


Heinrich Härtle and the National Socialist Nietzsche

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Abstract

Following one of our research topics we present here the first English translation of the text 'Nietzsche and National Socialism', written by Heinrich Härtle, former student of philosopher Alfred Baeumler. The author clearly indicates that his article is neither a profession of faith by National Socialist youth to a Nietzsche movement of the future nor an allegiance to a Nietzsche cult. He recognizes that attempts to equate Nietzsche and National Socialism are wrong because, in doing so, 'one necessarily becomes dishonest towards Nietzsche and presumptuous towards National Socialism'. The great difficulty, if not the impossibility, of moving from the individual in Nietzsche to the collective of National Socialism is recognized. The knowledge we have today of all or almost all of Nietzsche's writings raises the question of whether or not Härtle's contribution will withstand reexamination with this new material.

Keywords: Heinrich Härtle, Friedrich Nietzsche, Aldred Baeumler, Übermensch, Thomas Stockham Baker, National Socialism, Human Primates, Human Beings.

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INTRODUCTION

The Higher Man '...Is Always in His Own Company, whether he Associates with Books, Human Beings, or Landscapes' (Ecce Homo, II, 2)

Nothing is better for discussing ideas than having them in plain sight: this approach not only prevents writing nonsense and/or falsehoods but also enables us to detect those already published. Nietzsche is difficult to comprehend. As he himself stated in his Zarathustra: 'Verily, I am a forest and a night of dark trees: but he who is not afraid of my darkness, will find banks full of roses under my cypresses'. Evidently, personal interests, mental capacity, knowledge, personal experiences, expectations, etc., can be determinant in the creation of 'personal rose banks'. Some of these may not coincide, or may coincide partially or entirely, with what Nietzsche wrote at some point in his personal journey. Only Nietzsche himself could inform us about these coincidences, but he is no longer with us.

There is something I believe I can assert categorically without the need to extensively quote Nietzsche. At some point, he ceased to be a 'disciple' of anyone and investigated himself, as Heraclitus had already done and said (this activity is indispensable for understanding 'How One Becomes What One Is', as Friedrich stated, and part of it consists, as I say, in 'la

recherche du temps oublié' to be complete in a certain way). This investigation is necessarily the first step towards a clearer and broader understanding of the World (Gómez-Jeria, 2023b, 2024a, 2024b). Nietzsche would analyze, sometimes suffering and other times very distressed, but without mercy, what I have called 'the human primate called Nietzsche' and perhaps also discovered that during some moments, long or not, he was 'the human being called Nietzsche'. Perhaps his mental collapse was due to his inability to resolve the dramatic problem of how to definitively cease being a human primate (I will address this matter elsewhere). If the reader is surprised that I maintain that 'human primate' and 'human being' are not synonymous, they must forgive me for suggesting that they think, think, and think until unleashing within themselves a 'neuronal storm' in which a special lightning suddenly appears, revealing each of these two concepts in their defining contours (Heidegger & Fink, 1979, 2017). And let it be known that I include myself among the human primates who spend time as such (Gómez-Jeria, 2017).

The complexity of Nietzsche's legacy has allowed many to present their own selections of parts of his legacy as being 'Nietzschean'. *The strict truth is that nothing written after his death is 'Nietzschean'*. It is possible to assert that part of his writings has been used

to include him in certain forms of organization of human primates. However, daring to affirm that there has been an abuse, an appropriation, a perverse use, a mutilation, etc. of his thought is nothing more than the unacceptable assertion of some endowed with a notorious intellectual audacity (or ignorance). Nietzsche neither has nor has had a *pontifex maximus* who decides on what qualification to give to texts written about his thought or employing part of it.

It is beneficial for clarifying these ideas to examine the 'Reviews and Abstracts of Literature' section of The Journal of Philosophy from the year 1907. This is a good year because we are at a moment prior to the two great wars of the 20th century. There, Thomas Stockham Baker analyzes an article by Professor Raoul Richter (a 'valuable article'), an essay by Professor Julius Kaftan, and a book written by Emil Mauerhof, all about Nietzsche (Baker, 1907). Here I will only directly quote some phrases from Baker's analysis to show that even at that time the debate was quite heated.

'Professor Richter deals with Nietzsche chiefly as a constructive thinker. The prevailing fashion has been to consider the philosopher almost solely as an intellectual anarchist, and as having contributed very little that is positive'. The critic divides his essay into three parts. 'Richter is very much put to it to make of his hero anything but a destructive power in the field of religion, but he attacks his task bravely. He passes lightly over such a book as his 'Antichrist' and over the blasphemous title of his unpublished autobiography, 'Ecce Homo!' He claims that Nietzsche's annihilating criticisms of Christianity were merely attempts to clear the ground for purer spiritual conceptions, that he was a remarkably religious individual and, finally, that the influence of his work and of his personality is only now beginning to bear fruit'. 'In all this discussion Richter is compelled to take refuge behind philosophical phrases which seem very pregnant, but which really have little significance'. He believes that Nietzsche has revealed to us the possibility of a religion without any of the ideas usually connected with churchly doctrines'.

The second part of Richter's essay deals with the philosopher's attitude towards ethics. *'Richter is at some pains to explain why the radical views of Nietzsche will not produce moral anarchy by doing away with all laws except those dictated by the individual'. 'Richter's final division has to do with Nietzsche's significance in the field of art. He finds that the chief esthetic problem of the philosopher was concerned not with the essence of art, but with its value'. 'Richter does not concern himself with the different phases of Nietzsche's relations with Wagner. He treats the philosopher merely in the highest, or rather the latest, stage of his development'. 'It is unfortunate that Richter has not attempted a discussion of the influence of Nietzsche's own marvelous literary style upon his contemporaries'. 'Kaftan, in the first part of his brochure, 'Aus der Werkstatt dee Uebermenschen', takes*

up the question of the lack of philosophical structure in Nietzsche's works. He says that as early as 1881 Nietzsche had in mind the preparation of a system of philosophy. This was announced on the cover of the first edition of the 'Beyond Good and Evil', in 1886, and it is claimed that all of Nietzsche's works from this time on had reference to the idea of a system. The second part of 'Beyond Good and Evil' is expressly called by Nietzsche a 'prelude' to 'A Philosophy of the Future'. This was to be parallel to 'Zarathustra' without, however, its poetical character, but having a strictly philosophical and connected form. But Nietzsche was unable to complete this work. The studies he made for it which were extant were published in 1901 under the title 'Der Wille zur Macht, Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe'. Kaftan states that a sketch of the work, dating from the year 1887, was found in Nietzsche's literary remains. The book as prepared by the editors is the result of much arrangement and careful collection of widely scattered material. Kaftan thinks that this posthumous work is the most important of all of Nietzsche's writings for an appreciation of the essence of his philosophy, and upon this he bases the criticism (sometimes quite destructive) which is found in the ensuing pages of his monograph. Unfortunately for his study, the foundation is not quite in order. He attacks Nietzsche for holding ideas which are studied, in many cases, out of their proper connection. '...it is manifestly unfair on the part of Kaftan, or any other critic, to attempt an analysis of his philosophy with no basis more adequate than that of a book constructed after the author's death, out of stray notes and aphorisms'. 'It is unjust to attack Nietzsche as a philosopher when he never published a coherent and connected statement of his philosophical views, and it is equally unfair to assume that a posthumous work such as has already been described is a better basis for criticism than the several publications, divergent as they may be, of Nietzsche's lifetime. Here is where Kaftan makes the fundamental blunder, which vitiates much that he has to say later'. The 'aristocratic radicalism' should be mentioned in this connection. The true aristocrat is the man whose 'will for power' is triumphant; the slave is he whose 'will for power' is weak or dormant, and it is only through combinations of the weak slaves that they have been able to defeat the real aristocrats of the world and bring about the decadent conditions which now exist in our life and culture. Democracy is, therefore, a doctrine of slaves, who join together to thwart the progress of the aristocrats who approach most closely to Nietzsche's superman'. 'Kaftan maintains that the superman is an addition, an unnecessary appendix, to the system of philosophy which he thrusts upon Nietzsche. He thinks that the philosopher departs widely from the teachings of science, which he claimed to follow, in creating the superman. As a matter of fact, it was just this scientific suggestion which was especially attractive to Nietzsche. He was captivated by such phrases as the 'survival of the fittest', 'development of species', etc., and was unquestionably brought into this course of thought by

these very catchwords which were current. Kaftan, however, says, ***'The talk about the superman is the mere vamping of the imagination and has nothing to do with science. More correctly expressed, no mentally sound man could think of propounding this as a result of science or as a deduction from its results'***. *'Kaftan, tired of his logical deductions, confesses that Nietzsche is already a great power; those who believe in him will never be turned aside through the most convincing proof of the logician, and those who are opposed to him do not need this sort of demonstration. Nietzsche, he thinks, cannot have a future; everything, even the good, in his philosophy, is the product of a diseased mind, and everything is so exaggerated and pathologically perverted that the sane minds of the future will never be deluded. However this may be, there can be no doubt that much of the philosopher's mission has already been accomplished. His ideas have penetrated so deeply and so widely into German life and art and literature, that if all his work were blotted out he could not fail to have accomplished a great work'*.

'Mauerhof's essay is done in an extremely shallow and flippant manner, and in such a way as to make it impossible to take the study seriously. There is a great amount of padding, so that the tangible results of his investigation might have been expressed in one fourth the space which he has employed'.

As we can see, even Baker is in total disagreement with some of the ideas expressed by the three authors. The positive aspect of this review is that its author knows how to argue logically, despite occasionally being unable to resist employing somewhat derogatory expressions.

We say all this because, after 1945, some set out to erase from existence the interpretation (or interpretations) of Nietzsche's thought that were presented during the Third Reich. One can find everything in the cemetery of poor-quality articles on this topic: from those written by some 'Nietzschean high priests' with seemingly profound arguments that are false, to other writings that simply employed one of the fallacies of false analogy called *reductio ad Hitlerum* (of the type: Adolf Hitler was a painter and also a vegetarian; therefore, being a painter or a vegetarian is bad). What was also observed is this: there exists a small group of 'writers about philosophy' who patently demonstrate that they never read an original text like the one we present here, but rather cite each other reiteratively and repeat *ad infinitum* assertions that are absolutely false. And, as almost no one else reads the original texts, they pass for being 'eminences' on the subject. These falsifiers will not be named here, but I believe that Dante lacked creating some level in Hell where to group them (I think that perhaps the levels of traitors to the intellect or impostors could be appropriate since these pharisees betrayed and defrauded with their work) (Gómez-Jeria, 2023a).

Frankly speaking, and due to the aforementioned, when the translation of the text presented here began, one expected to find a furious diatribe declaring Friedrich Nietzsche as one of the intellectual foundations and a great and solid pillar of German National Socialism. Nothing could be further from the truth. What the reader of the text that follows will immediately notice is that its author is clear about some fundamental problems and clear limitations in relating Nietzsche to National Socialism. The most important and insoluble problem (this is the opinion of this author) had already been mentioned by Alfred Baeumler: ***'Nothing seems more difficult than to find the transition from the individual to the collective in Nietzsche's world'*** (Gómez-Jeria, 2024d).

Certainly, this transition has not been and will not be achieved because Nietzsche's work is not for National Socialists, nor for Marxists of any type, bourgeois of any stripe, or anyone who believes they have 'captured' him in some way. It suffices to remember and understand the meaning of the title of one of his books: *'Thus Spoke Zarathustra. A Book for All and None'*. Here, the 'for none' is of greater importance than the 'for all'. And, given that it is 'for none', any of the 'all' can create their own personal or group version (JSG-J is one of the 'all'). The only thing that cannot be done is to erase or try to make part of his legacy (his texts) disappear because that attitude is called 'intellectual delinquency'. For example, maintaining that Nietzsche would never have thought of writing the text *The Will to Power* falls within what has just been said: it is enough to examine the Posthumous Fragments (F. Nietzsche, 2008, 2016; F. Nietzsche, Aspiunza, Barrios Casares, & Sánchez Meca, 2008; F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, & Sánchez Meca, 2010; F. Nietzsche, Santiago Guervos, & Sánchez Meca, 2010). Now, why he did not write it warrants several comments that will be presented within another context because it is an extremely important matter.

Returning to what Baker mentioned above about 'Der Wille zur Macht', let us recall that, as is well known currently, 'The Will to Power' and 'Unpublished Fragments' are not precisely identical, though they are intimately related (Channel, 1999-2024). 'Unpublished Fragments' (in German, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente') refers to all of Nietzsche's writings that were not published during his lifetime, including drafts, notes, and fragments. 'The Will to Power' (in German, 'Der Wille zur Macht') was compiled and edited after Nietzsche's death, primarily by his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast). Essentially, 'The Will to Power' is a subset of the 'Unpublished Fragments'. The first German versions of *The Will to Power* appeared published in 1901 and 1906, when Adolf Hitler was 12 years old. It is therefore very difficult to believe that these two texts were 'Nazified' or 'Fascisticized' in those times. And it could also be argued that Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Heinrich Köselitz, being much closer to

Nietzsche than the writers who write about all of them, made a more judicious compilation than some others. This last point is merely a comment.

For these reasons, we have endeavored to employ bibliographic citations predating 1933. Oscar Levy's collection serves as a suitable starting point (although we have not been able to do this for all citations) (Stone, 2001). Indeed, a new compilation of all of Nietzsche's material in the German language, preserving all original words without substituting any presumed synonyms, would be highly welcomed. Furthermore, based on such a collection, the creation of compilations in other languages would be valuable (I am not at all convinced by the Colli-Montinari edition).

Some words about the author of the text are presented here. Heinrich Härtle (Sachrang, 24 February 1909 – Munich, 11 January 1986) was the son of a dairy farmer. In 1926 he entered the Freikorps Bund Oberland (Caballero Jurado & Bujeiro, 2008). On April 26, 1927, he joined the NSDAP (membership number 60,393). During 1928 he also joined the SA, in which he was promoted to Sturmbannführer (rank equivalent to major) in 1942. In 1936, Härtle became head of department in the Main Training Office of the NSDAP. In 1937 he published the book *Nietzsche and National Socialism* where he interprets some of Nietzsche's writings from the viewpoint of National Socialism. In other works, he polemicized against political Catholicism and Catholic social teaching. In 1939, Härtle succeeded Alfred Baeumler as head of the Department of Humanities in the Rosenberg district and was responsible for the 'Main Office of Philosophy'. During the Second World War, Härtle belonged to a propaganda company (1940), but was released from military service in December of the same year. In 1944, Alfred Rosenberg designated him with the leadership of the 'Working Group for the Study of the Bolshevik World Danger' as head of the Special Staff Science in the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg. After the war period, Härtle was incarcerated in a concentration camp until 1948.

It is possible that this text contains some errors, so we would appreciate any kind reader contacting us in this regard to make the necessary corrections.



Heinrich Härtle: Nietzsche and National Socialism (Härtle, 1944)

To my teacher: Party member Dr. Alfred Baeumler, Berlin
Foreword to the 2nd Edition

The scholarly attempt to explore the relationships between Nietzsche and National Socialism has generally found approval. Apart from some theological circulars, no substantive engagement has been attempted from opposing sides thus far.

Certain Nietzsche circles, despite their approval, have misinterpreted the purpose of this work. This is not a profession of faith by National Socialist youth to a 'Nietzsche movement of the future', but rather an attempt to make Nietzsche's intellectual heritage fruitful for the development of the National Socialist worldview. I do not profess allegiance to a Nietzsche cult, but rather wish to present Nietzsche as one of the great allies in the spiritual war of the present!

Details of such a work will always invite criticism. The fragmentary nature of the sources necessitates a certain reconstruction, which not everyone can agree with. The Nietzsche scholar must proceed like a portrait painter who paints a personality more similar to itself than it appears.

A decisive part of the writing, the demonstration of the inner kinship of Church, egalitarian democracy, and Marxism, is confirmed today by the practical geopolitical collaboration of Moscow, the Vatican, and New York. Likewise, the common Jewish root of this unity. There may once have been an ecclesiastical anti-Semitism with confessional aims; today, where the struggle against Jewry is conducted racially and ideologically, the world churches stand with Jewry and form the most powerful auxiliary troops of world Jewification.

Thus, may the second edition be accompanied into the public sphere by the wish that National Socialist scholars will soon be given the time and opportunity to systematically present Nietzsche's complete works, Nietzsche's epistemological criticism, ethics, metaphysics, etc., just as is attempted here with Nietzsche's political world of thought.

Berlin, March 1, 1939.
Heinrich Härtle.



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I. Introduction

There will be no end to the sufferings of mankind until either philosophers become rulers or rulers become philosophers. *Plato, 7th Letter.*

1. Aim of the Work

As one of the few creative great minds of the 19th century, Nietzsche points to our time and often beyond the present into the future.

Anyone who, as a National Socialist, consciously experiences and participates in shaping the ideological and religious struggles of the time must take a position on Nietzsche. The polemical clamor surrounding Nietzsche has fallen silent. The historical distance of our generation first enables a fair appreciation of the lonely creator; his works are beginning to have an increasing effect on the people and, above all, on the National Socialist youth.

Yet even today, great difficulties still stand in the way of understanding Nietzsche. As interest in Nietzsche increases, so does the danger of misunderstanding. Anyone who has intensively studied Nietzsche knows that Nietzsche is almost necessarily bound to be misunderstood. For, as contradictory as it may seem, Nietzsche, the brilliant stylist who shapes his thoughts more vividly, vigorously, and sensually than perhaps any philosopher before him, is nevertheless very difficult to understand. Particularly those who know only part of his political judgments, as they are scattered throughout all his works, who do not think them through in their entirety and context, are in danger of either considering Nietzsche inextricably contradictory or hostile to the present; or of believing that Nietzsche actually anticipated National Socialism (this mania is found everywhere today, wanting to dismiss National Socialism as a higher form of epigonism). Any of these misconceptions is possible from individual judgments of Nietzsche. I have therefore set myself the task of broadly presenting Nietzsche's political thoughts and sharply delineating National Socialism, clarifying both kinship and contrast. In doing so, beyond individual errors and contradictions, the still unmeasured fertility, the still insufficiently appreciated creative power of Nietzsche should become visible.

Apart from changes in the means of style and presentation, three epochs can be distinguished: youth, crisis, maturity.

In the previous political literature, I do not see this task fulfilled. *The majority of political Nietzsche literature is simply a disgrace; only in recent times have there been exceptions.* The ideological transformation is beginning to have an effect here as well, as I am convinced that only a conscious National Socialist can fully comprehend Nietzsche. However, I see little progress in the fact that today attempts are already being made to equate Nietzsche and National Socialism. *In*

doing so, one necessarily becomes dishonest towards Nietzsche and presumptuous towards National Socialism.

But it is also not sufficient to merely publish collections of quotations as a way out of the confusion of Nietzsche interpretations. This rather increases the danger of misunderstanding than dispels it [Note in the original edition: When E. Scheiner writes in the foreword of his collection: 'So much has been prattled about Nietzsche that the editor, after years of work, has abandoned his original plan to write a book about Nietzsche's political legacy', this is understandable in view of the actual difficulties. However, the effect is that the reader is now expected to master these dangers without guidance]. My approach is to limit the interpretation to the most necessary and, in return, to quote Nietzsche as literally as possible, more than is usually customary.

Only Professor A. Baeumler attempts in his work: *Nietzsche as a Philosopher and Politician* (Gómez-Jeria, 2024c) for the first time to present and appreciate Nietzsche's political significance in context. Undoubtedly, Professor Baeumler has, through this and equally through his afterwords to the editions of Kröner Publishing House, earned great merits for Nietzsche, contributed more to the understanding of Nietzsche than all previous 'interpreters' and also given valuable stimuli to this work.

Besides the veneration of Schopenhauer, the friendship with Richard Wagner becomes decisive for him. The 'Master' appears to him as the embodiment of the dreamed-of genius; on him he builds his hope for the rebirth of a German culture from the spirit of music. It is the epoch of *The Birth of Tragedy* and the *Untimely Meditations*.

But soon philosophical doubts about Wagner arise. At the inauguration of the Bayreuth Festival Theatre, Nietzsche becomes clearly aware of the deep chasm. Devotion turns into reticence, aversion, and finally rupture and despair. With the belief in Wagner, his cultural hopes collapse. A general physical, mental, and spiritual crisis is the result, from an absolute believer he becomes an extreme skeptic. With *Human, All Too Human* he traverses as a 'free spirit' the most dangerous epoch of his development. In content and style, it is the work of one oscillating between illness and recovery.

My work attempts to do justice to both Nietzsche and National Socialism. It contains all essential political thoughts of Nietzsche, mostly quoted verbatim, from the complete works including posthumous writings and letters. This comprehensive political presentation of Nietzsche is juxtaposed with National Socialism, not only as theory, but from knowledge and experience.

2. Limitations

With *Daybreak* begins the recovery and independence; growing further in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche then finds in *Zarathustra* the glowing affirmation of himself and his world. At the height of personal maturity and the full development of his philosophy, the other writings followed and, unfortunately unfinished, the main work: *The Will to Power*.

Parallel to these epochs, his political judgments fluctuate.

Hellenism and Germanness are the beliefs of the young Nietzsche; he appears like a national herald, conscious of his German mission. The politically most positive content is found in that unique fragment: *The Greek State*.

A) Epochs

The philosopher of becoming is himself in constant becoming. The unity lies only in the basic direction of his will.

The 'free spirit,' on the other hand, seeks to detach himself from all bonds, from people and state, committed only to the inexorable truth. The political statements become more negative, more general, although often critically remarkably accurate.

The mature Nietzsche sovereignly judges all political phenomena from his fully developed philosophy. Now the 'legislator of the earth' judges, and the strongest commonalities and sharpest contrasts to National Socialism emerge.

B) Time-Conditioned Aspects

Although Nietzsche also extends far beyond his intellectual milieu, he is not free from the influences and ties of his time. *I am as much a child of this age as Wagner*' (The case of Wagner, Preface, Vol. 8, 3rd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche, Ridley, & Norman, 2005). Since that epoch, the political worlds have collapsed. Between us and Nietzsche stand the World War, upheavals, tumults, and actual revolutions. But the greatest change is in the worldview. Nietzsche must still attack where we have already overcome. Every fighter is bound to his enemies. To say the opposite is also a repetition; the antithesis is based on the thesis, and thus Nietzsche is still forced into antitheses where we have already gained the synthesis. Just as racial understanding is fundamental to our political world, nothing separates and connects us more strongly with Nietzsche than those thoughts whose truth or error is rooted in the time-bound recognition or misrecognition of the racial problem.

Between us and Nietzsche stand the World War, upheavals, revolts, and real revolutions. But the greatest is the ideological upheaval. Despite everything, Nietzsche's world of thought is self-contained and

dominated by certain fundamental lines. However, exploring this unity is difficult and hardly more challenging with any philosopher than with Nietzsche.

Nietzsche still has to attack where we have already overcome. Every fighter is bound to his enemies. Saying the opposite is also a repetition; the antithesis is based on the thesis, and so Nietzsche is still forced into antitheses where we have already gained the synthesis. Just as racial recognition is fundamental for our political world, nothing separates and connects us more strongly with Nietzsche than those thoughts whose truth or error is rooted in the time-bound recognition or misrecognition of the race problem.

C) Contradictions:

Enemies and disciples of Nietzsche argue whether his work is unified or contradictory, a system or chaos. This poses serious difficulties for political evaluation. Nietzsche is neither one nor the other. Unity lies only in the inner fundamental attitude; contradictions and variations are surface level. Despite all apparent changes, everything is held together by a hidden unity.

The change conditioned by development has already been shown. Alongside this, reckless contradictions stand in the foreground, volcanically ejected, indifferent to formal connections.

‘The snake that cannot shed its skin perishes. So do spirits who are prevented from changing their opinions; they cease to be spirits’ (Daybreak, Book 5, Aphorism 573, Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche, Clark, & Leiter, 1997; F. Nietzsche, Sánchez Meca, & Aspiunza Elguezal, 2014; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Added to this are the difficulties due to the presentation. Nietzsche's style is aristocratic, distancing, often easier to misunderstand than to grasp, and demands all the art of reading. In the dance of aphorisms, tendencies, antitheses, masks, irony, and malice shimmer and sparkle [Note in the original edition: *‘I do everything to make myself ‘difficult to understand!’*, Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter Two, The Free Spirit, Aphorism 27, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.] (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909), Nietzsche paints in glowing colors without strict contours; his language is more music than architecture.

A large part of the material published today was no longer sifted, selected, and compiled by Nietzsche himself, e.g., the entire estate under WzM (WzM refers to Der Wille zur Macht or The Will to Power). For the last creative period, there is also the almost insoluble task of finding boundaries between healthy and pathological, between genius and insanity, to determine where paralysis (?) (Möbius *et al.*,) or schizophrenia (?) (Holz endangers the connection with reality.

Despite everything, Nietzsche's world of ideas is largely self-contained and dominated by certain basic lines. However, exploring their unity is difficult and hardly more challenging with any philosopher than with Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's political thought material can only be worked on if one clearly highlights the main accents without regard to individual deviations. I have made the following classification:

1. Quotes in which the contradictions are clear and explicable,
2. Uncertain to pathological judgments,
3. Decisive ones that are compatible with the typology of his thinking and with the basic lines of his philosophy.

Moreover, the aphoristic character of Nietzsche's literature forces one to deviate sometimes from the otherwise usual form and method in scientific presentation. One can no longer work on and present Nietzsche, like Goethe, as one would a purely ‘scientific topic’. These formal deviations, however, do not change the overall scientific character of such works.

3. Philosophy and Politics

In cases of occasionally misrepresented or uncertain political or historical contexts, it should be noted that Nietzsche's development as a classical philologist originates with the Greeks, with art and music, from which he transitions to philosophy, and it is only as a philosopher that he becomes a theoretical politician. For a better understanding of Nietzsche's political views, I therefore consider it necessary to briefly outline those philosophical fundamentals that significantly influenced his political stance.

1. Realism:

Affirmation of reality and life of ‘this’ world without addition or subtraction. Affirmation of struggle as the eternal order and justice, free from Christian ‘providence’ and arbitrariness.

‘To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than the meaning of the earth’. *‘Remain true to the earth!’* (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Zarathustra's Prologue, 3, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Common, 1917; F. W. Nietzsche, Del Caro, & Pippin, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

2. Will to Power:

‘Where I found a living creature, there I found Will to Power; and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master’ (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Second Part, XXXIV, Self-surpassing, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Common, 1917; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

3. Morality:

There is no meta-ethics. Morality and custom spring from the living conditions and the will to grow of classes, peoples, races.

4. Discipline and Breeding:

The 'meaning' of life is life and its enhancement. The task of man is human enhancement through discipline and breeding of the genius, the superman, the highest humans. 'The Superman is the meaning of the earth'. Everything is a means to this end!

5. Antichrist: Political Effects of Christianity:

- a) Providence as a constant effect of reward and punishment, curse and grace of a 'God' instead of the 'innocence of becoming', resulting in hostility to life, negative politics.
- b) Equality of souls before 'God', resulting in equality of 'believers', of humans among themselves, resulting in Marxist-democratic egalitarian delusion: destruction of race.
- c) Jewish falsification of values through Pauline Christianity.

If in the following I quote Nietzsche verbatim more often than is usually customary, it is for two reasons:

1. To always invoke Nietzsche's own testimony in the face of the confusion of Nietzsche interpretations,
2. To render Nietzsche's thoughts, as much as possible, in the incomparable beauty of his prose.

II. REICH

1. The Position

Undeniably, Nietzsche is one of the most significant opponents of the Bismarck Reich. In terms of sharpness and fundamentality of criticism, he stands unmatched. He views the Reich from the outside. The solitude of Sils Maria gives him an unusual distance. Through forcefully attaining freedom and independence, he gains an incorruptible view against external successes and apparent values. Perhaps the people of our time can no longer grasp how great Nietzsche is also in that he saw weakness, hollowness, and decline in a power seemingly proven repeatedly through victories and successes. The more brilliantly the Reich rises, the more ruthlessly Nietzsche attacks.

That Nietzsche becomes too negative in this process is certain [Note in the original edition: This 'conspiracy' has led Stebing to a senseless, indeed irresponsible distortion of Nietzsche. Cf. Stebing: *The Reich and the Illness of European Culture*]. A certain alienation from the Reich is unmistakable. He does not fully do justice to the historical situation.

It would be entirely mistaken, however, to equate Nietzsche's hostility to the Reich with hostility to Germany. One could reproach him for directing his

attacks only against the Reich. For what he reproaches his fatherland with often applies equally and in many cases more strongly to other nations. In reality, this is a distinction. Nietzsche only attacks the German Reich because his real hopes lie here. He criticizes most sharply where he expects the highest.

Unsatisfied with the present, the 'classical philologist' looks with ever deeper admiration at the unique solar zenith of Greek life and Greek culture. He judges his time by this standard. Despite everything, the result is not hopeless. It is the era of German military victory. In Versailles, a new German Reich arises. Indeed, this power lacks an equal culture, yet it is not entirely hopeless to fight for a German culture to match German power. For: genius lives. From the effect of Richard Wagner, Nietzsche hopes for the birth of an original German culture.

'... I recognize the only form of life in the Greek: and regard Richard Wagner as the most sublime step towards its rebirth in the German essence' ([Fragmente 1869–1874], [9=U I 4a. 1871], 9[34]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), (also in 9[34] of U I 4A.1871) (F. Nietzsche, Santiago Guervos, et al., 2010).

Wagner is not recognized in Bismarck's Reich. Nietzsche begins to fight for him, and in this struggle all later attacks against the Second Reich are already rooted. The content remains essentially the same; only the tone becomes increasingly hostile and mocking.

Wagner triumphs, but now Nietzsche has lost faith in Wagner. His disappointment is boundless and threatens to destroy him. He emerges from this crisis as the philosopher, the judge of his time. From this point on, Bismarck's Germany is judged and condemned.

2. Attacks

In this Germany, no culture flourished, nay - '... one now sees the culture of a society emerging multiple times, for which commerce is just as much the soul, as personal competition was for the ancient Greeks and as war, victory and law were for the Romans' (Daybreak, Book 3, Fundamental notion of a culture of traders, Aphorism 175. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche et al., 1997; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909) [Note in the original edition: A. Baeumler: 'Before the horrified opened eyes of the other great realist, this process unfolded: The mercantile bourgeois became master over the statesman, liberalism and romanticism alternately made policy, above all, however, one made good business'] (Gómez-Jeria, 2024c).

The Bismarck Era (the era of German stupefaction). The exclusive interest that is now bestowed in Germany on questions of power, on commerce and traffic and lastly on 'good living', the rise of parliamentary idiocy, the newspaper-reading and the literary meddling of everyone about everything (Beyond

Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

These reproaches against the Second Reich are only one aspect of his struggle for an original German culture. Nietzsche created a new concept of culture. In the examination of his position towards Germanness, I will show how his entire striving was a struggle for a new culture, and how this striving influenced his political judgments. In the Second Reich, Nietzsche sees not only no culture, but the opposite of a culture: the chaotic jumble of all possible styles, forms, worldviews. And added to this was the general superficiality, the busy optimism of the national liberal bourgeoisie. Too motley was the political ‘unity’ of this Reich: bourgeois and Marxist, liberal and national, democratic and dynastic, conservative and parliamentary.

Nietzsche castigates bourgeoisie and Marxism simultaneously: ‘*Subversives and possessive spirits, the two opposing parties, the socialist and the national, or whatever the names may be in the various countries of Europe, are worthy of each other*’ (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 480, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The bourgeois realm is parliamentary:

‘*Parliamentarism, that is, the public permission to choose between five fundamental political opinions...*’ (The Gay Science, Book 3, Aphorism 174. Vol. 10, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche, Williams, Nauckhoff, & Del Caro, 2001).

The Reich is Democratic:

‘*That I attached hopes where there was no hope, where everything all too clearly pointed to an end? At a time when the German spirit, which not long ago had the will to dominate Europe, the strength to lead Europe, was just now making its final and definitive abdication and, under the pompous pretext of founding an empire, was making its transition to mediocrity, to ‘democracy’ and ‘modern ideas’...*’ (The birth of tragedy, an attempt at self-criticism, section 6. Vol. 1, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Smith, 2000).

‘*And the ‘new Reich’, again founded on the most worn-out and best-despised thoughts: The equality of rights and votes*’ (Will to Power, Book 4, Discipline and Breeding, I. The Order of Rank, 1. Society and the individual, section 748. Vol. 15, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Above all, that Germany is liberal. Nietzsche remains his entire life long the enemy of liberalism in every form. If this work contains no separate treatise on

it, it is only because every chapter in itself represents a negation of liberalism.

It was precisely the destruction of liberalism that Nietzsche once hoped for from the newly risen German power. After the victory of 1871, he writes: ‘*The only productive political power in Germany, which we need not specify further to anyone, has now come to victory in a tremendous manner, and from now on it will dominate the German essence down to its atoms. This fact is of utmost value, because something will perish by that power, which we know as the actual opponent of any deeper philosophy and art contemplation, a state of disease from which the German essence primarily suffers and which afflicts even the best-natured German natures in ever-recurring gouty convulsions, not to mention the great masses, in whom one calls that suffering, with vile desecration of a well-meant word, ‘liberalism’.*’

‘*That entire liberalism built on a dreamed dignity of man, of the generic concept ‘man’, will bleed to death along with its harsher brothers on that rigid, previously alluded to power...*’ (Foreword to Richard Wagner, in: 11.MP XII 1 B. February 1871, 11[1]) (F. Nietzsche, Santiago Guervos, *et al.*, 2010) and (Notebook 11, February 1871, 11[1]) (F. W. Nietzsche, Geuss, Nehamas, & Löb, 2009).

Nietzsche was bitterly disappointed. Liberalism continued to proliferate in connection with dynastic nationalism.

Liberalism disintegrates the ‘*people’s and state instinct*’, it is a means for ‘*those truly international homeless money hermits... who, with their natural lack of state instinct, have learned to misuse politics as a means of the stock exchange and state and society as enrichment apparatuses for themselves...*’ Nietzsche clearly sees that danger, which is evoked by the liberal-optimistic worldview, which has its roots in the teachings of the French Enlightenment and Revolution, i.e., ‘*in a completely un-Germanic, truly Romanesque shallow and unmetaphysical philosophy*’ (Notebook 10, beginning of 1871, Fragment of an expanded version of *The Birth of Tragedy* written in the first weeks of 1871, 10[1]) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2009).

