead of him: the idea of tolerance. In his fanaticism the priest has greatness; he is able to become a hero in contradiction to his doctrine. That is why Zarathustra passes by the priests. Only the crusaders spoil the decent game of combat with their faith, they know nothing of justice.

But justice is killed with its smells by the enlighteners. The idea of tolerance is the opposite of justice: it abolishes the contrast, it confuses the order of things, because it calls the struggle itself something to be condemned. The priest invented the guilty conscience and morality in order to win and rule, he fights against the unbelievers because he believes himself to be in grace, while they dwell in damnation. The Enlightener pretends no longer to want to fight, conquer and rule, he serves morality alone. He is too enlightened to still erect

stakes, he erects 'chairs of virtue'. He is content to have a good conscience and to teach that his opponents do not have one. He calls this tolerance: the denial of opposites, so that he can rule without the trouble of fighting. And that is philosophy to him: the reduction of everything alive and powerful to pendulums of consciousness, to 'reason' and 'will'. Thus he makes the great small and the small great. The priest fights for the cause of God. But when the enlightened bourgeois wages war, he must invent a 'good cause' worth fighting for, because he only ever fights with a good conscience in principle. 'You say it is the good cause that even sanctifies war? I tell you: it is the good war that sanctifies every cause' (Zarathustra, On War and the Warrior People). But the moralism of the Enlightener must end with the complete rejection of war. The unheroic existence, life without great goals, the 'miserable fuss' is finally presented as a moral duty, war, which unleashes heroism, is damned.

***Modern history has two epochs: the epoch of priestly values is followed by the epoch of moral values.***

Nietzsche's psychology of the priest (of resentment) in 'Genealogy' is the continuation of the struggle against morality begun by 'Dawn'. Despite the distance that speaks in favor of the priest, the servants of the Holy and the servants of reason are of the same kind: they rebel in the name of the Absolute, they condemn, they curse instead of fighting. But at the same time they make use of human, all too human means to enforce their ends. *In order to achieve victory, morality must become immoral. For moral values to come to power, all sorts of immoral forces and affects must help* (Will to Power, 266). The Enlightener cannot tolerate this contradiction. He lacks the honesty and courage it takes to fight a state of affairs founded on contradiction. The Enlightener can stand it amidst the lie of Christian civilization, he has a good conscience even in the lie. But that is the psychological formula for anarchy. The order based on the rule of consciousness is only an apparent one: it is not based on the essence of things, it contradicts reality. When people believe in a fictitious harmony, in a world without forces and opposites, then chaos sets in. Nature is not chaotic; it is the realm of strict justice. The world of men becomes chaotic when they try to emancipate themselves from the justice that lies in the essence of things, when they deny the will to power.

Nihilism, chaos is the necessary consequence of the belief in a harmony without struggle, an order without opposites. The true order arises from the domination relations produced by the will to power. Human, we add, is a world in which the order of rank prevails, not a world in which moral concepts call the shots. Only chaos is inhuman. The rule of tolerance and moral ideas, of reason and pity, in short of 'humanity', leads to inhumanity.

If one wants to get an idea of the unity and consistency of Nietzsche's thinking, then one must read the section on Heraclitus and the concept of justice in the

segment on 'Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks'. Surrounded by quotes from Schopenhauer's main work, which stand without inner connection to the communicated vision, one finds here the fundamental thought of the 'Will to Power' in wonderful clarity. An 'awful and deafening idea' is called the eternal and sole becoming, the complete inconstancy of all actuality. Heraclitus has understood that all opposing qualities in the world are chained together 'like two wrestlers', of which now one, now the other gets the upper hand. The world is a mixing bowl that has to be constantly stirred. '*Out of the war of opposites all becoming arises: the definite and enduringly appearing qualities merely express the momentary predominance of one fighter...*'. And yet there is something lasting in the eternal conflict, the mixing bowl is indeed stirred 'constantly'. Mere conflict would undo itself. To Heraclitus, the Greek, this conflict reveals eternal justice. 'It is a wonderful idea, drawn from the purest well of Hellenic thought, which regards strife as the ever-present activity of a unified, strict justice tied to eternal laws. Only a Greek was able to find this idea as the foundation of a world view; it is Hesiod's good Eris transformed into a world principle, it is the competitive idea of individual Greeks and of the Greek state, transferred from the gymnasiums and wrestling schools, from the athletic contests, from the struggles of political parties and cities with one another into the most general, so that now the wheelwork of the cosmos revolves in itself. As every Greek struggles as if he alone were in the right, and an infinitely precise measure of judicial verdict determines every moment where victory inclines, so struggle the qualities with one another according to unbreakable laws immanent to the struggle and standards. The things themselves, whose existence and duration the narrow human and beastly mind believes in, have no real existence at all, they are the glitter and sparks of swinging swords, they are the flashing of victory in the fight between opposing qualities'.

All decisive positions of Nietzsche are contained herein germ: his rejection of the philosophy of the subject, teleology, the concept of causality, his struggle against optimism, moralism and progress. The worldview of the will to power is anticipated here, and the concept of justice as the deepest concept of this worldview is revealed. Where has this concept gone later? Why does the 'Will to Power' contain no section on justice?

In the world of thought of the young Nietzsche, justice plays an important role. It appears not only as a main concept in the characterization of Aeschylean tragedy (*The Birth of Tragedy*, 9), but also forms the ideal centerpoint of the two most important 'Untimely Meditations'. In the second 'Untimely One,' he who possesses the drive and the 'power for justice' is designated as the most venerable specimen of the human species. Justice is contrasted with objectivity, 'objectivity and justice have nothing to do with each

other' (*On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*, 6). By objectivity is meant the 'cold and contemptuous neutrality of the so-called scientific man' (Schopenhauer as Educator, 4). The power for justice enables man to overcome 'common empirical truth' in recognizing history through a deeper and more just perception of things. The historical world does not reveal itself to scientific curiosity and objectivity: only from the highest power of the present can the past be interpreted. Justice includes not tolerance and allowance to pass, but strength and greatness.

If we follow the hints given to us by the 'Untimely Meditations' with their decisive coordination of the concepts of justice and cognition, then we receive an answer to the most difficult question in Nietzsche's philosophy: the question of the possibility of cognition. In the face of the problem of cognition, the philosophy of the 'Will to Power' is in a dangerous position. Here idealism has its strongest position, here every relativism is doomed to failure. A metaphysics of justice certainly could not be relativistic, justice precludes relativism. The question therefore has to be: is there a connection between this concept and the philosophy of the will to power?

According to the doctrine of the will to power, all human doing and thinking can be traced back to drives. Even the will to truth can only be a drive to power: the greatest part of conscious thinking, even of philosophical thinking, belongs among the instinctive activities (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 3). How would an 'egotistical' drive to power be connected with pure cognition? Yet there is no pure cognition if one understands by it the cognition of an 'uninvolved', cold subject observing objects, for there is no such subject. Cognition must be relative to the cognizer. But since the cognizer is a quantum of power, cognition must have a relation to the power of the cognizer. All thinking is a form of the will to rule, every drive that makes use of consciousness for thinking 'wants to get somewhere'. In the long history of *Homo Sapiens* all fundamental drives of man 'have already practiced philosophy once'. Each individual would only too gladly present precisely itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and as the 'united master' of all other drives. 'For every drive is imperious: and as such it attempts to philosophize' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 6).

If one conceives the world of the will to power as a chaos of wildly clashing forces, then cognition is impossible. However, the world envisioned by Nietzsche bears an eternal order within itself: only by the more powerful can the weaker be overcome, there is no arbitrariness; the formula of the will to power is the formula of a law, a 'law' different, to be sure, from what has been known so far. With this, no 'law' above things is denoted, no general law beyond, to which everything on this side counts merely as a 'case', but the law is in the things themselves, in their prevailing and

succumbing, in the way they relate to one another. It is nothing other than the lasting relation of the struggling forces themselves in change. This relation, this equilibrium, is what Heraclitus understood by eternal justice.

Nietzsche's doctrine of cognition follows from this concept of justice. The transcendent concept of the 'law' corresponds to a transcendent subject of cognition hovering neutrally, uninvolved, 'disinterestedly' above things and therefore called 'pure'. From the immanent concept of law, however, it follows that every drive, every organizing center of power, can only bring its cognition as far as its 'will to power' extends. Only insofar and as strongly as the individual participates in the struggle is he able to cognize. This struggle is conducted with all means, also with the aid of consciousness. In the intoxication of victory Nietzsche conceded too little to this means. But his basic view remains: what cognizes, what philosophizes, is the will to power and not consciousness. It depends on the pathos, on the thinker's power, how far he gets in cognition. He who has the most widely stretched will, the highest power, also has the highest justice, and he also comes closest to the truth. For there is justice only where there is power. There is no justice without power, but there is also no true power without justice.

Only the superior, only the ruling one is able to establish 'justice', i.e., set up a standard by which things are measured; and the more powerful he is, the further he can go in 'letting-be'. This is what we read in a note from the time of the 'Will to Power'. And similarly: 'Justice as sanction of a widely surveying power; which looks beyond the small perspectives of good and evil, thus has a wider horizon: of advantage, the intention to preserve something that is more than this or that person'. Justice and power thus stand in a necessary relation to one another. But what can the highest power be other than the power of the whole? Justice is only another word for the existence of this whole, for the self-preservation of this whole which, in order to be power for all eternity, keeps itself in balance for all eternity, and which only keeps itself in balance in order to affirm itself in the struggle of all qualities against one another for all eternity.

The will to power is therefore only another expression for the highest justice. Man does not cognize because he has consciousness, consciousness is only a means, but he cognizes, i.e., he has a relation to the whole, because in him the will to power reaches the highest point among all beings, because he comes closest to eternal justice.

That our interpretation is on the right track is shown by a brief sketch of tremendous import: 'Justice as building, separating, annihilating way of thinking, emerging from the valuations: highest representative of life itself'.

If justice can be called the 'highest representative of life itself', then the definition of truth that corresponds to the philosophy of the will to power also reads: truth is the highest representative of life itself.

## 7. Dionysus. The Eternal Recurrence

At its height, the philosophy of the will to power, the philosophy of eternal becoming, passes over into the concept of being. Becoming is (this 'Being' is not a being beside or above becoming, rather, this 'Being' is merely an expression for the duration, self-preservation, immanent order, and justice of becoming itself).

The problem of the transition from becoming to being occupied Nietzsche strongly. *Among the most famous passages of his philosophy is the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which objectively is nothing but an attempt to round off the image of eternal becoming and put an image of eternal being in its place.* Here, too, the will to power is decisive, except that it appears not as immanent power, as highest justice, but as the decree of an individual: Zarathustra. 'To imprint upon becoming the character of being, that is the supreme will to power... That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to that of being: the peak of contemplation' (Will to Power, 617).

In these sentences the thought of eternal recurrence appears connected with the fundamental thought of the system. Or more correctly: the thought of eternal recurrence seems to be there in order to suspend the system. As the concept of eternal recurrence appears, the Heraclitean character of the world disappears: 'I teach you the redemption from the eternal flux: the stream always flies back into itself, and you always step into the same stream, as the same ones'. Obviously, we are facing a contradiction here. Only one can be valid: either the doctrine of eternal recurrence or the doctrine of the will to power.

It is known that the thought of eternal recurrence goes back to a shock experienced by Nietzsche, recovering in the solitude of the Engadine, in August 1881. At the end of the 'Joyful Science', the thought is voiced for the first time, proclaimed by Zarathustra. It is not surprising that it particularly attracted attention and that one was inclined to assume the philosophical depth and significance of this thought had to correspond to the insistency with which it was presented. In truth, from the standpoint of Nietzsche's system, this thought is insignificant. We have to regard it as an expression of a highly personal experience that stands in no connection with the fundamental thought of the 'Will to Power', indeed, if taken seriously, it would blow up the context of the philosophy of the will to power. Only externally a relation to the will to power has been established in the cited sentences: the character of being is imprinted upon becoming by an individual. It arises through the action of a subject. *But the will to*

*power is not a designation for an experience or event, but a formula for what happens in general.* This formula has an objective meaning, hence its inner relation to the concept of justice. Through the thought of eternal recurrence everything is turned to the subjective. Nietzsche himself, as a unique person, appears religion-founder-like at the center of world events: for mankind it is always the hour of 'high noon' when this thought appears. Here it is less a matter of the value of the thought itself than of the effect it is supposed to have on mankind. It denotes a turning point in history: those who do not believe in it must die out. 'Only he who holds his existence to be eternally recurring remains behind: but among such a condition is possible that no utopian has yet reached'. He who incorporates this 'thought of thoughts' will be transformed by it. 'The criterion for everything I do: is it so that I want to do it countless times? that is the greatest weight'.

What Nietzsche, through the thought of eternal recurrence attempted to express objectively, the innocence and purposelessness of existence, the justification of life through itself, is expressed much more perfectly by his system. It must not be overlooked that the conception stems from a time when Nietzsche was still on the way to the system of the will to power. The idea of recurrence is the germ of the Zarathustra idea; however, it was not Nietzsche's intention to always want to remain Zarathustra. Zarathustra was merely a call intended to bring him companions. The integration of the Zarathustra idea into the later system is perhaps only due to the fact that this call went unheard. A factual integration of the idea of recurrence into the system is not possible: the former idea is a religious conception, the latter, however, a strictly philosophical context of thought; with the former the question of truth cannot be asked, here, however, it must be asked; there everything depends on the possible effect, here it is a matter of the immanent profundity of a new image of the world.

The religious fundamental character of the idea of recurrence lies open and has also been emphasized by Nietzsche. 'Let us impress the image of eternity upon our life! This thought contains more than all religions which despised this life as fleeting and taught to long for an indefinite other life'. 'The great noon' is a religious vision; Nietzsche appears to himself as a teacher of eternal recurrence similar to a savior: 'I teach you the redemption from the eternal flux...'. He reproached Plato for his 'Egyptianism': Plato dehistoricized the world by considering it *sub specie aeterni*. Now the religion-founder Nietzsche also accomplishes an Egyptification of the Heraclitean world. There is nothing in his philosophical system that this mummification of the becoming could be connected with, the idea of eternal recurrence stands alone in the 'Will to Power', an erratic boulder. There is no philosophy of eternal recurrence, there is only a religion of eternal recurrence. In yielding to the inspiration of the moment, Nietzsche for an instant succumbed to the god-forming instinct within himself.

The surest indication that here we no longer have to do with the philosopher Nietzsche is the 'Hymn and Seal of Eternity' related to recurrence, with which the third part of 'Zarathustra' closes, and which with its emphasis on the concept of love ('For I love you, O eternity!') stands in contrast to all the philosophical positions of Nietzsche.

A number of drafts for the main work indicate that Nietzsche also wanted to entitle the last chapter, 'The Eternal Recurrence', 'Dionysus. Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence'. Alongside these are drafts in which this last book contained no reference to the idea of recurrence. 'The Great War' it is entitled once, another time 'Struggle of False and True Values'. The editors of 'The Will to Power' have placed at the end *an aphorism that contains the most intimate connection of the concepts Dionysian world, eternal recurrence and will to power*. It is that prose masterpiece that begins with the words: 'And suppose you could look into my innermost soul, assuming I had one; do you believe you would find there that "thing-in-itself" called "world?" In the consequence of my train of thought lies the proof that this fragment does not present the ideal formula for Nietzsche's philosophical worldview, as has hitherto been assumed, but rather that one only has the choice either to regard the 'Will to Power' as Nietzsche's actual system, or to reject this system and declare Dionysism Nietzsche's actual philosophy.

The only concept common to the aforementioned aphorism and the system is that of force. Here the world is described as a 'play of forces and wave motions,' as a 'sea in itself storming and surging of forces', as something changing and always running back into itself. Eternal recurrence is interpreted as a symbol of the self-affirmation of this force. It gives eternal becoming the character of a movement 'that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness', it lends it the character of happiness whose symbol is the circle. The becoming, whose concept we gained in the previous pages, arises from the opposition of forces, and is only another word for the general struggle of forces against each other. Both conceptions agree in that there are no fixed things, no permanent conditions; but the system does allow laws of probability that permit foreseeing the outcome of the struggle in individual cases. The laws of nature are 'formulas of power relations'. Something corresponding would not be conceivable in the Dionysian world. This world is not cognitively accessible at all, and when it is to be characterized, only aesthetic concepts prove adequate: it is a world that always finds its way back from dissonance to harmony, 'returning home from fullness to simplicity, back from the play of contradictions to the joy of harmony'. Such a world can never be philosophically presented, and it is impossible in this Dionysian world of 'eternally self-creating, eternally self-destroying, this secret world of double voluptuousness', to recognize again the world as struggle as we described it above, that world of opposition and tension dominated by the strict law of unity, of justice,

resulting precisely from this tension. 'Dynamic quanta in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta' (Will to Power, 635), that is Nietzsche's formula for the world. *On the basis of this formula he constructed a physics and physiology, a psychology and an ethics. He could never have done this with the aid of his Dionysism.*

The question suggests itself whether the entire Nietzsche understanding of recent decades, lured by the pipes of the Dionysian pied piper, has not taken a false path. Again and again one has sought and found Dionysus in Nietzsche, and thereby overlooked the philosopher, the true friend of the Greeks, the pupil of Heraclitus. But when Nietzsche himself retrospectively asks himself by what paths he attempted to prove the innocence of becoming, he does not name Dionysus at all. Before himself he is the thinker of the Heraclitean world, not the disciple of Dionysus. The name Dionysus is only a sign for the countermovement initiated by the young Nietzsche against Christian morality; as a mask of the 'Antichrist' Dionysus is characterized in the later preface to 'The Birth of Tragedy'. For how else could he effectively name that 'revaluation': 'As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, though not without a certain liberty, for who knew the right name of the Antichrist?, with the name of a Greek god: I called it Dionysian'. *Founders of religions, fabricators of myths tend to be enthusiasts.* Nietzsche conceived the philosopher as the antitype of the enthusiast. 'There is nothing in me of a founder of religion' (Ecce Homo, Why I Am a Destiny). But just as the unforeseen solitude of this singular life brought with it that the pupil of Heraclitus had to become the poet of 'Zarathustra,' so too the struggle against Christian Europe brought with it that the philosopher grasped after symbols in order to be able to say more clearly what no one wanted to hear. How grateful he was for every sign that made communication possible for him. So he invented 'Dionysus versus the Crucified'. With this contrast the self-portrayal closes. But not in this form is what Nietzsche has to say against Christian Europe and for its salvation to be sought, that is to be found in the 'Will to Power'.