Fifteen years later, Nietzsche writes again about the ‘*international money-hermits*’, who under the mask of liberalism pursue Jewish power goals: ‘*They know how to be powerful everywhere where power exists*’ ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[182], Warum die Schwachen siegen) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Against the liberal concept of freedom, which destroys every organic bond, disintegrates every natural community and in the end leads to anarchy or, as its counteraction, to despotism, against this atomistic concept of freedom, Nietzsche poses the freedom of the

warrior, grown out of overcoming, out of struggle, freedom as victory:

‘By what is the freedom of individuals and peoples measured? By the resistance that must be overcome, by the effort that it costs to stay on top. The highest type of free men would have to be sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome...’ (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 38. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

But liberal freedom is the freedom to anarchy, to formlessness, to decline:

Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on, there are no worse and more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions. One knows, indeed, what they bring about: they undermine the will to power, they are the levelling of mountain and valley exalted to a moral, they make small, cowardly, and pleasurable, with them triumphs every time the herd animal. Liberalism: in German, herd-animalization...

Peoples that were worth something, became worth something, never became this under liberal institutions (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 38. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

‘Not liberalism but ‘war educates for freedom. For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility... that one is prepared to sacrifice people to a cause, not excluding oneself. Freedom means that the masculine, the war- and victory-joyful instincts have dominion over other instincts, for example over those of ‘happiness’. The man who has become free, how much more the free spirit, treads underfoot the contemptible type of well-being dreamt of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats’ (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 38. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

But the Second Reich succumbed to this liberalism: against Bismarck and beyond Bismarck.

The ‘Reich’ was also the ‘stronghold of Christianity’. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is the greatest Antichrist of all times. One cannot understand the force and sharpness of Nietzsche's attacks against the Second Reich and against the Germans at all if one does not also constantly remember what danger Nietzsche saw in Christianity and with what contempt he fought against contemporary Christianity. This is of such essential influence on his political judgments, that I am compelled to at least sketch this position of Nietzsche here.

Already of the *Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche writes: *‘In this book, the transplantation of a deeply un-German myth, the Christian one, into the German heart*

is regarded as the actual German fatality’ ([14 = W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[20]) (Ferrer & Nietzsche, 2021; F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche, Colli, & Montinari, 1999). Nietzsche already separates with greatest sharpness the Jesus doctrine and the official Christianity of the Second Reich. Although he rejects both. Yet in contemporary Christianity, he combats not only the foreign values but also the contradiction of teaching and life, of idea and reality, the *‘lack of party between opposites’*.

‘The very word ‘Christianity’ is a misunderstanding, at bottom there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross. What from this moment on was called ‘Gospel’ was already the opposite of what he had lived: a ‘bad tidings’, a Dysangelium’ (The Antichrist, Section 39. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

Today, however, Nietzsche exclaims, it is indecent to still be a Christian, and it is doubly indecent to speak Christianly and act anti-Christianly: *‘... I pass through the madhouse-world of whole millennia, whether it be called ‘Christianity’, ‘Christian faith’, ‘Christian Church’, with a gloomy caution... I refrain from holding mankind responsible for its mental illnesses. But my feeling revolts, break out, as soon as I enter the modern age, into our age. Our age is knowing... What was formerly merely sick, today has become indecent... it is indecent to be a Christian today. And here begins my ‘nausea’...’* (The Antichrist, Section 38. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

And now Nietzsche aims at the Christianity of his time: *‘... everyone knows that: and yet everything remains the same. Where has the last feeling of decency, of self-respect gone, when even our statesmen, otherwise a very uninhibited kind of people and thoroughly anti-Christians in deed, still call themselves Christians today and go to communion?... A young prince at the head of his regiments, splendid as the expression of the selfishness and self-exaltation of his people, but without any shame, professing to be a Christian!...’* (The Antichrist, Section 38. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

Nietzsche thus sees the teachings and values of Christianity as incompatible with the political reality of the pre-war Reich. He denies these values and this teaching. But the compromise between Orient and Europe, which he sees as modern Christianity, this compromise he despises. *‘What does Christianity negate? What does it mean by ‘world’? That one is a soldier, that one is a judge, that one is a patriot; that one defends oneself, that one maintains one's honor; that one wants one's advantage; that one is proud... Every practice of every moment, every instinct, every valuation that becomes act is today anti-Christian...’* (The

Antichrist, Section 38. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

Christianity is possible as a most private form of existence, it presupposes a narrow, withdrawn, completely unpolitical society, it belongs in the conventicle. 'A 'Christian state', a 'Christian politics' on the other hand is a shamelessness, a lie, something like a Christian military leadership, which ultimately treats the 'God of Hosts' as Chief of the General Staff. Even the Papacy has never been able to make Christian politics... and when reformers engage in politics, like Luther, one knows that they are just such adherents of Machiavelli as any immoralists or tyrants' (Will to Power, Book 2, A criticism of the highest values that have prevailed hitherto, I. The Order of Rank, I. Criticism of religion, I. Concerning the origin of religions, section 211. Vol. 15, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

'At this moment, for example, the German Emperor calls it his 'Christian duty' to liberate the slaves in Africa...' (Ecce Homo, Why I wrote so excellent books. The case of Wagner: a musician's problem, section 3. Vol. 17, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

The Reich then became increasingly 'Christian' and the young Emperor saw in this the foreign policy task: 'to preserve the Christian world peace'. From this sketch it is already clear that for the politician Nietzsche, one must always presuppose his anti-Christian battle stance.

Only then does one understand the force and harshness of his reproaches. The more the power of the Reich grew, the stronger it became as a support of Christianity, the more furious Nietzsche's attacks become. And the Reich is 'national' and thus the 'delayer of Europe'. Nietzsche, however, is the 'good European': 'Can one be interested in this German Reich? Where is the new thought? Is it only a new power combination? All the worse if it does not know what it wants. Peace and letting things be is not a policy I respect. Ruling and helping the highest thought to victory, the only thing that could interest me in Germany. What do I care whether the Hohenzollerns are there or not?' (Fragments Summer-Autumn 1884, 26 [335]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, et al., 2010).

'Germany, Germany above all' is perhaps the most idiotic slogan ever given. Why Germany at all? I ask: if it does not want, represent, or embody something that has more value than any other previous power represents. In itself just one more large state, one more stupidity in the world' (Fragments 1884-1885, 25[248]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, et al., 2010). Two reasons caused this attack: the nationalism of the Second Reich is only an 'artificial nationalism', this artificial nationalism prevents the unification of Europe.

All these attacks will be shown in the course of the investigation as political problems in their full depth. 'A little pure air!' This absurd state of Europe should not last much longer! Is there any thought behind this cattle nationalism? What value could it have, now, when everything points to larger and common interests, to stir up these scruffy self-feelings? And this is in a state where the spiritual lack of independence and denationalization is obvious and where the actual value and meaning of current culture lies in a mutual melting and fertilizing of each other! ... the struggle for supremacy within a state that is worth nothing...' (Will to Power, Book 3, the principles of a new valuation, III. The will to power as exemplified in society and in the individual, 2. The individual, section 748. Vol. 15, 5th Ed) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

'Thanks to the morbid alienation which the nationality-madness has placed and is still placing between the peoples of Europe, thanks also to the short-sighted and quick-handed politicians who are on top today with its help and do not suspect at all how much the disintegrating politics they pursue can necessarily only be interim politics, thanks to all this and much that is still quite unspeakable today, the most unambiguous signs are now being overlooked or arbitrarily and mendaciously reinterpreted, in which it is expressed that Europe wants to become one' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 256, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

This Reich of bourgeois 'culture', of democracy, of Marxism, of Judaism, of National Liberalism, of Christian pretense, is the hostile power for Nietzsche. He incessantly intensifies the attacks; in the last conscious months, the struggle pulls him into a morbid tension. 'I have declared war on Germany in all my instincts' (Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, November 1888, Nietzsche to Hippolyte Taine, Turin, November 1888. (From a Draft)) (F. W. Nietzsche, Levy, & Ludovici, 1921).

Ultimate loneliness, inhuman disappointments and volcanic affects force him unrestrained forward to the point of treason: 'I myself am working on a memorandum for the European courts for the purpose of an anti-German league. I want to constrict the 'Reich' in an iron corset and provoke it to a war of desperation. I do not have my hands free until I have the young Emperor with appendages in my hands' (Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, December 28, 1888, To Franz Overbeck, [Received on December 28, 1888, from Turin]) (F. W. Nietzsche & Middleton, 1969).

Yet I doubt that this is conscious treason, I doubt that Nietzsche could still judge with clear responsibility in these days. The last outbursts are the

morbid exaggeration of what has its roots in the 'Untimely Meditations', becomes ever more sharply delineated, remains the same in tendency and only in tone and form finally deliriously overshoots. It is a necessary politically grounded consequence, ending in madness. *I consider it nonsense to try to measure in the earlier epochs of Nietzsche's work what is healthy, what is morbid* [Note in the original edition: How that typical educated philistine Mobius presumes]. When in Nietzsche an 'atypical paralysis' or a 'schizophrenia' might have begun is essentially irrelevant for an evaluation of Nietzsche literature.

'Sick' geniuses have produced highest-quality work in all fields in lyrics, painting, even in mathematics. An exception is justified according to my investigations only for the last creative period. Here illness speaks from work. The 'treason' of 28.12.88 was madness because Nietzsche already shows in previous statements the clouding of judgment.

Actually, the postscript that he wants to have the 'Emperor with appendages' in his hands proves it sufficiently. A few days earlier he writes already to Overbeck: *'In two months I will be the first name on Earth'* (Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, Christmas 1888, to Franz Overbeck, [Turin, Christmas, 1888]) (F. W. Nietzsche & Middleton, 1969).

Already on 26.11.88 to Brandes: *'I swear to you that in two years we will have the whole Earth in convulsions. I am a fatality'* (Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, November 20, 1888, to Georg Brandes, Turin, Via Carlo Alberto 6/III) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1921; F. W. Nietzsche & Middleton, 1969).

But also, in *The Antichrist* and in *Ecce Homo* a partially morbid exaggeration begins. The breakdown came as a stroke, yet not entirely without development. The bow broke when it was stretched to the extreme.

3. Reich Unity

Undoubtedly, Nietzsche also shows great concrete weaknesses in his fight against the Bismarck Reich.

Often the tendency breaks through to overemphasize art and culture compared to the state-political. Initially still from the concept of an original folk culture, later oscillating between Germanic-Greek and generally civilizational concept of culture. It is a schematizing exaggeration to classify Nietzsche into an 'aesthetic opposition' against Bismarck and the Reich [Note in the original edition: Cf. Ernst Westphal 'Bismarck's Enemies'], but especially in the period of *Human, All Too Human* the sphere of the political is occasionally judged too negatively, although with Nietzsche one must first determine in almost every individual case what he has in mind as 'politics' or 'culture'.

The overemphasis on art and culture hinders him from the outset from doing justice to the Reich in its political and historical significance. It is misguided when Nietzsche contrasts 'Polis' against 'Reich': *'The principle of nationality is a barbaric crudeness compared to the city-state. In this limitation the genius shows itself, which gives nothing to masses but experiences more in the small than barbarians do in the great'*.

He himself writes earlier: *'now we know that Thales proposed the founding of a confederation of cities, but did not succeed: he failed because of the old mythical polis concept. At the same time, he sensed the immense danger for Greece if this isolating power of myth kept the cities separate. Indeed: if Thales had brought about his confederation, Greece would have been spared from the Persian war'* (Fragments 1975 U II 8c. Sommer? 1875, 6[49]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2008).

Just as the polis isolation became the political danger of Hellenism, conversely, the founding of the Reich was not its danger for culture but the actual prerequisite for an original German culture, which needed a unified political foundation.

Yet this tendency is not leading in Nietzsche's attacks. It would be too contradictory that he fights the unification of the German small states and at the same time demands and expects the unification of the European states. Nietzsche does not see the target of attack in the German unification itself, but in the fact that from the unification the leading power of the nationality principle arises, whose existence prevents a political unity of Europe.

4. Bismarck

Despite all negation, Nietzsche does not completely misjudge the values of the new Reich. Even in his last period, he writes:

'The new Germany represents a large quantity of inherited and acquired efficiency, so that it can even afford to spend the accumulated treasure of strength wastefully for a while. It is not a high culture that has become dominant with it, still less a delicate taste, a noble beauty of instincts: but more manly virtues than any other country in Europe can show. Much good courage and respect for oneself, much security in interaction, in the reciprocity of duties, much industriousness, much perseverance, and an inherited moderation which needs the spur rather than the brake. I add, here people still obey, without obedience being humiliating... And no one despises his opponent' (The Twilight of the Idols. Things the Germans lack, 1. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

And although Nietzsche once again concentrates all his reproaches against Bismarck that he

accuses the Reich of, he remains more positive towards Bismarck. He plays all stylistic and psychological subtleties against Bismarck. The basic tone is given by the reproach: Bismarck lacks the 'idea', the substantive political goal, the 'worldview': '*... how many would like to be of one opinion with Bismarck with all their heart*', he mocks the Germans, '*... if only he himself were of one opinion or even made a show of being so henceforth! Indeed, without principles, but with basic instincts, a mobile spirit in the service of strong basic instincts, and precisely therefore, without principles ... that should not be anything striking in a statesman, but rather be considered as right and natural: but unfortunately, it has so far not been German at all*' (Daybreak, Unconditional homage, Book 3, Section 167. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'... a statesman who knows and values philosophy about as much as a peasant or a fraternity student, and who believes he can make his bold, ruthless politics of the moment more 'acceptable' to German taste (or conscience -) by adorning it with an antiquated trimming of royalism and Christianity' (Fragments 1885–1887, Herbst 1885–Herbst 1886, 2[5]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), and (2=W I 8. Autumn 1885–Autumn 1886, 2[5]) (F. W. Nietzsche & Del Caro, 2020).

Bismarck is counted among the '*politicians of the bold glance and the swift hand*', who do not realize how much their politics must be '*intermission politics*' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 256, Vol. 12 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). He is the hinderer of European unity. And Bismarck pursues that '*indecent politics*' which speaks Christian and acts heathen, a Christian of confession and '*Antichrist of deed*' (The Twilight of the Idols. Things the Germans lack. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

'The Buddhist acts differently from the non-Buddhist; the Christian acts like everyone else and has a Christianity of ceremonies and moods. The deep and contemptible mendacity of Christianity in Europe...: we truly become the contempt of the Arabs, Hindus, Chinese... One should hear the speeches of the first German statesman about what has actually occupied Europe for 40 years now... one should hear the language, the court preacher Tartuffery...' (Will to Power, Book 2, a criticism of the highest values that have prevailed hitherto. I. Criticism of Religion. 2. Concerning the History of Christianity, section 191. Vol. 14, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Bismarck may have piled up a 'monster of empire and power', yet '*the great thought that alone gives greatness to an act and cause*' is lacking (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 241, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'May Europe soon produce a great statesman and may the one who is now celebrated as 'the great realist' in this petty age of plebeian short-sightedness become small' ([30 = Z II 5, 83. Z II 7b. Z II 6b. Herbst 1884–Anfang 1885] 30[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), and (Nietzsche, Fragmentos Póstumos, Vol. 3, 30[1]) (F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, *et al.*, 2010).

Political irony alternates with admiration for Bismarck's personality:

'Bismarck: far from German philosophy like a farmer and corps student. Distrustful of scholars. That's what I like about him. He has thrown away everything that stupid German education (with gymnasium and universities) tried to instill in him. And he visibly loves a good meal with strong wine more than German music: which is mostly just a finer, effeminate hypocrisy and disguise for the old German male inclination towards intoxication. He has held fast to his honest limitations, namely those towards God and King, and later, quite reasonably, added the limitation that everyone has who has created something, the love for his work (I mean for the German Empire)' ([26=W I 2. Sommer–Herbst 1884], 26[402])(F. Nietzsche, 2016) and (Nietzsche, Fragmentos Póstumos, Vol. 3, 26[402]) (F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, *et al.*, 2010).

'Bismarck: Farmer, corps student: not gemütlich, not naive, thank God! Not a German as he 'appears in books...' ([26=W I 2. Sommer–Herbst 1884], 26[457]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), and (Nietzsche, Fragmentos Póstumos, Vol. 3, 26[457]) (F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, *et al.*, 2010).

'Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, Bismarck, characteristic of the strong German type. Living unscrupulously between opposites, full of that flexible strength which guards itself against convictions and doctrines by using one against the other and reserving freedom for itself...' ([9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[180])(F. Nietzsche, 2016) and (Nietzsche, Fragmentos Póstumos, Vol. 4, 9[180]) (F. Nietzsche, 2008).

Nietzsche recognizes with astonishing clarity the fundamental character and format of Bismarck. With absolute necessity, fate stands divisively between them. It is idle to make comparisons. Both have greatness in their own way, both have essentially common opponents. Bismarck created a national foreign policy, created the Reich. The bourgeoisie has gambled away both, because Bismarck did not provide, could not provide, the ideological foundations. Nietzsche, in the loneliest struggle, heroically fights for the fragments of a new worldview, yet he becomes too foreign to the historical situation, he becomes the enemy of his own prerequisites. Neither one triumphed over the other, each triumphed on his own battlefield, both live on in the Third Reich. Would German history of the last decades have been possible without Bismarck? Would our worldview be so great and fruitful without Nietzsche? To

measure Nietzsche politically against Bismarck would be as misguided as examining Bismarck philosophically against Nietzsche. Bismarck's greatness lies in the concrete-political, Nietzsche's greatness in the ideological-philosophical.

Nietzsche's hostility to the Reich was time-conditioned and is therefore historically overcome. Always admirable, however, remains the heroic attitude with which he, relying only on himself, uncompromisingly attacks an entire era, judges, and overcomes an entire era. And his political instinct also has greatness. He sees in the Reich the political power of his time, and therefore he fights in that Germany everything he has to fight against the time in general: merchant culture, nationalism, Christianity, democratism and liberalism.

III. Democracy

1. General

A noble value stance, sometimes elevated to aristocratism, even to autocratism, speaks from all of Nietzsche's writings. Parallel to this runs, from the very beginnings of his thought, the absolute negation of democracy in every form. And this in a time when, especially in Germany, democratism was still an 'ideal' without historical testing and historical refutation [**Note in the original edition:** 'His writings are in every respect the highest school of nobility', writes Peter Gast in the introduction to Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part 3, Vol. 75, of the Large Octavo Edition of Kröner-Verlag)].

Nietzsche launches the attack against democracy with all means, in sharpest antithesis. He remains bound to this and can no longer work his way through to a synthetic conception of democracy. He negates democracy in itself. Historical experience and the organic concept of the people make it impossible for us today to follow Nietzsche here anymore. His uncompromising fight against liberal egalitarian democracy, however, was and is exemplary and of lasting validity.

2. Anti-Democratic

'Democracy was always the declining form of organizing power' (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 39. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

The democratic movement is not only a 'form of decay of political organization' but the 'form of diminution of man' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 5, The Natural History of Morals, Section 203, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'A disregard, the decay and death of the state, the unleashing of the private person (I refrain from saying: the individual) is the consequence of the

democratic concept of state...' 'modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the state...' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 472, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

No one has ever fought more sharply and consistently against the delusion of equality [**Note in the original edition:** This fact proves unequivocally how mendacious it is to count Nietzsche among the 'liberal Western intelligentsia']. From all sides, Nietzsche shows the error and the dangers of the doctrine of equality of all that bears a human countenance. Every sentence is an attack formula of unsurpassable concentration. Decay, decline, diminution are the consequences of democratism. It is the explosive, is dynamite against any natural community organization, above all the death of the state. For the natural inequality of humans is the fundamental principle of the state.

'The doctrine of equality!... But there is no more poisonous poison: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, while it is the end of justice...' (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 48. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

'Democracy represents the disbelief in great human beings and in elite society: 'Everyone is equal to everyone else! ... 'At bottom we are all selfish cattle and mob!' ...' ([26= W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[282]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016). Also in (F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, *et al.*, 2010).

By 'democracy', Nietzsche always combats parliamentary equality-democracy. Under 'Marxism' I will show in more detail with what determination Nietzsche fought the democratic-Marxist equality-delusion.

3. Consequences and Mission of Democracy

'For the real psychology of the freedom and equality society. What decreases? ... The will to self-responsibility, sign of the decline of autonomy; the proficiency in defense and weapons, also in spiritual matters; the power to command; the sense of reverence, of subordination, of being able to remain silent; the great passion, the great task, the tragedy, the cheerfulness' ([11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[142]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016). Also in (F. Nietzsche, 2008).

But Nietzsche does not despair of democratism. He believes in the counter-forces that would rise strengthened from the democratic decay.

'The same conditions which drive forward the development of the herd animal also drive the development of the leader-animal' ([35=W I 3a. Mai-

Juli 1885], 35[10]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), also in (F. Nietzsche, Conill Sancho, et al., 2010).

He sees the historical mission of democratism and already anticipates the forms of its overcoming: how democratism turns against itself and is destroyed with its own weapons.

'And would it not be a kind of goal, redemption, and justification for the democratic movement itself if someone came who made use of it... that higher kind of domineering and Caesarian spirits, who would stand upon it, hold on to it, and raise themselves up by it? To new, hitherto impossible vistas, to their tasks?' ([2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[13]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), also in (F. Nietzsche, 2008).

As with 'parliamentary' means parliamentarism, so Hitler with 'democratic' means has destroyed 'equality democracy' (but organized his movement according to the opposite principles).

Nietzsche's world-historical vision proves magnificent here: democratism is only transition and dissolution: *'It seems that the democratization of Europe is a link in the chain of those enormous prophylactic measures which are the thought of the new era and with which we distinguish ourselves from the Middle Ages...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 275. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

4. Genealogy of Democratism

It is a historical-philosophical merit of Nietzsche, the discovery that modern democratism has its root in Christianity: [Note in the original edition: It will one day become effective as one of Nietzsche's deepest and most consequential thoughts in historical contemplation, that modern democratic ideals are of Christian, and indeed Romanic-Christian origin (uncertain reference)]

'...the democratic movement makes the inheritance of the Christian' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 5, The Natural History of Morals, Section 202, Vol. 12 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

Paul:

Rousseau, who would have dared this equation before? The equation: Christian and anarchist, Christian and Marxist, Christian and democrat.

'Democracy is the most naturalized Christianity: a kind of 'return to nature', after it could be overcome by an extreme unnaturalness of the opposite valuation...' (10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[77]) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909), and also in (F. Nietzsche, 2008).

'The poison of the doctrine, equal rights for all, Christianity has sown it most fundamentally; Christianity has waged a war to the death from the most secret corners of bad instincts against every feeling of reverence and distance between man and man, that is, the prerequisite for every elevation, for every growth of culture' (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 43. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

Nietzsche thus dares one of the gravest accusations against Christianity. The more the delusion of equality is overcome, the more peoples expel this poison, the louder Nietzsche's accusation will resound over the earth and find a shrill echo.

With the invasion of Christianity began the destruction of the Germanic laws of breeding, marriage, and kinship; the slave and serf were 'equated' with the free man, that was the beginning of the equality delusion in Germania, and Nietzsche accuses Christianity of being the cause and bearing the guilt for this, up to democratism and its rage and value-destroying consequences.

'... that everyone as an 'immortal soul' has equal rank with everyone else...' (The Antichrist, Section 43. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

'The equality of souls before God, this falsehood, this pretext for the rancunes of all the base-minded, this explosive of a concept which has finally become revolution, modern idea and principle of decline of the whole social order, is Christian dynamite...' (The Antichrist, Section 62. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

'Let us not underestimate the fatality that has crept from Christianity into politics! No one today has the courage for special rights, for rights of dominion, for a feeling of reverence for himself and his equals, for a pathos of distance... Our politics is sick from this lack of courage... The aristocratism of disposition was most subterraneously undermined by the soul-equality lie' (The Antichrist, Section 43. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

This radicalism of inference is only possible for Nietzsche. This is Nietzsche's historical-philosophical greatness.

5. National Socialism and Democracy

Despite these commonalities in the fight against equality-democracy, we differ very significantly from Nietzsche in our position on democracy. National Socialism unreservedly professes true democracy, the rule of the people.

The contrast to equality-democracy lies in the structuring of the people and in the method of political will formation. Not equality is the basis and essence of democracy but responsibility towards the people. The people do not directly govern themselves, but the leadership serves the people and is accountable to the people.

The whole specter of party mischief and parliamentary horse-trading has been swept away. *Will formation no longer occurs through party clusters, i.e., through the private owners of the means of influence; parties no longer elect but the people, representatives are not elected, but the leader is chosen.* This leader determines (*'Authority downwards, responsibility upwards'*). The leader is not 'by God's grace', nor solely responsible to his 'conscience', but stands simultaneously in full responsibility before the people. Not just 'power and consent' (Fascism), but the people govern themselves indirectly through the self-chosen leader. Equally distant from absolute dictatorship and formless mass will, two principles are synthetically bound here: authority and responsibility, leadership and popular rule.

In the inexhaustible richness of Nietzsche's world of thought, a testimony can also be found for this. Under 'New and old concept of government' he once writes:

'... On the contrary, one should now learn, according to a principle that has sprung purely from the head and is yet to make history, that the government is nothing but an organ of the people, not a provident, venerable 'above' in relation to a 'below' accustomed to modesty...' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 450, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

However, this is an isolated deviation from his fundamental doctrines. Nietzsche could not penetrate to the form of true democracy because, mainly due to his time, he lacked a positive relationship to people and state (see 'Individual and Community').

Germany, however, which has tasted formal democracy to the extreme, has also overcome it most thoroughly. National Socialism shapes the most modern democracy from the principles of duke and senate. Technology also gave its help. Radio and film overcome the impersonal barriers between leadership and people, similar to the Germanic thing, the personal relationship between leadership and followership reigns again, and thus the most modern form of people's organization is at the same time the ancient Germanic democracy in a contemporary form. The prerequisite for this was the overcoming of equality-democracy. And for this, Nietzsche provided the sharpest weapons.

IV. Marxism

1. Origin

Nietzsche sees history as the history of values. As in equality-democracy, he also recognizes in 'Socialism' a Romanic-Christian origin. Paul made Rousseau and Marx possible.

'How ridiculous the Socialists are to me with their silly optimism about the 'good man' who waits behind the bush, if only the previous order has been abolished and all 'natural drives' are let loose' (Will to Power, Book 4, Discipline and Breeding, I. The Order of Rank, 1. Society and the individual, section 755. Vol. 15, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'I am averse firstly to Socialism, because it quite naively dreams of the 'Good, True, Beautiful' and of 'equal rights' (even anarchism wants only in a more brutal way, the same ideal)...' (Will to Power, Book 4, Discipline and Breeding, I. The Order of Rank, 1. Society and the individual, section 753. Vol. 15, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'...for in all socialist agitations and earthquakes, it is still Rousseau's man who, like the old Typhon under Etna, moves' (Thoughts out of season, Part II, Schopenhauer as Educator. IV, Vol. 5, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

In Rousseau, Nietzsche sees one of his greatest enemies. He has struggled against the ideas and values of 1789 in all epochs of his life. Nietzsche unmasks Rousseau's 'return to nature' as a lie of world-historical effect. Rousseau's teachings have not led to nature, but to anti-nature. It was not natural values that triumphed in 1789, but the secularized values of Paulinism. The French Revolution is for Nietzsche an uprising of Jewish slave morality. Against Rousseau's sham nature and utopian 'man', he sets nature and man in ruthless realism, without deduction and addition, without appearance and excuse.

'Rousseau, this first modern man, idealist and canaille in one person... I hate Rousseau even in the Revolution: it is the world-historical expression for this duality of idealist and canaille... what I hate is Rousseau's morality, the so-called 'truths' of the Revolution' (Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt. Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen, 48) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005), (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes in a War with the Age, Section 48. Vol. 16, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909; F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

'...Rousseau's passionate follies and half-lies have awakened the optimistic spirit of the Revolution, against which I cry: 'Ecrasez l'infâme!...'' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, 'A Glance at the State', Aphorism 463, Vol. 6,

3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Yet Nietzsche reaches far beyond Rousseau: As he sees in Paul the actual ancestor of Rousseau, so to him Marxism is a secularized Christianity: the old Jewish values under a new mask.

'The Gospel: the news that a path to happiness is open for the lowly and poor - that one has nothing to do but to detach oneself from the institution, the tradition, the tutelage of the upper classes: in this respect, the advent of Christianity is nothing more than the typical socialist doctrine. Property, acquisition, fatherland, status and rank, tribunals, police, state, church, education, art, military: all just as many hindrances to happiness, errors, entanglements, works of the devil, which the Gospel announces judgment upon, all typical for socialist doctrine' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[379], Der Nihilist) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Above all, Nietzsche recognizes in the Marxist equality ideology only the political application of the Christian 'equality of men before God', the equality of the 'believers'. Christianity values humanity only artificially and unnaturally with the measure of Christian morality. The organic and racial diversity of humans is overlooked. All humans are equal: equally corrupted, equally sinful and equally in need of salvation. Hence Christian mission for all races: Mongols, Negroes, Jews; hence Jewish priests and black bishops! In the equality doctrine of this raceless religion, Nietzsche sees the precursor of Marxism:

'Another Christian, no less insane concept has been inherited even deeper into the flesh of modernity: the concept of the 'equality of souls before God'. In it is given the prototype of all theories of equal rights: humanity was first taught to stammer the proposition of equality religiously, later a morality was made out of it: what wonder that man ends up taking it seriously, taking it practically! that is to say politically, democratically, socialistically, indignation-pessimistically' ([15=W II 6a. Frühjahr 1888], 15[30], 2) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This consistency is unheard of and only at the beginning of its effect.

2. Equality

Nietzsche throws himself against the equality delusion with all his might. His entire teaching is built on the recognition of the natural inequality of humans. And so, Nietzsche's concept of justice is also the rebirth of natural justice in Plato's sense. 'Equality', however, is the end of justice:

'The doctrine of equality! ... But there is no more poisonous poison: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, while it is the end of justice ... 'To equals

equal things, to unequals unequal things' ... that would be the true speech of justice: and what follows from it, 'Never make unequal things equal'(Götzen-Dämmerung, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen, 48) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'With these preachers of equality, I will not be mixed and confused. For thus justice speaks to me: 'Men are not equal'' (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Second Part, XXIX, On the Tarantulas. Vol. 11, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Today this sounds so absolutely self-evident to us. Yet only the ideological and power struggles of half a century led to the realization of Nietzsche's teachings in the demand: not the same for everyone, but to each his own.

3. Property

Similar applies to Nietzsche's position on property. Here too, he has anticipated the future and warned his time. Remaining deaf to this is the historical guilt of the bourgeoisie: History has spoken its judgment on it. The bourgeois age is sinking.

Nietzsche demonstrates that in the dispute over property, the same mentality prevails among both the possessors and the non-possessors:

'When the Socialists point out that the distribution of property in present humanity is the consequence of countless injustices and acts of violence and in sum reject the obligation towards something so unjustly founded, they see only something individual...' '... the unjust disposition is also in the souls of the non-possessors, they are not better than the possessors and have no moral privilege, for at some point their ancestors were possessors' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 452, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

For Nietzsche, the drive and will to property are as natural as the drive to growth, the drive to life:

'Socialism, as the fully thought-out tyranny of the least and the dumbest, that is, the superficial, the envious, and the three-quarters actors, is indeed the conclusion of 'modern ideas' and their latent anarchism... Nevertheless, there will always be too many possessors for socialism to mean more than an attack of illness... 'One must possess something in order to be something.' This is, however, the oldest and healthiest of all instincts: I shall have to add 'one must want to have more than one has in order to become more'... Having and wanting to have more, growth in one word, that is life itself...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[11]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

But Nietzsche also says:

'Possessions possess, only to a certain degree does possession make man independent, freer; one step further, and possession becomes the master, the possessor the slave...' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions, Fragment 317. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The solution to the property problem, which Nietzsche then demands, is National Socialist:

Whenever the injustice of possession was strongly felt, one named two means of remedy: first, an equal distribution and second, the abolition of property and the return of possession to the community. The latter is especially after the hearts of the Marxists *'who are angry with that ancient Jew for saying: Thou shalt not steal. According to them, the seventh commandment should read: thou shalt not possess'*.

Attempts to abolish property had already been made in antiquity. But 'Equal land lots' is easily said; but how much bitterness is generated by the necessary separation and division... And it was always in vain. This equality, poisoned at the root and unhealthy, was held only for a short time!

'In a few generations, through inheritance, here one lot had come to five heads, there five lots to one head...'

Also, the second recipe, to return property to the community and make the individual only a temporary tenant, had failed, for it destroyed the farmland.

'Man is without foresight and sacrifice towards everything he possesses only temporarily, he treats it exploitatively, as a robber or as a dissolute squanderer...'

After these experiences, there is only one solution to the property problem (the National Socialist one): *'keep all work paths to small fortune open, but prevent effortless, sudden enrichment; withdraw all branches of transport and trade which are favorable to the accumulation of large fortunes, especially money trading, from the hands of private individuals and private companies, and regard those with too much as well as those with no possessions as beings dangerous to the community...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 285. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

4. Exploitation

Whoever takes Nietzsche's typification of morality into master and herd morality too literally and suspects in his teaching only a stark aristocratism, will be surprised that Nietzsche stands on the side of the workers, against the liberal-capitalist 'bourgeoisie'.

When Nietzsche speaks of master morality, he does not mean the reactionaries or the peaks of the so-called bourgeois society. He decides here too for the future-bearing force and against decadence.

Against the numbing American work haste, he places opium and bellum of antiquity, the craft against the machine.

'... their breathless haste of work, the actual plague of the 'New World', is already beginning to infect old Europe wildly and to spread a quite astonishing spiritlessness over it. One is already ashamed of rest... Rather do anything than nothing! this principle too is a string to strangle all culture and higher taste... if there is still pleasure in society and arts, it is a pleasure such as weary-worked slaves allow themselves... the urge for joy already calls itself 'need for recreation' and is beginning to be ashamed of itself...' (The Gay Science, Book 4, Sanctus Januarius, Aphorism 329. Vol. 10, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

To 'machine culture' belongs the machine slave: Nietzsche calls him the 'impossible class'.