#### Note

With this presentation I complete the critique of Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian that I began in the introduction to my friend Manfred Schröter's edition of Bachofen. One has otherwise perhaps sought to approach Nietzsche's world of thought via the concept of myth. In contrast, I have presented evidence that 'The Birth of Tragedy' reveals no deeper relation to the religious-mythical sphere, but rather clearly reveals its origin from the spirit of modern music ('The Myth of Orient and Occident'. 1926. Pp. CCXLI ff) [*Original footnote: My delineation of the contrast between Bachofen's and Nietzsche's worlds has prompted Thomas Mann to also make efforts to defend Nietzsche in 'Parisian Accountability' and elsewhere. It is not worth engaging with his polemics: they are likely to be among his fruitless endeavors*].

After Nietzsche's relation to myth had been presented, his other Greek writings could be properly appreciated; I identified the concept opposed to the mythical, that of the agonale, as the root of Nietzsche's German-Greek basic conception ('Bachofen and Nietzsche' 1929). The present text contains the elaboration of what I indicated in 'Bachofen and Nietzsche'.

In the introduction to the pocket edition of his works (Kröner Publishing House), I have attempted to construct Nietzsche's life and figure from two opposed fundamental drives: a philosophical and a musical one. *My particular concern here was to make transparent the exceptional position of 'Zarathustra' in Nietzsche's life as well as the unique nature of the form of this special work.* One will find again the dualism of 'philosophy' and 'music' that I established in the contrast between the Heraclitean and Dionysian worlds. For the doctrine of eternal recurrence is music, we would know it even if Nietzsche himself had not told us with the words: 'Yet know this! Transitoriness sings its early song ever anew, and to hear the first verse only makes one die of longing for it to be forever over'. So Dionysus therefore has two faces: seen from music, from Wagner he looks Greek, appears as Dionysus philosophos; seen from Heraclitus he reveals himself to be a musical phenomenon. Because of this ambiguity of the 'Dionysian' an understanding of Nietzsche is not possible via this concept. On this path one only arrives at the confusing problems of Nietzschean existence.

## II. The Politician

### 1. Germanic Fundamental Attitude. Relation to Rome

The key to understanding all of Nietzsche's concrete demands and goals lies in his view of the state. *Though he has not elaborated it in a coherent way, we can reliably reconstruct it.* Here, too, there is no question of contradictions and vacillations: from the beginning to the end this view remains the same.

Nietzsche's basic concept of the state is Germanic and not German if by German we want to understand the final form of what has grown on Germanic soil under Christian-Roman influence in the course of our history. The enduring tension in which Nietzsche finds himself with respect to 'Germany' rests on the fact that he goes back to the Germanic substrata of Germanness with an inflexibility and power like no one before him.

The domain of the German does not coincide with that of the Germanic. There are still other peoples who participate in the Germanic. But wherever the German reaches a historical apex, there the Germanic element strikes through with particular strength. Such high points are marked by the time of the Saxon, Franconian and Swabian emperors, the Reformation under Luther, the conjunction of Bismarck and Nietzsche

in the 19th century. Germany's destiny can be seen from the following facts: up to the death of Henry VI we are the politically leading power of Europe at the strongest time of the High Middle Ages, but we do not found an enduring state. We carry out the tremendous Reformation that ends the Middle Ages, but we leave the benefit thereof to the Papacy and the Romance peoples. At last a statesman unites a large part of the German tribes, but the state he founds lacks inner truth: when finally Luther and Henry VIII stand side by side, they do not recognize each other. The old Germanic defiance that sets itself against the state is overcome by Bismarck; but at the same time this defiance lives just as strongly as a thousand years before in Nietzsche and enters into opposition against the new state.

In his book 'Ecce homo' Nietzsche called himself 'the last anti-political German'. He felt himself to be the last German who protested against the state with power and emphasis. His aversion was directed not only against the German state, but against the state per se, from his youth on. His speeches 'On the Future of our Educational Institutions', which he gave in Basel in the winter of 1871-1872, were directed against the 'uniformed state culture'. And in one of his last works he says: culture and the state are antagonists, 'cultural state' is only a modern idea. 'The one lives at the expense of the other, the one thrives to the detriment of the other. All great eras of culture were eras of political decline: what is great in terms of culture was unpolitical, even antipolitical...' (Twilight of the Idols). It is obvious to suspect an aesthetic motive behind this emphasis on 'culture,' to assume that it was the artist in him who revolted against state-regulated education, in general against all state centralization. In truth, the reasons for this opposition lie in another depth: the Germanic need for freedom, the pride and defiance of the Germanic warrior in Nietzsche, alive when he defends himself against the state, which he perceives as an un-German, a Roman institution.

In the 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', this most important section of 'Twilight of the Idols', Nietzsche develops his concept of freedom in a few succinct sentences. Freedom, he says, is not an institution, there are no liberal institutions, no liberal state. 'Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on there are no more terrible and thorough corrupters of freedom than liberal institutions'. *Such institutions lead to leveling, make people small, cowardly and sanctimonious.* As long as they still have to be fought for, however, the same institutions produce completely different effects: it is war that produces these effects.

War educates for freedom. *For war educates for self-responsibility, it opens up distances between those who prove themselves and those who do not, it accustoms one to hardship, harshness and deprivation, it makes one indifferent to life and leads one to be willing to sacrifice*

*people for one's cause, not counting oneself.* In a word, freedom means 'that the masculine, warlike and victorious instincts have dominion over other instincts, for instance over that of 'happiness'...The free man is a warrior'. Freedom is measured in individuals as well as peoples by the resistance that has to be overcome, by the effort it costs to remain on top. Neither individuals nor peoples ever become great under liberal institutions: danger makes something out of them. 'One has to have need to be strong; otherwise one will never be so'. In 'aristocratic societies' like Rome (as a city) or Venice, man becomes strong; the state, on the other hand, is only an institution for breeding herd animals.

That is clear enough: Nietzsche affirms war but denies the state. This comes to sharpest expression in 'Zarathustra', where the speech 'On War and the Warrior Folk' is followed by the speech 'On the New Idol', by which the state is to be understood. 'One can only keep silent and feel when one has arrow and bow: otherwise one chatters and quarrels... *War and courage have accomplished more great things than charity*', so speaks Zarathustra. But then he says, 'State means the coldest of all cold monsters'. The state signifies the lie among peoples, everything about it is false, it is the idol of ruin. Zarathustra does not always speak well of the people, but here, in the face of the state, he praises the people: 'Where there is still a people, there the state is not understood and hated as the evil eye and sin against morals and rights... Every people speaks its own language of good and evil: the neighbor does not understand it. It created its language in morals and rights. But the state lies in all the tongues of good and evil'. Isn't it strange to see Zarathustra as a defender of the people's rights? Why has there never been a firmly established German state? Because according to the Germanic conception the king is not imperator, but merely leader of the army and guardian of law. The German only recognized a leader in danger, not a master.

In peace the king had the right to protect the people, no more. What genuinely Germanic sentiment speaks out of Zarathustra's defense of the people against the state, of the warrior against the official! Nietzsche is not aware here that he is expressing the secret of German history; he does not even speak from historical knowledge, but from the immediacy of instinct. From the same immediacy the young Nietzsche had already contrasted Germanic and Romanic, Greek and Roman essence.

*The state as we know it is an invention of the Orient.* The Romans adopted it from the Orient and developed it; the *Imperium Romanum* (to be clearly distinguished from the 'aristocratic commonwealth' of republican Rome) signifies the consummation of the entire Mediterranean culture. That all-embracing system of order which we have since called the 'state', with its imperial center, its centralized administrative apparatus, its claim to subjugation and obedience, is something



alien to the North. The life of the Germanic peoples is founded on clan and army alliance, law and war are the two sides of this life; law and war are not merged into a unified, universal structure. And the same aversion to the universalism of the state that we observe among the Germans, we find among the Greeks, related to the Germans by blood, for whom Nietzsche had the most enduring love. The Greeks created the mightiest war epic in the world; but no Greek state corresponds to the 'Iliad'. There are only Greek small states, city-states, which live in incessant feud with one another, with what delight Nietzsche's gaze rests on the spectacle of this incessant struggle, on this 'bloody jealousy from city to city, from party to party, the murderous greed of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse of the slain enemy, in short the incessant renewal of those Trojan battle and horror scenes'. There was a people, which was the tremendous experience of the young Nietzsche, who allowed the existing urge for power and victory to prevail and considered it justified. 'The struggle and the cunning for victory were recognized: and nothing distinguishes the Greek world so much from ours as the resulting coloring of individual ethical concepts, for example that of Eris and Nemesis'. The Christianized world knows envy only as an evil or petty emotion; in the Greek world envy signifies the urge to self-assertion, to power, to victory. It is this urge that Nietzsche presented in his philosophical main work as the ground of the entire world (See above, p. 64). In praise of the Greeks he says lastly in the 'Twilight of the Idols': 'I saw their strongest instinct, the will to power, I saw them tremble before the unbridled force of this drive, I saw all their institutions grow out of protective measures to make themselves safe from one another against their inner explosive'. On this drive rests the life form of the Greek human being, the life form of agon, of incessant struggle 'to be the best and superior to the others'. This is precisely the meaning of the Germanic princely state: for prince is not he who heads an office apparatus, but he who is first in danger and battle.

Nietzsche recognized the contrast between Greek and Roman nature in relation to the state with decisive clarity. In his Greek book a unifying glance falls on the Roman state: the Roman imperium is equated with the 'utmost secularization', called its most magnificent but also most dreadful manifestation (Birth of Tragedy). We read in the preliminary works for 'The Will to Power' of a nonsensical state expansion of the *Imperium Romanum*, and also there of an abuse of power by the Roman emperors, through which the morality of the powerless attained victory. For Nietzsche, the system of world struggle with its squandering of all forces stands higher than the system of the state with its thrift, which regards any agonistic squandering of power as 'useless' (he makes this observation explicitly 'against the Romans'). And how sharply Nietzsche expresses himself in the middle of his career when in 'Human, All Too Human' (442) he writes: 'Crude Roman patriotism is now, when quite different and higher tasks are set than

patria and honos [fatherland and honor], either something dishonest or a sign of backwardness'. How primeval Germanic is this saying! The image of the Germanic hero, as the best connoisseur of the Nordic soul, Andreas Heusler, teaches us, completely lacks the superpersonal. For these struggles there is no fatherland and no homeland; even the hero's battle most highly admired by the people on the move, the last battle of the Ostrogoths under King Teia, was according to this witness no struggle 'for freedom and fatherland'. 'That one asserts oneself in some extraordinary situation and in courage, self-control, defiance of death maintains one's warrior honor, which is what matters'. With such words, which could have been spoken by Nietzsche, Heusler describes the nature of the German. In the Icelandic sagas the same scholar finds the perfect, realistic representation of what Nietzsche meant by his master morality, which is warrior morality, as opposed to slave morality, which is servile mentality. In the epilogue to 'The Case of Wagner' Nietzsche actually speaks of the Icelandic saga as the 'almost most important document' of master morality. The Old Norse language had the word '*mikilmenni*', meaning 'man of great size', master man. What is magnificent in the will to power as well as in giving and helping is thereby designated. 'The '*litilmenni*' stands in contrast to it: the 'little man', who is anxious about everything and regrets the gift'. This is as if it were taken from the 'Genealogy of Morals'. And sounding as if originating from the 'Antichrist' is Heusler's sentence: 'In order to denominate the new virtue of humility in Germanic terms, one had to resort to word stems that meant the lowly or the servant; *humility was in fact, according to the older conception, servile mentality*'. And like a motto finally for Nietzsche's struggle against the morality of pity and pacifistic humanitarianism it looks when Heusler says in general characterizing terms: 'Instead of the universal human duties there ruled the great division into friends and foes'.

It could be objected that in 'Twilight of the Idols' Nietzsche judged the Romans and Greeks quite differently. Here, in the section 'What I Owe the Ancients,' he praises Sallust and Horace as those writers from whom he learned how to write. 'One will, right into my Zarathustra, recognize in me a very serious ambition for Roman style, for the '*aere perennius*' in style'. To the Greeks, he adds, I certainly do not owe any similarly strong impressions, they cannot be for us what the Romans are. To be sure, Nietzsche in the same breath praises Thucydides in the highest terms. The passage is completely misunderstood if one refers to the Romans outright: only the Romans as literary models are meant, as masters of noble form, of perfect literary posture. From them, there is no doubt, Nietzsche learned something essential. To this school he owes the polished, chiseled quality of his style, which stands in a certain contrast to what constitutes the content of his philosophy, but never can Nietzsche's attitude toward Roman literature lead to the conclusion that he was unsure in his

Germanic-Greek instincts. *The substance of his doctrine is un-Roman, indeed anti-Roman, this is most strongly expressed in his hostility toward the state as an institution.*

Incidentally, there is no lack of references indicating that Nietzsche was aware of this deep kinship with the Nordic-warrior world, just as he in general demonstrates uncanny genius in tracing what is related or opposed to him. At a time when the Icelandic sagas were still unknown to wider circles, he characterizes the 'noble man', the mighty man, in connection with the saga as the one 'who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who practices severity and harshness against himself with pleasure and has reverence for all that is strict and hard' (Beyond Good and Evil, 260). He further speaks of the German nobility as a 'Viking nobility at bottom' (Antichrist), and also in his literary remains there is found a reference to the Vikings. They are juxtaposed there with the people of the Renaissance. Instead of speaking of Nietzsche's 'Renaissanceism', one should rather speak of his Germanism, which coincides with his Greek agonistic ethics and agonistic metaphysics. Moreover, the nobility in the Upper and Middle Italian city-states, which in their feuds produced that type Nietzsche admired, very probably stemmed from Germanic blood. His admiration was sparked not by Renaissance art, but by the warrior-agonal human type of the epoch.

Aesthetes and writers focused on aesthetics have brought forth and put into circulation the view that Nietzsche's admiration for power and the warrior essence was born solely from experiences of a longing dreamer, a cultivated enthusiast who, conscious of his own powerlessness, intoxicated himself with sublime images of force and cruelty. A famous textbook on the history of philosophy says about this admiration with inimitable seriousness: 'It is the nemo professor who would like to be a wild tyrant'. *An interpretation of this kind that psychologizes overlooks that Nietzsche does not glorify power subjectively, but rather describes types, life forms that were real in history, discipline systems on a natural basis.* In his insights something breaks through that slumbers in the depths of our past, traces of which can also be found elsewhere. It is an objective efficacy, working under all epochs and coming alive again in Nietzsche, which led him to his deep insights. Aesthetic enthusiasm does not have such results.

## 2. The Antichrist. Protestantism and Catholicism

If one wants to properly understand Nietzsche's relationship to Christianity, one must never lose sight of the fact that the decisive statement 'God is dead' signifies a historical observation. The Christian churches and Christian doctrine are not combated by Nietzsche with the fatal subjectivism of the know-it-all critic, but with realistic arguments: it is shown what things actually look like in 'Christian' Europe. The critique of slave morality, the destruction of priestly values, is inseparable

from a realistic view of history. The historical perspective on things belongs to any true realism; in the view of events as fatefully necessary the Heracliteanism is perfected. Theology is separated from the philosophy of history. Inseparable from the question about Christianity is the question about the history of Christianity. Here, too, in the final and deepest layer, we encounter a Germanism in Nietzsche. From the North comes the doctrine of the twilight of the gods. 'I believe in the primeval Germanic word: all gods must die', we read in the drafts for 'The Birth of Tragedy'. If one juxtaposes this word of the young Nietzsche with the statement 'God is dead', one sees Zarathustra's mission. This is his calling: out of Germanic substance to proclaim the death of the Christian God. Zarathustra signifies the fulfillment of the presentiment contained in the word: all gods must die. Only from here does the tremendous gravity visible over and understandable in Nietzsche's work and figure.

In the 'Birth of Tragedy' the young Nietzsche opposes the 'foreign myth' of Christianity with the 'native myth', which alone could educate. Half a human lifetime later, during a major retrospective on his work, he says about the same youthful writing: 'In this book the transplantation of a deeply un-Germanic myth, the Christian, into the German heart counts as the actual German calamity'. Not only for understanding the person Nietzsche is this statement decisive, but it also elucidates the secret of the relationship with Wagner so important for the human being Nietzsche. 'I just want to confess', says a note from the time of 'Human, All Too Human', 'I had hoped that Christianity, gone stale for the Germans, could be made quite distasteful to them through art, German mythology as nauseating, habituating to polytheism, etc. What horror at restorative currents!' The fact that with 'Parsifal' Wagner became Christian was the last straw, led to the final break. In 'Parsifal' Nietzsche sensed the spirit of the Counter-Reformation. To him it seemed the abyss of mendacity that the same man who had conceived the figure of Siegfried finally sank down before the cross and the priest. In an extensive posthumous note from a later period Nietzsche relates the 'hysterically erotic trait' which Wagner especially loved in woman and set to music to French Romanticism, and he predicts that the Parisians would inevitably convert to Wagner at some point, one of the numerous predictions with which he was proven right. He feels that hysterically erotic trait as thoroughly un-German and therefore doubts that Wagner is a German artist. But something in Wagner is German, he broods further, perhaps only his strength and audacity, or that toward himself he was stricter and for the longest part of his life lived in the German way, on his own, as an unrelenting atheist, antinomian and immoralist, or that he invented the figure of a very free human being, Siegfried, 'who in fact is too free, too hard, too cheerful, too un-Christian for Latin taste?' The Latin taste, the Romanic world has a profound affinity for Christianity, this is one of Nietzsche's key insights. In the modern

culture dominated by the Romance peoples he sees the 'feeling of Protestantism' extinguished, establishes an actual predominance of Catholicism. Even decidedly 'anti-Protestant movements' like that to which Wagner's 'Parsifal' belongs are no longer perceived as such within this culture. And with a sudden turn to the depths Nietzsche continues this train of thought: 'The entire higher intellectuality in France is Catholic in instinct; Bismarck has understood that there is no longer any Protestantism' (Will to Power, 87).

This is the fundamental aspect under which Nietzsche sees Protestantism: as a movement against Romanism, as something that comes from the North. We will soon get to know the other aspect; beforehand his image of the Romanic world should be completely outlined. Decisive for this above all is an aphorism from 'Dawn' (192). Here Nietzsche speaks under the title 'Wishing Oneself Complete Opponents' about the French. The aphorism is composed from that wonderful chivalrous mood in which the fighter honors an opponent, because he knows that he is thereby doing himself the greatest honor. 'One cannot deny the French that they have been the most Christian people on earth...', this magnificent characterization begins, and it concludes with the observation that this people of the 'consummated types of Christianity' also had to produce the consummated opposites of the un-Christian freethinker.

A brief foray into the realm of Nietzsche interpretation now becomes necessary. Under the title of 'freethinker' Nietzsche wrote several of his books: 'Human, All Too Human', 'Dawn', 'The Gay Science', 'Beyond Good and Evil'. The way in which he poses this type against German clumsiness and dishonesty has led many to see in this turn to a French type, connected with an adoption of French idioms of expression, an abandonment of German intellectuality, indeed an inclination toward Romanism in general. The type of the freethinker is un-German; 'free spirit' is after all just a translation of the French expression 'libre penseur'. This type presupposes a different culture than the German one, it is the counter-image to the most perfect types of Latin Christianity, as precisely Nietzsche teaches us.

People have given themselves much trouble to prove Nietzsche's Romanism. The veneration on the part of the author of the books of aphorisms for the French moralists, especially La Rochefoucauld, plays a large role. If we do not overlook, however, that this veneration is by no means without essential reservations. The Christian origin namely of the moralism of a La Rochefoucauld, and recognizing this origin always signifies an objection for Nietzsche, has been very clear to Nietzsche from early on: La Rochefoucauld belongs with Pascal to his opponents. Both 'have all the Greek taste against them', La Rochefoucauld 'exposes according to the guiding principles of Christianity' the ugliness of man. A conversion to Romanism, even in its

freethinker-moralizing form, would always have had to signify for Nietzsche at the same time an apostasy to the Christian, the consistency of which the proponents of his 'Romanism' have not made themselves plain. They have not recognized that the inclination toward the Romanic in Nietzsche is essentially an antithesis, an effective mask, in order to goad, ridicule and horrify the satisfied Germans of the 'Reich'.

In the moment when one attempts to explain Nietzsche's hostility toward Christianity with the help of the concept 'freethinker', one loses the path to the real reasons for his anti-Christianity. From Bernard to Fénelon and Chateaubriand, French Christianity is sentimental, this word taken in the most objective sense. The counterthrust against Romanic, feminine Christianity therefore always occurs from the side of reason: the freethinker fights emotional religion from the position of reason. One would therefore, if one really wanted to conceive Nietzsche as freethinker, also have to call him a rationalist at the same time. He is not that. We completely disregard his irrationalistic metaphysics: even the attack on Christianity which he wages is decisively misunderstood if one sees in it merely an attack in the manner of Voltaire. With a certain pity Nietzsche sometimes thought of the anti-Christianity of this man, whom at the time of 'Human, All Too Human' he had expressly set up as his champion; with cutting clarity he felt that his own position was infinitely more daring, infinitely more dangerous than that of the most audacious rationalistic opponent of the Church in the 18th century. It is not with cool, mocking superiority, not out of luxury and skepticism that Nietzsche approaches Christianity. He comes to it with faith in fate in his heart: all gods must die. That is not the faith of a freethinker! *A freethinker does not say, 'God is dead', he says, 'If God did not exist, he would have to be invented'*. Everything freethinker-like, everything mocking and skeptical is in Nietzsche only means to an end. Behind the mask of the freethinker stands the tremendous earnestness of one who sees hovering over the world in which he lives a destiny, and who knows himself appointed to be the first to name this destiny.

We complete this proof of Nietzsche's anti-Romanism by saying: it is not Latin freethinking, but Siegfried that stands behind the attack by Nietzsche on Christianity. The Nordic heroic epic is the immense, dark substratum from which the bold fighter against Christian Europe emerges. He sees Christianity truly rooted in the Latin races. 'It seems that Catholicism belongs much more intrinsically to the Latin races than all of Christianity in general does to us northerners...' (Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 48). In Catholic countries, unbelief therefore signifies 'a kind of rebellion against the spirit of the race', while for us it is rather a return to the spirit (or un-spirit) of the race. This insertion 'or unspirit' is very characteristic, for in this case Nietzsche means that 'we northerners', compared to the inhabitants of Romanized regions, are truly barbarians. With what

force does his barbarian blood stir at the language of the sweetish Renan, how he immediately discovers there our 'probably less beautiful and harder, that is, more German soul'. The illness of the will that has overcome Europe as a result of Christianity shows itself greatest and most manifold there. Aphorism 208 of the same work goes on, where culture has longest been at home; the will is therefore most badly diseased in present-day France, for here we are farthest from Nordic barbarism.

Of all the problems of understanding Nietzsche, his concept of Germanness undoubtedly contains the greatest difficulties. Nowhere in his work does one find oneself faced with such an abundance of contradictory judgments. So might those in fact be right who deny that Nietzsche has a unified understanding precisely in essential questions? No! All the judgments that seemingly contradict one another can, with careful and patient investigation, be derived from a unified basic view. One must only always consider Nietzsche's personal situation, above all the situation after the publication of 'Zarathustra', and secondly one must not overlook that in the problem 'German essence' all the main lines of his thinking intertwine. For millennia Germany has been exposed to Romanization, in which Nietzsche as a Nordic man sees a disaster, and furthermore it is part of Christian Europe, against which he rose up as a fighter. The intertwining of the 'German' with the 'Christian' must be observed above all. All-important determinations about the Germans are made by Nietzsche under the viewpoint: what role do the Germans play in the process of Christianization of Europe?

*'Let us not forget that the names of peoples are originally abusive names. The Tatars for example by their name are 'the dogs': that is what they were called by the Chinese. The 'Germans': that originally meant the heathens'; thus the Goths called, following their conversion, the great mass of their unbaptized tribal relatives, according to the clue of their translation of the Septuaginta, in which the heathens are denoted by the word that in Greek means 'the peoples'; see Ulfilas. It would still be possible that the Germans subsequently made for themselves an honorable name from their old abusive name, in that they would become the first un-Christian people of Europe: a possibility for which Schopenhauer credits them much honor. Thus Luther's work would come to completion, he who taught them to be un-Romanic and to say, 'Here I stand! I cannot do otherwise!'*

The main lines intersect here: it is un-Roman to say: 'Here I stand! I can do no other!' The way the individual here bases himself on himself, on his fate, does not fit with the Latin universalism, with the state consciousness of the Roman human being, who always knows himself bound to an institution, integrated into a reasonably governed whole, upheld by norms and traditions.

The anti-Roman, anti-state tendency of Zarathustra has an inner relation to his hostility towards the Church, this 'last Roman building'. 'Church? What is that then?, Church? I answered, that is a kind of state, and indeed the most mendacious one' (Zarathustra, On Great Events). It is not a fleeting coincidence when Nietzsche relates Church and state to each other from his point of view. Rather, this identification goes back to the deepest ground of his Germanic awareness of freedom and fate. The premise of the state, so Nietzsche's opinion goes, states: 'The measure is there'. The principle of the state is a principle of shaping that hinders the freedom and growth of the individual. The state modeled on the Roman example and the Church, which has most perfectly realized this example, is in his eyes a means of making uniform the still unformed human being, of alienating him from his fate. I give this interpretation to the passage from the preparatory works for 'The Will to Power', which states: 'Presupposition of the state hitherto: man is not to develop himself; the measure is there! The Catholic Church (the oldest of all state forms in Europe) now best represents the old state!'

If this is recognized and acknowledged, then it is clear: no figure in German history can be more appealing and provocative for Nietzsche than Luther's.

CE. Hirsch has shown that Nietzsche's image of Luther depends on the portrayal that Jansen gave in his 'History of the German People'; Ch. Anbler has demonstrated how Ranke influenced Nietzsche's idea of Protestantism. One cannot expect an image of Luther drawn from the sources; in this regard every theology student is superior to the author of the 'Antichrist'. Nietzsche does not speak of Luther out of historical knowledge, but he speaks about him from a related historical situation: as a man who stands at a corresponding place within German, indeed European events.

In 'Dawn' (88), Luther is celebrated as the 'great benefactor'. Because he shook the way of life of the monk, the Christian *vita contemplativa*, in its esteem and thus made the path to an un-Christian *vita contemplativa* accessible again. But Nietzsche's task does not allow him to indulge what Luther brought: after all, the Reformer only replaced the structure of the Catholic Church, that noble Roman building, with another, coarser and more modest church building. That old building rests on a foundation that can also be characterized this way: it rests on a southern freedom and broad-mindedness of spirit and equally on a southern suspicion of nature, man and spirit, it rests on a completely different knowledge of man, experience of man than the north has had. The Lutheran Reformation was in its full breadth the indignation of simplicity against something complex; to speak cautiously, a crude, decent misunderstanding, of which there is much to borrow, one did not understand the expression of a victorious Church and saw only corruption, one

misunderstood the noble skepticism, that luxury of skepticism and tolerance, which every triumphant, self-confident power permits itself... (The Gay Science, 358). The aphorism from which these sentences are taken bears the title: 'The Peasant Revolt of the Spirit'. The Reformation is meant; it is held responsible for the degeneration of the modern scholar, for the German philistinism in matters of cognition, in short for the plebeianism of the last centuries.

The more violently Nietzsche rages against the Germans, the more sharply he speaks about Luther and the Reformation. The quoted aphorism belongs in the fifth book of 'The Gay Science', which was written at the same time as 'Beyond Good and Evil' and is already completely overshadowed by the mood from which the writings of the last year of creativity emerged. 'The Case of Wagner', 'Twilight of the Idols', 'The Antichrist', and 'Ecce Homo' are at their core nothing other than attacks on Germany. Part of this attack is also a partisanship for the Catholic Church, against which the new Germany (in the Kulturkampf) has just lost a battle. It is also not difficult to see what enables Nietzsche to advocate for the Church: in any case, it is a structure of power of the greatest style, and as such it can be admired. For the same reason, after all, the Imperium Romanum is occasionally acknowledged in the last writings. But the admiration for the 'noble skepticism' belongs in any case to Nietzsche's arsenal against the German spirit, which is incapable of skepticism.

However, how ambiguous the text immediately becomes when Nietzsche begins to praise the Church is evident from that little sentence in the Peasant Revolt aphorism: 'It seems the Germans do not understand the nature of a church'. Indeed, according to Nietzsche's own premises, they cannot understand it. In this context, praising can only want to express reproach, but in this mouth it means praise in any case.

The sharpest polemic we know from Nietzsche is found in 'The Antichrist' and 'Ecce Homo', and in both cases it is directed against the Christianity of the North as well as against the Germans. For Nietzsche, the mere fact that there is a Christianity of the North, a Protestantism, is enough. If there must be a Christianity at all, then it belongs to the peoples among whom it arose and first spread. It is a product of the Mediterranean world and was therefore alien to the Germanic north from the very beginning. 'If one wants to claim that the German was predisposed and predestined for Christianity, one must not lack impudence. Because the opposite is not only true, but also palpable. Whence should the invention of two distinguished Jews, Jesus and Saul, the two most Jewish Jews who may have ever existed, appeal more to the Germans than to other peoples?' This is how Nietzsche wrote at the time of 'Dawn'. Europe, he says, has allowed an 'outgrowth of oriental morality' to proliferate within itself.

And in the eyes of the young Nietzsche, accustomed to the clear circumstances of the Greek world, the drama of the Occident is reflected as follows: '*Greeksdom weakened, Romanized, coarsened, become decorative, then accepted by weakened Christianity as an ally, decoratively spread by force among uncivilized peoples, that is the history of Occidental culture. The feat is accomplished, and the Greek and the Priestly brought together*'.

That this view of the contrast between Mediterranean culture and its religions and the spirit of the Germanic north remained vital in Nietzsche until the end is attested above all by his most important late writing, the 'Genealogy of Morals'. Its basic idea is: Mediterranean culture reaches its climax in the type of the priest, which corresponds to a way of life in which pathos and resentment unite, priests are the best haters and know how to give solemn expression to their hatred. The warrior way of life of the German, related to the Greek, is of the opposite kind, after all, the Greeks play such a uniquely important role in the history of the Mediterranean peoples because, in contrast to the Romans, they never succumbed to the influence of the Orient. A small, fleeting juxtaposition by Nietzsche vividly brings the two worlds before our eyes: 'The heroic human being, crying out from battle and hardship and hatred and ashamed of pathos, and there the priest!'

Nietzsche's last writings are devoted to the psychology of the priest: the Genealogy and the Antichrist. In the attack on the type opposed to that of the warrior, in the analysis of the human being who dares to bless and curse in the name of the highest God, Nietzsche's work is completed. In the priest he sees the inventor and guardian of the consciousness of guilt, the human being who rules by taking possession of the bad conscience of others. In an attack of unheard-of force, Nietzsche defends the heroic way of life to which he confesses as a philosopher. Let no one say that he should have psychologically portrayed the ideal of the hero; if the heroic human being mattered to him, he could not portray him psychologically, because all psychology debases. For Nietzsche, psychology is always only a weapon. The fact that the warrior type is characterized by him only occasionally and briefly allows poor readers not to notice what it is about at all. But whoever does not understand the 'Genealogy of Morals' lacks the key to Nietzsche's final insights.

Two sentences from 'The Antichrist' culminate in the unification of motifs in this late period. 'I cannot understand how a German could ever have Christian feelings...' and 'If one does not get rid of Christianity, the Germans will be to blame for it...'. After what precedes these exclamations, one hears the voice overlapping itself in the last one, explain themselves.

Everything Nietzsche has said against Luther, against the Reformation, against the Germans, it always

comes back to the one reproach: they prevented the downfall of Christianity. 'Cesare Borgia as Pope' would have been the end, Luther's peasant fury did not allow that: the Reformation only enabled a new ascent of the papacy, made the triumph of the Counter-Reformation possible. 'The Germans robbed Europe of the harvest, of the meaning of the last great age, the Renaissance age, at a moment when a higher order of values, where the noble, life-affirming, promising-of-the-future values had achieved victory over the opposing values, the values of decline, penetrating into the instincts of those ruling there! Luther, this fateful monk, restored the Church and, what is a thousand times worse, Christianity, at the moment when it was defeated... The Catholics would have reason to celebrate Luther festivals, to put on Luther plays...' (Ecce Homo).

Almost everything Nietzsche says about the event of the Reformation is negative. It is precisely from this fact that we recognize Nietzsche's historical position. *For he does not want to go back behind the Reformation, but beyond the Reformation, and this will must express itself in negations. From his point of view, the Reformation was only retarding.* He conjectures a possible dialectical course in which the papacy would have abolished itself through its worldliness, which of course is only a highly questionable assumption. In any case, it is enough to determine Nietzsche to take sides against the Reformation. In this way, those notorious judgments come about which at the same time read like condemnations of the German spirit. But anyone who surveys the context will see with utter clarity that for Nietzsche it is solely a matter of antitheses, not of a partisanship for the Mediterranean priesthood and the old Church that would be impossible for him. A parallel to this is offered by the evaluation of the Imperium Romanum in the last writings. As soon as Nietzsche charges with full force against the priestly system, even the political system of the Romans shines in transfigured splendor. In the 'Genealogy' (I, 16) the Romans are juxtaposed as the strong and noble to the Jews: 'For the Romans were indeed the strong and noble, as they had never yet been on earth, even in their dreams had never been imagined so strong and noble; every leftover from them, every inscription enraptures, provided one guesses what is written there'. Over against the Jews and Christians, Greeks and Romans are placed on the same level (Antichrist, 59). Even old opponents must get along in the face of a stronger opponent, thus even the *Imperium Romanum* itself receives the highest praise: 'Christianity was the vampire of the Imperium Romanum... Do people still not understand this? The Imperium Romanum... this most admirable work of art in the grand style, was a beginning, its structure was more eloquent, intending to prove itself for millennia, until today nothing has ever been built like it, not even dreamed of, to the same extent, *sub specie aeterni!*' (Antichrist, 58; cf. Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes, 39).

### 3. Rousseau against Democracy and Socialism

It will one day become effective as one of Nietzsche's deepest and most momentous thoughts in the observation of history, that modern democratic ideals, insofar as they aim at the happiness of the majority, the welfare state, are of Christian, indeed Roman-Christian origin. Nietzsche did not investigate the origin of English liberalism, Calvinism lies outside his field of vision, but with the greatest interest he pursued that process of transformation of Roman-mystical religiosity into a political theory which finds its conclusion in Rousseau's teachings. *Rousseau of Geneva, revolutionary politician, optimistic pedagogue, sentimental novelist, enthusiast and rhetorician, the famous author of The Social Contract and Emile, is Nietzsche's most intimate enemy.* This enmity must be clearly distinguished from that between Nietzsche and Plato or Nietzsche and Pascal. Such men are not equal opponents with whom he competes; Rousseau, on the other hand, belongs to the other type: spiritually, he is a priest. He knows all the tricks for establishing oneself in the right without fighting, he knows how to kill an opponent spiritually. For that one does not need sacral spells of excommunication, moral concepts suffice. The moral defamation of the opponent is Rousseau's most effective invention, he is the master of resentful moralizing. The private person as priest, blessing and cursing, praising and condemning in the name of reason, goodness, virtue, humanity, to this day this seductive model has an effect.