Poor, cheerful, and enslaved, these should be possible together if one does not perceive it as a disgrace to be consumed as screws of a machine and, as it were, as stopgaps of human inventive art! Nietzsche turns against the depersonalization of labor, which degrades work to a commodity. It would be shameless to believe that through higher payment the essential worker misery, their impersonal subjugation, could be remedied... even less would it be possible to turn the disgrace of slavery into a virtue by increasing this impersonality within the machine-like operations of a new society. That would be the senselessness, as co-conspirators of the current folly of nations, which above all want to produce as much as possible and be as rich as possible - they should present them with the counter-reckoning: how great sums of inner value would be thrown away for such an external goal! But where would be the value of the worker if he no longer knew what it means to breathe freely?

Nietzsche then describes how the worker rebels against dishonor and exploitation, but now falls victim to Marxist demagoguery, which paralyzes all his strength with the illusion of world revolution. What use is it to you, he asks the proletarians, if you 'listen to the newspaper and leer at the rich neighbor, made lustful by the rapid rise and fall of power, money and opinions... while the pipe of the socialist pied pipers constantly sounds in your ear, wanting to make you ardent with mad hopes? Which tell you to be ready, and nothing more, ready from today to tomorrow, so that you wait for something from outside and wait and otherwise live as you have lived before, until this waiting becomes hunger, thirst, fever, and madness, and finally the day of the *bestia triumphans* dawns in all its glory?'

And Nietzsche recommends the worker to emigrate. *'No longer this indecent servitude, no longer*

this becoming sour and poisonous and conspiratorial! and one should rather bring in the Chinese for European machine slavery (Daybreak, The impossible class, Section 206. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). He turns against the hypocrisy which desires the abolition of slavery and abhors most severely bringing people into this situation, while slaves in all respects lived more securely and happily than the modern worker, as *'slave labor is very little labor in relation to that of the worker'* (All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, A Glance at the State, Fragment 457. Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). *'The exploitation of the worker was, as one now understands, a stupidity, a overexploitation at the expense of the future, a endangerment of human society'* (All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, The Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 286. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). For Nietzsche, it is not the economic plight that is the worker's worst fate, but the undignified, dishonorable position. In Nietzsche, what National Socialism today realizes as 'Social Honor' is heralded.

5. Class Struggle

'Soldiers and leaders still maintain a much higher relationship with each other than workers and employers. For the time being, at least, all militarily based culture still stands high above all so-called industrial culture. The latter, in its current form, is actually the basest form of existence that has ever existed'. In this machine culture, the law of necessity simply operates: 'One wants to live and must sell oneself, but one despises those who exploit this necessity and buy the worker'.

Instead of the natural relationship between leader and followers, in the capitalist economy, the relationship between buyer and commodity prevails, which is even worse and more contemptible than the relationship between masters and slaves. Submission to powerful, fearsome, even terrible persons, to tyrants and military leaders, says Nietzsche, is not felt nearly as painfully as this submission to unknown and uninteresting persons, to those magnates of industry: *'In the employer, the worker usually sees only a cunning, exploitative hound of a human being who speculates on all necessity, whose name, figure, custom, and reputation are completely indifferent to him'*.

The manufacturers and large entrepreneurs of commerce lack personal superiority, leadership 'all those forms and insignia of the higher race which first make persons become interesting, if they had the nobility of the aristocracy by birth in their gaze and gesture, there might perhaps be no socialism of the masses'.

Nietzsche even believes that the masses are ready for slavery of any kind, if the higher one above them constantly legitimizes himself as higher, as born to

command through noble form. The basest man feels that nobility cannot be improvised and that in it he must honor the fruit of a long time. For Nietzsche, therefore, it is not exploitation that is the worst, but the unworthy appearance of the exploiter. It is not against masters, but it is against such masters that the masses revolt, that the worker defends himself.

'... the absence of the higher form and the notorious vulgarity of manufacturers with red fleshy hands bring him to the idea that only chance and luck have raised one above the other here: Well then, he concludes to himself, let us try chance and luck! Let us throw the dice! And socialism begins' (The Gay Science, Book 1, Aphorism 40. Vol. 10, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Why does Nietzsche despise the Marxist as well as the bourgeois parties? They are the same with reversed signs.

'... the two opposing parties, the socialist and the nationalist, or whatever the names may be in different European countries, are worthy of each other' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 480, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

And he calls out to the bourgeoisie:

'Live as higher men and continually perform deeds of higher culture thus everything that lives will concede your right, and the order of society, of which you are the apex, will be secured against every evil glance and attack!' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 480, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche still sees possibilities for the bourgeoisie to atone for its guilt, establish social peace, and avoid revolution. First, however, the bourgeoisie must change its attitude and way of life. The bourgeoisie still has a means of not provoking Marxism, namely, to live moderately and frugally themselves, to prevent the display of any opulence as much as possible, and to come to the aid of the state when it heavily taxes all that is superfluous and luxurious.

'You do not want these means? Then, you rich bourgeois, who call yourselves 'liberal', just admit it to yourselves, it is your own heart's disposition which you find so terrible and threatening in the Socialists, but in yourselves you consider it inevitable, as if it were something different there. If you, as you are, did not have your wealth and the worry about its preservation, this disposition of yours would make you Socialists: only possession separates you from them. *You must first conquer yourselves if you want to conquer in any way over the enemies of your prosperity'*.

And this prosperity is not real well-being! Otherwise, it would not be so external and provoking envy, but more communicative, equalizing, and helpful. It is precisely the inauthentic and theatrical nature of these life joys that creates the feeling of opposition and thus of envy instead of a feeling of fulfillment and elevation of power. The lack of inner greatness, these ostentatious externalities, *‘these are the poisonous spreaders of that people's disease, which now as socialist heart's grief communicates itself ever more quickly to the masses but has its first seat and breeding ground in you. And who could now stop this plague?’* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions, Fragment 304. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The liberal bourgeoisie, however, remained deaf and blind to the Marxist world danger, incapable even of this preventive and defensive struggle. And so it happens that the philosopher of hierarchy ranks the worker higher than the bourgeois. Nietzsche senses the future power slumbering in the working class.

‘The workers shall one day live as the bourgeois do now; but above them, distinguished by their lack of needs, the higher caste: thus, poorer and simpler, yet in possession of power’.

‘Workers shall learn to feel like soldiers. An honorarium, a salary, but no payment!’

And Nietzsche demands the principle of performance: *‘No relationship between payment and performance! Rather, the individual, according to his kind, should be placed so that he can achieve the highest that lies within his scope’* ([9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], Erstes Buch, 9[34]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), also in (F. Nietzsche, 2008).

6. Revolution

Nietzsche does not see the first cause of the epidemic-like spread of that ‘socialist heart's grating’ in the working class, but in liberal bourgeoisie it has ‘its seat and breeding ground’. All complaints about the licentiousness of the masses fall heavily back on the educated; *‘the mass is just as good and as evil as the educated are’*. It shows itself to be evil and licentious to the extent that the educated show themselves licentious; *‘one goes before it as a leader, one may live as one wishes; one elevates or corrupts it, according to whether one elevates or corrupts oneself’* ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [18=M I 1. September 1876], 18[26]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The degeneration of the rulers and the ruling classes has caused the greatest mischief in history. Degeneration always takes its origin from the ruling classes. The decadence of the bourgeoisie first makes Marxism possible, only a degenerate Roman Empire could succumb to Christianity.

‘Without the Roman Caesars and Roman society, Christianity would not have come to power. When doubt befalls the lesser men as to whether there are higher men, then the danger is great!’ ([Fragmente 1884–1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[344]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Through all the masks and apparent forces of his time, Nietzsche sees this danger:

‘The revolution is not to be avoided at all, and indeed the atomistic one’ (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, III, 4)(F. Nietzsche, 2016), he writes more than fifty years ago.

The danger is intensified by the ‘use of the revolutionary idea in the service of a selfish stateless money aristocracy’ (Early Greek philosophy, The Greek State, Preface to an Unwritten Book, 1871. Vol. 2, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The democratic movement makes the inheritance of the Christian one, writes Nietzsche. Yet democracy is only a transition. This ideology will be further exaggerated to its ultimate consequences. Following the *‘clumsy philosopher-fools and brotherhood enthusiasts’*, the *‘peacefully industrious democrats and revolution ideologues’* come the terrorists, anarchist ideology is followed by anarchist action, intellectual crime is followed by political crime. For the more impatient, sick, and addicted of that insane ideology, the democratic tempo has long been too sleepy, they urge action, *‘this is evidenced by the ever more frenzied howling, the ever more unveiled baring of teeth of the anarchist dogs, which now roam through the streets of European culture’* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 5, The Natural History of Morals, Section 203, Vol. 12 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The Bolshevik state will sweep away the bourgeois states: *‘I know what these states will perish from, from the non-plus-ultra state of the Socialists; I am its opponent, and already in the present state I hate it’* ([Fragmente 1880–1882], [6=N V 4. Herbst 1880], 6[377]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche sees the whole danger. The liberal and capitalist bourgeoisie falls prey to anarchy! Anarchy turns into Bolshevik despotism. Dynastic despotism is followed by liberalism, equality democracy, this is followed by Marxist anarchy, and at the end stands despotism again.

Before Nietzsche's gaze, the Soviet-Jewish Cheka state emerges from the chaos: He describes Marxism as the fantastic younger brother of the almost defunct despotism; Marxism needs an abundance of state power such as only despotism has ever had, *‘indeed it surpasses all past by aiming at the formal annihilation of the individual’*: the individual appears to Marxism as an

unjustified luxury of nature and it wants to transform it into an expedient organ of the community: *'Marxism requires the most subservient prostration of all citizens before the absolute state, as nothing like it has ever existed before'*.

It can no longer even count on the old religious piety towards the state, because it must involuntarily continue to work on the elimination of religion. Therefore *'it can only hope for existence for short periods here and there through the most extreme terrorism. Therefore, it secretly prepares reigns of terror and drives the word 'justice' like a nail into the head of the semi-educated masses to completely deprive them of their reason...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 473, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

7. Judaism and Marxism

For Nietzsche, 'socialist' and 'socialism' always stand for Marxist and Marxism. To what extent his doctrine contains or does not contain a socialist community attitude, a Germanic socialism, I will show under 'Individual and Community'.

Here it suffices to state that he fiercely combats Marxism in all its premises and conclusions, but that Nietzsche, despite or precisely because of this, stands on the side of the worker struggling for honor and justice; against the liberal bourgeoisie!

The greatest aspect of this critique of Marxism is Nietzsche's unique thinking in relationships. He was the first to expose with uncanny consequence the inner kinship between Christianity, equality democracy, and Marxism. When he calls Christianity 'emancipated Judaism' and judges of Marxism:

'They must be degenerate humans or races who devise such a doctrine' (The Will to Power, First Book, European Nihilism, II. Concerning the history of European Nihilism, Signs of Increasing Strength, Section 125. Vol. 14, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909), the value-based recognition is complemented by the racial one, the Jewish substratum of these 'ideas' is discovered. We owe to Nietzsche the recognition of the life-threatening Judaization of values in the Nordic-Germanic cultural sphere.

V. War

1. Soldierhood

Nietzsche is a philosopher of culture. But he has nothing in common with bloodless 'aestheticism'. His life and his teaching are the will to struggle and power. At the height of his philosophy, culture and politics, spirit and power become unified.

The young Nietzsche was an eager recruit. For the war of 1870/71, the philosopher and university

teacher volunteered. However, his Swiss citizenship only allows him to participate as a medical orderly, and Nietzsche fulfills this service with full commitment of his health. The artist and thinker once wrote: *'My 'future', a rigorous polytechnic education. Military service: so that on average every man of the higher classes is an officer, whoever else he may be...'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888],11[152]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And: *'The future of German culture rests on the sons of Prussian officers'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [36 = W I 4. Juni-Juli 1885], 36[44]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

For Nietzsche, soldierhood is not just something military-technical. He affirms the soldierly as a way of life. Especially to those who have misunderstood Nietzsche's fight against Christian morality and believe he preaches licentiousness and mere instinctuality, it must be said that Nietzsche, in life and teaching, has always upheld the moral values of soldierhood, bravery, self-control, and manly discipline. The soldierly is not limited to the military for him:

'What remains most desirable under all circumstances is hard discipline at the right time... The same discipline makes the military man and the scholar proficient: and, on closer inspection, there is no proficient scholar who does not have the instincts of a proficient military man in his body. Being able to command and again to obey in a proud manner; to stand in rank and file, but capable of leading at any time; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh the permitted and the forbidden with a grocer's scale; to be more of an enemy to the petty, the cunning, the parasitic than to the evil' (Will to Power, Book 4, Discipline and Breeding, I. The Order of Rank, 2. The strong and the weak, section 912. Vol. 15, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche has great hopes for Europe that masculine virtues will be bred again because one lives in constant danger. *'Universal conscription'* is already today the peculiar antidote to the effeminacy of democratic ideas ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [34=N VII 1. April-Juni 1885], 34[203]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This even justifies the military state for him: *'The maintenance of the military state is the last means of all to either adopt or maintain the great tradition with respect to the supreme type of man, the strong type'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[407]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And Zarathustra calls out: *'My brothers in war! I love you from the very heart, I am and was your equal... And if you cannot be saints of knowledge, then, I pray you, be at least its warriors. They are the companions and forerunners of such saintship. Your nobility should be obedience! Your commanding itself should be obeying!'* *'War and courage have done more great*

things than charity...' *'It is the good war that hallows every cause'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, X, War and Warriors, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

One sentence outlines Nietzsche's position quite unambiguously: *'My starting point is the Prussian soldier'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [29=U II 2. Sommer-Herbst 1873], (29[119]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

2. War and Culture

Especially in the writings between crisis and recovery, there are statements which have been interpreted as hostility towards war and politics in favor of spirit and culture. But only the superficial reader can miss what Nietzsche has in mind here, namely the power politics of liberal patriotism. Where Nietzsche's emphasis lies, however, is shown clearly enough by the following passages:

He calls war a remedy for peoples becoming weak and wretched, if they absolutely wanted to continue living: War would be the brutality cure for the consumption of peoples. The eternal wanting-to-live and not-being-able-to-die would itself already be a sign of senility. In contrast: *'The more fully and ably one lives, the more ready one is to risk one's life for a single good feeling. A people that lives and feels in this way has no need for wars'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, The Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 187. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

To the disadvantage of war, it must be said: it makes the victor stupid and the vanquished malicious. In favor of war: it barbarizes in both of the aforementioned effects and thereby makes more natural: War is *'for culture a sleep or a winter, man emerges from it stronger for good and evil'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, A Glance at the State, Fragment 444. Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

It should be noted that Nietzsche's time did not yet know the horrors of modern warfare, the material battles, gas warfare, the war of poisons and machines.

He calls it mere enthusiasm and beautification to expect much (or even: even more) from humanity when it has unlearned how to wage wars. For the time being, there are no other means by which peoples becoming weak *'could be communicated that rough energy of the field camp, that deep impersonal hatred, that murderer's cold-bloodedness with good conscience, that common organizing ardor in the destruction of the enemy, that proud indifference to great losses, to one's own existence and that of friends, that dull earthquake-like shaking of the soul as strongly and surely as every great war does...'* *'Such a highly cultivated and therefore necessarily languid humanity as that of present-day*

Europeans requires not only wars but the greatest and most terrible wars, thus temporary relapses into barbarism, in order not to lose their culture and their existence to the means of culture' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A Glance at the State, Aphorism 477, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'The terrible energies, what one calls evil, are the cyclopean architects and roadbuilders of humanity' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Fifth Division, Signs of High and Lower Culture, Aphorism 246, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

It is thanks to Napoleon, and not at all to the French Revolution, which was out for 'fraternity' between peoples and general flowery exchange of hearts, that now a few warlike centuries might follow one another, which would have no equal in history, in short, that we have entered the classical age of war, of learned and at the same time popular war on the largest scale (of means, talents, discipline). Napoleon *'may be credited with having made man in Europe master again over the merchant and the philistine...'* (The Gay Science, Book Fifth, We Fearless One, fragment 362. Vol. 10. 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Not liberalism educates for freedom but war. Freedom comes from victory, from overcoming, from strength. War is the educator to strength and thus to freedom, for: *'One must need to be strong, otherwise one will never become it...'* (Twilight of the Idols, Chapter III: Morality as Anti-Nature, section 6, fragment 33) (F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

'A society that definitively and by instinct rejects war and conquest is in decline: it is ripe for democracy and the shopkeeper spirit...' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[192], Begriff, Egoismus) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Paradise is under the shadow of swords', also a symbol and tally-word by which souls of noble and warlike descent betray and discover themselves ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[19]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

3. Disarmament

Nietzsche does not want unrealistic war enthusiasm. He knows both the inevitability and the damages of war. When he affirms war as a brutality cure for languishing peoples, there is clearly the aforementioned limitation alongside: *'The more fully and ably one lives, the more readily one is prepared to give up life for a single good feeling. A people that lives and feels this way has no need for wars...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and His Shadow, Fragment 187. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W.

Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche's judgment on war would certainly have become more cautious had he experienced the World War and anticipated the subhuman weapons and effects of the total war of the future.

Once he warns of the biological counter-selection of war. The greatest disadvantage of the now so glorified mass armies consisted in the burial of people of the highest civilization; only through the favor of all circumstances had these grown, how sparingly and anxiously should one therefore deal with them, since it takes great periods of time to create the accidental conditions for the production of such delicately organized brains! But as the Greeks raged in Greek blood, so the Europeans now in European blood: Relatively most often, the most highly educated were always sacrificed, those who guaranteed a rich and good posterity: *'such namely stand at the forefront of the battle as commanders and moreover, because of their higher ambition, expose themselves most to dangers...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Fifth Division, Signs of High and Lower Culture, Aphorism 442, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Peculiarly divergent appears that passage where Nietzsche glosses the armament policy: No government now admits that it maintains the army to satisfy occasional desires for conquest; but it should serve for defense. That morality which approves self-defense would be invoked as its advocate. But this means reserving morality for oneself and immorality for the neighbor, because he must be thought of as lustful for attack and conquest if our state should necessarily think of the means of self-defense. It is as if Nietzsche had oriented himself on the French security complex.

He sees only one (albeit utopian) way to disarmament: ... To make oneself defenseless, while one was the more defensible, out of a height of feeling, that would be the means to real peace: *'which must always rest on a peace of disposition: while the so-called armed peace ... is the unpeace of disposition...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and His Shadow, Fragment 284. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

While German *'politicians'* up to the present day took disarmament conferences seriously, Nietzsche writes fifty years ago: *'Our liberal people's representatives lack, as is known, time to reflect on the nature of man: otherwise, they would know that they work in vain when they work for a 'gradual reduction of the military burden'...'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and His Shadow,

Fragment 284. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

To overcome the 'unpeace of disposition' through a 'peace of disposition' is also the aim of the Führer's peace policy.

4. Power and Right

Through National Socialist education, much has become self-evident to us that Nietzsche called out to a deaf age half a century ago. Yet terrible sacrifices were demanded by that decades-long school of facts, which led us back to insights such as those contained in Nietzsche's thoughts on power and right.

'In itself, truth is by no means a power, whatever the beautifying enlightener may be accustomed to say to the contrary, truth must rather draw power to its side or align itself with power, otherwise it would perish again and again!' (Daybreak: Fifth Book, Truth needs power, fragment 535. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'More natural is our position in political matters: we see problems of power against another quantum of power. We do not believe in a right that does not rest on the power to assert itself: we perceive all rights as conquests...' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[53]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

According to Nietzsche, it belongs to the concept of the living that it must grow, that it must extend its power and consequently must absorb foreign forces into itself. Under the befuddlement by moral narcosis, one speaks of a right of the individual to defend itself; in the same sense one might speak of its right to attack, for both, and the second even more than the first, are necessities for every living thing: the aggressive and the defensive egoism are not matters of choice or even of *'free will'* but the fatality of life itself.

'At least a people might with just as much good sense designate its need for conquest, its power-lust, whether by means of arms, trade, traffic, and colonization, as a right, as a right to 'grow', perhaps...' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[192], Begriff 'Egoismus') (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

5. Heracliteanism

The Nietzsche connoisseur senses that Nietzsche uses the words warrior and war primarily symbolically. At the deepest level, he wants a combative attitude towards life. In this sense, he was a warrior at every moment of his life. His creative work is struggle, with cutting antitheses he launches attack after attack, he is at war with all the great intellectual powers of his time. One of his early writings is already devoted to Homer's Contest, here his philosophy of power, of the eternal justice of struggle, is already germinating, which he completes 15 years later in The Will to Power.

And the idea of the *Will to Power* overtakes him in the midst of the raging Franco-Prussian War, as he watches German regiments storm past: Nietzsche is the thinker of power, of struggle, of the ‘*wrestling match for the use of power*’ and thus the philosopher of the political. [Note in the original edition: ‘*Regarding battle, confronting death, splendid in their vitality, in their fighting spirit, and fully the expression of a race that wishes to conquer, rule, or perish*’, Förster-Nietzsche ‘The Solitary Nietzsche’ p. 430 of the German edition (Förster-Nietzsche & Cohn, 1915)].

6. Visions of World War

In the midst of the saturated busyness of bourgeois society in the 80s, Nietzsche screamed his threat of the coming war and earthquake of the whole world:

‘I promise a tragic age: the highest art in saying yes to life, tragedy, will be reborn when humanity has behind it the consciousness of the hardest but most necessary wars, without suffering from it...’ (Ecce Homo, Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘...there will be wars such as there have never been on earth. Only from me on is there great politics on earth’ (Ecce Homo, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

A war of all peoples has since then stirred up the earth. Seemingly ended militarily, the struggle continues unstopably as a war of worldviews, as a war of ideas, the world war of values rages on, only now are the fronts forming and no peace is in sight.

VI. Jews

1. Personal

Nowhere do the contrasts and commonalities between Nietzsche and the National Socialist present emerge more clearly than in the position on Jewry. His greatness against the times, but also his uncertainty through the times, is strikingly evident here.

Personal fate unmistakably influences his judgments. Anti-Semites become enemies, Jews become ‘friends’ and ‘pioneers’ of his philosophy. Wagner and the Bayreuth circle are opponents of Jews. His publisher Schmeitzner is a known anti-Semite and brings Nietzsche’s works into danger of falling victim to the hatred, mockery, and silent treatment *by the already overpowering Jewish press*. Förster, his sister’s husband, is publicly suspected as an ‘anti-Semite chief’. Overbeck’s ‘warnings’. That contemporary anti-Semitism, which he himself rejects, endangers his works [Note in the original edition: ‘*The entire press has silenced my poetry to death since then...*’, E. Förster-Nietzsche ‘The Solitary Nietzsche’ p. 345-6 of the German Edition (Förster-Nietzsche & Cohn, 1915)].

Among Nietzsche’s temporarily closest ‘friends’, on the other hand, appear the not unambiguous ‘Russian’ Lou Salomé and the very ambiguous ‘Englishman’ Dr. Rée, of whom Nietzsche writes that he said no to his book (‘The Origin of Moral Sentiments’) as to no other, but whose harmfulness Nietzsche’s nobility prevented him from fully recognizing.

Jews, traders and brokers even in the most spiritual matters, with an innate instinct for opportunity, become ‘pioneers’ of Nietzsche’s philosophy. George Brandes is the first to read Nietzsche in Copenhagen. Maximilian Harden and Leo Berg take sides for Nietzsche. One could rank them among the ‘*apes of Zarathustra*’, were this not too harmless for the confusing and disintegrating side effect of these ‘pioneers’. Though Nietzsche thinks from the highest independence and freedom in decisive valuations, his attacks against anti-Semitism are undoubtedly influenced by personal influences, anti-Semitic enemies and Jewish ‘friends’.

2. Anti-Anti-Semitic

What Nietzsche primarily attacks in anti-Semitism is today mostly overcome. It is the historical anti-Semitism of confessional, social, or economic form, which lacks the modern biological justification, especially the anti-Semitism of mere negation: *The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for having spirit, and money. The anti-Semites, a name for the unsuccessful* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[182]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And he calls those anti-Semites the newest speculators in idealism, who today roll their eyes in a Christian-Aryan-bourgeois manner and seek to excite all the bovine elements of the people through an exhausting abuse of the cheapest means of agitation, the moral attitude (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Dritte Abhandlung: was bedeuten asketische Ideale?, 26) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

The fight against Eastern European Jewry is affirmed. Nietzsche believes that German and Jewish interests must converge here and that it is ‘*time, indeed high time*’ for this ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [41=W I 5a. August–September 1885], 41[13]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche is influenced by the Lamarckian view that the remaining Jews could be absorbed through assimilation. He writes as early as 1887 that German blood has difficulty coping with the existing ‘*quantity of Jew*’, and the demand for ‘*no more new Jews*’ commands the future of racial preservation. However, for the existing Jews, whom he describes as ‘*the toughest, most tenacious and purest race in present-day Europe*’, he recommends absorption, with all caution and selection, as the English nobility does it (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 251,

Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Once, he attempts to be fairer to the anti-Semites. It is acknowledged that among them, capable, strong-willed characters are fighting; all the more reason why anti-Semitism would be harmful, as it wastes and poisons so much capable strength, and precisely for this reason he would combat it. Yet he would only wage wars where he could not despise [**Note in the original edition:** Cf. E. Förster-Nietzsche, *The Solitary Nietzsche*, p. 247 of the German edition (Förster-Nietzsche & Cohn, 1915)].

Opposed to an anti-Semitism not biologically founded stands the Lamarckian misconception of possible Jewish assimilation. This becomes decisive for Nietzsche's position on anti-Semitism, beyond all personal and other influences.

3. Assimilation

The revolutionary significance of modern heredity theory is emphatically evident here. Nietzsche's Lamarckian predisposition leads him to underestimate anti-Semitism, hope for Jewish emancipation, and is partly the cause of a supra-ethnic European conception. We know that even a Lagarde and even a Chamberlain also harbored hopes of assimilation, as they too lacked modern hereditary biological research findings.

Nietzsche clearly sees the importance of the Jewish question at every moment. Equally, the certainty that its decision in Europe is imminent. He compares the situation to that in Egypt, praises the Jews for their 1800-year adaptation in Europe, their prudence and cunning, their bravery under the guise of wretched submission, their family marriage customs, their human experience, etc. They knew that Europe would *'one day fall into their hands like a ripe fruit'*. Intermarriage with the nobility could change the repulsive submissive manners, all Jewish abilities should flow into spiritual people and works, and then one could hope that the eternal revenge of Judah would turn into the eternal blessing of Europe (Daybreak, Third Book, The people of Israel, fragment 205, Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'As soon as it is no longer about conserving nations, but about breeding a European mixed race as strong as possible, the Jew is just as useful and desirable as an ingredient as any other national remnant', although the dangerous aspects of Judaism would be particularly deterrent and *'the young stock exchange Jew is the most repulsive invention of the human race'* (Human, All Too Human, A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Fifth Division, Signs of High and Lower Culture, Aphorism 475, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The goal of a European mixed race as a master race, which is biologically irresponsible today, must always be presupposed if one wants to understand Nietzsche's leap towards Jewish assimilation and not to suspect the greatest contradictions here (see 'Race', 'Europe', etc.). Nietzsche not only wanted this European racial mixing but also considered it unstoppable. Under this assumption, his advocacy of assimilation and the fight against anti-Semitism gain inner necessity, just as our fight against racial mixing inevitably requires the isolation of Judaism.

4. The Nature of the Jew

What Nietzsche says favorably about Judaism almost always stems from some fighting position against the anti-Semites of his time or from his European conception. But where he speaks freely about the Jew in himself, he judges with cutting sharpness and, as always, anticipating the present. Above all, the hypothesis of Arno Schickedanz appears here in embryonic form, that the Jews are neither a people nor a race but the human counter-race, the parasites of the human species.

Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes the Jew's inability to represent, to have proud affects, to be chivalrous, his absolute unpleasantness. He always distinguishes between ancient and modern Jews, the Israelites of antiquity and the Jews of today, which is again so essential for the Schickedanz hypothesis [**Note in the original edition:** Cf. Arno Schickedanz: 'Social Parasitism in the Life of Nations'].

'The dangers of the Jewish soul are: 1. It likes to nest parasitically somewhere, 2. It knows how to adapt, as naturalists say: they have thus become born actors, like the polyp, which, as Theognis sings, borrows the color from the rock on which it stands. Their talent and even more the inclination and fall towards both seem to be enormous...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [36=W I 4. Juni-Juli 1885], 36[43]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

As for the Jews, that people of the art of adaptation par excellence, one might see in them... a world-historical arrangement for the breeding of actors, a veritable 'actor breeding ground'... *'Also, the Jew as a born man of letters, as the actual ruler of the European press, exercises his power on the basis of his acting ability...'* (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Fünftes Buch, Wir Furchtlosen, 361, Vom Probleme des Schauspielers) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

The parallel between Nietzsche and Schickedanz in the distinction between Jews and Israelites has already been alluded to. In the 'Anti-Christ', which is equally the 'Anti-Jew', Nietzsche shows this in glaring illumination [**Note in the original edition:** Schickedanz writes: *'In a parallel process, Judaism gradually emerges from the individual Semitic tribes and the forming Israelite people, through continuous crossbreeding with the absorbed population*

of Palestine, first slowly, then ever more rapidly and distinctly. The gradual racial mixing, which took place over a long succession of generations, is simultaneously the most profound difference between Judaism and the 'Israelite family' from which it crystallized through the absorption of the most diverse blood. Through the Jewish elements in the priesthood, Judaism gradually assumed leadership over the racial mixture in Palestine, from which it replenished itself. And from then on, the 'Jewish chosenness' is progressively legally regulated, until it finally finds its complete expression and conclusion through Ezekiel and the high priests following him in the Talmud, as well as in the Shulchan Aruch' ('Social Parasitism in the Life of Nations', p. 88 f. of the German edition)].

With the 'Law', with the 'chosenness', the Jewish bastardization product sets itself apart from the environment. Nietzsche sees the same process in his own way: 'the concept of God falsified, the concept of morality falsified: the Jewish priesthood did not stop there... these priests accomplished that wonder of falsification, of which a good part of the Bible lies before us as its document...' (The Anti-Christ, A Curse on Christianity, section 26) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

This Jewish priesthood Nietzsche calls verbatim: 'A parasitic type of man, which thrives only at the expense of all healthy formations of life...'

With this, the nature of parasitism is already outlined. '... in all natural occurrences of life... the holy parasite appears to denaturalize them... what has no value in itself is made fundamentally worthless, contrary to value, by the parasitism of the priest...' (The Anti-Christ, A Curse on Christianity, section 26) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

One need only substitute 'Jew' for 'priest' (priest is essentially the potentiated Jew here) and it becomes clear, if not the equality, then at least the kinship in the assessment of the origin of Judaism.

'On such a falsified ground, where every nature, every natural value, every reality had the deepest instincts of the ruling class against it, Christianity grew up...' (The Anti-Christ, A Curse on Christianity, section 27) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

Schickedanz sees in the Jew an artificial product, incapable of nourishing and defending itself naturally. And compare this with Nietzsche: 'The Jews make the attempt to assert themselves, after having lost two castes, that of the warriors and that of the farmers...' (Beyond Good and Evil, Ch. 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 251, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

He writes of the 'absolutely apolitical Jewish society' and calls their condition 'a parasitic existence

within the Roman order of things' (Will to Power, Book 2, a criticism of the highest values that have prevailed hitherto. I. Criticism of Religion. 2. Concerning the History of Christianity, section 204. Vol. 14, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche demonstrates this acuity about the nature and origin of Judaism also in relation to the power of contemporary Jewry.

Even the young Nietzsche warns of the 'truly international money hermits'... who, with their natural lack of state instinct, had learned to use politics as a means for the stock exchange and to misuse state and society as apparatuses for their own enrichment...'. At a glance, he sees the connection between finance capital and Bolshevism and names as the 'most dangerous characteristic of the political present' the 'use of the revolutionary idea in the service of a selfish stateless money aristocracy' (Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern. 3. Der griechische Staat) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), ([Fragments 1869–1874], 10=Mp XII 1c. Anfang 71], Fragment einer erweiterten Form der 'Geburt der Tragödie' 10[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And a decade and a half later, he writes, as already quoted, about these Jewish 'big financiers': 'They know how to be powerful wherever there is power...' (Will to Power, Book 4, Discipline and Breeding, I. The Order of Rank, 2. The strong and the weak, section 864. Vol. 15) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

And 'That the Jews, if they wanted to, or if one forced them to, as the anti-Semites seem to want, could now already have the upper hand, indeed quite literally the dominion over Europe, is certain!' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 251, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

5. Anti-Semitism of Values

Nietzsche's gigantic struggle against Christianity is fundamentally the most fanatical attack on Jewish values. He aims at the 'priest'. But it is the Jew who is hit. This 'priest' is mostly a stylized, typified Jew. These priestly values are essentially Jewish values.

Nietzsche views the history of morality as a struggle between master values and slave values, between master races and slave races. The Jews are the bearers of slave morality. The Nordic race is the bearer of master morality. While this typification of morality must be exaggerated, even false, the crucial point is that Nietzsche senses in the struggle between 'master morality' and 'slave morality' the greatest drama of history: the world struggle of the Nordic race against the Jewish counter-race.

'It was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good, noble, powerful, beautiful, happy, beloved of God) and to hang on to this inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence)...'

'...One knows who inherited this Jewish inversion...' (Christianity, Democratism, Marxism).

For Nietzsche, the slave revolt in morality begins with the Jews: that revolt which has a two-thousand-year history behind it, and which is only out of our sight today because it was victorious (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 7) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

'The Jews, a people 'born for slavery', as Tacitus and the whole ancient world say, 'the chosen people among the peoples', as they themselves say and believe, the Jews have accomplished that miracle of inversion of values'.

The Jewish prophets had fused the concepts of 'rich', 'godless', 'evil', 'violent', 'sensual' into one and for the first time used the word 'world' as a term of abuse: *'In this inversion of values (to which it belongs to use the word 'poor' as synonymous with 'holy' and 'friend') lies the significance of the Jewish people: with them begins the slave revolt in morality'* (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft, 195) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Once again, it should be remembered with what certainty Nietzsche anticipates the most modern hypothesis about the nature and origin of Judaism, parasitism, the inorganic origin. And Nietzsche forces the anti-Jewish struggle up into the realm of value philosophy.