Nietzsche attacked Rousseau again and again, like a fencer he circled around him. One could compile one of the most complete psychological portraits contained in his work with regard to Rousseau. *He hates the Genevan for his false, effeminate, mawkish concept of 'nature,' for his mendacious morality.* 'I still hate Rousseau in the Revolution: it is the world-historical expression for this double-being of idealist and scoundrel' (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes 48). Voltaire with his pessimism, his skepticism and his moderation is infinitely closer to him than the distrustful optimist about whom the apt sentence is found in Nietzsche's posthumous writings: 'There are people whom everyone would like to compel to a Yes or No with regard to their entire person: their megalomania stems from their distrust of themselves'. For the characterization of the priestly nature of Rousseau's doctrine, only one sentence from the masterful exposition in 'The Will to Power' (95 ff) is quoted: Against Voltaire's pessimism, the goodness and providence of God is defended by Rousseau. Nietzsche remarks on this: 'He needed God in order to be able to cast the curse on society and civilization' (Will to Power, 100).

What Nietzsche fights above all in Rousseau is his pity, his feminism. 'Rousseau, in his veneration of the poor, women, the people as sovereign, moves entirely within the Christian movement: all slavishly servile faults and virtues can be studied in him, as well as the

most unbelievable mendacity (he wants to teach justice!). His counterpart Napoleon, ancient, despiser of mankind'. Nietzsche would feel the modern concept of the citizen, which politically equates woman with man, to be a consequence of Rousseau's premises.

From the Christian doctrine that all human beings are equal before God proceeds by necessity the demand for political equality in modern democratic states. For Nietzsche, this doctrine contains a disorganizing principle: it not only abolishes natural differences, but also destroys all traditions. The democratic ideal is based on the recognition of the equality of persons, on the belief in the ultimate triumph of truth, love and justice. But such a belief is life-destroying, it prevents an 'order of rank of forces' from establishing itself, in which commanders are recognized as commanders, and obeyers as obeying (Will to Power). *It leads to the badly turned-out, the inferior, the actors taking possession of the big words freedom, equality, justice, and setting up a kind of Jesuit regime. A social condition arises in which the 'handlers and intermediaries' play a role; literati and 'representatives' become dominant. A press develops which has the task of directing ears and senses in a false direction, while all great political events 'stealthily and veiledly sneak onto the stage'. The much-vaunted parliamentarianism is simply a means in the service of parties; as 'public permission to choose between five basic political opinions', it is defined by Nietzsche (The Gay Science, 174). Woman becomes masculinized and thus abolishes the position she occupies in great and healthy times.*

*In socialism, Nietzsche sees, with truly world-historical insight, a brother of despotism, for like the latter it desires a fullness of state power, indeed it surpasses all the past by striving for the literal annihilation of the individual.* The human being in his peculiarity appears to him an unjustified luxury of nature; he is to be 'improved' into a purposeful organ of the commonwealth. Meanwhile, Nietzsche clearly sees through the peculiar situation in which socialism finds itself in relation to the state: socialism wants the state, it wants 'the most obsequious prostration of all citizens before the absolute state'. but at the same time it works toward abolishing all existing states. That is to say, let us add, socialism is hostile to the state insofar as state means a legal structure, but it is in favor of any state omnipotence insofar as the state adapts itself to its purposes.

To achieve its goal, Nietzsche continues, socialism 'hammers the word 'justice' into the heads of the half-educated classes like a nail, in order to completely rob them of their reason... and to provide them with a good conscience for the evil game they are to play' (Human, All Too Human, I, 473). The conclusion of the train of thought is: 'Socialism can serve to teach the danger of all accumulations of state power quite brutally and impressively, and in this respect to

arouse mistrust of the state itself. When its harsh voice joins in the battle cry: 'as much state as possible', the clamor first becomes louder than ever; but soon the opposite also emerges with all the greater force: 'As little state as possible'.

From these sentences, which are of programmatic significance for Nietzsche's political views, we must gather that for him the state means a mass of private individuals with small, egoistic interests, held together by acts of violence. Here the concept of the state is determined by the notions: commercial state, police state, educational state. It is not the great historical type of the state that Nietzsche turns against, in this field he has strikingly little experience and knowledge, rather it is state-regulated society with its need for commerce and employment, enjoyment and education, security and peace that he has in view when he rejects the 'modern state' with contempt. 'To make society secure against thieves and fire and infinitely convenient for all trade and commerce, and to transform the state into providence in the good and bad sense, these are low, moderate goals not absolutely indispensable, which one ought not to strive for with the highest means and tools available...as they exist at all...' (Dawn, 179).

The book 'Human, All Too Human' is very revealing about Nietzsche the politician. Here already one finds that basic formula for the modern state which remains valid until the end: 'Modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the state' (I, 472). This sentence is derived at the end of a long historical observation, whereby the relation of 'religion and government' serves as the starting point. The state, it says there, surrounds itself for its own advantage with the splendor of religion, for by the help of priests a government makes its power 'legitimate'. In the concept of authority, divine and human authority merge; custodial government and preservation of religion go together. *But what happens when the people are sovereign, religion a private matter? Then society dissolves, the concept of the state is abolished, the contrast between private and public disappears.* 'The contempt, decay and death of the state, the unleashing of the private person (I avoid saying individual) is the consequence of the democratic concept of the state; herein lies its mission'.

The subtlety of the little treatise lies in that Nietzsche approves of this development, the mission of the democratic concept of the state, which is. If democracy has fulfilled its mission, then a 'new page' will be unrolled in the story of mankind, and cautiously the author intimates that then the time will begin which he hopes for: the prospect resulting from this certain decay 'is not a thoroughly deplorable one for every respect'. The old state passes away with religion and the priests; the new state, insofar as it has democratic ideals, is of Christian origin and by necessity steers toward anarchy, for Nietzsche these are two acts of the same

drama. Perhaps one may interpret his historic-philosophical construction further: where there is still a state, there is also still the Middle Ages. The democratic state is the successor to the state governed by authority and religion. Only when this form of state too will belong to the past have we left the middle Ages, only then is Christianity no longer a determining power.

*'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' is directed against the democratic and socialist ideals.* The Übermensch is the counterpart to the 'last man,' i.e., the functionary of the democratic-socialist society. This political meaning of 'Zarathustra' becomes particularly clear through the explanatory writing composed by Peter Gast, which is conceived entirely from out of Nietzsche's world of ideas.

#### 4. Culture and State in Hegel

It was recently noted by a wise observer that the opening sentences of the first 'Untimely Meditation' inaugurate a 'new historic-spiritual situation in Germany': here begins the opposition of the mind, especially the artistic mind, against the 'Reich' (Westphal, *Enemies of Bismarck*. Munich 1930. p. 124). The word 'culture' has taken on a magical splendor for many through Nietzsche. Few definitions of the young Nietzsche have been as fortunate as that of the first 'Untimely One': 'Culture is the unity of artistic style in all the vital expressions of a people'. Weisphal has drawn the conclusion from this concept of culture that Nietzsche belongs with that sociological, psychological and aesthetic opposition of the Bismarck Reich whose catchword was not 'state' but 'society,' an opposition whose intellectual leader may be called Dilthey. It seems that Nietzsche, with psychology and art, also fought state and science; his slogan was for culture, against the state.

But as far as Nietzsche himself is concerned, this construct does not correspond to the facts. The reasons for his opposition lie much deeper than the aesthetic motive reaches; the situation is much more complicated. Precisely the social condition whose spirituality is analyzed so rightly by Weisphal, precisely that psychological aesthetic 'culture', is the enemy Nietzsche has in mind when he says culture. To be sure, he has another enemy in mind too: the national and Christian state whose creator and leader Bismarck was in his day. But to see his relation to this state rightly, one must first know what the young Nietzsche actually meant by culture.

Indeed, it seems as if it is already the juxtaposition of Potsdam and Weimar when in the first 'Untimely One' we read that the victory of 1871 contains an enormous danger within itself: it could turn into a complete defeat, a defeat, indeed eradication of the German spirit for the sake of the 'German Reich'. Already here the Reich appears before us in those insidious quotation marks that henceforth always accompany the word when Nietzsche uses it. Bravery

seems to him the most important characteristic of the German, uniform and lasting bravery in contrast to the pathetic and sudden impetuosity of the French. But this natural bravery and perseverance, plus strict military discipline, superiority of leaders, unity and obedience among the troops has as yet nothing to do with culture. Discipline and obedience are something different from education; they also distinguished the Macedonian armies from the incomparably more highly cultivated Greek armies. So in 1871 we have by no means won a victory over Romance culture, still the German reality is formless, still a false 'erudition' rules with us instead of genuine cultivation, an erudition for which the new work by D. F. Strauss which is the target of the attack of the first 'Untimely' is an example. A German, original culture does not exist, in all matters of form we still depend on Paris as before, and it will still take a long time before one can say that we were barbarians.

The Macedonians are of course the Prussians, and the more cultivated Greeks correspond to the aesthetic Weimarans; even the catchword 'barbarians' is not missing. Whoever does not know Nietzsche must assume a devotee of French culture is speaking here, but in truth Nietzsche only wants to tell the Germans: given the prevailing European cultural conditions you will never amount to anything, here the French will always be ahead of you. You are destined for something else! The partisanship for Paris is the genuinely Nietzschean means of provocation appearing here for the first time: the antithesis is meant pedagogically. The second 'Untimely Meditation' already provides evidence of this: that erudition, namely, to whose downfall Nietzsche would like to help, corresponds to a 'decorative culture', i.e., a culture in which there is an 'exterior' and an 'interior', a form of life, then, based on conventions.

*This concept of culture, however, is a Romanic one for the young Nietzsche; the Greek concept stands opposed to it, according to which culture 'is a new and improved physis', and means a unity between life, thought, appearance and will (conclusion of the second Untimely Meditation).* The judgment on all decorative culture is that it is ripe for destruction, funeral orations should help it to its downfall, by no means is it to recommend Romance culture to the German as a model. Everything is measured by the Greek concept of culture.

The juxtaposition of Romance versus German culture may well stem from Wagner, even the contrast between grand opera and music drama may lie behind it: new and strikingly peculiar is the depth that the young Nietzsche gives to this contrast. In it lives, darkly and vigorously, the idea of a German way of life that is higher, more mature and more powerful than all past ones. He has this future constitution of the Germans in view when he speaks of the 'German spirit', of an 'orientation derived from the Germanic essence through art'. He has anything but a social condition with a highly developed dwelling culture, good theaters and an



artistically receptive public in view. Only from the notes of his literary remains does one learn what that definition, 'culture is the unity of artistic style in all the vital expressions of a people', actually wants to say. The offensive and decisive word 'artistic' can only be understood there when one senses the barb against science. Nietzsche comes from the work of the scholar; he experiences daily the dangers inherent in the pure drive to knowledge. *He notices: pure cognition, left to itself, leads to ruin.* It has proved impossible, he notes, to build a culture upon science. '*Scholarly culture*' is the most dreadful thing. True culture requires a unity that science cannot provide. There must be something there that also tames science itself. Where else could the young Nietzsche seek this taming element except in art, to which he owes the highest moments of his life, whose greatest master also calls him friend as well as being a true tamer of life. 'The taming of science now takes place only through art'. Veneration of art understood here thus does not mean escape into the aesthetic, idolatry of pure form, but precisely the opposite: return to life. In this sense, a strengthening of the aesthetic instinct appears to the young Nietzsche a 'salvation of the German spirit'. The turn to art is a turn to truthfulness and unity. 'To be completely truthful, glorious, heroic delight!... Now art takes on an entirely new dignity. By contrast, the sciences have lost one degree'. The emphasis in the quoted definition of culture lies on the word unity. 'The culture of a people reveals itself in the uniform taming of the drives of that people'. In this passage from his literary remains we have before us the more correct version of that definition.

When the young German speaks of art, he is not as far from the idea of the state as it seems, and it is no coincidence that in the notes the concepts 'the tragic work of art, the tragic human being, the tragic state' are mentioned together. The 'Birth of Tragedy' is certainly devoted to an aesthetic problem: but the problem of culture behind it is anything but unpolitical. It is only owing to Nietzsche's friendship with Wagner that his thoughts on the Greeks did not take on another tendency. Because ultimately everything had to lead to Wagner's artistic endeavors, the friend was in danger!, the planned 'Greek Book' appeared in a purely aesthetic attitude (see my essay 'Back Oven and Nietzsche'. Zurich 1929. p. 35). A large section on the Greek state had to be omitted. In this there was certainly a deeper necessity as well, for the reflections on the state would probably have connected better with the fragmentary book remaining on the pre-Socratic philosophers. *After all, Nietzsche saw in the early Greek philosophers a philosophy of statesmen alone!* Without a doubt, the Greek state played a major role in the field of vision of the young Nietzsche. The tendency of the young Greek enthusiast is not to grasp the state according to the categories of an aesthetic culture, but conversely, to view culture under the categories of the state. This tendency must have been all the stronger since the word of the Enlightener Schlosser, which he had heard in Burckhardt's lectures, continued

to resonate in the soul of the young Nietzsche: power is evil in itself. Accordingly, in the aforementioned fragment on the Greek state, the origin of the state is 'horrible', and yet the hearts swell involuntarily towards 'the magic of the emerging state'. Even the subjugated no longer care about that terrible origin, fervently the state is regarded as the goal and apex of the sacrifices and duties of the individual. One would think that devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalized people, consuming inter-ethnic hatred must estrange us from the state forever. And yet: 'The state, of disgraceful birth, for most people a constantly flowing source of hardship, in frequently recurring periods the devouring torch of mankind, and yet a sound at which we forget ourselves, a battle cry that has enthusiastically inspired countless truly heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and most venerable object for the blind and selfish masses, who even in the tremendous moments of state life have the perplexing expression of greatness on their faces!'

This passage is perhaps the most remarkable in Nietzsche's entire early work. It shows that his thoughts could well have led to the state. The 'will to power' would then not have become the work of a loner, a connection between Nietzsche's heroism and German state reality would have come within tangible reach, Bismarck and Nietzsche would not have become enemies... One need only think through the idea to realize that in truth we are not dealing with possibilities here at all. We have to precisely portray the unbridgeable abyss. In doing so, let us firmly grasp that Nietzsche does not belong to the 'aesthetic-cultural' opposition of the new Reich.

The concept of culture of the young Nietzsche is characterized by the absence of any aesthetic or ethical coloration. The genius, this remains until the end, is the goal of all-natural development and all human effort. Everything else, including the state, belongs only to the 'necessary auxiliary mechanisms and preparations' of this ultimate goal. Culture exists where everything is subordinate to the production and dominance of genius. Whoever removes this idea from the context in which it grew up will find it easy to read an anti-political aestheticism into it. But how far it is from an aesthetic concept of culture, when as the first prerequisite of his genius-state he immediately cites slavery. So he has the real Greek culture in mind, not some dreamed-up ideal social condition. Culture, he says unambiguously, is not at the discretion of a people; here reign ineluctable forces that are law and limit to the individual. Cruelty is also inherent in the essence of culture, creation, life and death are one, with a blood-drenched victor we can compare glorious culture ('The Greek State'). What a barbaric, amoral picture Nietzsche presents! To be sure, the state is only a means to an end: it is the conqueror with the iron hand, but by this hand he leads 'the splendidly flourishing woman' of Greek society.

Art is the goal, the path to this goal leads through the state. *For a modern 'philosopher of culture' this would mean: state reality has to be reshaped in accordance with the aesthetic goal until the condition is reached that corresponds to the 'goal,' i.e., until the condition of an aesthetic-pacifist cultural community is realized.* For Nietzsche, the sentence has the opposite meaning: the reality of the state with all its horrors is the enduring prerequisite for the birth of the redeeming work of art. This merely hovers like a vision above the whole: if one takes away that reality, this vision also disappears, arising as it does from the conflict and understandable only from the contrast. Demonstrating this is indeed the purpose of the aesthetic main work, the 'Birth of Tragedy'. Accordingly, Nietzsche states that the strength of the political drive provides a guarantee that the soil from which individual geniuses alone can arise is not inhibited in its fertility. At this point, the idea of education that dominated the young Nietzsche comes into play: in order for the great work of art to arise again and again, the concentrated will of the state is needed as a 'magical force' to force the selfish individuals into the sacrifices and preparations that are the prerequisite for the realization of great artistic plans. To this belongs 'almost first and foremost' the education of the people.

So it is that, looking precisely at the 'single solar height of their art', we have to imagine the Greeks as political human beings par excellence. Only the people of the Renaissance can be compared to the Greeks with regard to this 'unleashing of the political drive, such an unconditional sacrifice of all other interests in service of this instinct for the state'. The secret of the Greek concept of culture, and thus also of Nietzsche's concept of culture, is the connection that exists between 'state and art, political greed and artistic creation, battlefield and work of art'. State and society are two sides of an eternal, all-encompassing reality: the state is the 'iron clamp,' it forces the individual to serve genius, it wages its wars, it robs and murders, but in the moment when a standstill occurs, when there are 'some warmer days', the shining blossoms of genius spring forth. Thus the condition of society as a cultural community does not succeed the condition of the state, but society can only exist because there is a state.