The Jews are the most remarkable people in world history because, when faced with the question of being and non-being, they preferred being with a completely uncanny consciousness at any price: this price was the radical falsification of all nature, all naturalness, all reality, the whole inner world as well as the outer. They set themselves apart from all conditions under which a people could previously live, might live; they created out of themselves a counter-concept to natural conditions.

The Jews had, in turn, irreparably reversed religion, cult, morality, history, psychology into contradiction to natural values. The Christian church was only a copy of this revaluation of values and devaluation of nature. With all the force of his language, Nietzsche accuses:

'The Jews are, precisely because of this, the most fateful people in world history: in their after-effect, they have made humanity so false that even today the Christian can feel anti-Jewish without understanding himself as the last Jewish consequence' (Der Antichrist, Fluch auf das Christentum, 24) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The unprecedentedly dramatic portrayal of the struggle of Jewish values against the natural values of the master race is among the most powerful in Nietzsche's literature.

Ancient Rome had felt in the Jew the unnatural itself, as it were its antipodal monster; in Rome, the Jew was considered *'convicted of hatred against the whole human race'*... But Rome had succumbed to Judah, Jewish values triumphed over the ancient ones. *'Consider,'* Nietzsche exclaims, *'before whom one bows today in Rome, and not only in Rome, but almost on half the earth, everywhere man wants to become tame, before three Jews, as is known, and one Jewess, before Jesus, Peter, Paul and Mary. This is very remarkable: Rome has undoubtedly succumbed'* (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 16) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

Everything that had been done out of hatred against the 'noble,' the 'mighty,' the 'masters,' the 'power-holders' would not be worth mentioning compared to what the Jews had done against them; the Jews, that priestly people, had finally known how to obtain satisfaction against their enemies and conquerors only through a radical revaluation of their values, thus through an act of spiritual revenge (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 7) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

The Renaissance was the rebirth of ancient values. But the Reformation had not only saved the Catholic Church, but also helped the Christian-Jewish values to victory again. The Jewish values had triumphed even more in the Revolution of 1789!

'In a more decisive and deeper sense than at that time, Judaea once again came to victory over the classical ideal with the French Revolution...' (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 16) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

The victory of Jewish values has separated Europe from antiquity:

'... the whole work of the ancient world in vain: I have no word that expresses my feeling about something so monstrous... What for Greeks? What for Romans?... the whole ghetto-world of the soul suddenly on top' (Der Antichrist, Fluch auf das Christentum, 59) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Judaism was never more sharply attacked. A factual appreciation of this struggle is not possible within the scope of this writing. Here only hints are possible. Just as the Jews were to be the leaders of Marxism, but themselves experienced world domination, as they decomposed racial ties everywhere, but themselves pursued ruthless racial politics, so for Judaism all decadence movements are only means to a Jewish end.

'Psychologically calculated, the Jewish people is a people of the toughest life-force, which, placed under impossible conditions, voluntarily, out of the deepest wisdom of self-preservation, takes the side of all decadence-instincts, not as dominated by them, but because it recognized in them a power with which one can assert oneself against the 'world'. The Jews are the counterpart of all decadents: they have known how to put themselves at the head of all decadence-movements with a non plus ultra of histrionic genius (as Paul's Christianity), to create from them something that is stronger than any yes-saying party of life. Decadence is for the type striving for power in Judaism and Christianity only a means: this type of human has an interest in making humanity sick and in turning the concepts of 'good' and 'evil', 'true' and 'false' into a life-threatening and world-slandering sense' (Der Antichrist, Fluch auf das Christenthum, 24) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

What Marx was for our time, Paul was for Christianity:

'Paul, the flesh-, the genius-become Chandala? Hatred against Rome, against the 'world', the Jew, the eternal Jew par excellence...' (Der Antichrist, Fluch auf das Christenthum, 58) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And Judah has triumphed so much in Europe that, as already shown, *'even today the Christian can feel anti-Jewish without understanding himself as the last Jewish consequence'*. Our schools prove this drastically:

In our schools, says Nietzsche, Jewish history is presented as the sacred one, Abraham means more to us than any person in Greek or German history, and what we feel with David's psalms is as different from what reading Pindar or Petrarch excites in us as homeland is from foreign land. Nietzsche describes this *'train of events of an Asian, very distant and very peculiar race'* and the world-historical irony which *'puts the religion book of a Semitic people into the hands of people of the Indo-Germanic race'*.

It has gone so far that the European already has difficulty feeling the Jewish as alien again.

'Europe has adopted Jewish morality'.

'Europe has allowed an excess of oriental morality to proliferate within itself, as the Jews have conceived and felt it' ([Fragmente 1880–1882], [3=M II 1. Frühjahr 1880], 3[128]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The whole *Antichrist* is the most monstrous, even uncanny accusation that a human has ever raised against the Jews. Nietzsche goes even further; he also sees in Jesus an instrument of Jewish revenge and re-valuation.

'This Jesus of Nazareth, as the incarnate gospel of love, this 'redeemer' bringing bliss and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinners, was he not precisely the seduction in its most uncanny and irresistible form, the seduction and detour to precisely those Jewish values and innovations of the ideal? Hasn't Israel achieved the ultimate goal of its vindictiveness precisely through the detour of this 'redeemer', this apparent adversary and dissolver of Israel?... And could one, on the other hand, out of all refinement of the spirit, conceive of a more dangerous bait? Something that would equal in alluring, intoxicating, stupefying, corrupting power that symbol of the 'holy cross', that gruesome paradox of a 'God on the cross'... Certainly it is at least that sub hoc signo Israel with its revenge and revaluation of all values has so far triumphed again and again over all other ideals, over all nobler ideals' (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 8) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

With this, Nietzsche's attack reaches its climax. He judges entirely politically. Thus, it is unimportant whether Judah actually consciously or even instinctively wants to triumph in values through Jesus; decisive is the result, decisive is only the effect. The fact remains that without the noble figure of the Nazarene, the Western alienation of values is unthinkable. Without Jesus no Paul, but without Paul also no alienation of Europe through Jesus!

Real 'reformers' may rave about a blond and blue-eyed Jesus, decisive is only the fact that the churches propagate Jesus, as far as he is supposed to be 'God', as the son of Jehovah, and insofar as he is supposed to be human, as a Jew! From the snow-capped peak of his value philosophy, Nietzsche measures and judges, and his judgment becomes political in the highest sense. The consequence of the victory of Jewish values is the destruction of races: *'Thus never had a people a world-historical mission'*.

'One may take this victory at the same time as a blood poisoning (it has mixed the races together), I do not contradict; undoubtedly, however, this intoxication has succeeded. The 'redemption' of the human race (namely from the 'masters') is well on its way; everything is visibly becoming Judaized, Christianized, mobbed...' (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 9) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

2000 years of racial waste and racial care of immeasurable harm, this most terrible effect of

Christianity, Nietzsche recognizes it with horrified eyes. And he accuses Judaism of being the cause!

From Judaism, Christianity proliferates, and this destroys in its effects, as a raceless religion, as a carrier of Jewish-nihilistic values, the Nordic-Germanic and clan laws, whose biological wisdom we can hardly grasp today. This becomes the most disastrous drama in the history of the Nordic race. No one has yet raised this accusation against Judaism, and in comparison, all anti-Semitism of his time becomes harmless. Though Nietzsche may overreach reality in some details, though some things may be thought only symbolically or perspectively, his basic insight cannot be overturned, and to bear it becomes a test of spiritual strength.

Nietzsche does not do full justice to contemporary anti-Semitism. Time-bound, Lamarckian influences and a Europe conception presupposing racial mixing lead him to advocate the assimilation of modern Judaism. In his concrete demands, he thus distances himself from the National Socialist solution to the Jewish question. In the background of value philosophy, however, he is the archenemy of Judaism. His accusation is the uncanniest of all accusations against Judah.

VII. Race

1. General

The influence of Gobineau and above all genial instinct lead Nietzsche to the race problem [**Note in the original edition:** Baeumler: *'Nietzsche's critique of morality culminates in a new philosophy of history, which is alluded to in the title 'Genealogy of Morals'. From this work, connecting threads lead backward to Burckhardt's 'Reflections on World History', which Nietzsche heard lectured in Basel. And further to the main historical-philosophical work of Count Gobineau ('Essay on the Inequality of Human Races'), for whom Nietzsche held the highest reverence among all his contemporaries alongside Burckhardt and Taine' (Afterword 'Genealogy of Morals')].*

As a thinker of life and will, he had to encounter the race question. The Greeks are his model in this. *'The Greeks believed in a difference of races'* ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[72]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In them he praises the *'belief in good race'* ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[40]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The antipodes in Nietzsche's racial thinking are the Jews, the counter-race.

As essential as the race question is for National Socialism, so necessary is it, in a political evaluation of Nietzsche, to examine his position on race and heredity in detail.

2. Heredity

From Nietzsche's conception of heredity results his position on the race question, and from this his most essential political conclusions can already be developed.

His concept of nobility is today modern in the best sense: *'There is only nobility by birth, only nobility by blood. Where 'aristocrats of the spirit' are spoken of, there is usually no lack of reasons to conceal something; it is notoriously a favorite word among ambitious Jews. Spirit alone, namely, does not ennoble; rather, it first needs something that ennobles the spirit. What does it need for this? Blood'* (Goethe 03 § 542). ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [41=W I 5a. August-September 1885], 41[3]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Of heredity he says: It would not be possible that a person does not to have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body: whatever appearances may say against it. This is the problem of race. *'... with the help of the best education and cultivation, one will only succeed in deceiving about such an inheritance'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 9, what is Noble? Section 264, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

One may rightly be proud of an uninterrupted line of good ancestors up to the father, but not of the line; for everyone had that. *'The descent from good ancestors constitutes the true nobility of birth; a single interruption in that chain, an evil ancestor therefore, nullifies the nobility of birth'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Fifth Division, Signs of High and Lower Culture, Aphorism 456, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'The type is inherited; a type is nothing extreme, no mere 'stroke of luck'' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[133], *Meine Konsequenzen*) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

At times, Nietzsche is still bound to the Lamarckian tendencies of his time, with their belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics and their milieu theories.

'Heredity a false concept' he writes once.

'Only for what one is have his ancestors paid the costs' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], *Erstes Buch*, 9[45]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This inclination sometimes breaks through, and the breeding goal of a 'superman' and 'lord of the earth' as well as the hope for Jewish assimilation arose in part under Lamarckian assumptions.

Nevertheless, the accent in Nietzsche lies on idiotypic inheritance (idiovariation), and with such sharpness that he surpasses his time unprecedentedly in this as well. Without any knowledge of Mendel's laws, he approaches essential results of today's heredity research.

Against atomism he objects: *'And finally, they have omitted something in the constellation without knowing it, namely the necessary perspectivism, by virtue of which every power center, and not just man, constructs the whole rest of the world from itself, i.e. measures, feels, shapes according to its strength... it is indeed the specific-being that determines the so-and-so acting and reacting, depending on the circumstances'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[186]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Is this not already the beginning of today's hereditary scientific concept of 'reaction predisposition'? He also concerned himself with the problem of reaction and modification breadth. Everything seeks to maintain its type; beings that have external signs that protect them against certain experiences would lose these more if they came under circumstances where they lived without danger... If they inhabited places where the garment ceases to conceal them, they would by no means adapt to the milieu. *'Modification through climate and nutrition: but in truth indifferent'*.

'One claims the growing development of beings. There is no foundation for this. Every type has its [limits]: beyond these there is no development. Up to this point, absolute regularity' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[133]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And against Darwin he writes: The influence of *'external circumstances'* is overestimated to the point of absurdity in Darwin: The essential aspect of the life process is precisely *'the immense shaping, form-creating power from within, which utilizes, exploits the 'external circumstances''* (Fragmente 1885-1887], [7=Mp XVII 3b. Ende 1886 -Frühjahr 1887], 7[25]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And here a concept of heredity is outlined, to which he unfortunately does not always remain faithful: *'Against the doctrine of the influence of milieu and external causes: the inner force is infinitely superior; much that looks like influence from outside is only its adaptation from within. Exactly the same milieus can be interpreted and utilized in opposite ways'* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[175]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

3. Racial Purity and Mixing

As with heredity, Nietzsche does not take a completely unified position on racial mixing. He does

recognize the danger of racial mixing. As a cause for the rise of the democratic order of things, he once mentions the *'blood mixing of masters and slaves'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 9, what is Noble? Section 261, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

He also traces the religions of weariness back to a physiological feeling of inhibition, and this can be of various origins: *'perhaps as a consequence of the crossing of too foreign races (or of classes, classes always express differences in origin and race: the European 'Weltschmerz', the 'pessimism' of the nineteenth century, is essentially the consequence of an irrationally sudden class mixing)'* (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Dritte Abhandlung: was bedeuten asketische Ideale?, 17) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

He once called pessimistic skepticism the most spiritual expression of a certain manifold physiological constitution, of nervous weakness and sickness, which always arises when long-separated races or classes cross in a decisive and sudden manner. In the new generation, which inherits different measures and values in its blood, as it were, everything is unrest, disturbance, doubt, attempt... *'in body and soul there is a lack of equilibrium, center of gravity, perpendicular security...'* The present Europe is to him the result of an *'irrationally sudden attempt at radical class and consequently racial mixing...'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). *'But what becomes most deeply sick and degenerates in such mongrels is the will'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The once so untimely now appears highly timely with this as well. Just as race is not merely something 'physical' for Nietzsche, neither is bastardization. A 'physical' bastardization is to him also a mental-spiritual one.

At the same time, one can already sense here that his concept of race lacks firmness, as he did not have the modern biological findings at his disposal. He wavers and sees the classes racially at times, and the races as classes at other times. Political consequences arise from this.

The following from *Aurora* is very instructive for Nietzsche's concept of race: *'There are probably no pure races, but only races that have become pure, and these in great rarity. The common ones are the crossed races, in which, alongside the disharmony of body forms (e.g., when eye and mouth do not harmonize), disharmonies of habits and value concepts must also be found.'*

Crossed races are always simultaneously crossed cultures, crossed moralities...’.

Purity is the final result of countless adaptations, absorptions, and eliminations. Finally, when the process of purification has succeeded, all that strength which was previously lost in the struggle of disharmonious characteristics is at the disposal of the entire organism: *‘which is why races that have become pure have always become stronger and more beautiful’*.

‘The Greeks give us the model of a race and culture that has become pure: and hopefully a pure European race and culture will also succeed someday’ (Daybreak, Fourth Book, The purification of races, section 272. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Wonderful insights and yet also racially biologically questionable for us today. First, it is questioned whether there are pure races and assumed that there are only races that have become pure. Thus, reverse development. What the concept of race presupposes is seen as the result of a development. The Greeks show precisely the opposite. Racially relatively uniform, they had to deal with foreign-race aborigines and lower strata and succumbed in this struggle of blood and values. Only the first act of this world-historical drama shows the Greeks in their own development.

The hope for an equally pure ‘European race’ then clearly proves how far Nietzsche, in contrast to his concept of heredity developed only in *The Will to Power*, overestimates the possibilities of ‘adaptations, incorporations, and eliminations’. Today we know that a racial purification of our people is not possible in this way, but only through preventing further disintegration of the Nordic-Germanic core of the people and relatively stronger multiplication of the truly German racial element in the sense of the Nordic thought. Thus: not a becoming pure of our race, but the return to former racial uniformity.

This criticism of Nietzsche is, of course, very simple today, in the time of Mendelism, and with rich hereditary biological research results at hand. But no less important for understanding what separates us from Nietzsche and must separate us through his time-boundedness.

In the miserable face of his time, Nietzsche then loses all hope and belief in a national birth policy. He only finds scorn for the beginnings and plans of a racial policy: *‘We are, by race and descent, too manifold and mixed as ‘modern humans’, and consequently little tempted to participate in that mendacious racial self-admiration and inbreeding which today displays itself in Germany as a sign of German disposition and which appears doubly false and indecent in the people of ‘historical sense’* (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Fünftes

Buch, Wir Furchtlosen, 377) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

How much falsehood and swamp are needed to raise racial questions in today’s mixed-up Europe! *‘Why: Not to associate with any person who takes part in the mendacious racial swindle’* ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [5=N VII 3. Sommer 1886–Herbst 1887], 5[52]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche reckons with the destruction of nations. From technical and civilizational progress, he expects *‘a weakening and finally a destruction of nations, at least of the European ones’*, *‘so that from all of them, as a result of continuous crossings, a mixed race, that of the European human, must arise’* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A glance at the State, Aphorism 475, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

He finally demands: *‘The annihilation of the declining races’*. Since he considers racial mixing as given and inevitable, a national racial policy is to him *‘racial swindle’*.

Yet Nietzsche does not resign pessimistically like Gobineau. Above the racial chaos, through breeding and selection, a *‘master race’* is to rise majestically from *‘international kinship associations’*, the future *‘masters of the earth’* ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885–Herbst 1886], 2[57]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016). (More on this under ‘Breeding and Selection’, ‘Europe’, etc.).

But with this, Nietzsche completely departs from a real racial policy. His racial insights do not lead him to an organic concept of the people; the people do not become the starting point of his political conception, but rather the European ‘master race’. Therefore, Nietzsche’s racial thinking has no truly positive consequences for the future. However, his racial interpretation of history and values is magnificent.

4. Classical Philosophy of History

Undoubtedly, Nietzsche is among the precursors of racial historical consideration. He did not systematically process these historical intuitions and by no means drew conclusions from them that could be called National Socialist. *But scattered throughout all his works are statements that may be interpreted as embryonic approaches to a National Socialist philosophy of history* [Note in the original edition: A. Baeumler: *‘Not individuals, but generations, races, peoples, classes and the contrasts between them, the pathos of distance, are for him the starting points of all historical existence’*. See the English translation by J.S.G.-J. (Gómez-Jeria, 2024c)].

Under ‘Jews’, I showed how the Jewish counter-race repeatedly emerges in the background of

the history of slave morality. And to this, Nietzsche always opposes, out of Germanic instinct, the Nordic values of the Greeks, Romans, and Germans. With what admiration does the young Nietzsche look upon the Nordic world of the Greek golden age, on pre-Socratic philosophy, the Greek state, and the heroic age of Homer! From Nordic Persianism, he takes the figure of his Zarathustra [**Note in the original edition:** *'In the end, I had to give honor to a Persian. Persians were the first to think of history as a whole and on a grand scale'* (E. Förster-Nietzsche, *The Solitary Nietzsche*, p. 150 of the German edition (Förster-Nietzsche & Cohn, 1915))].

At every opportunity, he defends the Aryans against the Christians, holding up the Manu Book against the New Testament.

'It is completely in order that we have no religion of oppressed Aryan races: for that is a contradiction: a master race is on top, or it perishes' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[195]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Of the *'strong races of northern Europe'*, he does not understand why they have tolerated the Christian God for so long (Der Antichrist, 19)(F. Nietzsche, 2016). (See also [Fragmente 1887-1889], [17=Mp XVII 4. Mp XVI 4a. W II 8a. W II 9a. Mai-Juni 1888], 17[4], 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The proud Viking, the hero of the old Scandinavian saga, appears to him as the very type of *'noble morality'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 9, what is Noble? Section 260, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

He reproaches Richard Wagner for having falsified Germanic heroes and gods in a Christian manner, *'glancing towards the hero morality, the noble morality (the Icelandic saga is almost its most important document) and at the same time having in their mouths the counter-doctrine, that of the 'gospel of the lowly', of the need for 'redemption'...' (Der Fall Wagner, Ein Musikanten-Problem, Epilog)* (F. Nietzsche, 2016). (See also [Briefe 1888], [Mai 1888], 1041, An Heinrich Köselitz in Venedig) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

[Note in the original edition: A. Bäumler writes on this: *'He (Nietzsche) also speaks of the German style as 'Viking style at its core' (Antichrist) and in his posthumous works there is also a reference to the Vikings... Instead of speaking of Nietzsche's 'Renaissanceism,' one should rather speak of his Germanism, which coincides with his Greek combat ethics and combat metaphysics...' (see the English translation by J.S.G.-J. (Gómez-Jeria, 2024c))].*

Particularly interesting from a racial perspective is the following passage, in which Nietzsche examines how the designations of nobility

simultaneously point to the noble moral values and to the racial characteristics of their bearers.

'In Latin malus ... the common man could be characterized as the dark-colored, above all as the black-haired ('hic niger est'), as the pre-Aryan inhabitant of the Italian soil, who stood out most clearly by color from the dominant blonde, namely Aryan conquering race; at least Gaelic offered me the exactly corresponding case, fin (for example in the name Fin-Gal), the distinctive word of nobility, finally the good, noble, pure, originally the blonde head, in contrast to the dark black-haired aboriginal inhabitants' (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: *'Gut und Böse'*, *'Gut und Schlecht'*, 5) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

In today's Europe, Nietzsche clearly recognizes the de-Nordification and its spiritual and political consequences: *'... essentially, the subjected race has finally regained the upper hand there, in color, shortness of skull, perhaps even in the intellectual and social instincts: who can guarantee to us whether modern democracy, the even more modern anarchism, and especially that inclination for 'Commune', for the most primitive form of society, which is now common to all the socialists of Europe, does not in the main signify a monstrous atavism, and that the conqueror and master race, that of the Aryans, is not physiologically being vanquished?'* (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: *'Gut und Böse'*, *'Gut und Schlecht'*, 5) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b). And that in 1887!

It is unique how he recognizes the decline of the Nordic blood as the cause of the decline of the *'intellectual and social instincts'*.

On the problem of nobility and race: *'At the bottom of all these noble races the beast of prey, the splendid blonde beast prowling about avidly in search of spoil and victory, is not to be mistaken ... Roman, Arab, German, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings, in this need they are all alike ... The profound, icy mistrust which the German provokes as soon as he arrives at power, even at the present time, is always still an aftereffect of that inextinguishable horror with which for whole centuries Europe has regarded the raging of the blonde Germanic beast'* (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: *'Gut und Böse'*, *'Gut und Schlecht'*, 11) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

If one disregards individual exaggerations, his racial historical instinct is astonishing. Nietzsche goes far beyond Gobineau. The *'barbarians'* later become the bearers of the highest culture. *The 'blonde beast' is not a future ideal.* It stands at the beginning of culture. But in these *'barbarians'* slumbers the power for culture. Their opposites are the *'bearers of the oppressive and revenge-seeking instincts'*, the descendants of all European and

non-European slavery, all pre-Aryan population. These are the regression of humanity...

‘One may be perfectly justified in being always afraid of the blonde beast that lies at the base of all noble races and in being on one’s guard: but who would not a hundred times prefer to fear when one can also admire, than to be safe from fear, but thereby eternally condemned to the disgusting sight of the ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned. And is not this our fate?’ (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: ‘Gut und Böse’, ‘Gut und Schlecht’, 11) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

The whole contrast to Rousseau and liberalism speaks from that passage where he describes the origin of states. The Nordic conqueror race is the creator of the state:

‘some pack of blonde beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the ‘state’ began on earth’ (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Zweite Abhandlung: ‘Schuld’, ‘schlechtes Gewissen’ und Verwandtes, 17) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

With the boldness of genius, Nietzsche recognizes history as racial history, sometimes still in time-bound obscurity, then often with a clarity as if he stood in the midst of the present; I quote again: ‘... crossed races are always simultaneously crossed cultures, crossed moralities...’ (Daybreak, Fourth Book, The purification of races, section 272. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

With this, it is recognized that soul and spirit are also racially determined. For ‘the strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, German philosophizing’ Nietzsche seeks racial causes. First, through language kinship, through common grammar... everything is prepared from the outset for a uniform development and sequence of philosophical systems.

‘Likewise, the way seems almost barred to certain other possibilities of world interpretation’.

‘Philosophers of the Ural-Altaic language domain... will with great probability look differently ‘into the world’ and be found on other paths than Indo-Germans or Muslims’ (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 1, Prejudices of Philosophers, Section 20, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The kinship of language and grammar is initially the cause of worldview and philosophical kinship. But the commonality of grammar has its causes in race: ‘the spell of definite grammatical functions is

ultimately the spell of physiological value judgments and racial conditions’ (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 1, Prejudices of Philosophers, Section 20, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Thus, philosophy and worldview are also expressions of race. That is the 20th century!

5. Race and Politics

Nietzsche has ingenious insights into heredity, his Nordic-Germanic basic attitude, his eye for the racial conditionality of history, especially the history of values, is among the greatest things about him. With this, he is closely related to National Socialism despite all time-bound uncertainties and stylistic exaggerations.

In the practical-political conclusions, however, we part ways completely. Nietzsche is fatefully forced into such an opposition to his time that he loses all racial hopes. He fears too advanced bastardization. He even denies the Germans blood relationship with the Germani (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Zweite Abhandlung: ‘Schuld’, ‘schlechtes Gewissen’ und Verwandtes, 13) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

The Aryans in Europe are also ‘*physiologically succumbing*’ (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: ‘Gut und Böse’, ‘Gut und Schlecht’, 5) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b) and therefore Nietzsche denies the possibility of future national racial politics: ‘*How much falsehood and swamp is needed to raise racial questions in today’s mishmash Europe*’ ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [5=N VII 3. Sommer 1886-Herbst 1887], 5[52]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This is apparently a contradiction to Nietzsche’s demand for a new master class, new ‘race’. Also, where he tries to define these ‘lords of the earth’ more closely, he uses Nordic-Germanic elements and values. But, as I will show, Nietzsche still does not want a national-organic racial policy. The term ‘master race’ is actually meant more in terms of class.

National Socialism has at its disposal an unprecedented development of racial research. It shows us the magnitude of the bastardization danger and also points us to the way and hope of racial rebirth. Moreover, between us and Nietzsche stands the World War and its consequences. These historical experiences show that nations and peoples were incomparably stronger than civilizational development and have only put all these ‘advances’ in their service. The National Socialist conclusion from historical and hereditary biological experience is therefore not acceptance of bastardization and creation of a master caste but: Nordicization of the German people.

I hope to have thus exposed the reasons why Nietzsche could not find a positive position towards

people and state. The assumption of an inevitable bastardization of Europe has decisive consequences for his political judgments and goals:

1. He denies people and nationalism,
2. His Europe concept becomes inorganic,
3. Uncertainty in the substantive definition of the state,
4. His breeding and cultivation goals are not nationally bound.

VIII. Breeding and Cultivation

1. Political Significance

A dispute has arisen over whether the racial thinking of the present is indebted to the natural sciences or to ideological-political achievements. That both, natural sciences as well as politics and humanities, and in both areas especially ‘outsiders’, without significant causal connection, thus on separate paths, have arrived at the same result, Nietzsche is proof of this. His time knew no Mendelian laws and was still groping in the colorful mists of Lamarckism. Nevertheless, Nietzsche made racial hygiene, population policy, and breeding demands that belong right in our time and elevate him to the herald of the present and the future in this area as well. Nietzsche recognized above all that these demands are highly political, that politics begins with procreation.

2. Racial Hygiene (Means)

The cultural philosopher writes: ‘*No reflection is as important as that on the heredity of characteristics*’ ([Fragmente 1875–1879], [17=U II 5b. Sommer 1876], 17[28]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

How modern Nietzsche stood on heredity, I showed under ‘Race’. Now his statements and demands: He clearly recognizes the danger of hereditary defects. He fought against alcoholism from youth on. Against criminality, he considers elimination much more important than ‘punishment’.

‘*Against criminals, one should be as against the sick: also, in that one abhors making them propagate. This is the first general improvement of morals that I wish: the sick and the criminal should not be recognized as fit for propagation*’ ([Fragmente 1880–1882], [14=M III 5. Herbst 1881], 14[16]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Ruthlessly and clearly, Nietzsche made present-day demands half a century ago. The criminal should be offered the possibility to make his peace with society: if he does not belong to the race of criminality, i.e., to the born criminals. In the latter case, one should make war on him even before he has done anything hostile: ‘*(first operation, as soon as one has him in one's power: castrate him)*’ ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[50]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche demands even more sharply the elimination of the sick and inferior. Love and marriage should serve the race. ‘*One should not make the*

satisfaction of the drive a practice by which the race suffers... the extinction of many types of humans is just as desirable as any reproduction’.

And with brutal seriousness he calls: ‘*We must put an end to this clumsy frivolity. These geese should not marry! Marriages should become much rarer! Go through the big cities and ask yourselves whether this people should propagate...*’ ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [5=Mp XV 1a. Sommer 1880], 5[38]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

With all harshness, Nietzsche wants to fight against hereditary diseases: ‘*there are cases where a child would be a crime: in chronically ill and neurasthenics of the third degree... Ultimately, society has a duty to fulfill here: there are few such urgent and fundamental demands on it. Society, as the great mandatory of life, has to answer for every failed life before life itself - it also has to atone for it, therefore it should prevent it. Society should prevent procreation in numerous cases: for this purpose, it may, without regard to origin, rank and spirit, keep the harshest coercive measures, deprivations of freedom, under circumstances castrations in readiness. The Bible word 'Thou shalt not kill' is a naivety compared to the life-ban on the decadents: 'You shall not procreate!'... life itself recognizes no solidarity, no 'equal right' between healthy and degenerate parts of an organism: the latter must be cut out or the whole perishes. Compassion with the decadents, equal rights also for the ill-constituted, that would be the deepest immorality, which would be anti-nature itself as morality!*’ ([Fragmente 1887–1889], [23=Mp XVI 4d. Mp XVII 7. W II 7b. Z II 1b. W II 6c. Oktober 1888], 23[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche goes so far as to demand voluntary death as a duty of honor in such cases (Twilight of the Idols, Raids of an Untimely Man, section 36) (F. W. Nietzsche & Polt, 1997).

Those who find this language too fanatical should consider that Nietzsche is writing in a time that hardly knows anything about racial hygiene. That indifference forces Nietzsche to use the glaring language of despair. No thinker before him has preached the politics of procreation so seriously and radically.

As unrelenting as his elimination demands are, so glorious is Nietzsche's will for selection:

‘*In your children you shall make good that you are your fathers' children*’ (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Third Part, LVI, Old and New Tables, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

He again sets the natural goal for marriage: ‘*In marriage in the noble, old noble sense of the word, it is about breeding a race... thus about maintaining a fixed, specific type of ruling humans: to this viewpoint man and*

woman were sacrificed' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [4=D 18. Mp XV 2c. Mp XVII 3a. Mp XVI 1b. Anfang 1886-Frühjahr 1886], 4[6]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The important demands of humans on themselves are to be derived from their relationship to the whole stream of later generations' ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [8=U I 5a. Winter 1870-71-Herbst 1872], 8[92]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche's entire doctrine of the Superman has its origin in the will to enhance life. This is the new morality.

'To create a higher being than we ourselves are, is our essence. To create beyond ourselves! That is the drive of procreation, which is the drive of action and of value... In the purpose lies love, reverence, the vision of perfection, longing' ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [5=Z I 2a. Mp XV 3a. November 1882-Februar 1883] 5[1], 203) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche believes that the marriages of humans should make a god more impatient than anything else. Far could the individual progress, in his seventies, even in his thirty years. It would be astonishing even for gods. But if one then saw that he indeed knew how to acquire, but not how to preserve, how he did not even think about 'that he could prepare an even more victorious life by means of procreation: one would become impatient, because *'nothing can become of humanity in the long run, individuals are squandered, the chance of marriages makes all reason of a great course of humanity impossible'* (Daybreak, Second Book, Purposes ? Will? aphorism 130. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche et al., 1997; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

Here Nietzsche's affinity with the greatest breeding politician of antiquity, Plato, becomes evident. In one place, he gives very concrete suggestions: *'For the future of marriage: An increased tax burden (on inheritances), also increased military service burden for bachelors from a certain age and increasing; advantages of all kinds for fathers who bring plenty of boys into the world: under circumstances a plurality of votes; a medical protocol, preceding every marriage and signed by the community leaders, in which several specific questions must be solemnly answered by the engaged couple and the doctors. ('Family history') Every marriage accounted for and endorsed by a certain number of trusted persons of a community: as a community matter'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [16=W II 7a. Frühjahr-Sommer 1888], 16[35]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The permission to beget children should be granted as a distinction...' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [14=M III 5. Herbst 1881], 14[16]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

[Note in the original edition: Rirdmer comes to the following conclusion: *'Even if Nietzsche erred in*

individual biological questions, the fundamental idea and essence of his philosophy are intimately connected with the principles of racial hygiene' (Archive for Racial and Social Biology, Vol. 17, Issue 4, p. 395)].

In Zarathustra, Nietzsche gives his poetic will in unique beauty. I cannot deny myself quoting these commandments of a future ethic verbatim, even if it seemingly transcends the boundary of the political. Zarathustra preaches the highest meaning of marriage [Note in the original edition: Nietzsche's sister writes: An admirer of my brother once told me that no holy book in the entire world contained such magnificent words about marriage as Zarathustra (E. Förster-Nietzsche: The Solitary Nietzsche, p. 417 of the German edition) (Förster-Nietzsche & Cohn, 1915)]:

'Thus, I want man and woman: the one warlike, the other child-bearing' (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Third Part, LVI, Old and New Tables, 23, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

'This man seemed worthy to me and ripe for the meaning of this earth: but when I saw his wife, the earth seemed to me a madhouse'. 'Indeed, I wished the earth would tremble in convulsions when a saint and a goose mate' (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XX, Child and Marriage, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

'I want your victory and your freedom to long for a child. You shall build living monuments to your victory and your liberation. You shall build beyond yourself. But first you must be built yourself, rectangular in body and soul'.

'Marriage, thus I call the will of two to create the one that is more than those who created it. Reverence for each other, I call marriage, as for the willers of such a will' (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XX, Child and Marriage, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909). *'Not only to propagate yourselves but to elevate yourselves, to that end, O my brethren, may the garden of marriage help you!'* (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XX, Child and Marriage, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909). *'Holy I call such a will and such a marriage'* (Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XX, Child and Marriage, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

3. Breeding Goal

Breeding thoughts dominate Nietzsche's entire philosophy. He remains faithful to this will through all transformations. In his youth, he strived for the creation of genius, then follows the goal of the Übermensch, and thereafter the ruling race, the lords of the earth. Yet underlying this change is a main direction: he always aims at an upper stratum of exceptional humans, never

seeking the breeding enhancement of organic communities, of race or people.