The further features of what Nietzsche calls the secret doctrine of the connection between state and genius are only to be hinted at: the original founder of the state is military genius, which evokes the primal state through separation and order. It immediately pushes back the family in significance: the man lives in the state, the child grows up for the state and by the hand of the state. It is precisely in this way that woman gains her efficacy: as the being more closely akin to nature, as the eternally equal and tranquil being, she broods for the state what sleep is for man. She does not step forward, she lives as mother in the darkness, because political drive, including its highest purpose, demands it. In modern times, on the other hand, with the 'complete disarray of the state

tendency', the family becomes an expedient in place of the state, and accordingly the artistic goal of the state is immediately degraded to a domestic art (house music instead of tragedy!). At the same time, the education of the house poses as it were as the only natural one, which tolerates that of the state only as a questionable encroachment on its rights, and rightly so, insofar as the modern state is concerned.

Only now are we able to demonstrate the basic outlines of Nietzsche's actual relationship to the real state of his time. We have seen that this relationship cannot be characterized on the basis of the first 'Untimely Meditation' as an opposition of the 'spirit' to the militaristic power state. It is not coincidental or conditioned by the time of writing that in the preface to 'The Birth of Tragedy' Nietzsche writes to Richard Wagner about the 'terrors and sublimities of the war just ended' (1871), that he sees his problem in a deep connection with the turbulent events. Westphal assumed a reversal between this statement and the beginning of the first 'Untimely Meditation'. We will show that the fundamental idea remains the same not only between 1870 and 1873, but also later on.

The fragment on the Greek state, which together with 'Homer's Contest' and the fragment on the pre-Socratics gives a purer representation of Nietzsche's image of the Greeks than 'The Birth of Tragedy', contains a brief digression in the middle. Out of the proliferation of the political world of the Hellenes, Nietzsche casts a glance at the present and says in what phenomena he believes he can recognize 'equally troubling atrophies of the political sphere for art and society'. What then is the standard by which he approaches the state of the present here? In the 'Untimely Meditations' it is called 'culture', and because one did not know how to interpret this word, one understood it aesthetically and believed that Nietzsche confronted the modern state as a 'critic of culture'. But it is the phenomenon of war that provides him with the standard. He distinguishes two concepts and conditions of the state: one in which war is an impossibility, and another in which the state is not based on the 'fear of the demon of war'. The state in the former sense appears to him as a protective institution of selfish individuals, the decision about war and peace is left here to 'the egoism of the masses or their representatives', while in the other case it is entrusted to 'individual powerholders'. In the 'currently prevailing nationality movement', in the spread of universal suffrage, Nietzsche therefore sees 'effects of the fear of war'. Nationalism, democracy and pacifism form an inseparable unity for him. But in the background he sees the liberal-optimistic worldview, which has its roots in the doctrines of the French Revolution, 'that is, in an entirely un-Germanic, genuinely Romance, flat and unmetaphysical philosophy'. *The real cowards, however, are 'those international, homeless anchorites who, owing to their natural lack of a state instinct, have learned to use*

*politics as a means of the stock exchange and to misuse state and society as enrichment devices for themselves'. Against the diversion of the state tendency into a money tendency that is to be feared from this side, he says, 'the only antidote is war, and war again...'. The dangerous characteristic of the present political situation is therefore the use of revolutionary ideas in the service of a selfish, stateless financial aristocracy: all ills can be traced back to this, and 'so one will have to approve an occasional paean to war from me', Nietzsche concludes.*

An even more direct political consequence of the ideas reproduced here is drawn in the first version of the preface to 'The Birth of Tragedy' addressed to Richard Wagner. On February 22, 1871, Schopenhauer's birthday, Nietzsche writes: The only productive political power in Germany has come to victory in the most tremendous way and from now on will dominate German being down to its atoms. 'This fact is of the utmost value, because something will perish on that power which we hate as the actual opponent of any deeper philosophical and artistic contemplation'. This opponent is liberalism. 'That whole liberalism constructed on a dreamed-up dignity of man, of the generic concept man, will bleed to death on that rigid power hinted at before; and we want to gladly forgo the little charms and kindnesses that cling to it, if only this actually anti-cultural doctrine is cleared from the path of genius, for what else should that rigid power serve, with its centuries-long birth out of violence, conquest and bloodbath, than to clear the path for genius?'

Nietzsche places his hope on the military force of Prussia, it will let liberalism bleed to death in itself, but he rejects the national state. We can guess his reasons for this when we read in the notes: 'The principle of nationalities is a barbaric crudeness towards the city-state. In this limitation genius shows itself, which cares nothing for masses, but experiences more in the small than barbarians in the great'. The state, as he sees in the example of Rome, which cannot reach its ultimate goal, swells to an unnatural size; the expansion of the Romans is therefore nothing sublime compared to Athens. But it is the same with the unity of the nation as with the unity of a church: there are disadvantages associated with it. 'Blessing of struggle', Nietzsche adds to this observation. In the unification of Germany, he ultimately sees a quantitative, not a qualitative change; for him it is the 'unification of the German governments into a state'. He must be an opponent of this unification because it only endangers the goal of engendering genius.

At the time of 'Human, All Too Human', Nietzsche becomes sharply opposed to rationalism: rationality as a dogma directly demands narrow-mindedness: all higher culture can now only fence itself in with national boundary markers to its own detriment. In the preliminary work for 'The Will to Power' we find a rejection of the 'national passport' and the remark that to be national in the sense now (1880s) demanded by

public opinion would not only be an ignominy but a dishonesty for more spiritual people, with a sigh over 'this homogeneous rationalism' behind which no thought lies. Aphorism 748 of 'The Will to Power' begins with a sigh over 'this homogeneous rationalism', behind which no thought lies. Nietzsche points to the mutual melting together and fertilization, in which lies the real value and meaning of 'present-day culture' and predicts the economic unification of Europe to come; the 'peace party' appears in reaction, which will be a party of the oppressed for a while, but soon the great party. The aphorism ends with the incomplete sentence: 'A war party, proceeding in the opposite direction with the same basic severity against itself'. Nowhere is the national state attacked because of its tendency towards warfare, rather Nietzsche seems to move away from his earlier view that democratic states must be war shy. But for him, the nationalist state is already a democratic one because of universal suffrage. In the aphorism from 'The Will to Power' just quoted, for this very reason another contemptuous glance is cast at the Bismarckian Reich: 'And the 'new Reich', founded once again on the most worn-out and despised idea: the equality of rights and votes'.

We therefore concluded: Nietzsche did not empathize with the national movement that accompanied the founding of the Reich, just as he faced the Wars of Liberation without understanding and rejecting them. If he finds only bad things in the national state, this is not because he looks at it with the eyes of a pacifist, but because he considers such a democratic colossus incapable of preparing the people for the engendering of genius. This rejection was already expressed in the sharpest terms in the fragment on the Greek state, where the modern concept of rationality is called ridiculous in the face of the Pythia and the Roman concept of the state is rejected with the words: it is an unvoiced wish to want to see a nation equipped as a visible mechanical unity with glorious governmental apparatus and military pomp.

We have shown that the young Nietzsche cannot represent the antithesis: spirit versus power state, because he represents another one through which it is excluded; it follows from this that, despite those introductory sentences in the first 'Untimely Meditation', he is not on the side of art and education against the 'Reich'. He is not the representative of an aesthetic opposition, but he is in opposition to a politicizing aesthetic education. The philosopher of that 'culture' which unthinkingly participated in the founding of the Reich, the representative spirit of the German bourgeois intelligentsia in the 1870s is still Hegel. D.F. Strauss is ultimately disposed of by Nietzsche as a Hegelian; the lectures on the future of our educational institutions are directed essentially against Hegel; for the Hegelian philosophy was foundational for the new 'general state education'. But when Nietzsche mocks the 'apotheosis' of the state, he is not thinking of the

militaristic power state, as whose theoretician Hegel can also be seen, but with the right instinct he takes the Hegelian total state to be the cultural state. It is the state as a total concept, as it is developed in Hegel's philosophy of right, it is the spirit of Weimar concretized into the state, that Nietzsche fights against. However strongly the young Nietzsche feels the personal greatness of Lessing and Schiller: he has not listened for a moment to the liberal-bourgeois culture that is baptized with their names. He can therefore not be counted as part of an opposition in any phase of the development of this culture, one that opposed the state with the help of the 'spirit'. That Nietzsche's writings supplied weapons to such an opposition cannot be denied. Nietzsche himself and his work have nothing in common with it.

### 5. Bismarck against the 'Reich'

In the historical epoch that Nietzsche experienced as an observer, the leading layer of the German bourgeoisie was liberal and national. *Rational liberalism, ideologically founded by Hegel, was the latest form of that synthesis of Enlightenment and Romanticism which Nietzsche was called upon to dissolve. The fundamental flaw of spiritual national liberalism lay in its lack of originality, its 'idealism'.* A bold, new idea was missing, the realism, the contact with what was really moving in the depths of the century was missing. It was precisely this lack of realism that had to have fateful effects, because the nation believed it had just awakened to reality, thought it was successfully making the transition from daydreaming to 'real politics'. In truth, there was only one real politician, the leading statesman, and one realistic philosopher, the unknown Nietzsche. The question of the epoch was: will Bismarck have the power to lead the German bourgeoisie out of national liberalism, or will the same bourgeoisie, which had not had the power to create the Reich, subsequently take control of the gift that had fallen into its lap? What the Untimely sensed in 1873 happened afterwards: the history of the Reich became a history of Bismarck's intellectual defeat. Before the horrified opened eye of the other great realist, this process took place: the commercial bourgeois became master over the statesman, liberalism and romanticism alternately made policy, but above all, good deals were made. The Reich flourished, but it was an illusory blossoming, and the philosophy that accompanied it ('ethical idealism') was a sham philosophy. In the World War, the ostentatious romantic-liberal structure collapsed, and at that same moment the two great antagonists of the past became visible.

The documents in which Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck is characterized are not easy to read (the statesman took no notice of Nietzsche).

We have before us a whole number of passages in the works, as well as statements in letters and notes, which mention Bismarck's name. He is also meant in many places where his name does not appear,

everywhere we read 'Reich' or 'great politics' or simply 'Germany'. Just as furthermore the phrase 'the artist' almost always refers to Wagner, 'the statesman' always means Bismarck. Let us now pursue how Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck developed!

Behind the statement in a letter from 1868 (on February 16 to v. Gersdorff): 'Bismarck gives me immoderate pleasure', we can surmise more of a human than a political sympathy. From 'The Birth of Tragedy' he deleted a passage during printing that mentioned the 'leading statesman' of Germany and the 'creative artistic genius' (Wagner) side by side. In January 1874, in connection with his criticism of Wagner, Nietzsche notes the sentence: 'Whether he (Wagner) was right with his great confidence which he placed in Bismarck, a not-too-distant future will teach'. In 'Human, All Too Human' he deals with Bismarck under the titles 'In the Service of the Prince', 'The Apparent Weather Makers of Politics', 'New and Old Concept of Government', 'the Helmsman of Passions' (445, 449 f., 453, 458). There is still something tentative in these characterizing rather than evaluating sections. Even sympathy speaks from the aphorism 'Comfort for Hypochondriacs' (615). In between, however, initially still in interrogative form, under the heading 'Great Politics and Its Losses' (481) an aggressive tone appears: a people which is preparing to engage in great politics, becomes eager for political laurels, no longer belongs to its own cause as completely as before; the daily new questions and worries of the public good devour its strength, and the question arises: is all this bloom and splendor of the whole worth it, when for this 'coarse, shimmering flower of the nation' all the nobler, more delicate, more spiritual plants and growths have to be sacrificed? Here speaks that fundamental aversion to democratic nationalism whose reasons we know. The aphorism stands in an ideal relationship to another one in the same volume (235, 'Senile and Ideal State in Contradiction'), in which the same objection is raised against the socialists. The socialists, it says here, want to produce a prosperous life for as many as possible. But if the perfect state they have in mind were really achieved, the soil from which the great intellect and the powerful individual in general grows would be destroyed by this prosperity. The wise man must resist the 'extravagant wishes of unintelligent goodness,' because in the perfect state only exhausted individuals would have a place.

So Nietzsche takes sides equally against Bismarck's direction as well as against his opposition, and his contradiction is ultimately grounded in the rejection of the democratic state. One must always keep both parallel actions in view, only then does one gain an idea of how deeply Nietzsche saw through the bourgeois society of his era. The endeavors of the two opposing parties, the socialist and the nationalist, are characterized throughout Europe as 'envy and laziness in different directions'. 'They are worthy of each other' (Human, All Too Human, 480). Under the title 'Subversive Spirits and

Possessive Spirits' in the Mixed Opinions and Maxims (304) there is something that still has validity today for bourgeois culture in Europe. In a few pages the new bourgeoisie is characterized there, which differs from the socialists only in terms of property. 'It is you yourselves you must first overcome, if you are somehow to prevail over the opponents of your prosperity'.

It is indicative of Nietzsche's fairness towards the two parties that the sharpest expression he used for nationalism ('national heart spasms and blood poisoning' [The Gay Science, 277]) is already found here in connection with the other party: the popular disease of 'socialist conjuring craze'.

One recognizes with what subtlety and caution Nietzsche knows how to initiate an attack from the aphorisms 323 and 324 of the 'Mixed Opinions and Maxims'. 'To be very German means de-Germanizing oneself', is the phrase with which the great attack on the 'Reich' is introduced. The intensification of the situation that occurs with this section consists in the 'turn towards the un-German' being called a characteristic of the most capable people of our nation.

Here no longer speaks the aversion against the class, here speaks malicious intent. The leading statesman, next to Wagner the only contemporary who is recognized by Nietzsche as an equal, appears more and more to the ruling stratum as the leader of the nation. This leader is a representative of the national principle, reason enough for Nietzsche not only to attack this principle as before, but to strike at it in an even more refined and deeper way.

The fact that this takes effort is not important here, we are in the middle of the fight! (by the way, there are still plenty of means to nonetheless hunt the truth, and after all an author who is counting on Europe's best readers should not make things too easy for the intelligence of his readers. The famous statesman runs neck and neck with the lonely thinker down the same track, both are Germans, Germans of a kind that only return after intervals of centuries. For the true competitor, the cause and the person are inseparably intertwined: Nietzsche's genius consists to a good extent in taking the personal so seriously that it becomes the 'cause'. He hits the leader of Germany, the Germany that actually he, Nietzsche, should be leading, right in the heart, if he is right about this: being properly German means de-Germanizing oneself. Because the other does nothing for de-Germanization, he Germanizes as much as he can. But that makes him un-German! That takes him away from our tradition, from the most capable of our people! So Bismarck no longer belongs among the most capable of our people! Don't overlook the honest sound of these last words: they clearly indicate the dual nature of the aphorism. When in these years would Nietzsche speak of 'our people'?

The aphorism that immediately follows contains a concise critique of German weaknesses, under the pretense that a foreigner is speaking. Here Bismarck is betrayed: that Germany's greatest statesman does not believe in great statesmen. So Bismarck is being negated here (he does not believe in himself), on the level of irony exactly the same thing is happening that the preceding aphorism intends in all seriousness (subtleties of this kind are nothing unusual for Nietzsche).

With the strongest accents Nietzsche tends to speak of Goethe's anti-nationalism (how wrong he is in this is shown by the wonderful conversation of the Wise Man with Luben on December 13th 1813). When he wanted to expose Bismarck as the nation's leader, he had to play Goethe off against him. Therefore Goethe has to be 'an interlude without consequences' in the history of the Germans, 'who would be capable of pointing to a piece of Goethe for example in German politics of the last seventy years!' And shortly before that in the second book: 'Look at the best of our statesmen and artists from this perspective: none of them had Goethe as their educator, they could not have had' (Wanderer, 125, 107).

How consciously and carefully Nietzsche works can be seen from the following: it would be unthinkable for one of his published writings to have Bismarck's name appear alongside Napoleon's. That is forbidden by the struggle for pre-eminence. Napoleon and Goethe strictly belong together as 'Europeans', Bismarck stands on the opposing side. But in the notes of the posthumous papers Bismarck is mentioned no fewer than four times in the same sense together with Napoleon, once he appears alongside Goethe, yes, once, together with Frederick the Great, even above Goethe. Here it is not a matter of 'contradictions', here it is a matter of a system.

That envy, good Eris, the desire of the Western fighter is decisively involved here, is made clear beyond doubt by aphorism 167 of 'Dawn'. It deals with 'Unconditional homages'. And who are the examples? The most widely read German philosopher, Schopenhauer, the most listened-to German musician, Wagner, and the most respected German statesman, Bismarck. Just placing him alongside Schopenhauer and Wagner says a great deal, Nietzsche had no higher personal distinction to bestow. Here there would be, he says, 'a magnificent spectacle' to see three times over, but in all three cases one could not be of the same opinion. Bismarck comes off worst: he is not even of the same opinion as himself! For he is 'a movable spirit in the service of strong basic drives, and for that very reason without principles'. In a statesman that would be nothing unusual, but listen, 'unfortunately up until now it has been so utterly un-German!' Nietzsche as eulogist of the German past, Nietzsche as advocate of principles in politics, Nietzsche as one who objects to a person because he has strong basic drives, anyone who does not perceive the tendency here cannot read. These books

have not yet been read as Nietzsche himself wished them to be read, precisely as stated in the later preface to the book in which the quoted aphorism appears. 'To read well, that means to read slowly, deeply, cautiously, with afterthoughts, with open doors, with delicate fingers and eyes...'