But Nietzsche does not want a ‘spiritual race’, and the superman is by no means just an ‘idea’ in stellar distance [Note in the original edition: Prof. Lenz writes: Why genius should ‘naturally not be hereditary’ and not be ‘cultivable’ is not apparent; on the contrary, all biological facts seem to me to speak in favor of this possibility (Archive for Racial and Social Biology, Vol. 17, Issue 4, p. 437)].

‘To elevate man beyond himself, like the Greeks, not incorporeal phantasm. The higher spirit bound to a weak, nervous character, is to be eliminated ([Fragmente 1882–1884], [9=N VI 2. Mai-Juni 1883], 9[29]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Goal: Higher cultivation of the whole body and not just the brain! ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [9=N VI 2. Mai-Juni 1883], 9[43]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘The problem I pose here is not what shall replace mankind in the sequence of beings (man is an end): but what type of man one should breed, as the more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future’ (Der Antichrist, Fluch auf das Christenthum, 3 and see also [Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[414]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘The great task approaches, inevitably, hesitantly, terrible as fate, how should the earth as a whole be administered? And to what end should ‘man’ as a whole and no longer a people, a race be raised and bred?’ ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[8]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

A decade earlier he writes that one could educate the great individual even differently and higher than it has been educated by chance so far. *There are still hopes: breeding of significant humans* ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[11]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The more Nietzsche sees only bastardization and vulgarization in the masses, the more sharply he demands the countertype: *‘... would it not be timely, the more the type ‘herd animal’ is now being developed in Europe, to make the attempt with a fundamental artificial and conscious breeding of the opposite type and its virtues?’* ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[13]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘The equalization of the European man is a process that cannot be hindered: one should even accelerate it... This equalized species, once achieved, requires a justification: it lies in the service of a higher sovereign species, which stands upon it and can only rise to its task upon it. Not merely a master race whose sole task would be to govern but a race with its own sphere of

life...’ ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[153]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The ultimate and highest breeding goal are the ‘Lords of the Earth’: *‘... the creation of international lineage-associations is made possible, which set themselves the task of breeding a master race, the future ‘Lords of the Earth!’...’* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[57]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

4. Critique

Biological and historical experience proves to us that a thin upper stratum is too greatly endangered. The underpinning, the support is missing, the roots are cut off. Caste-like noble strata are always threatened by external destruction (wars, etc.) or internal decay (decline in births, bastardization). The Antique stands before us as a shocking warning. Therefore, a modern breeding policy must only be directed at natural communities, races, or peoples. Here too, as everywhere, the organic way is also the most purposeful.

But Nietzsche is compelled to this breeding goal of an upper stratum. Because he demands from a false premise: he considers the ‘European equalization’ as inevitable, he fears the destruction of nations, dissolution of peoples, the bastardization of races too far advanced and as Europe’s inescapable fate. Thus, his breeding hopes could only apply to a supranational ruling race. For us, this premise has fallen and with it the conclusion.

Our breeding policy knows only natural and concrete goals and carriers: we know three causes of decline: 1. Reduction of the population, 2. Decrease of the gifted and the healthy, 3. Demise of the essential racial substance. And therefore, we strive for three goals for rebirth: Promotion of healthy and elimination of sick hereditary mass, increase of the population and especially of gifted children, augmentation of Nordic blood: racial hygiene, population policy, and racial policy. The breeding goal and content, however, is the people.

Nietzsche’s breeding will be not limited to influencing procreation. Alongside breeding stands cultivation. And often it seems that under Lamarckian influences, he hopes too much from cultivation. Today, sometimes contrary tendencies emerge. If one used to believe education is everything, today some think hereditary mass is everything. Various biologists are too oriented towards animals and plants and believe they can assume the same conditions for humans. However, humans differ essentially from animals:

1. Through ‘consciousness’, ‘free will’,
2. Through the sense of time, the ‘historical sense’.

Racial policy must take this into account. Through the influences of consciousness, humans have a vastly greater possibility of utilizing the breadth of modification than animals and plants. Thus, the predispositions are modifiable to a much greater extent, through education, self-education, etc., through cultivation and self-cultivation. Humans can consciously and willfully enable, enhance, and direct species-appropriate modifications of the hereditary mass. The individual already has the possibility to direct the modification of their predispositions according to this or that ideal image. And this applies even more to peoples. England, Japan, and above all Jewry are striking examples.

Additionally, humans possess a sense of time. While in animals we consider mutations, the possibility of idiotypic changes, so small that they remain insignificant for normal breeding, this also applies to humans. But in humans, there are, so to speak, historical permanent modifications. Mental-emotional modifications do not change the hereditary predisposition, but through the human sense of time, they affect beyond the individual in the stream of generations. For example, a modification of the *völkisch* hereditary predisposition towards stronger emphasis on soldierly virtues can become a permanent modification in the entire history of a people through the human sense of time. In animals, not only is a similar consciousness influence lacking, but every mobilization also ends in its effect essentially with the individual. Through consciousness and sense of time, humans can live remembering the past or planning in the future, and this gives them an incomparably greater modification duration compared to all other beings.

The National Socialist racial policy standing under the 'Nordic idea' therefore does not limit itself only to improving the hereditary predisposition, but also wants to guide the modification of hereditary predispositions in a species-appropriate manner. It is tasked with two objectives:

1. Nordic enhancement of the German people through increasing Nordic births,
2. Nordic modification of the German people.

Not only the Nordic German will be affected, but also the part of Nordic predispositions slumbering in all folk comrades shall be developed most strongly through Nordic educational direction in contrast to other mixtures. Every German should emphasize the Nordic within themselves. Like Nietzsche, our racial policy wants breeding and cultivation.

Our goal, however, is not a supranational upper stratum but: the highest people. In this struggle, we want to carry the commandments of Zarathustra before us like banners: 'You shall become progenitors and cultivators for me and sowers of the future... you shall love your children's land... towards it, I bid your sails to seek and

seek!' (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Third Part, LVI, Old and New Tables, 12, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2006; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

5. Degeneration and Selection

The Enlightenment brought a progress ideology, according to which humanity, interrupted by phases of regression, is in progress through world history, towards a moralistic-civilizational ideal state, towards a world citizenship in peace and equality.

Nietzsche, on the other hand, coined the concepts of decadence and 'ascending life'. He recognizes the natural development of degeneration and deterioration and thereby refutes the humanistic progress utopia.

The decadence is caused by counter-selection, by contra-selection, the 'ascending life' through selection, through cultivation and breeding. Like no philosopher before him, he recognizes in world events the titanic effect of selection and counter-selection.

'The nihilistic movement is the expression of a physiological decadence' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [17=Mp XVII 4. Mp XVI 4a. W II 8a. W II 9a. Mai-Juni 1888], 17[8]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'I see all philosophers, I see science on its knees before the reality of the reverse struggle for existence, as the school of Darwin teaches it, namely, I see everywhere those on top, those remaining, those who compromise life, the value of life' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[123]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Assuming that one does not show us the reason why man is the exception among creatures, I incline to the prejudice that Darwin was mistaken everywhere' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[123]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

How much man is an 'exception among creatures', I tried to show on p. 73 [The reader must look for the correct page number in this text. Note of J.S.G.-J.]. The greater modification-breadth and -duration, the modifiability of humans, can be as favorable as it is dangerous; humans are thereby more easily enhanced through cultivation, as well as led to degeneration through foreign influences. The world-historical example of this is the Christian infection of Germanism. This can only be pointed out here. Nietzsche's objection to Darwin therefore has deep justification.

'My overall view of the world of values shows that in the highest values that are hung over humanity today, it is not the strokes of luck, not the selection types that have the upper hand: rather the types of decadence, perhaps there is nothing more interesting in the world than this unwanted spectacle...' ([Fragmente 1887-

1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[123]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘Precisely the opposite is palpable: The striking out of strokes of luck, the impossibility of higher-turned-out types, the inevitable mastery of the average, even the below-average types’ ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [14=W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[123]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

As with democracy and Marxism, Nietzsche also seeks the ultimate root and cause for contra-selection in Christianity, i.e., for Nietzsche always: in the Judaization of values.

Nietzsche claims that Christianity bears the main guilt for the decadence of the present for three reasons:

1. ‘Eternal bliss’ as the life goal of the individual is the extreme enhancement of private egoism. There, the welfare of the community is too little esteemed and therefore endangered.
2. Through the doctrine of the equality of humans before God, the delusion of equality arose and with it the ‘equivalence’ of humans. Everyone is a ‘redeemer in Christ’, every life, even the inferior, would thus be preserved and propagated.
3. Christian asceticism is hostile to life; it sacrifices not for life but for a ‘beyond’.

When Christianity brought the doctrine of selflessness and love to the forefront, it still did not set the species interest as higher than the individual interest. Its actual historical effect, the fateful effect, remains conversely precisely the enhancement of egoism, of individual egoism to the extreme (to the extreme of individual immortality). The individual was taken so importantly by Christianity, set so absolutely, that one could no longer sacrifice him: but the species exists only through human sacrifice... In addition, came the delusion of equality. Before God, all ‘souls’ were equal: but that was precisely the most dangerous of all possible valuations!

‘If one sets individuals as equal, one questions the species, one favors a practice which leads to the ruin of the species: Christianity is the counter-principle to selection’. ‘If the degenerate and sick (‘the Christian’) should be worth as much as the healthy (‘heathen’) or even more, according to Pascal’s judgment on sickness and health, then the natural course of development is crossed and unnaturalness is made law’ ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [15=W II 6a. Frühjahr 1888], 15[110]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Christian self-sacrifice (monk, martyr) has *‘from the standpoint of overall breeding absolutely no sense’*.

‘The species needs the demise of the ill-formed, weak, degenerate, but it is precisely to these that Christianity turns as a conserving force... Christian altruism is in reality the mass egoism of the weak: True

love of humanity demands sacrifice for the benefit of the species, it is hard, full of self-overcoming, because it needs human sacrifice. The pseudo-humanity of Christianity wants to enforce precisely that nobody is sacrificed’ ([Fragmente 1887–1889], [15=W II 6a. Frühjahr 1888], 15[110]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Because Nietzsche judges Christianity above all politically, the political consequences of Christianity must be repeatedly pointed out here, especially for racial policy.

‘Christianity, from Jewish roots and only comprehensible as a growth of this soil, represents the counter-movement to any morality of breeding, of race, of privilege: it is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence: Christianity the revaluation of all Aryan values, the victory of Chandala values, the gospel preached to the poor, the lowly, the collective uprising of everything downtrodden, wretched, ill-formed, ill-fated against the ‘race’...’ (Götzen-Dämmerung, Die ‘Verbesserer’ der Menschheit, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

Against Christian ‘humanity’, Nietzsche praises the ‘Aryan’ humanity of the Manu laws. Here breeding had become religion, here the task was set to cultivate no less than four races at once: a priestly race, a warrior race, a trader and farmer race, and finally a servant race, the Sudras. (Whereby Nietzsche uses ‘race’ again more in a class sense). The concept of ‘pure blood’ is the antithesis of a harmless concept. Terrible would be this antithetical concept, implemented against the non-breed human, the mishmash-human, the Chandala.

‘How poor is the New Testament compared to Manu, how badly it smells...’ (Götzen-Dämmerung, Die ‘Verbesserer’ der Menschheit, 3) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

‘... it always pays dearly and terribly when religions do not act as breeding and educational tools in the hand of the philosopher, but rule sovereignly on their own, when they themselves want to be ultimate ends and not means among other means...’ (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter Three, the Religious Mood, Aphorism 62, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909), and (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Drittes Hauptstück: das religiöse Wesen, 62) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This is directed primarily against Christianity. In the overall reckoning, the hitherto sovereign religions belonged to the main causes which held the type ‘human’ at a low level. Through these, too much was preserved of what should have perished: ... Therefore, they worked ‘indeed and truth on the deterioration of the European race’. For they had turned all valuations upside down, ... yes, even turned the whole love for the earthly and for

dominion over the earth into hatred against the earth and the earthly.

'... does it not seem that a will has ruled over Europe for 18 centuries, to make humans into a sublime monstrosity? ... Humans, not high and hard enough to be allowed to shape humans as artists... such humans have ruled over the fate of Europe with their 'equality before God' until finally a diminished, almost ridiculous species, a herd animal, something good-natured, sickly and mediocre has been bred, the European of today...' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter Three, the Religious Mood, Aphorism 62, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche may too one-sidedly accuse Christianity among the causes of contra-selection, he may place too much importance on the preservation of the inferior compared to the destruction of the superior, but it is certain: Christianity brings unnaturalness everywhere [**Note in the original edition:** See vows of 'chastity', celibacy, etc.]. As it still has a dissolving and species-contrary effect on small nature-peoples today, so it has destroyed the organic bonds, the biological marriage and kinship laws in Germanism on a world-historical scale and infected the natural culture with magical-inorganic doctrines and forms.

Nietzsche has, with unprecedented consistency, judged and condemned Christianity, Paulinism in particular, from a racial-political perspective.

6. Titanic Politics

Attempts have been made to force Nietzsche's philosophy into a whole series of concepts: Zarathustrianism, Dionysianism, Renaissanceism, Perspectivism, Heracliteanism, etc. However, Nietzsche is no less the philosopher of breeding on a grand scale than any thinker since Plato. With gigantic tendency, he proclaims cultivation and breeding commandments that belong to the immortal part of his teaching. The progress utopias are overcome through selection laws.

Admittedly, Nietzsche is in danger of overestimating breeding possibilities as well; for all enhancement through breeding and selection is limited to the predispositions and finds its limit in the highest development of the predispositions. However, what is decisive is not time-conditioned exaggerations but Nietzsche's fundamental will [**Note in the original edition:** *'Nietzsche has no place between Darwin and Mendel for his history of the enhancement of man through selection... He had experienced the enhancement of man as the meaning of all civilization...'* (Günther, 'Nordic Thought', p. 18, 1927, German edition)], [**Note in the original edition:** *'... from Nietzsche, a revival of hereditary health and proto-racial ideas could have emanated... if his worldview had fundamentally been more than an emphasis on individualism. In the distortion of the 'Blonde Beast', the*

Nordic idea is even noticeable in his work' (Günther, 'Racial Science of the German People', p. 448, German edition):

'What partly necessity, partly chance has achieved here and there, the conditions for the production of a stronger species, we can now understand and consciously will: we can create the conditions under which such an elevation is possible' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[153]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'In the great whirlpool of forces, man stands and imagines that this whirlpool is reasonable and has a reasonable purpose: Error! ... and it always leads to his ruin if he were to entrust himself to 'providence'' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [3=Mp XIII 6b. (U II 8, 239-200). März 1875], 3[75]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Man should set goals for himself.

Nietzsche explains that the total degeneration of man, this bestialization of man into a dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, is entirely possible. Whoever has thought this possibility through to the end knows no more disgust than other people, and perhaps also a task! He senses the new task, he hopes, for he knows what can still be bred from man, with a favorable accumulation and enhancement of forces and tasks, he knows it with all the knowledge of his conscience, how man is still unexploited for the greatest possibilities (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 5, The Natural History of Morals, Section 203, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). Therefore, it is necessary to teach man the future of man as his will, as dependent on all human will, and to prepare great ventures and overall experiments of cultivation and breeding, in order to thereby end that horrible dominion of nonsense and chance, which has hitherto been called 'history' ... (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 5, The Natural History of Morals, Section 203, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

This is his boldest hope: *'Let us assume that my attack on two millennia of anti-nature and human degradation succeeds. That new party of life, which takes the greatest of all tasks, the higher breeding of humanity, into its hands, including the ruthless destruction of all degenerate and parasitic elements, will make that excess of life on earth possible again, from which the Dionysian state must once again grow'* (Ecce Homo, Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The legislative moralities are the main means by which one can shape humans into whatever pleases a creative and profound will - provided that, 'such an artist-will of the highest rank has the power in its hands and can enforce its creative will over long periods of time, in the form of legislations, religions, customs'

([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[8]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

When Nietzsche's vision soars beyond the possible, the logic of his thought can only be exemplary for us! Politics becomes the enhancement of humanity.

Breeding and cultivation as a life task is greater than any moralism and all Bible 'ethics'. Combining natural experience and reason, drive and will, instinct and wisdom, it is the concrete prerequisite for happiness and greatness, for power and beauty, the political task of life.

Hitherto, however, 'crossed by the infinite' and enraptured in 'ideas', one saw in breeding goals 'materialistic biologism'. But Nietzsche confesses: 'My religion, if I may still call anything thus, lies in the work for the production of genius... Religion is 'love beyond ourselves'...' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[22]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'To redeem the past and to transform every 'It was' into 'Thus I willed it!', that alone I would call redemption!' (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Second Part, XLII, Redemption, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2006; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

'Even in knowledge I feel only my will's procreation and becoming-delight; and if there is innocence in my knowledge, this happens because there is will to procreation in it'. '...To man I am driven ever anew by my ardent creative will; thus is the hammer driven to the stone...' (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Second Part, XXIV, In the Happy Isles, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2006; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909). 'I walk among men as among the fragments of the future: that future which I contemplate'.

IX. People

1. Preliminary Remarks

The entire tragedy of Nietzsche's political fate confronts us when we examine his relationship to the people. The developing Nietzsche believes in the people with enthusiastic hopes. Then comes the break. With a fateful consequence, he increasingly distances himself from the organic concept of the people.

The more negatively he views Romanticism, the more decidedly he develops away from the people. In essence, he is also here a victim of his time. An epoch that lacked the biological foundations of today's conception of the people and a time whose political face makes despair of the people understandable.

However, Nietzsche's philosophy, his overemphasis on the individual, is equally complicit. He saw the great ones as too great, too absolute, and too free from natural community ties. This is examined under 'Individual and Community'. In this too, he is the man of

his time; it is the unprecedented distance from the democratic idols of those decades that leads him to extremes and exaggeration.

Later, the people appear almost only as the antithesis of the great ones, leveled, of genius, of leader and master natures. People are often seen only in the sense of mass, mishmash, rabble, herd.

2. Völkisch

If one quotes from Nietzsche's early writings the confessions to the people, then it is indeed possible to prove with epigonic overzeal that Nietzsche thought völkisch like National Socialism. And yet a deep chasm yawns here.

The following passages, for example, sound astonishingly contemporary:

The genius is still accorded a metaphysical homeland, but it is also said that he emerges from the midst of a people, that he represents, as it were, the reflected image, the saturated play of colors of all the peculiar forces of the people, 'that he reveals the highest destiny of a people in the parable-like nature of an individual and in an eternal work...'.
'The genius is still accorded a metaphysical homeland, but it is also said that he emerges from the midst of a people, that he represents, as it were, the reflected image, the saturated play of colors of all the peculiar forces of the people, 'that he reveals the highest destiny of a people in the parable-like nature of an individual and in an eternal work...'.'

But the genius can only do all this if he has matured and been nourished in the womb of a people's culture, while without the protecting and warming home he would not unfold the wings for his eternal flight at all, 'but sadly, triste, like a stranger cast into wintry wastes, sneaks away from the inhospitable land' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag III)(F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Education must serve the people: 'Task of education: to live and work in the noblest aspirations of one's people...' ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [8=U I 5a. Winter 1870-71-Herbst 1872], 8[92]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The Nietzsche of that time also draws his brilliant concept of culture from the people: 'The culture of a people manifests itself in the unified taming of the drives of this people' ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [19=P I 20b. Sommer 1872-Anfang 1873], 19[41]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Culture is above all unity of artistic style in all life expressions of a people' (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen I, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And he saw his task for the German people as: 'That higher unity in the nature and soul of a people must be restored, that rift between inner and outer must disappear again under the hammer blows of necessity...'.
'That higher unity in the nature and soul of a people must be restored, that rift between inner and outer must disappear again under the hammer blows of necessity...'.'

Of the 'productive spirit' he calls: 'How could he endure it if the unity of the people's feeling was lost... it torments him to have to speak, as it were, only to one

side and to no longer be necessary within his people... The instinct of the people no longer comes to meet him; it is useless to spread his arms longingly towards it... so he exchanges the deep insight of his fate for the divine pleasure of the creator and helper and ends as a lonely knower, as an oversated sage...' (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

We know it, the 'productive spirit' is Nietzsche, and this fate is Nietzsche's fate, anticipated with an incomprehensible, indeed eerie certainty.

Several times he gives definitions of the essence of the people that are valuable again today:

From history one could learn that the trunk of a people is best preserved where most people have a lively sense of community as a result of the similarity of their habitual and indisputable principles, thus as a result of their common faith. Here good, efficient custom would strengthen, here the subordination of the individual would be learned, and firmness of character would be given as a gift and later instilled (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Fifth Division, Signs of High and Lower Culture, Aphorism 224, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Already in his first work, he appreciates the historical-philosophical significance of the people.

'...the most consequential discovery of historical-philological science... the discovery and appreciation of the people's soul...': '...now for the first time one understood the long-felt power of greater individualities and wills, as it is the vanishing minimum of the single human being... now at last one felt the great mass instincts, the unconscious people's drives as the actual bearers and levers of so-called world history' (Über die Persönlichkeit Homers, Nietzsche's inaugural lecture at the University of Basel delivered on May 28, 1869 in: Homer and Classical Philology, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

And even in 'Zarathustra' it says of the people: *'...each people speak its own tongue of good and evil: which the neighbor does not understand. It invented its own language in customs and rights'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XI, The New Idol, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'No people could live that did not first value; but if it wants to preserve itself, it must not value as the neighbor values...': 'A table of goods hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its overcoming; behold, it is the voice of its will to power' (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XV, The Thousand and One Goals, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

3. Upper Völkische

As the highest goal, Nietzsche once wanted the shaping of an original folk culture. It is striking, yet of inner necessity, that this concept of culture later no longer appears in relation to the people.

He distances himself from the organic concept of the people. From the posthumous works, the turn becomes clear: *'It is a glorious spectacle: from local interests, from persons who are tied to the smallest fatherlands... from mere points in space and time, gradually grows a lasting culture that bridges countries and peoples...'*

One should not listen when people lament the lost folkishness (in costume, customs, legal concepts, dialects, forms of poetry, etc.) It is precisely at this price that one rises to the supra-national ([Fragmente 1875–1879] [23=Mp XIV 1b. Ende 1876–Sommer 1877], 23[111]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

At one point it is even claimed that science and national feeling are contradictions, even if political counterfeiters occasionally deny this knowledge. Further, *'that all higher culture can now only to its detriment fence itself in with national boundary posts. It was not always so: but the wheel has turned and continues to turn...'* ([Fragmente 1875–1879], [36=Mp XIV 2a. Herbst 1878], 36[2]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

If these quotes come from the crisis period, there is a decisive passage from the time of the 'Will to Power': *'How we have relearned in fifty years! The whole of Romanticism with its belief in the 'people' is refuted!'* ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [1=N VII 2b. Herbst 1885–Frühjahr 1886], 1[17]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

But the young Nietzsche demanded: *'Create for yourselves the concept of a people; you cannot think it noble and high enough!...'* (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, 7) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The contrast is clear. And yet Nietzsche does not now think in terms of humanity. The above posthumous passage has a sentence appended: *'No conclusion from linguistic kinship to racial kinship'*.

This already suggests it's about the formal concept of the people. It is fundamentally against this that Nietzsche turns. However, he also does not arrive at a substantive concept of the people. For this, he lacks the belief in the blood-conditioned nature of contemporary peoples and the insight into concrete racial distribution possible for us today. Nietzsche also underestimates the perseverance of historically grown elements and simultaneously overestimates the denationalizing effect of civilizational progress (see 'Europe', 'national', etc.).

Ultimately, he places the 'genius', the 'overman', the 'lords of the earth' outside the people,

accentuates them excessively, and thus inevitably deviates increasingly from the natural concept of the people (see 'Individual and Community').

4. National Socialist Concept of the People

Through the fateful break with Schopenhauer and Wagner, Nietzsche allows himself to be driven too much into antithesis. Above all, he views Romanticism too negatively. The modern conception of the people, on the other hand, has its origin in Romanticism. And yet it stands far above Romanticism.

The National Socialist concept of the people is not only historically or intuitively grasped but also scientifically-biologically grounded.

Nietzsche once attempts to explain the becoming of a people thus: '...when people have lived together for a long time under similar conditions (of climate, soil, danger, needs, work), something emerges from it that 'understands itself', a people'.

What is missing, which is decisive for us, is race. Only because Nietzsche, due to his time, did not also conceive of the people racially, could he distance himself so far from the people.

For us too, people are not just race. We recognize the 'permanent modification' of our inherited mass through space and history, landscape and fate. The accent, however, lies on kinship and racial affinity. A Jew may live for a thousand years in the German spatial and fate community, he will never be a Volksgenosse. However, the Nordic-determined Huguenots would become full Volksgenossen.

If race is the foundation of the people, then not racial purity in the biological sense. Yet our concept of people presupposes a specific degree of racial mixing under the leadership of a racial core substance, e.g., the Nordic-Germanic in the German people.

A true people of this kind are the natural synthesis, the organic community of geopolitically, historically, fatefully related people in the succession of generations and biologically related humans. A physical, mental, and spiritual community: people's body, people's soul, people's spirit as a living unity. The National Socialist concept of the people unites natural and spiritual science, feeling and knowledge, instinct and cognition, experience and valuation. People are the most modern political concept.

Nietzsche had to fail necessarily in grasping the concept of the people. Half a century of revolutionary historical, ideological, and biological development lies between us and him. The heroically untimely one was still inevitably bound to his time. And therefore, his end had to become tragic.

X. National Socialism

1. Against Formal Nationalism

Many Nietzsche experts will meet the attempt to pin Nietzsche down to individual problems with much skepticism. Indeed, the difficulties are often very great. But not insurmountable. All apparent changes and contradictions are still carried by a hidden, but nonetheless unified basic attitude. The investigation is particularly difficult with regard to people, state, Germanness, and nationalism.

The young Nietzsche is consciously nationalistic in his concept of culture and in his political stance. With the exuberant hopes for a cultural rebirth in the Second Reich, for Wagner and Bayreuth, Nietzsche's belief in the nation also shatters. Under the mask of the 'free spirit', he saves himself through the crisis of his fate. The 'legislator of the earth' then judges consciously supranationally. He tries to force absolute independence: '...not to remain attached to a fatherland: even if it be the most suffering and needy, it is already less difficult to unbind one's heart from a victorious fatherland...' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 2, The Free Spirit, section 41, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Only in this way could nationalism become such a 'problem' for Nietzsche.

Often his fight against nationalism is actually the fight against the Second Reich, against national liberalism, against bourgeois-dynastic patriotism. His criticism becomes very sharp where he recognizes in nationalism a symptom of nihilism.

Nationalism is nihilistic in Nietzsche's sense when it remains purely formal, without substantive, i.e., völkisch-racial justification. Nietzsche fights against this formal nationalism, from a stance that rejects any pure formal value as a pseudo-value and thus as nihilistic.

Above all, he wages the fight against nationalism in every form from his Europe conception. This Europe conception, in turn, was only possible because he saw no organic foundation in contemporary nationalism but was also unable to penetrate to a racial-völkisch deepening of nationalism. Since he denies the possibility of a future, völkisch racial policy in view of the existing and overestimated bastardization, he remained in antithesis to nationalism and could not find a substantive-racial justification for nationalism.

The rejection of formal nationalism is already clear in the basic direction of the young Nietzsche. He compares contemporary nationalism with the Greek state: '*...how ridiculous the modern concept of nationality appears in comparison to the Pythia, and what an awkward wish it is to want to see a nation as a visible mechanical unity equipped with a glorious government apparatus and military pomp. Nature expresses itself, if this unity exists at all, in a more*

mysterious way than in popular votes and newspaper jubilation. In any case, our political will is not overloaded, each of us will admit this with a smile: and the expression of this stunted growth and weakness is the concept of nationalities' ([Fragmente 1869–1874], [7=U I 2b. Ende 1870-April 1871], 7[122]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'In such times, the genius must become a hermit...' ([Fragmente 1869–1874], [7=U I 2b. Ende 1870-April 1871], 7[122]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

With this, his political fate is instinctively anticipated! Essentially, formal nationalism already appears here as a caricature of a *völkisch* nationalism. Nietzsche repeatedly attacks this stunted form of nationalism: That in which one finds national differences is, more than has been understood until now, only the difference of various cultural levels and to a lesser extent something permanent (and even this not in a strict sense) (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, Miscellaneous maxims and opinions, Fragment 323. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

To be national in the sense now demanded by public opinion is, for more spiritual people, not only an absurdity but a dishonesty, an arbitrary stupefaction of better knowledge and conscience ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[199]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016). Nietzsche calls this nationalism artificial.

'This artificial nationalism is, moreover, as dangerous as artificial Catholicism has been... not the interest of the many (of the peoples), as one often says, but above all the interest of certain princes' dynasties, then that of certain classes of trade and society, drives this nationalism... once one has recognized this, one should unhesitatingly declare oneself a good European and work through deed on the fusion of nations' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A glance at the State, Aphorism 475, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Even more clearly, the following passage shows: *'That which is today called 'nation' in Europe and is really more a res facta than nata (indeed, sometimes looks confusingly similar to a res ficta et picta) is in any case something becoming, young, easily shiftable, not yet a race, let alone such an aere perennius as the Jewish kind is...'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 251, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'Nation, people who speak one language and read the same newspapers call themselves 'nations' today and want all too eagerly to be of common descent

and history: which, however, has not succeeded even with the worst falsification of the past' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [34=N VII 1. April-Juni 1885], 34[203]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche's criticism is not directed against nationalism itself, but against its contemporary stunted growth, the 'artificial nationalism', which he denies inner justification.

2. Völkisch Nationalism

Nietzsche could no longer arrive at an organic nationalism. Approaches to this are also present. For example, two passages from the posthumous works of the early and middle period: *'Is it such a great thing to have love for one's homeland and love for one's fathers? And these are solely the foundations of a natural politics. The aristocratic family feeling, the sense for the past of a lineage, as if it were a unity and now blooming in you, and the thought that life, possessions, and everything that is touched by us is consecrated, sanctifying personality! these are the foundations. An almost metaphysical feeling of unity and feeling of sanctification, with the obligation that the sanctifier also protects and preserves'* (Einzelne Gedanken und Entwürfe, Aus dem Jahre 1872, Eins der schädlichsten Bücher ist der Don Quixote) (F. Nietzsche, 1901; F. Nietzsche, Oehler, Oehler, Förster-Nietzsche, & Musarion, 1922).

'...one practices in the great principle of blood and race kinship, 'nations' are much finer concepts than races, basically a discovery of science, which is now incorporated into feeling' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [11=M III 1. Frühjahr-Herbst 1881], 11[273]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This is one of the most curious passages in the posthumous writings and actually the most unequivocal affirmation of nationalism. But precisely the posthumous writings contain the richest contradictions from the inexhaustible abundance and variation of Nietzsche's spirit.

These are positive deviations. Nietzsche's position on nationalism remains fundamentally negative. He fails to recognize that, especially in Germany, underlying the seemingly merely formal nationalism was a feeling and intuition of organic commonality, the instinct of blood kinship. The World War has proven this all the time.

Nietzsche underestimated national ties and overestimated both the degree of European racial mixing (see 'Race') and its increase, as well as the civilizational unifying tendencies of an economic and technical nature. This is the cause of his Europe conception, which then drives him to an ever-sharper struggle against nationalism and the Second Reich.

Therefore, Nietzsche's attack on nationalism still has nothing in common with an internationalism of Marxist, liberal, or other coloration or with the 'Pan-Europeanism' of a Coudenhove-Kalergi, that Asian-European-Jewish hybrid.

And Nietzsche's critique also has a justification. For there is not only a hysterical nationalism, chauvinism, but also an 'artificial nationalism', at least here and there for certain times. For centuries, German unification could be prevented by playing 'tribal nationalism' against imperial consciousness. The last experiment was the 'Austrian Nation' under the patronage and parentage of Rome and Paris. Likewise, a 'Czechoslovak national consciousness' could be fabricated. This 'artificial nationalism' (disguised imperialism) in Versailles made 'nations' with vile falsifications and drew borders. This concept of nationalities 'of fragmentation and weakness', of 'mechanical unity', is dangerous, unsettling and poisonous, an artificial product, the unnaturalness in politics.

For us, even today, there must be no nationalism 'in itself' with abstract equivalence and equal rights. Nationalisms are as diverse as their foundations. Every nationalism is worth as much as its racial and historical basis, every nationalism is worth as much as its bearer.

National Socialism has brought nationalism to an unprecedented maturity and clarity through historical and *völkisch* justification. Nietzsche's struggle against 'herd nationalism' and against 'artificial nationalism' cannot affect the National Socialist concept of the nation but rather deepen it.

XI. The Germans

1. Development

Whoever takes Nietzsche too literally or too conceptually will never fully understand him. Nietzsche is unity in change, consistency in inconsistency. Much stands symbolically or perspectively.

The same word, the same concept is used differently, even contradictorily. Where he uses the term 'morality', it must always first be determined what he presupposes as morality at the moment. He uses the type 'Christian' differently, yet he always uses the same word. This is most true where he judges the Germans [**Note in the original edition:** 'Of all the problems in understanding Nietzsche, his concept of Germanness undoubtedly contains the greatest difficulties', judges A. Baeumler (p. 194 of German edition)].

Nietzsche is, in a sense, his own experiment. He throws himself, completely given over to a mood, uninhibitedly onto a problem, pushes it to the utmost consequence, only to turn against it again. His creative dynamism often threatens to burst into every context.

This results in contradictions on the surface. But all these apparent contradictions and opposites are, though often difficult to recognize, held together by a unity and basic direction.

Essentially, Nietzsche uses the word 'German' for three types:

1. The Reich German, the 'merely German', the citizen of the Second Reich.
2. The un-Germanic German. 'The degenerates of the race'.
3. The true German. 'Of the day before yesterday and of the day after tomorrow'.

Perhaps Nietzsche is most typically German where he ruthlessly criticizes the Germans. Perhaps only a German can make his own nationality such a problem. It is basically the German national weakness of objectivity and impartiality even against one's own nature. The German usually cannot be merely instinctively national. The German needs a German 'consciousness', i.e., he must fight for an inner justification. He wants to understand his Germanness as a 'mission', and this must be 'just', 'scientifically provable'. National Socialism could only educate the Germans to the highest belief in themselves through substantive justification, so to speak through biological proof.

Only as a German could Nietzsche fight such a dramatic battle for his own nature.