But we are not yet done with the quoted aphorism, it is a masterpiece of agonistic malice. How much one would have to forget about these 'three greats of the age', Nietzsche says in conclusion, in order to be able to be their worshipper in one fell swoop from now on! It would be more advisable, he says, to try something new, namely, to become 'honest', to learn that unconditional homages to persons are something ridiculous, and that it does not depend on the persons but on the matters. This conclusion would be weak if it only depended on the thought, for it is surely meager, in the face of three men revered by their nation, to say: it does not depend on the persons but on the matters. But this truth is not stated by Nietzsche in German, but in French. And he who the saying stems from stands at the end like a bronze statue opposite the false greatness of the day that is Bismarck: 'This saying is like that of him who spoke, great, brave, simple and silent, entirely like Carnot, the soldier and republican. But is one allowed to speak like this now from a Frenchman to Germans, and a republican at that?' Who still doubts here the conscious art: a Frenchman, a republican, a silent one, and there Bismarck, the German, the monarchist, the man with the long parliamentary speeches! Nietzsche makes use of the same means in aphorism 95 of 'The Gay Science'. In a section on Chamfort, Mirabeau is introduced and, suddenly, it continues: 'Mirabeau, who as a person belongs to an entirely different rank of greatness, than even the foremost among the statesmen greats of yesterday and today'. Here again the point lies in a Frenchman being played off against Bismarck. Exactly as Nietzsche plays La Rochefoucauld off against German philosophy, Bizet against Wagner, as 'ironic antitheses', as he himself writes to a musical friend in Bizet's case, exactly so he shoves Carnot and Mirabeau, random figures, in front of Bismarck.

Only in passing (Dawn, 190), in a characterization of the education of the Germans, 'which they no longer possess', is the political and national madness spoken of which they have exchanged it for: a direct attack against the one who is to blame for this exchange. It is characteristic that although Nietzsche seeks to give the impression, Bismarck's sake, that the disappearance of that education was a loss, at the same time he describes this education truly devastatingly: as presumptuous and naive, as soft, good-natured, silvery shining idealism etc.

In 'Dawn' finally (201) the violence of the attack is reached which from now on characterizes the measure or rather the excess in Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck. An unconnected train of thought about the

future of the nobility concludes with the sudden words: 'In the end: what should the nobility busy itself with from now on, when it appears more and more each day that it is becoming indecent to be involved in politics?' Only if one relates the word to Bismarck does it make sense: it is a stab. And as if satisfied, a little further down (262) Nietzsche adds the Lutheran verses 'Though they take our life, Goods, honor, child, and wife: Let all these be gone, They yet have nothing won' and comments: 'Yes! Yes! The Reich!'. The mockery continues at the end of the great aphorism in 'The Gay Science' (357) which bears the title: 'On the old problem: what is German?' Schopenhauer is praised here as a 'good European', of course not as a German. His pessimism was an exceptional case among Germans, in whom everything testifies to the opposite of pessimism: 'Our brave politics, our cheerful patriotism, which is decided enough to view all things from a slightly philosophical principle ('Germany, Germany above all')...' (is there a more grotesque juxtaposition than Bismarck's 'cheerful' philosophy with the main clause 'Germany, Germany above all' on one side and Schopenhauer's pessimism on the other? No matter what well-founded objections Nietzsche can otherwise raise against Schopenhauer's pessimism, no matter that he has just named Schopenhauer, Wagner and Bismarck together, here the old pessimist is good enough to be played off against the 'Reich'. Such turns are then placed by clueless readers under the heading 'Nietzsche's contradictory attitude to Schopenhauer', while they belong under the heading: Nietzsche's consistent struggle against Bismarck).

As if summarizing, there is the beautiful aphorism at the end of 'Human, All Too Human' (377): 'We homeless'. It is dedicated to the opponents of Bismarck, the 'Europeans of today', those homeless who can see neither a goal in 'founding a Reich of justice and concord on earth' (because under all circumstances it would be the Reich of the deepest mediocrity and philistinism), nor speak up for nationalism and racial hatred either. These homeless live on mountains, out of their times, in past or coming centuries, only so that they can avoid the silent fury to which they would feel condemned as eyewitnesses to a politics 'that makes the German spirit barren by making it vain and is petty politics besides'. Nietzsche describes his own way of life here; he reveals why he cannot live in Germany. There one makes 'petty politics'. But what does Nietzsche do? Clearly the opposite: great politics. 'Great politics' is the watchword of the coming years in the struggle against the 'Reich'.

In the concepts of 'good European' and 'great politics' we recognize the weapons that Nietzsche used in his final battle with Bismarck. This battle is fought in the works of 1888, everything held back breaks out there. But before the final battle there is still a phase in which the struggle continues in the old, indirect manner. The eighth main chapter of 'Beyond Good and Evil' is titled 'Peoples and Fatherlands'. The first aphorism (240) deals

with Richard Wagner. It is that incomparable prose piece on the *Mastersingers*' overture which concludes with the words: the Germans are from the day before yesterday and from the day after tomorrow, they do not yet have a today. Do not overlook that thereby that Germany which Nietzsche expelled is denied existence! Wagner is followed immediately by Bismarck; the aphorism dedicated to him is in no way inferior in the art of vilification to the previous one. It is extremely clever how Nietzsche here distributes contrasting opinions between two old men and thereby reserves for himself the possibility of hovering above the Bismarck problem and pronouncing the definitive judgement, one cannot defeat a rival in a more profound and thorough manner...

The main speaker gives the impression of defending German narrow-mindedness. There is talk of the German's shyness and delight in standing aside, of his fondness for foreign lands and secret infinitude. And a statesman who reversed this, who made the spirit of this people narrow, its taste national, he would be great? He may be strong, strong and mad, but certainly he is not great. The whole aphorism actually has the concept of greatness as its subject: the 'great politics' to which Bismarck has condemned his people is contrasted with the 'great thought' which gives greatness to an act and cause. A particular subtlety is that Nietzsche does not name the statesman, just as he does not name the one who brings the 'great thought', while Wagner is named without hesitation in the previous section. In place of the name there is a characterization of Bismarck which says everything in two words: 'He knows and holds as much of philosophy as a peasant or student fraternity member, he is still innocent'. Do you understand now what is held against Bismarck? That he overlooks Nietzsche, that he believes he can lead the German people while next to him the deepest, most revolutionary thoughts are being thought without him noticing anything about it. Bismarck is personally held responsible by Nietzsche for the fact that he is not taken seriously by the Germans, for whom he produces work upon work. Anyone who wanted to find this personal attribution to Bismarck ridiculous would reveal that he sees the whole thing only morally-psychologically, not symbolically. Of course Bismarck was not to blame for Nietzsche's lack of effect, but he was guilty nonetheless, because he did after all allow the German bourgeoisie to become master over his work, over the Reich founded by him, the same bourgeoisie for whom Nietzsche, the author of 'Zarathustra', was, in the eyes of his friends, merely a rich but deranged spirit. Franz Overbeck allowed his friendship with Nietzsche to founder because of the latter, and yet he understood nothing of the friend's world-historical significance, as his notes movingly demonstrate. Seen from a world-historical perspective Nietzsche was in the right when he held Bismarck, and no one else, accountable for his own fate: the great man is liable symbolically, not morally.

'A stronger one becomes master of the strong', the aphorism concludes, what Christian consolation from a Nietzsche! And for the intellectual shallowing of a people there is compensation, 'the deepening of another one'. Which other people is meant here is mostly hard to guess, moreover it is said in the same main chapter (254). In Germany, the great statesman leads his followers right into the 'restlessness, emptiness and noisy devilry' of politics, in France on the other hand people of taste hold both ears closed 'before the raging stupidity and noisy claptrap of the democratic bourgeois'. Despite a certain Germanization and vulgarization of taste the French have been able to maintain all their cultural superiority over Europe. They are after all a 'halfway successful' synthesis of North and South and therefore protected against the ghastly northern gray on gray, against the German disease of taste, 'against whose excess one has presently prescribed blood and iron, which is to say: 'great politics' (according to a dangerous healing art, which has taught me to wait and wait, but until now still not to hope)'. For the born intermediaries, for the 'good Europeans' (among whom Nietzsche counts himself here), the artist of music has created a piece 'South of Music': Bizet.

The Bizet episode is spun out a little more in the following aphorism (255), but then the main thread continues again (256): the theme France and Germany is brought to the strangest conclusion. Europe, Nietzsche begins, wants to become one. The politicians 'of shortsightedness and hasty action', who are dominant today with the help of nationalist madness, know nothing of this; their politics can therefore only be 'between-acts politics'. All deeper and more receptive people of this century try out the European of the future in advance, only in weaker moments, for instance in old age, do they belong to the 'fatherlands'. Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, Wagner are cited as examples. The connection between Wagner and late French romanticism is particularly interesting here. Wagner's German friends should reflect on whether his art does not come from non-German sources and impulses, although of course precisely Paris was indispensable for the development of his type.

Up to this point Nietzsche has driven disguise and antithesis, now he suddenly breaks off and says something completely unexpected in honor of the German nature of Richard Wagner. One must read the passage: it negates everything said before; suddenly everything is there again that represents Nietzsche's real opinion. In everything Wagner made it 'stronger, harder, higher' than a 19th century Frenchman could make it, thanks to the circumstance that we Germans are still closer to barbarism than the French. 'Perhaps the most noteworthy thing that Richard Wagner created is, for the whole late Latin race, inaccessible, unfathomable, inimitable for all time and not only for today: the figure of Siegfried, that very free human who may well be far too free, too hard, too cheerful, too healthy, too anti-

Catholic for the taste of all old and weary cultural peoples'. Nietzsche's romanticism, his inclination for the south, his good Europeanism have so often been cited, but anyone who can write a sentence like the one above is only a very ironic admirer of French culture, for precisely the fact that Latin culture is old and weary can only be felt by those who bear the youthful force of the Germanic essence within themselves. Nietzsche's 'Germanism' is therefore not weakened in the slightest by his tendentious predilection for the south, for the Mediterranean, for the Mediterranean taste of the Latin peoples. Freedom, toughness and daring, the virtues he values most highly, still appear to him in the figure of Siegfried.

The Siegfried idea is central for Nietzsche. We remember encountering it before (see above p. 99). Now it is given a sharp point against the romantics, who will one day find the way to Rome. The recollection of the 'anti-Roman Siegfried' is followed by the well-known Parsifal poem, which concludes with the words: 'For what you hear is Rome, Rome's faith without words!' We know that in Nietzsche's view the Romance peoples are closer to Christianity than the Germanic races, we know what that means for him. According to that we have to gauge what the conclusion of this main chapter on 'Peoples and Fatherlands' wants to say: it restores the balance in favor of the north.

In the spring of 1888 Nietzsche steps up to his final battle: it is against German culture, i.e., Wagner, and against German politics, i.e., Bismarck. To properly understand this last phase one must know the letters in which Nietzsche bemoans the ineffectiveness of his existence. Since the publication of 'Zarathustra', that call to supposed comrades which was met with stunned silence, he has been extremely sensitive. It was not his nature, it was the times, it was the intellectual narrowness of the German bourgeoisie that isolated him. Already in 1885 he writes to his sister: 'It is most eerie to be so alone', and two years later he speaks to Overbeck of the 'soundless, now thousandfold solitude'. In 1886 we read in a letter to his sister: 'It is hard, truly mad, that a person born for the richest and most extensive effectiveness who could lay down and plow in his best into unexplored souls is condemned to making literature with his half-blind eyes, just to be able to have any effect at all'. His books are fishhooks to him; 'if they do not catch me a few people, they have no meaning!' 'Get me a small circle of people who want to hear and understand me, and I will be healthy!' (to the same.)

That it was Wagner who 'took all the people from him on whom having any effect at all in Germany could have meaning', had already become clear to him in the summer of 1882. Now, in 1888, he sets about realizing what he had always hoped: to become Wagner's heir. His attack on Wagner is meant to bring him into possession of the inheritance by force. The 'Case of Wagner' is the first of the eruptions of the last creative

year. In it Nietzsche wages war on Wagner and 'incidentally' (i.e., in reality principally) on German taste. Such a falsity as that of Bayreuth, it says at the end of the explosive pamphlet, is today no exception. 'We all know the unaesthetic concept of the Christian junker, this innocence between opposites, this 'good conscience' in the lie...'. Here too we will probably have to think of Bismarck. Numerous passages from the letters let us recognize that Wagner and Bismarck now mean only two names for the same obstacle. Nietzsche no longer wants to live in secret. He wants to rule Germany, he wants to stand beside Bismarck. 'Even a member of the Reichstag and adherent of Bismarck (Delbrück)', he writes to Gast after Wagner's death, 'is said to have expressed his extreme displeasure that I do not live in Berlin, but in Santa Margherita!!'

The letters to his friend v. Seydlitz especially allow the situation to be clearly recognized: here Nietzsche, there Bismarck! 'Between ourselves... it is not impossible that I am the first philosopher of the age', he writes to v. Seydlitz at the beginning of the fateful year 1888, 'yes perhaps even a little more, something decisive and fateful, standing between two millennia'. And this consciousness of world-historical significance sees itself opposed to 'our dear Germans'! In Germany, Nietzsche continues, they have not yet managed even a moderately respectable permanent review of his books. Eccentric, pathological, psychiatric are the terms applied to them. No one protests, no one feels insulted when this philosopher is insulted. 'Under these circumstances one has to live in Nice... God, with the cynicism peculiar to him, allows his sun to shine more beautifully over us than over the so much more respectable Europe of Herr von Bismarck (with feverish diligence works on his accoutrement and completely presents the aspect of a heroically attuned hedgehog)' [*Original footnote. One year earlier on the same: 'For this present Germany, however much it may bristle with armaments, I have no more respect. It represents the most stupid, stunted, mendacious form of the 'German spirit' that has existed up to now...'*]. Also to v. Seydlitz in the autumn of the same year on the 'Twilight of the Idols': 'I humbly opine that the 'Spirit', the so-called 'German Spirit' has gone for a walk and is residing somewhere in summer quarters, certainly not in the 'Reich', rather already in Santa Margherita...'

Contrary to expectation, the section of 'Twilight of the Idols' with the title 'What the Germans Lack' is quite moderate. The new Germany is even praised: it is not a high culture that has become dominant with it, but it has 'more manly virtues' than any other European country can boast of. However, there is one objection: it is dearly bought, becoming powerful; power stultifies. Politics devours all seriousness for really spiritual things, 'Germany, Germany above all, I fear that was the end of German philosophy'. Bismarck devours everything, he is Germany. This is expressed with bloody mockery: 'Are there German philosophers? Are there



German poets? Are there good German books? I am asked abroad. I blush; but with the courage that is characteristic of me even in the most desperate cases, I answer: Yes, Bismarck! If only I were permitted to concede what books are read today... The cursed instinct of mediocrity!

It goes without saying that in this context France receives high praise once again. 'At the very moment when Germany rises up as a great power, France gains a transformed importance as a cultural power. Even today much new seriousness, much new passion of the spirit has emigrated to Paris; questions like pessimism for example, the question of Wagner, nearly all psychological and artistic questions are reflected there incomparably more subtly and thoroughly than in Germany, the Germans themselves are incapable of this kind of seriousness. In the history of European culture the rise of the 'Reich' means above all one thing: a displacement of the center of gravity. It is known everywhere already: the Germans no longer come into consideration in the main thing, which remains culture'. With precise chronological determination it says in the 'Maxims and Arrows': 'German spirit: a *contradictio in adjecto* for the past 18 years'.

Nietzsche expresses himself even more sharply in his last work 'Nietzsche contra Wagner': 'Even now France remains the seat of the most intellectual and refined culture of Europe and the high school of taste: but one must know how to find this 'France of taste'. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung for example, or whoever has it for his mouthpiece, sees 'barbarians' in the French, as for my person I seek the black continent, where one ought to emancipate 'the slaves', in the vicinity of the Norddeutsche...'. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was Bismarck's official organ, among the 'slaves' we have to understand those who rendered him allegiance, i.e., the Germans.

The antithesis: German spirit-German Reich completely dominates the late Nietzsche's production. But this is not a theoretical antithesis, a contemplative observation, an assertion that might be true; it is a means of combat. The desire of the competitor, the wrestler for the highest prize, carries Nietzsche away with it. He leaves the realms of philosophy, he jumps over all dividing lines: if Bismarck does not act, Nietzsche will act. Nietzsche will become a politician. The 'great harvest time' has arrived: the plan of the theoretical main work, 'The Will to Power', is to be reforged into a new passionate, aggressively attacking work of four books which will bear the title: 'The Revaluation of All Values'. The first book is finished, it is called 'The Antichrist'. Almost simultaneously 'Twilight of the Idols' appears. About it Nietzsche allows himself terrible clarity in one of his last letters to Overbeck. One must know the passage completely: 'As I go into it quite honestly with the Germans, you will not have to complain about 'ambiguity'. This irresponsible race,

which has on its conscience all the great atrocities against culture and had something else on its mind at all the decisive moments in history (the Reformation at the time of the Renaissance; Kantian philosophy when a scientific mentality had just about been achieved with difficulty in England and France; wars of liberation at the time of experiencing Napoleon, the only one so far strong enough to make Europe into a political and economic unity), has 'the Reich' in mind today, this recrudescence of petty statism and cultural atomism, at a moment when for the first time the great world question is posed. There has never been a more important moment in history: but who would know anything about it? The disproportion that emerges here is completely inevitable: at the moment when an unprecedented height and freedom of spiritual passion takes possession of the supreme problem of mankind and conjures up the decision for its fate, the general pettiness and obtuseness stands out all the sharper in contrast'.

This is not enthusiasm: it is the clear-sightedness of genius. Of course, these extreme formulas only become meaningful for someone who observes the concrete situation to which they are aimed. It is not about 'mankind': that is a hyperbole. It is about Germany. But it is about Germany in all seriousness: Nietzsche is planning a political attack on his homeland. 'We must drive the Germans mad with esprit...' (to Fuchs). The word shows the direction of attack: once again the Romanic antithesis is to have its say, but it is not only to have its say. It is conscious treason when Nietzsche writes to Laine in Paris: 'I am unhappy to be writing in German, although I write much better than any German ever wrote. In the end, the French will hear from the book (he is referring to Twilight of the Idols) the deep sympathy they deserve, and I have declared war on Germany in all my instincts (p. 58, a separate section 'What the Germans Lack'). One must look the facts in the face: Nietzsche specifically draws a Frenchman's attention to the section directed against the Germans. That is something fundamentally different from sending the book containing that section: it is an act. High treason as an act is then also announced in the penultimate still clear note to Overbeck: 'I myself am just working on a memorandum for the European courts for the purpose of an anti-German league. I want to lace the 'Reich' into an iron shirt and provoke it to a war of desperation'.

'What a moving high point! He, who had allowed himself to be provoked into a war of desperation by Bismarck, wanted to provoke the 'Reich'.

In the last weeks of his conscious life, Nietzsche was carried by a sense of destiny as never before. He repeatedly assured Overbeck that there was no more coincidence in his life. Amor fati had always been his true religion, now he was living in it. What does it mean to feel completely under fate? It means: becoming one with the power that appears in events, it means: overcoming the tension between oneself and the world.

The personal becomes universal, the universal personal. Everything that happens is meaningful, symbolic, typical. There is nothing isolated anymore: everything, every word, every person has a mysterious relation to our life and its ultimate goal.

Out of an extremely heightened state of this kind, Nietzsche's autobiography emerged, which was given the title 'Ecce Homo'. Shortly before the end, with the dawning awareness of this end, Nietzsche tells the story of his life. From this fiery written book shines the torment, first experienced by Nietzsche, of living as a world-historical human being in the sharpest light of consciousness, having to name himself, his position in the context of things exactly, without yet having the power to change anything now, without even having as much influence as to convince the closest, most friendly people that one represents a turning point in the history of Europe. This must be made clear: 'Hear me! For I am so and so. Above all, do not confuse me with anyone else!' (Preface). In two words of the preface Nietzsche gives the most succinct, exhaustive characterization of his thinking: 'Error is cowardice' (A martial word. It is spoken by one who feels himself a warrior of the future in contrast to a tired, late civilization moving towards dissolution).

'Ecce Homo' is not really an autobiography: it is a polemical writing in the form of a self-portrait. Therein lies the demonic: that the portrayal of the most personal life automatically becomes an attack on a whole world.

Nietzsche immediately introduces himself as 'the last anti-political German' (Why I am so wise). He believes that in doing so he is being 'more German' than present-day Germans, 'mere Reich Germans', could still manage to be. Of course, he mentions in passing the tale of his Polish ancestors, though not without strongly emphasizing the German core of his family. The whole writing breathes a spirit of struggle against the 'Reich', but only at the end, in the section dealing with 'The Case of Wagner', does Nietzsche let loose. He wants to tell the Germans 'a few hard truths': they have on their conscience all the great atrocities against culture for the past three centuries, and always for the same reason: 'from their innermost cowardice in the face of reality, which is also cowardice in the face of truth, from their instinctive untruthfulness, from 'idealism'...'. They could never make up their minds, they always tried to reconcile opposites, smooth over contradictions. This neutrality and selflessness, 'this lack of partisanship between opposites!' Everything great becomes small with them; they do not know what is great and small. 'German' is an argument for them, 'Germany, Germany above all' a principle, the Germanic peoples the 'moral world order'.

But all these attacks have a completely personal reference. 'And finally, why should I not give words to my suspicion? In my case too, the Germans will again try

everything to give birth to a mouse from a tremendous fate. They have compromised themselves with me so far, I doubt that they will do better in the future. Ah, how I long to be a poor prophet here! ... My natural readers and listeners are now already Russians, Scandinavians and French, will they not be so more and more?' What more could be added to this revelation?

One who does not want things to be as he says. He says the worst about Germany that can be said, so that he is heard! Germany is regarded as 'Europe's nightcap' ('Twilight of the Idols', What the Germans Lack); one never gets to the bottom of the German, he has none; the word German should be minted internationally as currency for the desire for lack of clarity about oneself, for this 'psychological degeneracy' in short. 'At this moment, for example, the German Emperor calls it his 'Christian duty' to liberate the slaves in Africa: among us other Europeans that would then simply be called 'German'!...'. Nietzsche goes so far as to say that it is part of his ambition to be regarded as the par excellence despiser of Germans. 'Germans are impossible for me. When I think up a kind of person that goes against all my instincts, a German always comes out'. The Germans lack any concept of how vulgar they are: '...but that is the superlative of vulgarity, they are not even ashamed to be merely German...'. One must always keep in mind here that it is a question of the Germans' ability or inability to understand, to read, to appreciate. They have 'no fingers for nuances, no esprit in their features'. In vain he looks in his life for a sign of tact, of delicateness that he would have experienced from Germans. 'From Jews yes, never from Germans'.

Finally, he recalls that it was a foreigner, a Dane, who first had the subtlety of instinct and courage enough to give lectures on his philosophy. Nietzsche knew that this Dane, Georg Brandes, was a Jew. He was deeply averse to the Jews, in whom he saw the true priestly natures, and even the flattering treatment he received from them could not change his opinion. But just as he plays off French culture against German, so he plays off Jews against Germans. The antithesis is of particular sharpness here because for him Judaism and Christianity are essentially one ('The Christian is the Jew all over again', *Antichrist*, 44). 'The Jews are the priestly people of resentment par excellence' (*Genealogy*, I, 16).

We know: all this is not really Nietzsche's thoughts about the Germans, nor is it only exaggerations in the heat of battle. Everything is said deliberately. But what does Nietzsche really think of the Germans? Why does he fight against the 'Reich', against Bismarck?

It must be investigated at some point what characteristics of the Germans Nietzsche actually perceived. He knew about the intricacy and depth, about the unfathomability and comprehensiveness of the German soul. Above all, he very sharply perceived the

contrasting qualities of the German, his 'diversity'. But beyond everything, one thing was certain to him: the Germans are not yet exhausted, an enormous power still sleeps within them. All around them everything is in decline (with the exception of Russia): the culture of the West is old, over-refined, skeptical, tired. The English are not to be considered. But the Germans have not yet had a culture of their own. The young Nietzsche believed in this emerging German culture, the man fought for it, and he did not give up believing in it until the end.

We hear his undisguised voice when in 'The Will to Power' (108) we read his testament to the Germans: 'The Germans are still nothing, but they will become something; thus they still have no culture, thus they cannot yet have a culture! They are still nothing: that means they are all sorts of things. They will become something: that means they will someday cease being all sorts of things. The latter is basically only a wish, hardly yet a hope; fortunately, a wish one can live on, a matter of will, work, passion, discipline, as much as a matter of abstinence, longing, deprivation, discontent, even bitterness, in short we Germans want something of ourselves that has not yet been wanted of us, we want something more! That to this 'German as he is not yet', something better is due than today's German 'culture'; that all those 'becoming' must be enraged wherever they perceive a satisfaction in this domain, a brazen 'sitting back' or 'self-glorification': that is my second proposition, about which I have also not yet changed my mind'.

Everything stands in this, it also stands in it that hope can become a matter of displeasure, discomfort, even 'bitterness'.

From the beginning, Nietzsche praises the courage of the Germans. The will is least diseased in the north, Germany has more manly virtues to show than any country in Europe. But where there is still will, courage, determination, there are also still hopes for the future, 'He who can command, finds those who must obey: I am thinking for example of Napoleon and Bismarck' (The Will to Power, 128). The German threefoldness and duality also had another side: there is a strong German type. Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, Bismarck are characteristic of it. 'Living unconcernedly among opposites, full of that supple strength which guards against convictions and doctrines by making use of one against the other and keeping freedom for itself' (The Will to Power, 884). This type is far from the hereditary vice of the Germans, the inclination to sentimentality, false geniality, obscurity and that 'secret infinity' which Nietzsche praises in the Germans when he wants to belittle them. Even Wagner and Schopenhauer, whom he likes to play off as 'Europeans' against the Germans, cannot be counted among them. 'A good number of higher and better endowed human beings will, I hope, finally have enough self-overcoming to get rid of the bad taste for poses and sentimental obscurity and turn against

Richard Wagner as much as against Schopenhauer. These Germans corrupt us, they flatter our most dangerous qualities. There lies in Goethe, Beethoven and Bismarck a stronger future prepared than in these aberrations of the race. We have not yet had philosophers'. There can be no doubt that in this posthumous note Nietzsche sees his own philosophy as the philosophy that belongs to the same 'strong type' whose representatives he also counts Bismarck among.

This philosophy is the 'Dionysian', or rather the Heraclitean. It is the philosophy of a man who must either take Christianity seriously, but then he can no longer be a European of today or must put new values in place of Christian ones. The Christian era has run its course. 'Christianity is possible as the most private form of existence; it presupposes a narrow, withdrawn, completely unpolitical society, it belongs in the conventicle. A 'Christian state', on the other hand, a 'Christian politics', is shamelessness, a lie, like a Christian military leadership, which in the end treats the 'Lord of Hosts' as chief of staff. Even the papacy has never been able to conduct Christian politics... and when reformers like Luther pursue politics, one knows that they are just as much adherents of Machiavelli as any immoralists or tyrants' (The Will to Power, 211). By their unpriestly, brave, warrior nature, the Germans are destined to lead the Europe of the new epoch. A German cannot really feel Christian, Nietzsche thinks. And yet next to him lives a German statesman of the 'strong type', who does not understand the unique, world-historical opportunity, the enormous task that now presents itself.

There is much to praise in him: he is 'as far from German philosophy as a peasant or corps student. Suspicious of scholars. I like that about him. He has thrown away everything that the silly German education (with grammar schools and universities) wanted to instill in him. And he obviously loves a good meal with strong wine more than German music: which mostly is only a more refined, womanly hypocrisy and disguise for the old German male inclination to intoxication'. In other respects: he is not at all genial, close, thank God, he is no German 'as he appears in books', he even understands parliamentarianism as a new means of doing what one wants. But what does this statesman do?

Nietzsche has two objections to make: they go to the heart of the matter. Bismarck is no Christian, but he leads a 'Christian' state. And Bismarck delivers Germany up to the democratic movement.

The first reproach is as serious for Nietzsche as the second, both are fundamentally a single reproach. Already in 'The Dawn' (92) we find an aphorism indicating how Nietzsche thinks precisely about the most Christian Bismarck. 'At the Deathbed of Christianity' are the few sentences headed, which one would have to consider unimportant and not corresponding to the

weight of this title, if a special meaning were not behind it. But the beginning reads: 'The really active men are now inwardly without Christianity...'. Whom else could Nietzsche have counted among the 'really active' men of his time but Bismarck? It is certainly no coincidence that in the same book in which the systematic attack on Christianity (on the 'morality' of Christianity) begins, the planned attack on Bismarck is also opened (see above p. 143). 'The Dawn' thus reveals itself as the work in which Nietzsche begins to undermine Christian Germany, the 'Reich', behind everything Nietzsche undertakes, and even more behind what he undertakes against Germany, stands his anti-Christianity. It has been assumed up to now that Nietzsche gave expression to his attitude toward Christianity only theoretically. We must unlearn on this point. Nietzsche introduced a new way of philosophizing. His eminent literary talent enabled him to think and put his thoughts into action at the same time. He is an 'existential thinker', as Kierkegaard would put it, the inventor of a new kind of 'practical philosophy', he is one who always at the same time does what he thinks. He teaches an unchristian philosophy of struggle, so he also fights, by living it, against Christianity.

But he fights not only against concepts, but also against the powers that represent Christianity in his time. Among these powers, the 'Reich' stands first. That in the leading statesman 'realism and Christianity' are combined, that is not his objection. 'The madness of nationalities and the boorishness of fatherlands are without charm for me: 'Germany, Germany above all' sounds painful to my ears, basically because I want and wish more of the Germans than... Their foremost statesman, in whose head brave realism and Christianity are compatible with a ruthless opportunist politics, arouses my ironic curiosity'. In Bismarck's politics, in his 'old-fashioned guise', his ruthlessness in combining realism and Christianity, Nietzsche sees something reactionary, a remnant from the beginning of the 19th century. This pretense that nothing has happened, this sneaking past the real spiritual situation of Europe fills him with disgust. 'Whither has the last feeling of propriety gone, of self-respect, when even our statesmen, otherwise a very candid type of person and antichrists indeed through and through, still call themselves Christians today and go to Communion? ... A young prince at the head of his regiments, magnificent as the expression of his people's selfishness and arrogance, but, without a shred of shame, professing himself a Christian! ... What then does Christianity deny? What does it call 'world'? That one is a soldier, that one is a judge, that one is a patriot; that one defends oneself; that one upholds one's honor; that one wants one's advantage; that one is proud...' (Antichrist, 38).

Now we understand the deeper meaning of that sharp word in 'The Dawn': it is becoming indecent to concern oneself with politics (see above p. 143). Nietzsche connects a very specific sense with this word 'indecent'. *Rome, the home of Western Christianity, is*

*for the poet of 'Zarathustra' 'the most indecent place on earth'.* In the section of 'Antichrist' just quoted, there is the sentence: 'What was formerly merely sick has today become indecent, it is indecent today to be a Christian'. The word thus denotes a combination of the incompatible, an inward untruth: it does not befit Zarathustra to dwell in Rome, it does not befit a military leader, a statesman, to live in Christian forms.

In summary: Nietzsche fights against the 'Reich', not because it is German, but because it is German and Christian. With its Christianity, Germany, to which Nietzsche through his philosophy would like to provide spiritual leadership in Europe, commits itself to those tendencies that lead to ruin. In vain he has shown how corrosively Christianity in its modern, dissolved form works in all areas of life and spirit. He has demonstrated in the field of political life the fateful consequences of the concepts of equality and justice, but the German spirit, which just now still had the will to rule over Europe, the power to establish Europe, is 'under the pompous pretext of founding an empire making its transition to mediocrization, to democracy and 'modern ideas'...' (The Birth of Tragedy, later preface). 'So far goes the decadence in the value instincts of our politicians, our political parties: they instinctively prefer what dissolves, what accelerates the end'. (Antichrist, 39). The German Reich is only one of the 'half-measures' of modern democracy. In order for there to be institutions, there must be a kind of will, instinct, imperative, 'anti-liberal to the point of malice', but in place of the 'will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries forward and backward to infinity', to solidarity of chains of generations, the new Germany has the will to ruin: it is liberal.

Basically Nietzsche as a politician has only one concern: 'the rise of democratic man and the consequent stultification of Europe and diminution of European man'. He does not think in German national terms, because he stands above the national and democratic mass state. But he thinks in a new, bolder and more far-reaching way German: Germany is again to become leading in Europe. With Nietzsche this is of course not meant in the old 'idealistic' sense. He does not want to make Germany again the people of thinkers and poets, he does not speak of a kingdom of the German spirit or of a Christmas tree of the German soul. Nietzsche knows that any spiritual rule also includes legal relations and power systems. He does not want to make the Germans unpolitical; he does not want to found a German 'culture state' which ironically superior neighboring peoples can use as a domain of good business and recreational travel, but he wants the Germans to lead Europe in great politics. For this it is necessary that they overcome national self-satisfaction, narrow-mindedness and spiritual narrowness, the dangers of the nation state. They have no reason to settle down and congratulate themselves. 'If Germany does not want, represent, embody something that has more value than any other previous power

represents', then there is in itself only one great state more, one absurdity more in the world. 'Can one be interested in this German Reich? Where is the new idea? Is it only a new combination of power? So much the worse if it does not know what it wants. Peace and *laissez faire* is no politics I have respect for, ruling and helping the highest idea to victory, the only thing that could interest me in Germany. What do I care that Hohenzollerns are there or not there?'

What Nietzsche reproaches the Bismarck era is that it does not set itself against bourgeois-liberal conditions in the slightest. 'The Bismarck era (the era of German stultification). The exclusive interest that is now given in Germany to questions of power, commerce and trade and, in the end, 'good living', the rise of parliamentary imbecility, newspaper reading and literati meddling by everyone in everything, the admiration of a statesman who knows and values philosophy about as much as a peasant or corps student' etc., with this characterization the form of life is designated, to which Nietzsche from early youth was in contradiction, and at the same time his whole epoch is summarily described from his own position: the era of German stultification or the Bismarck era. With what contempt he portrayed in 'The Dawn', in 'Human, All Too Human' and in 'Beyond Good and Evil' the bourgeois way of life. He saw behind the morality of modern 'commercial society', which is based on the principle 'moral actions are actions of sympathy for others', a social drive for timidity at work, which wants life to be stripped of all danger. Only actions that aim at the common security and sense of security of society may be called 'good' (Dawn, 174). Thus a 'culture of the commercial' is emerging, whose soul is commerce just as personal rivalry was for the culture of the ancient Greeks. In that commercial culture the question of questions is: 'Who and how many consume this?' Everything is calibrated to the needs of consumers, not to the most personal needs of the creator. The merchant understands how to calibrate everything without making it; he constantly applies this valuation, including to the products of the arts and sciences, peoples and parties (Dawn, 175). But not understanding commerce is noble (Dawn, 308). Characteristic of that culture are modern meals, as they are already enjoyed by scholars as well as bankers, after which one seeks to drive out the heaviness in stomach and brain again by means of stimulating drinks. One wants to represent with such meals. But all that still gets represented is money, for money is 'power, fame, dignity, influence' (Dawn, 208).