In his early works, he seeks his task in the struggle for a German world culture. He passionately hopes for the German genius. He believes in his German mission [**Note in the original edition:** 'My brother loved Germany' (E. Förster-Nietzsche: 'The Young Nietzsche', p. 190)]. His highest concern is for culture. The political-military victory of 1870/71 should be followed by the inner victory, the higher culture, a German national culture.

'I have the greatest apprehensions about the impending cultural state. If only we do not have to pay too dearly for the enormous national successes in a region where I, at least, cannot agree to any loss' (To Karl von Gersdorff, Bale, 7.11.70) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1921).

'Now new duties beckon: and if one thing may remain with us in peace from that wild war game, it is the heroic and at the same time prudent spirit which, to my surprise... I have rediscovered in our army, fresh and strong, in old Germanic health. On this we can build we may hope again! Our German mission is not yet over! I am more courageous than ever: for not everything has yet perished under French-Jewish superficiality and 'elegance'...' (An Karl von Gersdorff in Frankreich (Feldpostbrief), Basel, 7.11.70, [Briefe 1870], 107) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Yet Nietzsche is 'extremely doubtful' about the 'German culture floating on top'.

He has one hope: Richard Wagner. This faith shatters. The disappointment is so terrible that it threatens to break him.

And it seems as if Nietzsche, with the hopes for Wagner's work of art, has also been robbed of all hopes for Germanness. When, after a crisis of years, he once again enters the fight, his goal is no longer a German folk culture, but now the philosopher struggles for and about his doctrine. This changes the perspective towards the Germans. The hope for 'complete original folk cultures' is now rejected as 'romantic fantasy' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, First Division, First and last things, Aphorism 24, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

As far as humanly possible, Nietzsche tries to detach himself from all ties, to distance himself, to value the whole world under his own aspect, not as a German, but as the philosopher he now tries to value the Germans. But the more his own doctrine denies the shape of contemporary Germany, the more contradictory, even furious, his judgments about the Germans themselves become.

Yet not only his philosophy, but also his own fate significantly influences his position towards Germanness.

Professor Baeumler [**Note in the original edition:** 'All of Nietzsche's statements against Germany, which are held in the aggressive style of *The Case of Wagner, must be read under the sign of antithesis*' (Gómez-Jeria, 2024c). 'It is the old love that finds expression here, the love for his highest calling: to be a teacher of the Germans' (G. Thibon, p. 555-556, afterword)] rightly points out that the aggressive accusations against the Germans should be read under the 'sign of antithesis'. But this explanation is not sufficient. For Nietzsche is aggressive and contradictory in the foreground in all areas. As little as his fight against Wagner, so little is his attack against the Germans merely antithesis. These attacks have their justification in Nietzsche's fate, philosophy, and political basic attitude.

No thinker has been treated with so much disfavor and misunderstanding as Nietzsche, even to this day. The manner of his presentation may be partly to blame for this. But this never excuses how he was treated by his German contemporaries. A presentation of Nietzsche's attacks against the Germans must therefore also show what the Germans did to Nietzsche.

In Germany, Nietzsche was less fought against than ignored, laughed at, not taken seriously. This is the worst; we know it from the first years of struggle! Enemies are glorious, but: to become a fool, a mockery, this is the worst.

On 12.2.88 he writes to v. Seydlitz: '*...it is not impossible that I am the first philosopher of the age...*' (An Reinhart von Seydlitz in Cairo, Niza, 12-02-1888, [Briefe 1888], 989) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

But: '*In Germany, although I am in my 44th year of life and have published about fifteen works (including a non plus ultra, the Zarathustra), they have not yet managed to produce even a single even moderately respectable review of even one of my books. They now help themselves with the words: 'eccentric', 'pathological', 'psychiatric'. There is no lack of bad and slanderous hints about me; an unbridled hostile tone prevails in journals, learned and unlearned, but how is it that no one ever protests against it, that no one ever feels offended when I am insulted? And for years no refreshment, no drop of humanity, not a breath of love...*' ([Briefe 1888], An Reinhart von Seydlitz in Cairo, Niza, 12-02-1888, 989) (F. Nietzsche, 2016). '*I have been badly treated among Germans*' (Ecce Homo, sections 1-12).

'*...they (the Germans) have compromised themselves with me so far, I doubt they will do better in the future... Yes, what I desire is to be a bad prophet here! My natural readers and listeners are now already Russians, Scandinavians and French, will they always be?*' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 3) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The poet of Zarathustra, one of the highest works of world literature, must have some writings printed at his own expense, finds no publisher in Germany...

This drives Nietzsche into indescribable loneliness. Though he knows that fundamentally he cannot yet be understood. As late as 1888 he writes: '*But it would be a complete contradiction to myself if I already expected ears and hands for my truths today...*' (Ecce Homo, Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And in 1887 to Overbeck: '*After all, this all belongs to a generation that we both will probably no longer experience: the same one in which the great problems from which I suffer, as certain as I still live through them and for their sake, must become tangible and must transition into action and will*' ([Briefe 1886], An Franz Overbeck in Basel, Sils-Maria den 30 Juni 1887, 870) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

But like-minded and like-feeling friends are also denied to him: '*A deep man needs friends: unless he still has his God. And I have neither God nor friends*'.

'*Forgive this outburst of passion, but my stay in Germany is to blame for this, from which I always return with bitterness to regions more agreeable to me...*'.

'Now I should once again allow myself some rest: for the mental and spiritual tension of recent years was too strong... and my temperament has become sharper and gloomier. My health is in truth quite normal, only the poor soul is so injured and so longing for good friends, for people 'who are like me'. 'Provide me with a circle of people who want to hear and understand me, and I am healthy!' (Letter from Nietzsche to his Sister, Sils-Maria, July 8, 1886) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1921).

To Overbeck: *'If I could give you an idea of my feeling of loneliness! Among the living, as little as among the dead have I ever found anyone with whom I felt akin. This is indescribably dreadful...'* ([Briefe 1886], An Franz Overbeck in Basel, Sils-Maria, 5 August 1886) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Misunderstanding and icy loneliness, all this destroys the mental health of the hyper-sensitive artist nature with uncanny inevitability. Nerve-destroying sleeping drugs do the rest! The breakdown in Turin is the unstoppable and inexorable conclusion.

This is already announced months before in emotional explosions, misperception of the situation, in volcanic outbursts. With this he tries to discharge his tension, with this he wants to break the silence, his calls have not been heard, now he lets screams resound into a deaf time!

What he now writes can only be understood in light of that mood. This is especially true where he rages against the Germans.

'I have no choice at all. This logic alone keeps me upright now; viewed from all other sides, my condition is untenable and painful to the point of torture. My latest writing reveals something of this: in a state of a bow tensed to the point of breaking, any affect does one good, provided that it is violent' ([Briefe 1888], An Franz Overbeck in Basel, Nizza den 3 Februar 1888) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

To the sister: *'I sometimes lose myself completely out of control; I am almost the prey of the most somber resolutions'* ([Briefe 1888], An Franziska Nietzsche in Naumburg (Entwurf), Nizza, vermutlich 17 Februar 1888, 995) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Of the Twilight of the Idols, He Writes:

'This writing is my philosophy in nuce - radical to the point of crime' ([Briefe 1888], An Georg Brandes in Kopenhagen, Turin, den 20 Okt. 1888, 1134) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'I am not a man, I am dynamite' (Ecce Homo, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin, 1 and [Briefe 1888], An Helen Zimmern in Florenz, Turin, via Carlo Alberto 6 III, um den 17. Dezember 1888, 1197) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Above all, what stands in Ecce Homo about the Germans is to be judged under these premises. Not that those passages contained essentially new attacks. Only everything is uninhibitedly exaggerated in form and content. And yet the writing is intellectually and stylistically a work without example, even for Nietzsche a supreme achievement. The tempo is often hardly bearable. But Nietzsche more often loses reality and context.

Since Nietzsche's position towards Germanness is of decisive importance compared to the foreign Nietzsche literature, these detailed preparations are probably justified.

2. Critique of the Germans

It has already been shown that Nietzsche allows himself to be driven too far into negation in his hostility towards the Reich. Repeatedly it appears as if he considers politics altogether harmful for the Germans, as if politics were only possible for the Germans at the expense of culture. He undoubtedly gives in too strongly to this tendency. He fundamentally negates only the contentless and aimless politics, politics for politics' sake, politics without culture. Similarly, 'small politics', nation-state politics, is contrasted with 'great politics', European politics. But he is not always sufficiently aware of this basic direction. An overall evaluation shows indisputably that these are antithetical foreground tendencies. Nietzsche's higher concept of politics is never affected by this. Nor is his higher concept of culture. The accents are always decisive.

'The nationalism madness and the fatherland buffoonery are without charm for me: 'Germany, Germany above all' sounds painful in my ears, fundamentally because I want and wish more from the Germans than...' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[10]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In 1888, in a retrospective on his only expectations of Germanness, Nietzsche writes that he had attached hopes where there was nothing to hope for, where everything too clearly pointed to an end... *'where the German spirit, which not long ago had still had the will to dominion over Europe, the power to lead Europe, was just then willingly and finally abdicating under the pompous pretext of founding an empire...'* (Die Geburt der Tragödie, Versuch einer Selbstkritik, 6) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Meanwhile I have learned to think hopelessly and mercilessly enough about the German nature' (Die Geburt der Tragödie, Versuch einer Selbstkritik, 6) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche repeatedly accuses the Germans of being what they could not be, namely, Christians; that with the Reformation they saved church and Christianity;

and that they became 'national' when Napoleon wanted the one Europe.

'But here nothing shall prevent me from being coarse and telling the Germans a few harsh truths: who else does it? I speak of their debauchery in historicism'.

'German' was an argument, 'Germany, Germany above all' a principle, the Germans were the 'moral world order', in relation to the imperium romanum the 'bearers of freedom', in relation to the 18th century the restoration of morality, of the 'categorical imperative'... They had all the great cultural crimes of four centuries on their conscience! And always for the same reason, from their innermost cowardice before reality, which is also the cowardice before truth, through their untruthfulness out of 'idealism'.

The Germans had deprived Europe of the harvest, of the meaning of the last great age, the Renaissance age, at a moment when a higher order of values, where the noble, the life-affirming, the future-guaranteeing values had come to victory at the seat of the opposite, the decadence values.

'Luther, the fate of monk, restored the church, and what is a thousand times worse, Christianity at the moment when it was succumbing... Christianity, this religion become negation of life! Luther, an impossible monk, who attacked the church for reasons of his 'impossibility' and, consequently, restored it. The Catholics would have reason to celebrate Luther' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 2) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The Germans are said to have finally, as a force majeure of genius and will strong enough to make Europe a unity for the purpose of world domination became visible on the bridge between two decadence centuries, deprived Europe of the meaning, of the miracle of meaning in Napoleon's existence with their 'wars of liberation'. The Germans are guilty of nationalism, 'this anti-cultural disease... from which Europe is suffering...', this 'perpetuation of the small-state system of Europe, of small politics' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 2) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

As far as political errors are concerned here, they are proven elsewhere. Whether historical, especially cultural-historical misjudgments are contained, cannot be examined in this framework. This central attack is only meant to show from which premises Nietzsche's attacks against the Germans proceed.

With disappointment and contempt Nietzsche looks at the culture and intellectuality of the Second Reich: 'I cannot stand it in Germany, the spirit of pettiness and servitude permeates everything, down to the smallest city and village papers and likewise up to the most respectable artists and scholars...' ([Fragments

1880–1882], [7=N V 6. Ende 1880], 7[279]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

A 'temporary Swissification' is for him the means 'to look a little beyond the German momentary economy' ([Fragments 1880–1882], [11=M III 1. Frühjahr–Herbst 1881], 11[249]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Goethe was an incident without consequences in the history of the Germans: no one could point to a piece of Goethe in German politics of the last 70 years... (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 125. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The German spirit was becoming coarser and flatter. Even more frightening for Nietzsche is that German seriousness, German depth, German passion in intellectual matters were increasingly declining. The pathos had changed, not just the intellectuality. He occasionally touched on German universities and found only a barren, complacent and lukewarm spirituality. Germany was increasingly regarded as Europe's flatland.

'I am still looking for a German with whom I could be serious in my way...' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Was den Deutschen abgeht, 3) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

'I have my readers everywhere, in Vienna, in St. Petersburg, in Copenhagen and Stockholm, in Paris, in New York, I don't have them in Europe's flatland Germany...' (Nietzsche contra Wagner Vorwort) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

Germany was the nation becoming ever more sluggish and instinct-poor in intellectual matters, ever more honest, which continued with an enviable appetite to nourish itself on opposites and tried to reconcile 'faith' as well as scientificity, 'Christian love' as well as anti-Semitism, the will to power, to 'Reich' as well as the evangel des humbles without digestive troubles.

'... this lack of party between opposites! This stomachic neutrality and 'selflessness', this fair sense of the German palate, which gives equal rights to everything, which finds everything tasty...' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Already in 'Daybreak' he points with superior characterization to that German arch-weakness, 'the lack of party between opposites': the Germans, this people of unconditional feelings, were now made quite sour, and by their own great men... There Schopenhauer was an opponent of Wagner's music and Wagner an opponent of Bismarck's politics, and Bismarck an opponent of all Wagnerism and Schopenhauerism (Daybreak, Third Book, Unconditional homage, section 167, Vol. 9, 2nd

Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

This Is Repeatedly Nietzsche's Central Reproach:

The Germans have no culture, i.e. they lack the unity of inner and outer, of content and form. I will present this more precisely. All other reproaches, even if no word about culture is mentioned, can be traced back to this basic motif. Only the words change.

In place of the contradiction between form and content, the reproach appears in all variations: 'lack of party between opposites'.

'The German soul is above all manifold, of diverse origins, more put together and superimposed than actually built that is due to its origin... As a people of the most monstrous mixing and mingling of races, perhaps even with a preponderance of the pre-Aryan element, as a 'people of the middle' in every sense, the Germans are more incomprehensible, more comprehensive, more contradictory, more unknown, more incalculable, more surprising, even more frightening, than other peoples are to themselves: they elude definition and are thus already the despair of the French... the German knows the secret paths to chaos. And as everything loves its likeness, so the German loves the clouds and all that is unclear, becoming, twilight, damp and veiled: the uncertain, the unformed, the shifting, the growing of every kind he feels as 'deep'. The German himself is not, he becomes, he 'develops himself.'

The clumsiness of the German scholar, his social tastelessness, alarmingly agrees well with an inward tightrope walking and light boldness, before which already all gods had learned to fear. There reigns a boorish indifference towards taste and the noblest and the most common stand side by side! (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 244, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche repeatedly tries to separate between the Germans and the greatest Germans. The great Germans were super-German.

'Goethe stood above the Germans in every respect and still stands so now: he will never belong to them. How could a people of Goethe's spirituality ever be equal to him in well-being and goodwill! Just as Beethoven composed music over the Germans' heads, as Schopenhauer philosophized over their heads, so Goethe wrote his Tasso, his Iphigenia over the Germans' heads...' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, Miscellaneous Maxims and opinions, Fragment 170. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

What is German? Nietzsche asks this question repeatedly. Are the German philosophers, *'in any permissible sense also to be credited to the whole race?...*

Or would the opposite be true? Were they so individual, so much the exception to the spirit of the race, as Goethe's paganism was with a good conscience? Or as Bismarck's Machiavellianism is with a good conscience, his so-called 'Realpolitik' among Germans?'

'Leibniz, Kant, Hegel on the other hand...'. 'In all three cases we feel something of ourselves uncovered and guessed at and we are grateful for it and surprised at the same time...' 'Self-knowledge, self-experience, self-comprehension'. *'... 'our inner world is much richer, more comprehensive, more hidden', so we feel with Leibniz. As Germans we doubt with Kant the ultimate validity of scientific knowledge and indeed of everything that can be known causally: the knowable as such seems to us of lesser value. We Germans are Hegelians, even if there had never been a Hegel, insofar as we (in contrast to all Latins) instinctively attribute a deeper meaning and richer value to becoming, to development than to what 'is'...' [Note in the original edition: It is not by chance that Nietzsche always speaks here of 'we' and 'us']*.

Schopenhauer, on the other hand, with the 'problem of the value of existence', with the 'scientific conscience', the 'intellectual cleanliness at any price', was an 'exceptional case' among Germans. Schopenhauer was a pessimist as a 'good European and not as a German'. *'The Germans of today'* with their *'cheerful patriotism'* were not pessimists (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Fünftes Buch, Wir Furchtlosen, 357) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

Alongside these attempts to define 'German', which are in part unsurpassed masterpieces of folk psychology, Nietzsche also tried several times to racially define the Germans, without of course being as relevant today as with his psychological sketches. It is the attempt to find racial causes for the 'lack of party between opposites'.

'One need only look at the faces of the Germans: everything that had masculine, overflowing blood in it went abroad; over the miserable remaining population, the servant-soul folk, came an improvement from abroad, especially through Slavic blood'.

'The Brandenburgian nobility and the Prussian nobility in general (and the peasant of certain North German regions) currently contain the most masculine natures in Germany' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[268]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'All true Germans went abroad; present-day Germany is a pre-Slavic nation...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[419]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Once, Nietzsche wished to deny all Germanic qualities to contemporary Germans: *'Between the*

ancient Germans and us Germans, he asserted, *'there exists no conceptual, let alone blood relationship'* (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung: 'Gut und Böse', 'Gut und Schlecht', 11) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

'The Germans may well be the most mixed people'. *'The people of the middle', 'the inventors of porcelain and a Chinese-like type of privy councilors'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[399]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The Germans of the present were something young and becoming, Nietzsche distinguishes them from the Germans of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War. To overlook this chasm would be historical falsification. In the 17th century, something occurred that was tantamount to the downfall of a race. This phenomenon of discouragement, cowardice, senility, the Chinese pigtail, this must have been, on the whole, the result of a terrible blood corruption. It is estimated that the manliest men continuously went abroad and died or degenerated there. An involuntary mixing with less related races also took place at that time... The German nobility would have been worst affected: it was the most deeply damaged. *'What remained at home suffered from alcoholism, what went abroad and returned from syphilis. To this day, it has had little to say in intellectual matters'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [34=N VII 1. April-Juni 1885], 34[104]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Even this selection of statements shows that Nietzsche essentially always denies the same thing: the Christian, national bourgeois of the Second Reich, the mixture of race, soul, opinions, the un-Germanic in the German, the lack of contrast between opposites, the contradiction between inside and outside. The Germans lack 'culture' in Nietzsche's sense. Often, only that which could be reproached even more to other European peoples is attacked in Germanness. Why does Nietzsche always accuse the Germans?

All these attacks are already rooted in the Untimely Meditations. Only form and intensity change with the epochs of fate. The furious outbursts in the later works, insofar as they do not appear unhealthy or tendentious, are not new in content.

'What is called 'profound' in Germany is precisely this instinctive uncleanness toward oneself that I am talking about: one does not want to be clear about oneself' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 3) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'What have I never forgiven Wagner? That he condescended to the Germans, that he became imperial German... As far as Germany reaches, it corrupts culture' (Ecce Homo, Warum ich so klug bin, 5) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The language becomes ever sharper.

'To think German, to feel German, I can do anything, but that is beyond my powers...' (Ecce Homo, Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe, 2) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'It is already known everywhere: in the main thing, and that remains culture, the Germans no longer count' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Was den Deutschen abgeht, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

For: Culture would be the unity of life. Germany, however, is a philosophical, political, artistic chaos. Nietzsche does not shrink from insults and provocations.

'These Germans are my enemies, I confess it: I despise in them every kind of conceptual and value uncleanness, every cowardice before every honest Yes and No... they have all the half-measures, three-quarter measures! on their conscience, from which Europe is ill... If Christianity is not finished with, the Germans will be to blame for it...' (Der Antichrist, Vorwort, 61) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The Germans have no concept of how vulgar they are, but that is the superlative of vulgarity, they are not even ashamed of being merely German... they talk about everything, they consider themselves decisive, I fear they have also decided about me... My whole life is the rigorous proof for these propositions. In vain I search in it for a sign of tact, of delicacy towards me. From Jews yes, but never from Germans...' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The Germans are impossible for me. When I conceive a type of man that goes against all my instincts, a German always emerges...' (Ecce Homo, Der Fall Wagner, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And yet, in the midst of these excessive outbursts, Nietzsche remains German. Not 'Imperial German', of course. Already in the 4th 'Untimely Meditation' this other concept of the German emerges:

'The Germans are not national, nor cosmopolitan, the greatest Germans...' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [11=U II 9. Mp XIII 4, 6-8. 47. Sommer 1875], 11[4]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'A good German, forgive me if I repeat it ten times, is no longer a German' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[412]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'It seems I am something of a German of a dying species. To be good German means to de-Germanize oneself' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884] 26[395]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And even in *Ecce Homo*, in that writing which contains the worst reproaches and insults against the 'Imperial Germans', Nietzsche once again confesses himself as German.

'On the other hand, I am perhaps more German than present-day Germans, mere Imperial Germans, could still be capable of being, I am the last anti-political German' (*Ecce Homo*, 3, First Version, October 1888, see *Ecce Homo*, Why I am so wise, 3, Vol. 17, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Does this not say everything? Anti-political German, i.e., anti-imperial German. 'more German', i.e., German in a higher sense than this age could be. Nietzsche thus gave us the formula for understanding his position on Germanness.

3. Romanism

Not only German hatred, but even 'Romanism' is reproached to Nietzsche. As justification, those passages suffice where he plays off the decorative yet uniform culture of the French against the German stylistic muddle. One cannot falsify Nietzsche more grievously.

'At the same moment when Germany rises as a great power, France gains a changed importance as a cultural power. Already today, much new seriousness, much new passion of the spirit has moved to Paris; the question of pessimism, for example, the Wagner question, almost all psychological and artistic questions are considered there incomparably more finely and thoroughly than in Germany' (*Götzen-Dämmerung*, Was den Deutschen abgeht, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

It has been overlooked that Nietzsche does not use his higher Greek-Germanic concept of culture here.

Just as the decorative French culture was confused with Nietzsche's actual concept of culture, so the '*libres penseurs*' was confused with Nietzsche's 'free spirit' and 'free mind'. But here he himself has given the answer: *'...to this day nothing has been more foreign and unrelated to me than the whole European and American species of 'libres penseurs'... With them, as with incorrigible blockheads and clowns of 'modern ideas', I find myself even in a deeper discord than with any of their opponents'* (*Ecce Homo*, Die Unzeitgemässen, 2) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Even now, France is still the seat of the most spiritual and refined culture in Europe: but one must know how to find this 'France of taste'...' (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Achtes Hauptstück: Völker und Vaterländer, 254; also Nietzsche contra Wagner, Wohin Wagner gehört) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005) and ([*Fragmente* 1884-1885], [38=Mp XVI 1a. Mp XVI 2a. Mp XV 2b. Juni-Juli 1885], 38[5]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And the bearers of this culture?

'Fatalists, gloomy ones, sick ones, delicate ones, artificial ones... As artists, one has no home in Europe except in Paris... The fingers for nuances, the psychological morbidity, are found only in Paris' (*Ecce Homo*, Warum ich so klug bin, 5) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This is the 'cultural power' France! *'The ability for artistic passions, for devotion to 'form', for which the phrase l'art pour l'art was invented among a thousand others...'*

And the immoralist even praises *'their old manifold moralistic culture, on which the French can base a superiority over Europe...'* (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 254, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

One could fall for this! Nietzsche goes even further: He fights against Wagner with unsurpassable sharpness. He calls his art the music of decadence. This decadence art, however, belongs to France, to Paris. At the same time, this French decadence is played off as a cultural power against the Germans. Romanism?

How little Nietzsche's actual concept of culture has in common with French *l'art pour l'art* decadence and with 'moral culture', I will try to show later.

On the question of Romanism, however, there is a much more precise measure: The position of France towards Christianity. Christianity is Nietzsche's real enemy. What is essentially related to it and friend of it belongs to his enemies. Capability for paganism is the highest distinction Nietzsche has to bestow, affinity to Christianity, the sharpest negation.

'One cannot dispute that the French have been the most Christian people on earth...' (*Daybreak*, Third Book, Wishing for perfect opponents, Aphorism 192. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'The entire higher spirituality in France is Catholic in instinct' ([*Fragmente* 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[129]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

It seems that Catholicism belongs much more intimately to the Latin races than Christianity in general does to us Northerners, and that consequently, unbelief in Catholic countries means something quite different from what it does in Protestant ones, namely, a kind of rebellion against the spirit of the race, while with us it is rather a return to the spirit (or lack of spirit) of the race' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Chapter 3, The Religious Mood, Section 48, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'How Catholic, how un-German August Comte's sociology smells to us with its Roman logic of instincts! How Jesuitical that amiable and shrewd cicerone of Port-Royal, Sainte-Beuve, in spite of all his hostility to Jesuits!' (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Drittes Hauptstück: das religiöse Wesen, 48) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'In France, the Christian ideal came to bloom as far as the pale sun of the North allowed it' (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Drittes Hauptstück: das religiöse Wesen, 48) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Anyone who still manages to speak of Romanism in Nietzsche has either deliberately falsified his personality and teaching or is not disposed to ever understand Nietzsche in his depth. His entire philosophy is rooted in a Nordic-pagan world feeling. Romanism is a mere phrase in relation to Nietzsche.

Christianity is akin to the Romans. But Christianity and Germanism are eternal opposites for Nietzsche.

'If one wants to assert that the German was pre-formed and predestined for Christianity, one must not lack in impudence. For the opposite is not only true, but also palpable' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [3=M II 1. Frühjahr 1880], 3[115]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche fights with all passion throughout his life against the ideas of the French Revolution, against Rousseau! But when he reveres great figures of France, as with Napoleon, Gobineau, etc., they are not French by blood.

I refer once again to Wagner. Here, no side should or can be taken in the *Nietzsche contra Wagner* battle. Decisive for this task is only that the 'Roman' Nietzsche calls everything he fights in Wagner's art with extreme means French.

'As for Wagner, one can grasp with hands, perhaps with fists, that Paris is the proper soil for Wagner: the more French music shapes itself according to the needs of the 'âme moderne', the more it will Wagnerize...' (Nietzsche contra Wagner, Wohin Wagner gehört) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

This applies above all to the Wagner of 'Parsifal'. But what Nietzsche affirms in Wagner, he immediately calls anti-Romanic: *'Perhaps the most remarkable thing that Richard Wagner has created is forever inaccessible, not to be felt or imitated by the entire late Latin race, not only for today: the figure of Siegfried, that very free man, who is indeed far too free, too hard, too cheerful, too healthy, too anti-Catholic for the taste of old and mellow cultural peoples. He may even have been a sin against Romanism, this anti-romanian Siegfried: well, Wagner has amply atoned for this sin...'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and

Countries, Section 256, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

What remains now of 'Romanism'? This thesis does have one justification: Nietzsche's preference for the sun and cheerfulness of the South. It is the old Germanic tendency and inclination towards the South. But what does this have to do with Romanism, with civilization, with Paris? Nietzsche is only mood-related to the heroic landscape of the Upper Engadine. Nietzsche and Romanism are as far apart in essence and mood as Upper Engadine and Paris.

4. Concept of Culture

If Nietzsche had only strived for a French decorative culture, why then his life's struggle for a culture? France is the heir to the formal culture of Roman imperialism. But Nietzsche did not form his concept of culture on Rome but on Hellas!

Indeed, in Nietzsche's 'anti-German' attacks, this is the main motif: the Germans have no culture. This is where his struggle begins, which is why the development of this struggle must be presented here: The young Nietzsche leads the fight for an original German culture by showing the formal, conventional culture of France as an example, not as a model: Against the cosmopolitan muddle of so-called German education, he calls upon the German spirit: *'Of course, one must understand how to seek out this German spirit first in its hiding places, under fashionable disguises or under piles of rubble, one must love it so much as not to be ashamed even of its stunted form, one must above all beware of confusing it with what now calls itself with proud gesture 'German culture of the present time'. With this, rather, that spirit is inwardly at enmity'* (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag II) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Compare how here, 15 years earlier, a concept of the German spirit already applies, which already contains all the essentials of what Nietzsche later wants to be understood by the 'anti-political German', by the 'More-German'.

What he later calls the 'lack of contrast between opposites' is fought here as a 'cosmopolitan aggregate':

'What now calls itself with particular conceit 'German culture' is a cosmopolitan aggregate, which relates to the German spirit as the journalist to Schiller, as Meyerbeer to Beethoven'. 'This was only possible under the influence of the fundamentally un-Germanic civilization of the French, which was imitated inactively and with uncertain taste, and in this imitation gave German society and press, art and stylistics a gleaming form. But the copy nowhere achieves such an artistically complete effect as that original civilization of France grown out of the essence of the Romanic' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag II) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

So, France is the example of a formally unified original culture. And the model?

'There is an old struggle of the Germans against antiquity, that is, against the old culture: it is certain that precisely the best and deepest in the German resists it. But the main point is this: that resistance is only right if one means the Romanized culture: but this is already the decay of a much deeper and nobler one. Against this, the German resists wrongly' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[38]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Not Rome, but Greek culture is the model for an original folk culture. Nietzsche shows how the Greeks warded off foreign influence and found the unity of essence and life.

The Greeks had, for centuries, like us, been in danger of being flooded by the foreign and past. They had never lived in proud untouchability: their 'education' had rather long been a chaos of foreign, Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, Egyptian forms and concepts, and their religion a veritable battle of gods of the entire Orient: *'Similar to how now 'German education' and religion is a chaos fighting within itself of the entire foreign world, of the entire past'*. Nevertheless, Hellenic culture was not an aggregate... *'the Greeks had gradually learned to organize the chaos, by reflecting on themselves, according to the Delphic doctrine, that is, on their genuine needs and letting the apparent needs die off'* (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, 10) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'This is a parable for each of us individually: he must organize the chaos... He then learns to understand that culture can be something other than decoration of life... Thus, the Greek concept of culture is unveiled to him, in contrast to the Romanic, the concept of culture as a new and improved physis, without inside and outside, without pretense and convention, of culture as a unity between living, thinking, appearing and willing'. This culture must arise.

'May it itself be able to bring about the fall of an entire decorative culture' (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II [Untimely Meditations II], 10) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Then the German spirit may *'after its return to the primal source of its being, dare to stride boldly and freely before all peoples, without the leading strings of a Romanic civilization: if only it understands how to learn unswervingly from one people, from whom to be able to learn at all is already a high glory and a distinguished rarity, from the Greeks'* (Die Geburt der Tragödie, 19) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

If Nietzsche had already had access to the results of today's prehistory research, then for him not only Greek but also ancient Germanic culture would

have been a model for the Germans. After the victory of 1870/71, Nietzsche fears that the German might want to evade his cultural task: *'He would rather play the fool, be an ape, rather learn manners and arts through which life becomes entertaining'*.

But one could no longer insult the German spirit more than if one treated it as if it were made of wax, so that one day one could also knead elegance into it. And if it were unfortunately true that a good part of the Germans would like to be kneaded and reshaped, then it should be said against this until it is heard: *'it no longer dwells with you, that old German nature, which is indeed hard, harsh and full of resistance, but the most precious material, on which only the greatest sculptors may work...'* (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen III, 5) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In such sentences, actually all the tendencies of Nietzsche's attacks up to the last time are already present. It is basically always that reproach, from the *Untimely Meditation* to *Ecce Homo*: *'The lack of contrast between opposites'*, the absence of culture:

'So, one lives, compared to earlier times, even today still in a sloppily incorrect French convention, as all our walking, standing, conversing, dressing, dwelling indicates. While believing to retreat to the natural, one only chose self-indulgence, comfort and the smallest possible measure of self-overcoming. One may wander through a German city, all conventions, when compared daily with the national peculiarity of foreign cities, show themselves in the negative, everything is colorless, worn out, poorly copied, negligent... The sense of form is almost ironically rejected by the Germans, for they have the sense of content: they are after all the famous people of inwardness... Now there is also a famous danger of inwardness... the foreigner will always retain some right when he reproaches us that our inner self is too weak and disordered to affect the outside and give itself a form' (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'I only want to speak straightforwardly about us Germans of the present, who suffer more than any other people from that weakness of personality and from the contradiction between content and form'.

Therefore, Nietzsche demands a new concept of culture: *'Culture is above all unity of artistic style in all life expressions of a people. Much knowledge and learning are, however, neither a necessary means of culture, nor a sign of it, and is compatible if necessary with the opposite of culture: barbarism, i.e., stylelessness or the chaotic jumble of all styles'* (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen I, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

But the German of the present lives in this chaotic jumble of all styles. This is proven by *'...every glance at his clothing, his rooms, his house, every walk*

through the streets of his cities, every visit to the magazines of art fashion dealers; in the midst of social intercourse, he should become aware of the origin of his manners and movements, in the midst of our art institutions, concerts, theater and muse pleasures of the grotesque side-by-side and on-top-of-each-other of all possible styles’.

‘The German piles up around himself the forms, colors, products and curiosities of all times and zones and thereby produces that fairground colorfulness which his scholars then in turn have to regard and formulate as the ‘Modern as such’: he himself remains calmly seated in this tumult of all styles...’ (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

True culture is the opposite: ‘The culture of a people reveals itself in the unified taming of the drives of this people... In all Greek drives, a taming unity shows itself...’ (Notebook 19, summer 1872-beginning of 1873, 19[41]) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2009).

Nietzsche fights this battle for the German people. He wants the unity of German life: ‘...the people to whom one attributes a culture should only in all reality be something living and unified and not so miserably fall apart into inner and outer, into content and form... so my testimony shall explicitly stand here that it is German unity in that highest sense which we strive for and more fervently strive for than political reunification, the unity of German spirit and life after the destruction of the opposition between form and content, between inwardness and convention’ (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Not the formal-decorative culture of France is Nietzsche’s cultural goal but the German unity of form and content after the unattained model of Greece. But Nietzsche’s youthful hopes are shattered. As if with a shattering premonition of his fate, he already writes then of the ‘genuine German spirit’: ‘He is a stranger: in lonely sorrow he passes by and there the censer is swung before that pseudo-culture which, under the cheers of ‘educated’ teachers and newspaper writers, has usurped his name, his dignities and plays a shameful game with the word ‘German’ (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag III) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2009).

Although Nietzsche despairs of Wagner, he has not given up hope for a German culture in his innermost being repeatedly the ray of light of faith in the German genius breaks through, often in the midst of seemingly sharpest attacks.

‘Is it true that it belongs to the essence of the German to be styleless? Or is it a sign of his incompleteness? It is probably so: that which is German has not yet fully emerged clearly. It cannot be learned by looking back: one must trust one’s own strength’.

‘The German essence is not yet there at all, it must first become, so that above all it may be visible and honest to itself. But every birth is painful and violent...’ ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [2 =U II 2. Sommer-Herbst 1873], 29[123]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘In Germany, there has been no culture so far, but only mystical separatists. Always only individuals, that is a consolation!’ ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[240]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Hitherto there had been no German culture. Against this proposition it is no objection that there were great individual figures in Germany (Goethe etc.): for these had a culture of their own. But precisely around them, as it were like mighty, defiant, isolated rocks, there always lay the rest of the German essence as their antithesis, namely like a soft, marshy, unsure ground, on which every step and tread of the foreigner made ‘impressions’ and - ‘formed’: German culture was a thing without character, an almost unbounded compliance’ (Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 7, p. 791).

‘The Germans have no culture’, that is, according to Nietzsche, above all the Germans still have no German culture, they still have no original culture. Not against the German cultural possibility but against the German stylistic muddle is the formal yet original culture of France, or rather French civilization, played off. One thing is absolutely certain, that Nietzsche’s goal was never the artistic, civilizational formal culture of France. His entire philosophy is indeed the struggle of the content against the formal, of nature’s unfolding against stylized nature, of the Germanic against the Romanic, culture against civilization.

In the time of *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche summed up his actual opinion about French culture in one sentence: ‘France at the forefront of culture, a sign of Europe’s decline...’ ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[112]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

With *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche’s detachment from the concept of the people begins. At the same time, he calls the belief in the rebirth of ‘completed original folk cultures’ a ‘romantic fantasy’ (*Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, First Division, First and last things, Aphorism 24, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.*) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

We, however, have rediscovered the concept of the people and brought it to its highest development and maturity. What was previously instinct, and feeling has become clearly conscious through biological foundation. The people are the center of our actions and goals. With this, the cultural philosophy of the young Nietzsche becomes relevant for us again. Albeit with limitations.

1. Art and culture are not for us the purpose of the people, not the people are for culture, but

culture is for the people. Nietzsche accentuates culture too strongly. The life of the people itself is always higher for us than the unity of artistic style in all life expressions...

2. Although there has been no original German culture so far, our cultural creations are not only 'separatist'. We are proud of a wealth of typically German cultural creations.
3. Our model is not only Greek culture, but also ancient Germanic culture.

Nietzsche's demand for the unity of form and content is in the deepest sense the demand for totality of a people's life: Culture is this totality.

The more we promote Volk, the more justified becomes the hope for an original German culture. The first prerequisite was a unified worldview. National Socialism has created it and will transform the entire Volk with it. The second prerequisite lies in increasing the racial core substance of our Volk. From spiritual and racial unity must be born the unity of lifestyle. Worldview and Nordification shall build the foundation for a coming German culture. That is our deepest obligation and proudest hope.

5. Hope and Confession

There can be no justified doubt that Nietzsche fought against the Germans politically, especially as a 'Reich'. This is the ultimate meaning of his formula 'to be good German means to de-Germanize oneself'. Likewise, he fights against the un-Germanic in Germans and German national weaknesses with all psychological and even racial arguments.

At the core, however, he remains German and believes in the Germans, and he criticizes most sharply where he still has hopes alone.

'Where one despises, one cannot wage war... On the contrary, attacking is for me proof of goodwill, under circumstances of gratitude' (Ecce Homo, Warum ich so weise bin, 7) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Once again, let us point to that sentence in *Ecce Homo* which, placed right in the midst of the most extreme challenges, indeed insults to the Germans, encompasses Nietzsche's true confession to being German: *'On the other hand, I am perhaps more German than present-day Germans, mere Reich Germans, are still able to be, I, the last anti-political German'* (Ecce Homo, 3, First Version, October 1888, see Ecce Homo, Why I am so wise, 3, Vol. 17, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

Nietzsche has not treated the Germans as badly as the Germans have treated him! The old ingratitude of the Germans towards their greatest.

It is excusable that Nietzsche has often been misunderstood. He demands much from the reader. However, it seems incomprehensible to me that until today, he has not been sufficiently appreciated for his incomparable art of language. What he has given to German prose alone ranks him among the great creators of all time. His images lie in an almost mystical-religious glow. Only a German can experience nature so deeply, with a sanctifying feeling for the world. Nietzsche philosophizes in images and moods, the most sensual becomes spiritual, the most spiritual sensual. After Luther, Nietzsche is the greatest creator and shaper of German prose.

Now, randomly from all life epochs, those passages where Nietzsche (without regard to time-bound contradictions), beyond his political system, directly speaks of German essence and German hopes: *'Who else but the German youth will have the fearlessness of gaze and the lordly trait towards the immense, to turn their back on all those weak comfort doctrines of liberal optimism in every form and to live resolutely in the whole and full'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [11=Mp XII 1b. Februar 71], 11[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche has a new concept of the barbarian: *'... the Germans are barbarians, despite all those humane qualities. If one had to wish them, the barbarians, victory, it was of course not because they are barbarians, but because the hope for an emerging culture sanctifies the Germans: while there is no consideration for a degenerate and exhausted culture: Not the woman who lets her child degenerate, but the one who will give birth, is sacred to the law'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [19=P I 20b. Sommer 1872-Anfang 1873], 19[312]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This is also the reason for the glorification of Viking culture, the 'blonde beast', the heroes of the Nordic early period, they are the 'barbarians of the heights'.

'I merely point to something new: certainly, for such a democratic being there is the danger of the barbarian, but one seeks it only in the depths. There is also another kind of barbarian, they come from the heights: a kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are looking for material they can shape. Prometheus was such a barbarian' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [34=N VII 1. April-Juni 1885], 34[112]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The starting point is the Prussian soldier'. This characteristic attitude of Nietzsche is still far too little known. Especially the following glorification of Fredericianism proves how strongly a Prussian-soldierly trait was alive in him. Frederick William I: *'That unscrupulous enthusiast for tall, well-built grenadiers, who as King of Prussia gave existence to a military and skeptical genius and thus fundamentally to that new, now victorious emerging type of German... he knew which*

deficiency was a hundred times more anxious and urgent than, say, the lack of education and social form... Men were lacking...’.

The spiritual Fredericianism: ‘... Meanwhile, in his son grew that more dangerous and harder new kind of skepticism... the skepticism of daring masculinity, which is most closely related to genius for war and conquest, and which made its first entry into Germany in the form of Frederick the Great. This skepticism ages and yet tears at itself; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe, but it does not lose itself in the process; it gives the spirit dangerous freedom, but it keeps the heart strict; it is the German form of skepticism, which, as a continued and spiritually heightened Fredericianism, brought Europe for a good time under the supremacy of the German spirit and its critical and historical distrust’.

‘... be it as fearlessness of gaze, as bravery and hardness of the warring hand, as stubborn will for dangerous voyages of discovery, for spiritualized North Pole expeditions under desolate and dangerous skies. It may be good reasons when warm-blooded and superficial humanity-humans cross themselves precisely before this spirit: cet esprit fataliste, ironique, mephistophélique Michelet calls it, not without shuddering.

But if one wants to feel how distinguishing this fear of the ‘man’ in the German spirit is, through which Europe was awakened from its dogmatic slumber, one should remember the former concept that had to be overcome with it, and how it is not too long ago that a masculinized woman dared, in unbridled arrogance, to recommend the Germans to Europe’s sympathy as gentle, good-hearted, weak-willed and poetic bumpkins’ (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 209. Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

I have already pointed out that it is Nietzsche’s sharpest denial of the French when he characterizes the French as disposed to Christianity. Conversely, it is his strongest affirmation when he considers the Germans as natural non-Christians. About *The Birth of Tragedy* there is a passage in the estate: ‘In this book, the transplantation of a deeply un-German myth, the Christian one, into the German heart is regarded as the truly German fate’ ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [1 =W II 5. Frühjahr 1888], 14[20]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And after almost two decades: ‘I cannot understand how a German could ever feel Christian’ (Der Antichrist, 60) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The Germans as the first un-Christian people of Europe: ‘The ‘Germans’: originally, the word meant the ‘heathens’. It would still be possible for the Germans to make a title of honor out of their old term of abuse, by

becoming the first un-Christian people of Europe, for which Schopenhauer credited them as being highly predisposed. Thus, Luther’s work would come to completion, who taught them to be un-Roman and to say: Here I stand! I can do no other!’ (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Drittes Buch, 146) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2001).

The Germans and the Greeks: ‘The Germans have perhaps only ended up in the wrong climate! There is something in them that could be Hellenic, that awakens upon contact with the South, Winckelmann, Goethe, Mozart. Ultimately: we are still very young - - -’ ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[162]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

He dreams of the ‘rebirth of Greece from the renewal of the German spirit’ ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [16=P II 8b. Sommer 1871-Frühjahr 1872], 16[44]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016). Even in the Will to Power, the German spirit appears as the ‘new Columbus’, the ‘discoverer of the old world’ ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[8]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

‘... we are becoming more Greek by the day, first, as is proper, in concepts and valuations, ... but one day hopefully also with our bodies! Here lies (and has always lain) my hope for the German essence!’ ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [41=W I 5a. August-September 1885], 41[4]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The German as Anti-Christ and as heir of the Greeks! No other people have Nietzsche so distinguished. And now a masterful psychology of the German essence: ‘A German is capable of great things, but it is unlikely that he does them: for he obeys wherever he can, as this pleases an inherently lazy spirit. If he is forced into distress, to go alone, ... he discovers his powers: then he becomes dangerous, evil, deep, daring and brings to light the treasure of sleeping energy he carries within himself, which otherwise no one (not even he himself) believed in ... so that he is then, as said, equal to great things that bear no relation to the ‘weak character’ he presupposes in himself’.

German history is rich enough in examples.

‘Usually, however, he fears depending on himself alone, to improvise, which is why Germany consumes so many officials and so much ink. Frivolity is foreign to him; he is too anxious for it; but in entirely new situations that draw him out of his drowsiness, he is almost frivolous ... and he understands intoxication!

... The advantage and disadvantage of the Germans and even their scholars have hitherto been that they were closer to superstition and the desire to believe than other peoples ...’.

Only in Germany could 50 parties once be taken seriously.

'When a German did something great, it happened in distress, in a state of bravery, of clenched teeth, of tense prudence and often of generosity ... almost every German has something to give if one understands how to bring him to find it, find it again (he is disorderly within himself).'

'Man must have something to which he can obey unconditionally' ... that is a German sentiment, one encounters it at the bottom of all German moral teachings ... but, I know, when the German gets into the state where he is capable of great things, he always rises above morality! ... Now he must do something new, namely command ... but his German morality has not taught him to command!' (Daybreak, Third Book, Attitude of the Germans towards morality, section 207, Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche et al., 1997; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

'What the German spirit could be, who has not already had melancholy thoughts about it! But this people have willfully stupefied itself, for nearly a millennium: nowhere have the two great European narcotics, alcohol and Christianity, been more viciously abused' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Was den Deutschen abgeht, 2) (F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

The true German spirit: *'German scholarship, German inventiveness, the honest German drive for knowledge, the German diligence capable of self-sacrifice, beautiful and glorious things that other nations will envy you, indeed the most beautiful and glorious things in the world, if only that true German spirit were spread over them all as a dark, flashing, fertilizing, blessing cloud ...' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag V) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).*

50 years ago, Nietzsche called Christianity the un-German myth, and even then he wanted to lead the Germans back to the origins of their essence, on that path that early history now shows us.

'It hardly seems possible to transplant a foreign myth with lasting success ... We hold so much to the pure and vigorous core of the German essence that we dare to expect precisely from it that violent expulsion of implanted foreign elements, and consider it possible that the German spirit will reflect upon itself ... But may it never believe it can fight similar battles without its household gods, without its mythical home, without a 'restoration' of all German things!' (Die Geburt der Tragödie, Vorwort an Richard Wagner, 23) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Let no one believe that the German spirit has forever lost its mythical home when it still so clearly understands the bird voices that tell of that home. One day it will find itself awake, in all the morning freshness

of an enormous sleep: then it will slay dragons, destroy the malicious dwarves and awaken Brünnhilde, and Wotan's spear itself will not be able to block its path!' (Die Geburt der Tragödie, Vorwort an Richard Wagner, 24) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And 15 years later, after isolation and bitterest disappointments: *'I heard, once again for the first time, Richard Wagner's overture to the Meistersingers: ... something German, in the best and worst sense of the word, something in the German manner that is manifold, shapeless and inexhaustible; a certain German mightiness and over-fullness of the soul, which has no fear of hiding under the refinements of decadence, which perhaps feels most at home there; a real and true sign of the German soul, which is at once young and aged, over-ripe and still rich in future. This kind of music expresses best what I think of the Germans: they are of the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow, they have as yet not today' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 240, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).*

Are we already the 'day after tomorrow'?

'The Germans are still nothing, but they are becoming something; thus, they have not yet any culture, thus they cannot yet have any culture. That is my proposition: let him who must take offense at it. They are still nothing: that means, they are all sorts of things. They will become something: that means, they will one day cease to be all sorts of things. The latter is basically only a wish, hardly yet a hope; fortunately, a wish on which one can live, a matter of will, of work, of discipline, of breeding as well as a matter of displeasure, of longing, of deprivation, of discomfort, indeed of bitterness, in short, we Germans want something from ourselves that was not yet wanted from us we want something more!!' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [36=W I 4. Juni-Juli 1885], 36[53]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

National Socialism has taken up this willing. As gratitude and sacred obligation also to that loneliest fighter, whom we may count among our own with pride: Friedrich Nietzsche, the Germanic German.

XII. Europe

1. Overcoming the National

Nietzsche wants Europe as a political unity. But is his goal a Pan-Europe? Does he have anything in common with a Coudenhove-Kalergi? It is not difficult today, equipped with the experiences of recent decades, to 'refute' Nietzsche's conception of Europe. It is more difficult to measure what it meant, in the 1870s, in the midst of a nation-state and dynastic development, to proclaim a new Europe.

Nietzsche sees and expects a series of technical, economic, and political facts that would increasingly force a unification of Europe.

'The economic unification of Europe comes with necessity' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[235]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The small states of Europe, I mean all our current states and 'empires', must, given the absolute drive of great commerce and trade towards an ultimate boundary, towards world trade and world commerce, become economically untenable in a short time (Money alone already compels Europe to eventually coalesce into one power)' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[9]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Trade and industry, the exchange of books and letters, the commonality of all higher culture, the rapid change of home and landscape, the present nomadic life of all non-landowners, these circumstances necessarily bring about a weakening and ultimately a destruction of nations, at least of the European ones: that from all of them, as a result of continuous crossbreeding, a mixed race, that of the European man, must emerge' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight, Division, A glance at the State, Aphorism 475, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

What begins here with still uncertain arguments then increasingly condenses into the conception of a new Europe. The development towards inner racial, spiritual, and cultural unity precedes the political formation.

'The equalization of the European man is the great process that cannot be hindered: one should even accelerate it' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[153]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016) (see above).

'The diversity of languages most prevents seeing what is fundamentally taking place, the disappearance of the national and the production of the European man' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [19=U II 5c. Oktober-Dezember 1876], 19[75]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'I look beyond all these national wars, new 'empires', and whatever else stands in the foreground. What concerns me, for I see it preparing itself slowly and hesitantly, is the One Europe' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[9]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Europe is to be conceived as a cultural center: national follies should not blind us to the already existing continuous mutual dependence in the higher region, e.g.: France and German philosophy, Richard Wagner and Paris (1830-50), Goethe and Greece. Everything strives towards a synthesis of the European past in the highest spiritual types' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[112]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'In all the more extensive and profound people of this century, it has been the actual collective work of

their souls to prepare that new synthesis and to experimentally anticipate the 'European of the future': only in their weaker hours or when they grew old did they fall back into the national limitation of 'fatherlands'. Thus: Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Schopenhauer ...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[9]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche repeatedly attempts to justify the compulsion towards European unity also on racial-biological grounds. *'... behind all the moral and political foregrounds ... an immense physiological process of assimilation of Europeans is taking place, their growing detachment, from conditions under which climatically and class-bound races arise, their increasing independence from any specific milieu ..., thus the slow emergence of an essentially supranational and nomadic type of man, who, physiologically speaking, possesses as his typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 241, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

This process of the emerging European could indeed be delayed by great relapses in tempo but might gain in vehemence and depth precisely because of this. The currently raging storm and stress of 'national feeling' was only a temporary relapse, as was the emerging anarchism.

'This process probably leads to results on which its naive promoters and panegyrists, the apostles of 'modern ideas', would least like to reckon' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 242, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'Our Europe of today, the scene of an absurdly sudden attempt at radical class and consequently race mixing' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909) (see 'Race').

Nietzsche fears that European hybridization has progressed so far that *'mendacity and slough'* are necessary *'to raise racial questions in today's mishmash Europe'* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [5=N VII 3. Sommer 1886-Herbst 1887], 5[52]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016) (see 'Race').

The result of this denationalization and racial hybridization is initially the *'future European: the same as the more intelligent slave animal, very industrious, fundamentally very modest, excessively curious, manifold, pampered, weak-willed, a cosmopolitan chaos of affects and intelligence'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[31]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

2. New Europe

Yet this is only the negative side of that development. Simultaneously with the bastardized herd-European, the 'good European' or the 'higher European' emerges. *'The same new conditions under which on average an equalization and mediocritization of man will develop, a useful, industrious, variously serviceable and skillful herd-animal man, are in the highest degree suitable to give rise to exceptional men of the most dangerous and attractive quality'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 242, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The democratization of Europe produces a type prepared for slavery in the finest sense. But at the same time, in individual and exceptional cases, the strong man must turn out stronger and richer than ever before. *'The democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the breeding of tyrants, the word understood in every sense, even in the most spiritual'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 242, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). *'The sight of the present European gives me hopes: a daring ruling race is forming there on the broad base of an extremely intelligent herd-mass'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [34=N VII 1. April-Juni 1885], 34[94]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This new Europe should be 'Napoleonic': *Napoleon: ... 'thus one will one day be able to credit him with the fact that the man in Europe has again become master over the merchant and the Philistine; perhaps even over 'woman', who has been pampered by Christianity and the enthusiastic spirit of the eighteenth century, even more by 'modern ideas''*.

Napoleon had seen in modern ideas and straight in civilization something like a personal enemy and had proven himself with this enmity as the greatest continuator of the Renaissance: he had brought back a piece of ancient essence, perhaps the decisive one, the piece of granite. This piece of ancient essence would finally become master over the national movement again and make itself in the affirmative sense the heir and continuator of Napoleon: *'who, as is known, wanted the one Europe, and this as mistress of the earth'* (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Fünftes Buch, Wir Furchtlosen, 362) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

There was still no reason for discouragement. Whoever preserves and cultivates a strong will, together with a broad mind, has more favorable chances than ever. For the trainability of man has become very great in this democratic Europe; men who learn easily, who easily submit, were the rule: the herd animal, even highly intelligent, is prepared. *'Whoever can command finds those who must obey I think for example of Napoleon and*

Bismarck' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[449]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The new mood of Europe: *'... The fight against Plato, or to say it more intelligibly and for the 'people', the fight against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia, for Christianity is Platonism for the 'people', has created in Europe a magnificent tension of spirit, such as had not yet existed on earth: with such a tense bow one can now shoot for the most distant targets'*.

From Nietzsche's bold belief, one can gauge what a setback O. Spengler's prophecy of decline represents.

The European man indeed perceives this state as an emergency; and twice already attempts have been made on a grand scale to unstring the bow. Once through Jesuitism, for the second time through democratic enlightenment: *'But we, who are neither Jesuits nor democrats, nor even German enough, we good Europeans and free, very free spirits, we still have it, the whole distress of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the task, who knows, the target'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Preface, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'I rejoice in the military development of Europe, also in the inner anarchic conditions: the time of rest and of Chineseness, which Galiani predicted for the century, is over. Personal manly competence, physical competence is gaining value again, assessments are becoming more physical, nutrition meatier. Beautiful men are becoming possible again. The pale sanctimoniousness (with mandarins at the top, as Comte dreamed it) is over. The barbarian is affirmed in each of us, also the wild animal. Precisely because of this, there will be more philosophers. ... Kant is a scarecrow at some point!' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[417]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

About the concrete form of European unity, there are only hints: For Nietzsche, the external organizational transformation is not the essential thing. Decisive for him is the compulsory emergence of the European slave and master class. The concrete determination of the new political form is less important to him. An attempt dates from the crisis period. The practical result of the spreading democratization would be, first of all, a European league of nations, in which each individual nation, demarcated according to geographical expediences, would hold the position of a canton and its special rights. *'... The corrections of borders that would prove necessary should be conducted in such a way as to serve the interests of the large cantons and at the same time those of the overall association, not the memory of any antiquated past. That would be the task of future diplomats, who would have to be cultural researchers, agriculturists, and experts in transportation, and who would have reasons and utilities behind them rather than armies. Only then would foreign*

policy be inseparably linked with domestic policy: whereas now the latter still runs after its proud mistress and collects in the miserable basket the ears of corn that remained after the harvest of the former' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, The Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 292. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

This is the only and uncertain attempt to hint at the new political form of Europe. Far bolder is the vision and task of the 'good Europeans': '*... to prepare that still so distant state of affairs where the good Europeans' task falls into their hands: the direction and supervision of the entire earth's culture'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, The Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 88. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

3. The Historical Development

Nietzsche's conception of Europe shows the full audacity of his political thinking and equally, his practical-concrete uncertainty. However, Nietzsche's starting point must always be noted. The national-political position is missing. He judges as the supranational philosopher, the 'legislator of the earth', the thinker of life: '*Starting from a conception of life (which is not a will-to-self-preservation, but a will-to-grow), I have given a view over the basic instincts of our political, spiritual, social movement of Europe'* ([Fragmente 1885–1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885–Herbst 1886], 2[179]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And Nietzsche did not have at his disposal the revolutionary historical experiences of the last decades. The supposed unifying tendencies of the progress of traffic and technology had the opposite effect. Nationalism has rather forced the most modern inventions into its service. The World War brought the greatest, albeit misguided, outbreak of national passion of all time. Versailles destroyed all serious European hopes. The League of Nations became the cynical caricature of all honestly meant European community endeavors.

The World War and its consequences had dangerously shaken Europe's geopolitical position. Independence movements and self-determination of colonial peoples threatened the European powers, Japan had emerged as a counterplayer and great power, the U.S.A., distancing itself from Europe since 1770, became from the blood business of the great war from a debtor country to a creditor, to the leading capital power of the earth, France increased its African bindings and Russia pushed more and more into Central Asia.

Then the supranational powers, only partially recognized by Nietzsche, gained more powerful influence on Europe from decade to decade: Judaism,

world freemasonry, international high finance, Jesuit Catholicism and Bolshevism.

Nietzsche lacked these experiences. Besides, he was undoubtedly subject to partly time-conditioned, historical, racial and political errors.

The prerequisite for a substantial European unity would be the physiological-racial unity, the European people. Nietzsche was mistaken in the racial uniformity as well as in the assumption of a growing assimilation (see Race). The racial contrasts of the European peoples are greater than Nietzsche assumed, and they are further increased by the coming racial politics with the exclusion of Jews and colored people and strengthening of the racial core substance of the peoples.

Likewise, Nietzsche underestimates the strength of the ethnic self-will, as well as the power of persistence of the historically evolved. Even the German unification, which was actually a reunification, and indeed of racially and historically related peoples, even this unification was only possible under foreign political pressure and with 'blood and iron'.

Nietzsche's underestimation of the national is especially evident in his misjudgment of the Wars of Liberation and the political overestimation of Napoleon and Frederick II, whom he once praises as '*that first European to my taste'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 256, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909). Both pursued inorganic, supranational politics.

Napoleon and the example of the Wars of Liberation should have proven to Nietzsche that peoples are stronger than formalistic imperialism. Although it must be noted that he was not only thinking of the present but in centuries. Yet history since 1895 shows that even the development over centuries could not take the course Nietzsche expected.

The ultimate cause of this misjudgment probably lies in the time-conditioned lack of biological knowledge (see People, Race, etc.).

4. Essence of Europe

That Nietzsche nevertheless did not want a Pan-Europe, that offspring of the bastard brain of a Coudenhove-Kalergi, should already be proven from the quotations so far. Nietzsche does believe in an inevitable racial mixing in Europe. But above the mishmash should rise a new ruling class: '*... for I am already touching on my seriousness, on the 'European problem' as I understand it, on the breeding of a new caste ruling over Europe'* (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 8, Peoples and Countries, Section 251, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

This is supposed to be the justification for the herd of the mediocre. *'A terrible decision is being conjured up; Europe is being put before the consequence of whether its will 'wills' downfall. Prevention of mediocritization, rather downfall!'* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[131]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Just as little was Nietzsche a cosmopolitan. For himself applies what he assumes in a posthumous passage about the greatest Germans: *'The great unsatisfied heart, which is far greater than a nation. ... One calls it vulgarly the cosmopolitanism of the German, but that is only a caricature. The Germans are not national, but also not cosmopolitan, the greatest Germans ...'* ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [11=U II 9. Mp XIII 4, 6-8. 47. Sommer 1875], 11[4]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

For him, there also exists no 'humanity' (in the sense of a whole, instead of a sum of peoples): *'To speak of an unconscious goal of humanity I consider false. It is not a whole like an anthill. Perhaps one can speak of the unconscious goal of a city, a people: but what does it mean to speak of the unconscious goal of all anthills of the earth!'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [19=P I 20b. Sommer 1872-Anfang 1873], 19[160]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Not 'humanity', but overman is the goal!' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[232]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'That humanity should have a collective task to solve, that it as a whole should run towards some goal, this very unclear and arbitrary notion is still very young. Perhaps it will be gotten rid of before it becomes an 'idée fixe' ...'

'It is not a whole, this humanity: it is an insoluble multiplicity of ascending and descending life-processes, it does not have one youth and then a maturity and finally an old age...' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[226]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Humanity! Was there ever a more hideous old woman among all old women?!' (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Fünftes Buch. Wir Furchtlosen, 377) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2001).

Europe is not yet a conscious political reality. Indeed, it is hardly geographically definable. It is equally difficult to define Europe historically. The Europe of around 1600 has little in parallel with today's. In an aphorism about the development of national costumes into European fashion, Nietzsche once attempts a definition of Europe: *'Here, where the concepts 'modern' and 'European' are almost equated, Europe is understood to encompass much more land than*

geographical Europe, the small peninsula of Asia, includes namely, America belongs to it as well, insofar as it is the daughter country of our culture. On the other hand, not even all of Europe falls under the cultural concept of 'Europe'...' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 215. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

Indeed, parts of North America are decidedly more 'European' than parts of Southern France. And if the U.S.A. describes itself as the nation of 100 million Frenchmen, that could become France's way to Africa, to a mulatto empire. Russia would become Central Asian under Jewish rule. England, however, resembles a pyramid whose tip is in Europe, whose base is non-European (but even geographical Europe, including Russia, comprises about 24% of the Earth's inhabitants, but hardly 6% of the Earth's space).

So where does Europe lie today and what is its actual significance? While the geopolitical, historical, and political delimitation of Europe is almost impossible in general, the question can be answered: where is the center and leadership of Europe?

Here, the surest definition of the European is the racial one. Nordic-Germanic blood created historical Europe and what, as European culture, has enriched the whole Earth. The core and center of Europe is where the conscious carriers of this blood live in this culture and continue to shape this culture. There must also lie the leadership of Europe. This is by no means meant to exclude non-Nordic determined peoples from the European family of nations, but only to show where the accent of the European lies. The new Europe does not come from a fictitious and backward-looking 'Latinity' or 'Romanity', but from the same racial and historical substance that created ancient Greece, ancient Rome, and Germania.

Nietzsche essentially acknowledges this too when he searches for the forces that should dominate Europe.

Of course, he cannot show a concrete power system of the future. Also, his hints in this direction are not without contradiction. But what Nietzsche left behind in individual allusions proves once again his political foresight and clairvoyance. For example, the following assessment of England: *'... but to enter the fight for the government of the earth with good prospects ... Europe probably needs to 'come to an understanding' with England: it needs England's colonies for this fight ...*

... namely, no one believes anymore that England itself is strong enough to continue its old role for another fifty years, it is perishing from the impossibility of excluding the homines novi from the government, and one must not have such a change of parties to prepare such lengthy things: one must first of all be a soldier today, in order not to lose one's credit as

a merchant ...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [37=W I 6a. Juni-Juli 1885], 37[9]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The 'Romanist' Nietzsche has greater hopes and expectations for the Russia of his time:

'Signs of the next century: Entry of the Russians into culture. A grandiose goal. Proximity to barbarism, awakening of the arts. Magnanimity of youth and fantastic madness and real willpower' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [7=N V 6. Ende 1880], 7[111]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'I see more inclination to greatness in the feelings of the Russian nihilists than in those of the English utilitarians. An intergrowing of the German and Slavic races, we also absolutely need the most skilled money people, the Jews, to have dominion on earth (see 'Jews') ... we need an unconditional cooperation with Russia, and with a new, common program, which does not apply English schemes in Russia. No American future...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[335]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The disease of the will was unevenly distributed across Europe: it showed itself greatest and most manifold where culture had been at home the longest; it disappeared to the extent that 'the barbarian' still, or again, asserted his right under the sloppy garment of Western education.

'In present-day France, accordingly, as one can easily infer as well as grasp with one's hands, the will is most seriously ill...'

The power to will, and to will a long will, was somewhat stronger already in Germany, and in northern Germany again stronger than in central Germany; considerably stronger in England, Spain, and Corsica, there bound to phlegm, here to hard skulls, not to speak of Italy, which would be too young to know yet what it wants, and which must first prove whether it can. But the greatest strength lay *'in that immense intermediate realm where Europe as it were flows back into Asia'*, in Russia. There, the strength to will had long been laid back and stored up, there the will waited, *'uncertain whether as a will of negation or of affirmation'*, *'I mean such an assumption of the menace of Russia that Europe would have to resolve to become equally menacing, namely, to acquire a will, through the means of a new caste ruling over Europe'*.

With that, the long-spun comedy of its petty statehood and likewise its dynastic as well as democratic multiplicity of will would finally come to an end (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Once Russia appears as *'the extended jaws of Asia that would like to swallow up little Europe...'*

(Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, the Wanderer and his Shadow, Fragment 231. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'To me, the inventive capacity and the accumulation of will-power appear greatest and most unused among the Slavs, thanks to an absolute regime; and a German-Slavic hereditary regime is not among the most improbable things...'

... The Germans should breed a ruling race...' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [34=N VII 1. April-Juni 1885], 34[111]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'... Slavic-Germanic-Nordic culture! the more spiritual, but stronger and more industrious!' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [11=M III 1. Frühjahr-Herbst 1881], 11[273]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

A certain contradiction remains open in the problem of Europe. Sometimes statements can be identified that are difficult to reconcile with the 'overcoming of the national'. Especially his hopes for the Germans seem to contradict this. When he writes about the Germans, they are *'from the day before yesterday and from the day after tomorrow'*, the German soul *'is still overrich in future ... we Germans would once cease to be all sorts of things ... We Germans want something from ourselves that one has not yet wanted from us, we want something more'* (see above). In one passage of the posthumous fragments, he even writes that already now one is practicing in the great principle of blood and race relationship, wars are the great teachers of such concepts ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [11=M III 1. Frühjahr-Herbst 1881], 11[273]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

These are undercurrents that do not abolish the Europe conception, but do prove how Nietzsche, in approaches consciously or unconsciously, corrects or at least limits his own conception.

Nietzsche's hopes lie least with the Romanics, more strongly with the 'Slavs', and he expects even more for the leadership of Europe from the German-Germanic (how Nietzsche would judge today's Russia is probably clear). This becomes even clearer in that Nietzsche names almost only Nordic-Germanic geniuses, especially Germans, as the 'good Europeans' or 'higher Europeans'. And what he demands in terms of value from the Europe of the future are Nordic-Germanic and above all German values.

5. Future of Europe

The more Germany reflects on its Nordic-Germanic nature, the greater its significance for the leadership of Europe becomes. Germany may not have the highest percentage, but numerically it has the most Nordic blood. In Germany, the race problem has reached the highest consciousness. It pursues the most modern

racial politics, supported by a Nordic-Germanic worldview. And thus, Germany is also the center of the actual European substance. It already has the racial and ideological leadership into the future. Germany is the conscience of Europe, of Germanic culture.

National Socialist Germany has the inner leadership of Europe, and thus one of Nietzsche's highest hopes is fulfilled, albeit not in the form he expected. In the goal setting, Nietzsche remains related to us beyond the mostly time-conditioned opposites. But the path is fundamentally different. We do not want European unity through mixing and blurring of historically organic borders, but the ordering of natural opposites, the European family of peoples, unity in diversity. At the Europe Congress in Rome from November 14-20, 1932, Alfred Rosenberg represented the emerging Europe before the world public for the first time: *'Pan-Europe' as an external political organic fact can only exist under the predominance of the Nordic-determined states and in the delimitation of the sphere of influence of the individual Nordic countries'* (Myth, p. 641 of the German edition). *'Not a raceless and peopleless 'Central Europe', as Naumann proclaimed, not a Franco-Jewish Pan-Europe, but a Nordic Europe is the slogan for the future, with a German Central Europe. Germany as a racial and national state, as the central power of the continent, as a safeguard of the South and Southeast; the Scandinavian states with Finland as a second rim, to secure the Northeast; and Great Britain as a safeguard of the West and overseas in the places where it is necessary in the interest of Nordic man'* (Myth, p. 642 of the German edition).

A German-Scandinavian bloc with the aim of securing Northern Europe against the communist wave, preventing the formation of a coalescing threat in the East; an alliance of this bloc with England, whose crumbling dominion is likewise only guaranteed through the prevention of a power-political Asianism; despite existing great tensions, joint support of a white racial policy in North America... A Mediterranean alliance under the leadership of Italy, in the Far East a yellow system of states with common preservation of white hegemonic interests through North America, England, and Germany... (Myth, p. 576 of the German edition). This is modern European and world political thinking, limited by organic realities.