In the 'industrial culture', which no longer knows any estates, Nietzsche sees 'the most common form of existence that has existed so far'. The worker seeks to sell himself as dearly as possible, but the employers lack 'all those forms and insignia of the higher race which first make people interesting'. Nobility cannot be improvised. The 'manufacturers' vulgarity with red, fat hands' gives the common man the idea that

only chance and luck have raised one above the other here. 'Well then,' he concludes, 'let us try chance and luck once! Let's throw the dice once! and socialism begins' (The Gay Science, 40). The book in which these sentences stand was published in 1882. One must always keep in mind the impartiality and acuity of this characterization if one wants to assess Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck correctly. The philosopher saw what remained hidden from the statesman: the actual justification of the socialist movement, which lies in the fact that the ruling class, while *de facto* in possession of power, i.e., in possession of money, no longer really rules. For rule requires a superiority that finds its natural expression in the 'noble form'. But what bourgeois society called 'noble', Nietzsche rightly considered just another expression of plebeianism. He foresaw the downfall of the class that was no longer inwardly but only outwardly ruling and was infinitely superior to Bismarck in this regard.

But the quoted aphorism goes further. Nietzsche is not deceived by the militarism of the Reich: he sees that the industrial spirit is much stronger than the military spirit. This is precisely what the lack of noble form is based on. 'Soldiers and leaders still have a much higher relationship to each other than workers and employers. At least for now, all militarily founded culture still stands high above any so-called industrial culture'. Submission to powerful, frightening, even terrible people, to tyrants and army leaders, is felt far less painfully than 'submission to unknown and uninteresting people, as all the greats of industry are: in the employer, the worker usually sees only a cunning, exploitative cur of humans who speculates on every trick, whose name, figure, manners and reputation are completely indifferent to him'. In this impersonality of the relationship, we add, Nietzsche sees the actual reason for the evil, because this relationship necessarily lacks responsibility. Every personal relationship, even that of the tyrant to the subjugated, stands higher, because the tyrant is still personally liable for what he does. Tyrannicide is an expression of this liability. A class that has power in the form of money in its hands always rules irresponsibly: no one is to blame for what happens, because behind the impersonal system the individual disappears. In private life, the employer is often a harmless Christian and family man and feels completely innocent. No one thinks of murdering him, and yet the existence of these more or less innocents weighs like a fate on the whole and generates that dull pressure, that gloominess of the atmosphere which is the expression of the inner crisis. With what scorn Nietzsche would have answered the attempt to alleviate this condition by demanding, without changing anything in depth, 'social responsibility' from money givers and entrepreneurs!

If modern bourgeois society is based on the instinct of timidity, then in it the need for security and peace must grow more and more and eventually lead to a state of affairs in which war as such is abhorred and

finally morally condemned. The culture of industrial society ends in pacifism. Nietzsche also anticipated this development; he already established it as a general tendency in the 'Reich' (which later proved unable to take political action in a war). That is why he did not tire of pointing out the necessity and significance of wars from 'Human, All Too Human' on. The ideas belonging here all stem directly from the views on state and culture which he set down in the fragment on the Greek state. War is indispensable. 'It is mere enthusiasm and beautiful soul to expect much more (or even: first of all much more) from mankind when it has unlearned how to wage wars'.

The rough energy of the field camp, the common organizing bloodlust in the destruction of the enemy, the proud indifference to great losses and one's own existence can 'for the time being' still be imparted to souls through nothing other than great wars. Even in the dangerous voyages of discovery, navigations and climbs undertaken for scientific purposes, the desire for adventure and danger is expressed. A highly cultivated and therefore necessarily weak humanity needs periodic relapses into barbarism so as not to lose their culture and their very existence to the means of culture (Human, All Too Human I, 477). In times of security man does not grow in height. The secret of reaping the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from existence is called: living dangerously! 'I welcome all signs indicating that a more manly, warlike age is beginning, which will above all bring honor to bravery again!' Heroism must be brought into cognition, wars must be waged 'for the sake of thoughts and their consequences' (The Gay Science, 283).

Here the concept of great politics springs forth: What drives great politics forward is the need for the feeling of power, which gushes forth at intervals from inexhaustible sources not only in the souls of individuals but also in the lower strata of the people. The hour always comes again when the masses are ready to stake their lives, their property, their conscience, their virtue. Then the pathetic language of virtue is spoken. 'Strange deity of moral judgments! When man feels powerful, he feels and calls himself good: and it is precisely then that the others, upon whom he must vent his power, call and feel him evil!' (Dawn, 189).

*Against the increasing equalization, mediocrity and diminution of the European human being there is only one antidote: danger and war.* Nietzsche likes to use the word war also in the general sense of struggle. He is too far removed from the doctrine of life for the sake of life itself and too hostile to the moral-humanitarian ideology spawned by Christianity to fight war between peoples as reality. Pacifism belongs for him to the herd ideals; it is a form of slave morality. Since real wars require peoples and states to wage them, but Nietzsche's national, democratic mass state is negated because of its leveling tendencies, we find in his work passages like the

one quoted above justifying wars between peoples, but at the same time we see how he shifts emphasis more and more to the spiritual struggle for power. This struggle is waged first for predominance in Europe. If bloody wars arise from this, Nietzsche does not shy away from justifying them.

Thus his politics culminates in the idea of a European struggle for the 'power' of the greatest thought. The European human being strives for the condition represented in 'Zarathustra' by the type of the last man. 'Übermensch' is the formula for overcoming this type. The Übermensch is supposed to free the world from the 'last man', i.e., from the final result of Christian-democratic development. 'A fight in the arena for the deployment of the power which mankind represents. Zarathustra calls for this fight in the arena'. The 'revaluation of all values' is meant to initiate the struggle. In 'Ecce Homo' the final and actual goal is stated in the words: 'The concept of politics has then completely gone into a spiritual warfare; all power formations of the old society have been blown into the air, they all rest on the lie: there will be wars such as there have never been on earth before. Only from me on will there be great politics on earth' (Why I am a Fate).

Let Europe, we read in a posthumous note from the time of 'The Will to Power', let Europe soon 'produce a great statesman, and he who is now celebrated in the small age of plebeian shortsightedness as 'the great realist' will stand small there'. The global contest is over. Nietzsche is the victor.

## 6. The Good European

One word remains to be said about that concept which alone of all political concepts tends to be known as Nietzsche's at present. This is the concept of the 'good European'. In order to determine the value of this concept, we do best to start from the most representative place where it appears: that is the preface to Beyond Good and Evil. In Europe there now exists 'a magnificent tension of the spirit such as has never existed on earth before: with such a tense bow one can now shoot for the most distant goals'. This tension, however, is felt as distress by the Europeans, and attempts have already been made twice to relax the bow, once through Jesuitism, the second time through the democratic enlightenment with the aid of freedom of the press and newspaper reading. The Germans, it says at the end, invented gunpowder, all praise to them!, but they gave it up again, they invented the printing press. But we, Nietzsche continues, 'we who are neither Jesuits nor Democrats nor even German enough, we good Europeans and free, very free spirits, we still have it, the whole need of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the task, who knows? the goal...'. With the 'bow' Nietzsche alludes to the struggle for Europe. The antithesis is clear, besides: 'good European' is the opposite concept to a person who is only German. *The good European is a freethinker, a free*

*spirit, and therefore well-disposed to the French, a lover of the Romance cultures, a friend of the Mediterranean and a 'music of the south'.* All minds belong to the good Europeans who understand form, artistry and psychology, people who have a feeling for nuances, mocking, superior minds who live homeless on high mountains. Occasionally Schopenhauer and Wagner also belong, of course never Bismarck or other Germans. We have seen how quickly Nietzsche drops the designation when it comes down to it: it does not adhere to an entity, to a substance, it has solely a function, a purpose, the purpose of insulting the Germans and creating a kind of sphere around the lonely one who is not recognized by them.

The concept of the good European first appears in a meditation of 'Human, All Too Human' (475), in which the increasing intercourse is (falsely) concluded to lead to an 'annihilation of nations'. Here the good European, to which the German is supposed to be particularly suited through his talent as an interpreter and mediator, is seen as the European of the future (let us recall how Nietzsche thinks about the 'mediator'. See p. 116 above). In an aphorism of the 'Wanderer' (87), everyone who is 'well-disposed to Europe' is required to learn to write well and ever better: it is no use, Nietzsche adds here, 'even if he himself was born in Germany, where bad writing is treated as a national prerogative'. The actual purpose here is to prepare that as yet distant state of affairs 'where the great task falls into the hands of the good Europeans: the leadership and supervision of the entire culture of the earth'. Whoever is against good writing and good reading shows the peoples a way to become even more national, because it hinders understanding, and is consequently 'an enemy of the good Europeans, an enemy of free spirits'. In his rejection of national differences, Nietzsche goes so far in the 'Wanderer' as to play off fashion against national costumes as something European (215). This train of thought reaches its conclusion in aphorism 292 of the same work, in which the 'victory of democracy' is predicted. The provisional outcome of the spreading democratization will be 'a European league of peoples, in which each people, delimited according to geographical expediencies, occupies the position of a canton and its special rights'.

The good European as he appears in these sections is obviously identical with what Nietzsche in 'Zarathustra' calls the 'last man' and in 'The Will to Power' the 'future European': he is the result of completed democratic leveling, 'the most intelligent slave animal, very industrious, basically very modest, infinitely curious to the point of vice, manifold, spoiled, weak-willed, a cosmopolitan chaos of intelligence and senses' (Will to Power, 868). This is undoubtedly not the good European Nietzsche means when he says in 'Ecce Homo': 'it costs me no effort to be a 'good European' (Why I am so Wise). The good European in this latter

sense is undoubtedly again that free spirit who belongs to a small elite of European minds.

However, there is yet a third concept of the good European. This latter is no longer merely a freethinker, but a martial spirit. He is far from being an enlightened concerned with the dissemination of good reading and good writing, but rather he fights against the century of enlightenment, in which people knew so well how to read and write: 'Basically we good Europeans are waging a war against the eighteenth century' (Will to Power, 117.). These good Europeans are described in detail in aphorism 132 of the 'Will to Power': they are the people of Nietzsche's philosophy. They are 'the legislators of the future, the masters of the earth'. A posthumous note reads: 'Principle: 1. To create a kind of being that can replace priest, teacher and physician (The conquest of mankind). 2. An aristocracy of spirit and body that breeds itself, constantly taking in new elements and distinguishing itself from the democratic world of the botched and the half-botched' (The Masters of the Earth.). For this type we also find the name of the 'higher European', who is called a forerunner of great politics (Will to Power, 463). It is the people of this type to whom Nietzsche calls out at the end of the preface to the second volume of 'Human, All Too Human' in September 1886: 'You, whose comfort it is to know the way to a new health, ah! and to walk it, a health of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, you fore-ordained ones, you victorious ones, you time-overcomers, you healthiest ones, you strongest ones, you future ones!'

### Epilogue

It would be in Nietzsche's sense if one defined: rule of the spirit is another word for anarchy. That the politicizing 'spirit' could once appeal to Nietzsche belongs to the irony of history. The error is ultimately based on Nietzsche's wrong relationship to the state and on the hard to eradicate legend of his 'individualism'. In his world, the individual always seems to be right in contrast to the masses and the people and the state. It should give pause to say that this individual is a ruler, Nietzsche's world cannot be so completely without relation to the state after all. But this relation is obscured: nowhere does his time make itself felt as clearly as here. That the realm of the political lies in shadow for Nietzsche is not conditioned by the matter itself. In the 'Politeia' of his great opponent Plato stands the sentence: 'The greatest punishment is to be ruled by an inferior, if one does not make the resolution to rule oneself'. This state-founding word could stand as the motto above 'The Will to Power'. To prevent the inferior from ruling, because the better withdraw in disgust. that is undoubtedly one of Nietzsche's goals.

Nothing seems more difficult than finding the transition from the individual to the collective in Nietzsche's world. And yet the collective necessarily lies on the path that is traced 'along the guiding thread of the body'. The philosopher of the will to power clearly heard

that soft rushing of the stream flowing on under the ages, from which the individual emerges into the light. The conscious connections made by humans through the times are usually considered the most important, 'while in truth the real connection (through procreation) pursues its unknown path' (Will to Power, 676). The individual, the *individuum* is only an error: 'we are more than the individual: we are the whole chain too, with the tasks of all the chain's futures' (Will to Power, 687). 'The isolation of the individual must not deceive, in truth something flows under the individuals' (Will to Power, 686). Whoever thinks along the guiding thread of the body cannot be an individualist; likewise, whoever thinks historically cannot be an individualist. In Nietzsche's relation to the great commonalities there is just as much of a break conditioned by time as in his relation to history. How little he thought individualistically within the historical realm is proven by the 'Genealogy of Morals': not individuals, but generations, races, peoples, estates and the contrasts between them, the pathos of distance, are for him the starting points of all historical existence. It may look sometimes as if he was only interested in the 'future of mankind'. But the realist knows too well that there is no such thing as a 'human species' as a historical unity. The collective from which the individual human being springs is never humanity, but always a concrete unity, a race, a people, an estate. 'Preservation of the community (of the people) is my correction, instead of 'preservation of the species'. 'The various moral judgments have not yet been traced back to the existence of the 'species man': but to the existence of 'peoples', 'races', etc., and indeed of peoples who wanted to assert themselves against other peoples, of estates who wanted to sharply delimit themselves from lower strata'.

By the individual taking on the demands of a people, his strength grows; by participating in the tensions that exist between the world-historical unities, he travels the path to greatness. For all active natures, this path leads through the state. Nietzsche's work does not contain a doctrine of the state, but this work has opened up all paths to a new doctrine of the state. How could the philosopher who conceived the body as a 'dominion structure' not be a teacher of the state? 'As little state as possible!', this cry of disgust was directed at the Romano-Christian degenerate form of the state, not at the political form of life. The posthumous writings contain a passage about the state which suggests what Nietzsche could have taught about the state in another historical situation: 'It was not considerations of prudence but impulses of heroism that were powerful in the emergence of the state: the belief that there is something higher than the sovereignty of the individual. There the reverence for the lineage and the elders of the lineage takes effect: the younger brings them his sacrifice. The reverence for the dead and the ancestral statutes handed down by the ancestors: the present brings them his sacrifice. There is the homage to a spiritually superior and victorious one takes effect: the rapture of encountering his exemplar in

the flesh: this gives rise to vows of loyalty. It is not coercion nor prudence that sustains the older forms of state: but the outpouring of noble emotions. Coercion could not even be exercised at all, and prudence is perhaps still too little developed individually. A common danger perhaps provides the occasion for coming together, and the feeling of the new common power has something ecstatic about it and is a source of noble resolutions'.

The state as a heroic phenomenon, as a dominion structure, as an outpouring of all greatness, as a means and expression of the struggle for the highest power, which is never merely physical or economic, this is a Germanic idea of the state. It is this that lives in Nietzsche, even there, indeed precisely there, where he talks against the state, and precisely where he attacks Germany. It is this too that lives in Hölderlin's hymns. Where there is no struggle for the highest form, there can be no state. In the Italian journeys of the German emperors lives the spirit of the state of which the German is capable. This spirit of the state does not aim at an economic and financial securing of power, it has a dangerous contempt for all static thinking, it is purely dynamic: the state exists where greatness is, where a bold leader rules over martial men and pursues far-flung goals. There is state where courage and death, boldness and strength are, where goals and tasks beckon. In the youthful era of the European peoples the heroic idea of the Germanic state made an enormous impression; the neighboring kings voluntarily bowed to the emperors of the Saxon, Salian and Swabian dynasties. Since the 13th century, the great century of the Church, this is over, and the fall is so deep that not even in Germany has a memory of the heroic era been preserved.

Nietzsche awakens this memory in us again. His attack on the 'Reich' springs from the feeling of the world-historical task awaiting us. He wanted to know nothing of the state as an ethical organism in Hegel's sense, but he also wanted to know nothing of Bismarck's Little Germany based on Christianity. Before his eyes stood again the old task of our race: the task of being the leader of Europe. German politics is inconceivable in the future without an element of Hölderlin and Nietzsche: the future of Europe depends on Germany's youth. For the youth of the other European peoples, the state is no problem; for German youth, it is the problem. What would Europe be without the Germanic north, what would Europe be without Germany? A Roman colony. How rightly our enemies perceived the Germanic in Nietzsche during the World War. They saw in his work an attack on 'Christian culture', i.e., on a proven combination of gospel and business; they felt this honest and courageous spirit as a negation of the civilization that waged war under the banner of the cross, they felt the Siegfried attack on the urbanity of the West. The irreconcilable opponent of that Western civilization which declared war on us in 1914, that is Nietzsche. For this civilization is the Christian-Romanesque 'Occident',



whose illusions he destroyed in 'The Will to Power'. Across the millennia the spirit alien to Rome, akin to the Greeks, has come alive again in him. For him, the Christian-Germanic state of the Romantics and the 'realpoliticians' is just as much an aberration from the spirit of the North as the civilizing welfare state of the West. He occasionally hints at a foreign policy that points radically eastward. In Russia he sees a power that has duration in the body, which can wait and promise something. 'Russia, the antithetical concept to the miserable European pettiness and nervousness, which has entered into a critical condition with the founding of the German Reich... The whole West no longer has those instincts from which institutions grow, from which future grows...' (Twilight of the Idols, Expeditions, 39). Under the signs of the coming century Nietzsche sees the Russians entering into culture: 'A grandiose goal. Proximity to barbarism, awakening of the arts, magnificence of youth and fantastic madness and real will power'. These words were spoken at a time when there was no Soviet Russia yet, can one conceive of a better anticipation of its nature than is contained in these lines? And is there a clearer rejection of Western politics than the words: 'We need an unconditional rapprochement with Russia, and with a new common program that does not allow English schemas to rule in Russia. No American future!'.

Germany can only exist world-historically in the form of greatness. It only has the choice of being the anti-Roman power in Europe, or not being. If it subordinates itself to the civilization of the West, it submits itself to Rome; if it forgets its Germanic origin, it succumbs to the East. The creator of a Europe that is more than a Roman colony can only be the Nordic Germany, the Germany of Hölderlin and Nietzsche. Nietzsche does not belong next to Bismarck; he belongs in the era of the Great War. The German state of the future will not be a continuation of Bismarck's creation but will be created out of the spirit of Nietzsche and the spirit of the Great War.

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