Nietzsche's mission lay here too in stimulation. We do not see Germany from Europe's perspective, but Europe from Germany's perspective. For us, there are only European interests if they are simultaneously German interests. We know that just as little as the Frankfurt Parliament created German unity, an egalitarian-mechanistic League of Nations can shape the new Europe.

Nietzsche wants to go beyond European politics. He demands earth politics. The task of the

'higher Europeans' is the 'guidance of earth culture, the government of the earth'. Great politics sets itself 'goals encompassing the whole earth' and the great politicians are the 'masters of the earth'

'The task of earth government is coming. And with it the question: how do we want the future of humanity! New tables of values are necessary. And struggle against the representatives of the old 'eternal' values as the highest concern!...'

'Who should be the master of the earth? That is the refrain of my practical philosophy' ([Fragmente 1884–1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[247]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Insofar as Nietzsche's demand contains formal-imperialistic, 'Napoleonic', tendencies, we reject them. Nevertheless, he remains correct in the fundamental direction of his will. We can no longer today, and even less so in the future, exclude ourselves from genuine world politics. The current state, viewed politically, is merely a transitional stage. For world politics, as for any politics, Plato's words apply: *'The greatest punishment is to be governed by someone worse when one does not resolve to govern oneself'* (Republic).

Germany must never become an object in world politics. Yet just as we recognize European interests only when they are simultaneously German, we will acknowledge world political tasks only insofar as they are simultaneously German. This is the only real and honest stance a people can take towards its continental and world political interests.

If a general world political goal can be theoretically posited at all, it seems to me to be a hierarchy in Nietzsche's sense: a ranking of peoples according to the unity of power and value, inner greatness and external influence, unity of power order and value order. Not the same for everyone, but to each their own, this should one day apply to peoples as well! The path to this goal is not imperialistic and unorganic unnaturalness, but elimination of inorganic and reinforcement of organic boundaries, not equalization of all tensions and opposites, but naturally structured power and alliance systems. That where fateful and racial commonalities are or become greater than what has hitherto been divisive, that there, over decades and centuries, beyond alliance systems, deeper communities may one day arise, is a hope, perhaps one day a reality.

The prerequisite for a new world politics, however, is a new Europe. Yet the Europe of the future can no longer grow from the idols of Rousseau, nor from Napoleon, but only from the spirit of Schiller.

XIII. State

1. The State as Institution

How is it possible that the thinker of power, of dominion structures, the teacher of hierarchy and 'Great Politics' fights against the state with the most hostile means?

Is it the true state that he attacks? Or is it the state of 'trading society', the crutch of dynasties, the administrative state, the state as bureaucracy, the caricature of the true state?

Nietzsche also asks about the meaning, the content, the justification of the state. Does the state serve life, culture, the totality of life?

'The subordination which is so highly valued in the military and civil service state will soon become as incredible to us as the closed tactics of the Jesuits have already become... It must disappear, for its foundation is disappearing: the belief in unconditional authority, in definitive truth...' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, A glance at the State, Aphorism 441, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

He describes in detail under 'Religion and Government' that this state cannot be maintained without the support of religion and without the blessing of priests. This means, however, that this type of state lacks its own meaning and content.

'The interest of the tutelary government and the interest of religion go hand in hand, so that when the latter begins to die out, the foundation of the state is also shaken. The belief in a divine order of political affairs, in a mystery in the existence of the state, is of religious origin: if religion disappears, the state will inevitably lose its old Isis veil and no longer evoke any reverence.'

One should always note which 'state', and which 'religion' Nietzsche has in mind. The sovereignty of the people serves to dispel the last magic and superstition in the realm of these sentiments; modern democracy is the historical form of the decline of the state. The prospect that arises through this certain decline is not in every respect an unfortunate one... (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, Glance at the State, Aphorism 472, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche thus reckons with the certain end of the 'state'. However, chaos does not follow, but an even more purposeful invention than the state would come to victory over the state (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, Glance at the State, Aphorism 472, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'The contempt, decay, and death of the state, the unleashing of the private person (I refrain from saying: of the individual) is the consequence of the democratic concept of the state, here lies its mission' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, Glance at the State, Aphorism 472, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

To the liberal night-watchman state, Nietzsche calls out: 'As little state as possible'. *'To make society thief-proof and fire-proof and infinitely convenient for every trade and transaction, and to transform the state into a providence in the good and bad sense, these are low, moderate, and not absolutely indispensable goals, which one should not strive for with the highest means and tools that exist at all, the means that one should save precisely for the highest and rarest purposes!'* (Daybreak, Third Book, as little of the State as possible, section 179. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1997; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

With this, Nietzsche gives a concise but apt characterization of the atrophied form of the state. The negative side of his critique is directed against this.

The 'highest and rarest purposes' for him are culture, the enhancement of life. That state only wants comfortable trade and commerce. To serve it is not the highest duty of man, but a 'stupidity' (Morgenröthe, Drittes Buch, 179) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The mere power state is also rejected. This would also only be determined by the most evil and coarsest forces, *'by the egoism of the acquisitive and the military despots. The state in the hands of the latter does indeed, like the egoism of the acquisitive, attempt to reorganize everything anew out of itself and to be bond and pressure for all those hostile forces: that is, it wishes that men might practice the same idolatry with it that they have practiced with the church'* (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen III, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This is perhaps an attack on Hegel. However, the misunderstood Hegel. For Hegel did not deify the state, but the people, the 'spirit of the people'. And the Hegelian state is holistic, does not limit itself to the 'egoism of the acquisitive' and to the 'military despots'. What Nietzsche attacks as 'state', Hegel did not aspire to either.

Nietzsche regards both the night-watchman state and the mere power state as hostile to culture. This is the meaning of his thesis *'Culture and state are antagonists'*: *'If one expends oneself for power, for high politics, for economy, for world commerce, parliamentarianism, military interests, if one expends in this direction the amount of understanding, seriousness, will, self-mastery that one is, then it is lacking on the other side. Culture and the state, let there be no*

deception about this, are antagonists: 'Kultur-Staat' is merely a modern idea. One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Was den Deutschen abgeht, 4) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2005).

Here Nietzsche is no longer concerned with the night-watchman state in general, but concretely with the German pre-war state of national liberal coinage.

Which state Nietzsche attacks becomes nowhere more vivid than in Zarathustra's accusation against the 'new idol': This idol is the opposite of the people, i.e., a state without content.

'Now open your ears, for now I shall speak to you my word concerning the death of peoples'.

The state without people: *'State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies as well; and this lie crawls from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people!' It is a lie! Creators were they who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus, they served life'*.

The state without völkisch fulfillment: *'Where there are still a people, it does not understand the state and hates it as an evil eye and sin against customs and rights'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XI, The New Idol, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

State as the antithesis of life: *'State, I call it, where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the bad: State, where all lose themselves, the good and the bad: State, where the slow suicide of all, is called 'life'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XI, The New Idol, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The state of the 'egoism of the acquisitive': *'Away with these superfluous ones! Wealth, they acquire and become poorer with it. Power, they want and first the lever of power, much money, these impotent ones'*.

The dynastic state: *'They want to get close to the throne: their madness is that, as if happiness sat on the throne! Often filth sits on the throne, and often also the throne on filth'*.

The state as bureaucracy: *'There where the state ceases, only there begins the man who is not superfluous: there begins the song of necessity, the unique and irreplaceable melody'. 'There where the state ceases. Look there, my brothers! Do you not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the Superman?'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XI, The New Idol, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Thus, Nietzsche's target of attack is clear. He does not fight the state bound to the people, but the state

as the antithesis of the people, the state as an institution, the institution as an end in itself. *'Prerequisite of the previous state: 'Man shall not develop, the measure is there...'* ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [7=M III 4b. Frühjahr-Sommer 1883], 7[242]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This state as an end in itself reaches its extreme in Bolshevism: *'It requires the most subservient prostration of all citizens before the absolute state, as nothing like it has ever existed'*.

This danger has taken political shape after five decades; in the Jewish Cheka state of the USSR. The state as a terrorist machine it is the most extreme form of the state in itself. In this sense, Nietzsche's admonition is to be understood: *'Socialism can serve to teach the danger of all accumulation of state power in a brutal and emphatic way and thus instill distrust of the state itself. When its rough voice joins in the battle cry: 'As much state as possible', this will at first become noisier than ever: but soon the opposite will also emerge with all the greater force: 'As little state as possible'...''* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, Glance at the State, Aphorism 473, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The liberal state is the precursor of the Bolshevik state. It is the merchants who try to make this easy chair state as inviting as possible for us, *'they now dominate the whole world with their philosophy. The 'industrial state' is not my choice, as it is Spencer's choice'* ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [6=N V 4. Herbst 1880], 6[377]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'I know what these states will perish from; from the non plus ultra state of the Socialists, whose opponent I am and whom I already hate in the present state...' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [6=N V 4. Herbst 1880], 6[377]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016) (See Marxism).

Besides the lack of content, the 'non plus ultra state' also features the 'formal annihilation of the individual'. Nietzsche hates this state and hurls his antithesis against the terroristic destruction of personality: *'As little state as possible'*.

As liberalism leads to Marxism, so the liberal state leads to the non plus ultra state of the Bolsheviks. Unnaturalness is followed by unnaturalness in the extreme. It is the state without content, the state without people and without culture.

This state is un-Germanic. But it is also neither a Roman construction nor a polis: too unnatural to be Germanic, too formless to be Roman, and too formal to be Greek.

Even where Nietzsche, as already shown, sets the state against culture, he does not hit upon the true

state. 'Culture and the state, let there be no deception about this, are antagonists... All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great in the sense of culture was unpolitical, even anti-political...'

The very next sentence shows the contradiction: '*Goethe's heart opened at the phenomenon of Napoleon, it closed at the 'Wars of Liberation'*' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Was den Deutschen abgeht, 4) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

It is not state and culture that are opposites, but the state of the Second Reich and culture. In this perspective, Nietzsche considers only German power politics as political, not Napoleon!

Words or concepts should not be concluded. Besides, a certain uncertainty regarding the concrete state is undeniably recognizable. His fight against the state is not wrong in its basic stance, but often erroneous in its premise. Just as he attacks 'morality' and only hits its diminution, so he attacks the 'state', and it is almost always the atrophied state. This has caused some confusion in the Nietzsche literature.

2. The Organic State

'To make society thief-proof and fire-proof and infinitely convenient for every trade and transaction, these are low goals that one should not strive for with the 'highest means and tools that exist at all' (Daybreak, Third Book, as little of the State as possible, section 179. Vol. 9, 2nd Ed.) (F. Nietzsche et al., 1997; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

This is Nietzsche's direction of attack against the state. But is that all? Does he remain in criticism? What should replace the 'state'? Does Nietzsche want chaos or the 'stateless society'?

He leaves no doubt that the type of state he negates will perish and should perish. The state as an end in itself ends in the '*non plus ultra* state' of the Bolsheviks.

But what should replace the previous state? Can a new concept of the state or at least an attempt at it be reconstructed from Nietzsche's works?

Positively, only rudiments of his own state doctrine can be established. The following passage clearly differs from the previous pure negation: '*State or organized immorality: internally: as police, criminal law, classes, commerce, family; externally: as will to power, to war, to conquest, to revenge*' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[407]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Organized immorality', i.e., for Nietzsche organized, natural life, thus a holistic state.

This is vague, indeterminate. Nietzsche's state will is not to be found where he uses the concept of state, but where he demands hierarchy and structures of domination.

He uses the concept of 'society' incorrectly. Nothing is more foreign to the community structure he announces in basic lines than a 'society' in the sense of liberal-Marxist sociology.

On the contrary, Nietzsche is '*anti-liberal to the point of malice*'. E.g. his admiration for the imperium Romanum: '*The Roman Empire, which we know, which the history of the Roman province teaches us to know better and better, this most admirable work of art in the grand style, was a beginning, its construction was calculated to prove itself with millennia, to this day nothing has been built like it, not even dreamed of building in an equal degree sub specie aeterni! This organization was firm enough to withstand bad emperors: the accident of persons must have nothing to do with such things, first principle of all great architecture*' (Der Antichrist, 58) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

We do not look upon the raceless Roman universal state with the same admiration. It should only be shown how little Nietzsche has to do with 'society'. Or is it liberal-sociological, what he praises about the 'aristocratic communities'?

'Every aristocratic morality is intolerant, in the education of youth, in the control over women, in marriage customs, in the relation of old and young, in the penal laws (which have in view only the degenerating): it counts intolerance itself among the virtues, under the name of 'justice'' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 9, What is Noble? Section 262, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 1909).

In this sense, that already quoted description of the origin of the state is particularly characteristic (significantly, state is always put in quotation marks here): '*...that the oldest 'state' accordingly emerged as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and ruthless machinery and continued working until such a raw material of people and semi-animal was finally not only kneaded and pliable but also formed.*

I use the word 'state': it is self-evident who is meant by it, some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a population perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomadic. This is how the 'state' begins on earth: '*I think that sentimentality which made it begin with a 'contract' has been disposed of...*'.

Here the state appears as a work of art:

'...they are the most involuntary, unconscious artists that exist: In short, something new stands there where they appear, a structure of domination that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and made relative, in which nothing at all finds a place that has not first been assigned a 'meaning' in relation to the whole. They know nothing of guilt, responsibility, or consideration, these born organizers; in them that terrible artist-egoism rules, that looks like bronze and knows itself justified to all eternity in its 'work', like a mother in her child' (Zur Genealogie der Moral, Zweite Abhandlung: 'Schuld', 'schlechtes Gewissen' und Verwandtes, 17) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009b).

Zarathustra calls the administrative state *'the coldest of all cold monsters'*. About the 'older forms of state', however, the Nachlass contains this splendid sketch: *'Not considerations of prudence, but impulses of heroism have been powerful in the origin of the state: The belief that there is something higher than the sovereignty of individuals. There the reverence for the lineage and the elders of the lineage works: to it the younger brings his sacrifice. The reverence for the dead and the traditional laws of the ancestors: to them the present brings its sacrifice. There works the homage to a spiritually superior and victorious one: the delight of encountering his model in the flesh: there vows of loyalty are made' ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [7=M III 4b. Frühjahr-Sommer 1883], 7[55]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).*

Almost all negative words about the state are directed against the state of his time. As soon as he looks at the great state types of the past, his judgment immediately changes. The negation applies to the contemporary 'state', he pays admiration to the historical state, such as the Roman Empire and even more to the Greek polis.

'It is not coercion and not prudence which maintains the older forms of state: but the continued flow of noble emotions. Coercion could not be exercised at all, and prudence is perhaps still too little developed individually. A common danger perhaps gives the occasion for coming together, and the feeling of new common power has something enthralling and is a source of noble resolutions' ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [7=M III 4b. Frühjahr-Sommer 1883], 7[55]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The state, of shameful birth... and yet a sound at which we forget ourselves, a battle cry that has inspired countless truly heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and most venerable object for the blind and egoistic mass, which only in the immense moments of state life has the strange expression of greatness on its face!' ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [10=Mp XII 1c. Anfang 71], 10[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And then again against his time: *'our institutions are no good anymore... after we have lost all the instincts from which institutions grow, we lose institutions altogether, because we are no longer fit for them. Democracy was always the declining form of organizing power: I have already characterized democracy with its half-measures, like 'German Reich', as the decaying form of the state' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen, 39) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).*

Here, the pre-war German state is clearly designated as a 'decaying form'. This half-measure and decaying form are the antagonist of culture and is therefore attacked by Nietzsche. The following passage contains his entire opposition to liberal state and social thinking (this comes from the same writing in which culture and state, even politics and culture appear as contradictions, but which, as is mostly overlooked, only turns against the state and against the politics of the Second Reich):

'For there to be institutions, there must be a kind of will, instinct, imperative, antiliberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries to come to the solidarity of chains of generations forward and backward in infinitum. When this will is present, something like the Imperium Romanum is founded' (Götzen-Dämmerung, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen, 39) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche et al., 2005).

Nietzsche demands hierarchy. But with this, the real state is presupposed. Hierarchy can only be relative and meaningful within a community. The prerequisite of hierarchy is the inequality of humans. No one has emphasized this more sharply than Nietzsche, no one therefore also demands hierarchy more ruthlessly. 'Society' is based on the principle that humans are more alike than different. With this, all organic ranks fall, and as 'state' only an administrative mechanism is still possible.

Hierarchy and 'society' are mutually exclusive. 'Society' replaces the state. Hierarchy compels the state. And so, we find under the concepts of 'structures of domination and hierarchy' the positive state thinking.

'I am compelled, in the age of universal suffrage, i.e. where everyone may sit in judgment over everyone and everything, to re-establish the hierarchy' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[9]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

With hierarchy, Nietzsche comes to the problem of estates and their structure. *'Rank-determining, rank-separating are solely quantities of power: and nothing else'* (see The Nietzsche Channel, Concordance between The Will to Power and Sämtliche

Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Book IV, 855) (Channel, 1999-2024).

'What determines rank is the quantum of power that you are, the rest is cowardice' [Fragmente 1887-1889], ([11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[36]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

If we substitute 'performance' for 'quantity of power', the determination of rank becomes clearer. Nietzsche must use the concept of 'power' here because he attempts to coin the 'will to power' as a formula for all life and being. But since becoming and being cannot be reduced to one principle, Nietzsche is forced to either schematize or to expand the concept of 'will to power' so much that it negates itself. In this context, it would be better to substitute performance for the concept of power-quantum. Of course, a concrete doctrine of estates cannot be derived from Nietzsche's works. And an examination of the fragments would lead too far afield. To capture his estate-oriented tendency, let us only demonstrate his partisanship for the manly ones.

'To establish a law book in the manner of Manu means to grant a people henceforth to become master, to become perfect, to aspire to the highest art of life'.

What Nietzsche essentially admires in the Manu law is the state content, *'to aspire to the highest art of life'*, i.e., for a people: to mature into a state, to achieve the total form of life in their own kind of state.

'The order of castes, the supreme, the dominating law, is only the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank, over which no arbitrariness, no 'modern idea' has power'.

Every healthy society contains, mutually conditioning each other, three physiologically differently gravitating types, each of which has its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own kind of feeling of perfection and mastery. The hierarchy is a natural order:

'Nature, not Manu, separates from one another the predominantly spiritual, the predominantly muscle and temperament-strong, and the third who are distinguished in neither one nor the other, the mediocre, the latter as the great number, the former as the selection'.

The uppermost stratum (*'the predominantly spiritual ones'*) being the fewest, as the most perfect, also have the privileges of the fewest: to represent happiness, beauty, and goodness on Earth. Goodness is a privilege. They should consider the difficult task as a privilege... It is not permissible for them to be the second ones.

The second ones are the guardians of justice, the cultivators of order and security, the noble warriors,

judges, and upholders of the law... *'The second ones are the executive of the most spiritual'*.

The third ones: *'A high culture is a pyramid: it can only stand on a broad base'*... Among the third, he includes: craftsmanship, trade, agriculture, science, the greater part of art, the entire concept of professional activity. For the mediocre, being mediocre is fortunate; mastery in one thing, specialization, is a natural instinct. Mediocrity itself would be the first necessity for there to be exceptions. A high culture is conditioned by it. One should not underestimate the privileges of the mediocre. For *'life towards the heights becomes ever harder, the cold increases, responsibility increases'*.

The inequality of rights is the first condition for there to be rights at all. A right is a privilege. In his kind of being, everyone also has his privilege...

'The order of castes, the rank order, merely formulates the supreme law of life itself' (Der Antichrist, 57) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The parallel from the caste order to the estate order, rank order, is characteristic of Nietzsche. He fails to recognize that those caste orders were based on much greater racial differences than, for example, the order of a European people. Through the transfer of historical and ancient community types to our conditions, Nietzsche arrives at an exaggeration of the estate-based system. Nevertheless, that presentation is brilliant and precise and related to Plato's doctrine of estates. But it can only apply to those states and communities that are based on a similar racial stratification as the Manu laws presuppose.

And Nietzsche then also deviates from the estate doctrine shown in the Manu order and arrives at aristocratism. Only in one thing does he remain true to himself: at the apex of the community structure stands the philosopher, the legislator, the creator of values, the *'Caesarean breeder of culture'*.

Why Nietzsche cannot penetrate to a concrete and just rank order, I show under 'Individual and Community'.

Nietzsche's struggle for the rank order proves he was on the path to the organic state. As uncertain as his concrete approaches may appear, theoretically he almost always presupposes the genuine state.

Similarly, Nietzsche presupposes the state with its breeding and cultivation laws. Such titanic demands require a state of utmost cohesion and highest power. And Nietzsche demands this without using the term 'state': *'Dominion structures, the like of which have not yet existed... a tremendous aristocracy built on the hardest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of violence and artist-tyrants is given duration over millennia'* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W

I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[57]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche was on the way to a gigantic total state, albeit not to our, ethnically based state. But his state doctrine remained only a fragment like his main work, the 'Will to Power'. Fate broke Nietzsche before completion. Distance and tensions against time and contemporaries became so unbearable that the lightning of madness struck him down.

3. The Greek State

Nietzsche's uncertainty towards the state lies more on the content side. The people are missing. The negation of the state as an institution has its deepest root in his struggle for culture. Nietzsche combats every state that does not serve culture. In doing so, he always places culture above the state. For him, the state is the means and basis of culture. According to our view, culture and state are neither in opposition nor in a relationship of means and end. Culture and state condition each other, in interaction. Without state no culture, without culture no true state. State is the total form of life of a people, culture is the unity of style in all life expressions of a people. Culture and state thus have the same prerequisite: the people.

Even today, the concept of 'state' is used differently: 'state in the narrower sense' as administration and authorities, or in the broader, 'total' sense as the form of life of the people or the people's order. More and more, however, the concept of Reich is being expanded for this as the unity of administration, authorities, armed forces, party. 'State' is then only administration and authorities, and what Nietzsche expresses positively about the 'state' then applies to what is today mostly understood as 'Reich'.

Nietzsche's most positive statements about the 'state' therefore stem from a time when he still believed in the people. In Greek life, he finds the unity of people, state, culture: the polis. To be sure, a metaphysical-romantic concept of genius hovers over everything; Schopenhauer and Wagner are not yet overcome. People and state are the means, genius is the end. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's confessions are of inspiring beauty and contemporary relevance.

'Greek morality is not based on religion but on the polis. There were only priests of individual deities, not representatives of the whole religion: thus, no estate. Likewise, no sacred document' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[104]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche writes of *'an omnipotence of the state once achieved only in antiquity'*.

'The older Greek philosophy is the philosophy of statesmen through and through. How wretched our statesmen are in comparison!'

For the ancients, the goal of agonal education was the welfare of the whole, of the state society. Every Athenian, for example, should develop his self in competition to the extent that it would be of the highest use to Athens and cause the least harm. No ambition into the immeasurable and immeasurable, as most modern ambition: *'... the youth thought of the welfare of his mother city when he ran or threw or sang in competition; he wanted to increase her fame with his own; he dedicated to his city gods the wreaths that the judges placed honorably on his head'*.

Every Greek had felt in himself from childhood the desire to be an instrument for the salvation of his city in the competition of cities: *'In this, his selfishness was inflamed, then it was bridled and circumscribed. Therefore, individuals in antiquity were freer, because their goals were nearer and more tangible'* (Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern, 5, Homer's Wettkampf) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Although Plato is portrayed by Nietzsche as a 'mixed character' in one of the first writings, and Nietzsche fought against the Platonic idea and ontology throughout his life, he still admires Platonic state thinking.

'Plato's perfect state is certainly something greater than even the warm-blooded among his admirers believed, not to mention the smiling air of superiority with which our 'historically' educated tried to reject such a fruit of antiquity' ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [10=Mp XII 1c. Anfang 71], Fragment einer erweiterten Form der 'Geburt der Tragödie', 10[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In the custom of the Hellenic people, the family's claim on man and child was reduced to the smallest measure: *'The man lived in the state, the child grew up for the state and at the hand of the state... From the state, the individual had to receive everything, to give everything back to it'*. The State and the Woman: *'The woman thus broods for the state, what sleep is for man... in her, the future generation dreams...'*. And in contrast to the modern emancipation Amazons, Nietzsche points to *'the Olympian women including Penelope, Antigone, Electra...'*

'Of course, these are ideal figures, but who could create such ideals from the present world?... Furthermore, one must consider what sons these women have borne, and what women they must have been to bear such sons! The Hellenic woman as mother had to live in darkness, because the political instinct, along with its highest purpose, demanded it'.

Yet in more recent times, *'with the complete disruption of state tendencies'*, the family becomes a makeshift for the state: domestic art instead of state art; love passion its zealous content, domestic, state-alien

education... *'and all this rightly, insofar as the modern state is concerned'*.

Amidst the enthusiasm for the polis, the contempt for the modern state. National Socialism, with the organic state, also regains the alignment of family, education, and art with the people's state, with the 'Reich'.

The State and the Mothers: *'In Greek antiquity, they took the position that the highest state will assigned to them: therefore, they have been glorified as never again. The woman felt herself in the right position towards the state: therefore, she had more dignity than woman has ever had again'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [7=U I 2b. Ende 1870-April 1871], 7[122]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

It is the substantial fullness of the Greek state that moves Nietzsche to passionate admiration. State and culture are antagonists, he says of the state of his time. In the polis, the young Nietzsche sees the extreme opposite and he exaggerates this to the extent that the state becomes a means of art.

'The state was a necessary means of art reality'. Yet all art was art of the state: *'The Greek artist directs his artwork not at the individual but at the state: and again, the education of the state was nothing but the education of all to enjoy the artwork. All great creations, of sculpture and architecture as well as of the musical arts, have in mind great state-nurtured popular sentiments. In particular, tragedy is annually a solemn act prepared by the state and uniting the whole people'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [7=U I 2b. Ende 1870-April 1871], 7[121]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'For its culture, the state was not a border guard, regulator, supervisor, but the hardy, muscular, battle-ready comrade and traveling companion, who gives the admired, nobler and seemingly supernatural friend escort through rough reality and reaps his gratitude for it' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag III) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

National Socialist cultural policy sees in being *'supervisor, regulator'* only its negative task. Its highest goal is to be patron and *'comrade'* of art.

The beauty of the people, the flourishing culture is the justification of the ancient Greek state: that bloody jealousy of city against city, of party against party, the greed of those small wars, the incessant renewal of Trojan battle and horror scenes, in whose sight Homer delightfully sank, the naive barbarity of the Greek state...

'... whence does it take its excuse before the tribunal of eternal justice? Proud and calm, the state steps before it: and by the hand it leads the gloriously flourishing woman, Greek society. For this Helen it

wages those wars, what gray-bearded judge might condemn here?' (Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern, 3. Der griechische Staat, and [Fragmente 1869-1874], [10=Mp XII 1c. Anfang 71], Fragment einer erweiterten Form der *Geburt der Tragödie*, 10[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Following *'blows and thunderbolts'* of warlike and political discharges, as soon as there are some warmer days, 'the luminous flowers of genius' always follow again. It is a *'mysterious connection... between state and art, political greed and artistic procreation, battlefield and artwork'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [10=Mp XII 1c. Anfang 71], Fragment einer erweiterten Form der *'Geburt der Tragödie'*, 10[1], also Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern 3. Der griechische Staat) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

This should also become the noblest completion of National Socialism, to mature into a cultural state and state culture, into a cultural people and people's culture. *'... so the tremendous strength of the political in the narrowest sense of the homeland drive may appear to us as a guarantee that the sequence of individual geniuses is continuous... the stronger the political drive is, the more the continuous succession of geniuses is guaranteed...'* ([Fragmente 1869-1874], [7=U I 2b. Ende 1870-April 1871], 7[121]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Precisely the greatness of Greek art presupposes the strength of political passion: *'We must construct the Greeks, in view of the unique solar height of their art, a priori as the 'political humans per se'; and indeed, history knows no example of such a terrible unleashing of the political drive, of an unconditional sacrifice of all other interests in the service of this state instinct'* (Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern 3. Der griechische Staat, also [Fragmente 1869-1874], [10=Mp XII 1c. Anfang 71], Fragment einer erweiterten Form der *Geburt der Tragödie*) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche's position on the state shows the whole tragedy of his political thinking. The passionate affirmation of the Greek state is followed by the harsh disappointment with the state of his time. Greek culture and the culture of his time, Greek state and the state of his time are equally contradictory. Therefore, Nietzsche had to negate this 'state', as he negated this 'culture'. And yet here too, negation is not the last word. The attacks against the state as an institution are followed by a mighty struggle for the true state, which he could only announce in fragments as rank order and dominion structure.

Nietzsche's state judgments are magnificent fragments, representing the whole drama of his development, his fate. Tragedy surrounds the one struggling in ultimate solitude. His genius is cruelly suspended between two ages.

For the present and future, Nietzsche's state thinking is fruitful in negation as well as in affirmation, in the fight against the state as an institution as well as in the beginnings of a philosophy of the 'state' of a new life order.

XIV. Individual and Community

1. Individualism

The opinion still prevails that Nietzsche's doctrine is only subjectivism or individualism. At the same time, Nietzsche is considered the philosopher of rank order, of anti-liberal dominion. Are we faced here with an inextricable contradiction in his teaching? Or can a specific accent also be identified in his community thinking? **[Note in the original edition:** Langbehn once says of Nietzsche, referring to his alleged descent from the East on his paternal line: 'Nietzsche is an autocrat... Nietzsche is an oriental conqueror... like a Genghis Khan' ('Rembrandt as Educator', p. 51)] **[Note in the original edition:** A. Baeumler: '*Nothing seems more difficult than to find the transition from the individual to the collective in Nietzsche's world...*'].

Indeed, in ruthless antithesis against the democratism and leveling of his time, he has overemphasized the great human being. These great individuals are not just 'individuals', but rulers, creators. According to our view, however, even the great individual is not just an 'individual'.

Nietzsche's exaggerated concept of genius lacks the natural connection to the root and the task in the organic community, in the people. Hence often his Caesarean and Napoleonic tendencies.

This passage shows it drastically: *'The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. For a similar price, one would have to desire the anarchic overthrow of our entire civilization... The value of a human being does not lie in his usefulness: for he would continue to exist even if there were no one he could be useful to. And why could not precisely the human being from whom the most pernicious effects emanated be the pinnacle of the entire human species: so high, so superior, that everything would perish from envy of him'* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[31]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

When these exaggerations are generalized, the 'autocrat' Nietzsche easily emerges. But does the exaggeration of geniuses, of great individuals, prove Nietzsche's 'individualism'?

Once he clearly outlines his position as: *'Apart from both movements, the individualistic and collectivistic morality, for even the first does not recognize the rank order and wants to give one the same freedom as all'* ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [7=Mp XVII 3b. Ende 1886-Frühjahr 1887], 7[6]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'My philosophy is aimed at rank order: not at an individualistic morality. The sense of the herd should rule in the herd, but not reach beyond it' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [7=Mp XVII 3b. Ende 1886-Frühjahr 1887], 7[6]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche already clearly sees the connection between individualism, egalitarian democracy and Marxism. The apparently opposing traits that characterize modern Europeans: the individualism and the demand for equal rights: Nietzsche recognizes them as related and mutually conditioning. The individual strives for equality, it wants to be valid inter pares.

'The individual principle rejects the very great human beings' ([Fragmente 1884-885], [40=W I 7a. August-September 1885], 40[26]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Individualism is a modest and still unconscious kind of 'will to power'; here it seems enough for the individual to get free from an overpowering of society (be it of the state or the church). He does not set himself in opposition as a person, but merely as an individual; he represents all individuals against the totality. That means he instinctively sets himself equal with every individual; what he fights for, he fights for not as a person but as representative of individuals against totality...'

In this, individualism, liberalism and Marxism are the same.

'Socialism is merely an agitation means of individualism: it understands that to achieve something, one must organize into a collective action, into a 'power'. But what it wants is not society as the purpose of the individual but society as a means to enable many individuals' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[82]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

It is Nietzsche's unequivocal rejection of individualism when he describes it as Marxist-liberalistic. Just as Marxism and democratism, he also sees individualism caused by Christianity in Europe. He reproaches Christianity precisely for individualism:

'In fact, it was Christianity that first challenged the individual to set himself up as judge over everything, megalomania was almost made a duty for him: after all, he has to assert eternal rights against everything temporal and conditional! What state! What society! What historical laws! What physiology!' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [15=W II 6a. Frühjahr 1888], 15[30], 2) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The communal stands higher than the individual: *'The continuum! Marriage, property, language, tradition, tribe, family, people, state are continua of lower and higher order. Their economy consists in the surplus of advantages of uninterrupted work, as well as multiplication over the disadvantages'*

([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[15]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The social outweighs the individual: *'In regard to the continuity of communal life and the amount of thoughts it claims how small is the scope that purposes and images relating to the individual being itself occupy in it! The social drives far outweigh the individual ones. Animals perform actions to their own detriment that benefit the group'* ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [8=Mp XVII 1a. Sommer 1883], 8[9]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In another passage, he attempts a genealogy of community. Although this may be historically disputable, it shows that Nietzsche sees individualism only as the lowest form of life, and a rank order, a dominion structure, as the highest.

'Once a certain independence has been achieved, one wants more: separation emerges according to the degree of power; the individual no longer sets himself equal without further ado but seeks his equals, he sets others apart from himself. Individualism is followed by member and organ formation: the related tendencies grouping together and asserting themselves as power: between these power centers friction, war, recognition of mutual strengths, equalization, approximation, exchange of services. At the end: a rank order' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[82]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

He clearly sees in individualism the lowest and most primitive stage of human organization. Nietzsche did not penetrate to a *völkisch* socialism. There are only beginnings present. Yet his teaching is in all parts nothing less than individualistic:

'The isolation of the individual must not deceive; in truth something flows on under the individuals... ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[231]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

... We are more than individuals; we are the whole chain with the tasks of all futures of the chain' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[7]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nevertheless, community is not the highest for him. While he places community higher than the individualistic, he values the *'great individual'* higher than community.

'I teach that there are higher and lower humans, and that a single individual can under certain circumstances justify their existence over whole millennia' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [27=Z II 5a. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 27[16]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The present, however, would not even be capable of unconditional community.

Equally foreign as the great individual would be to it the absolutely socialistic community, ... the disappeared individual, the submergence in a great type, the not-wanting-to-be-a-person: wherein the distinction and zeal of many high humans consisted in earlier times. As examples he mentions: *'Being-a-city' as in Greece; Jesuitism, Prussian officer corps and civil service'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [40=W I 7a. August-September 1885], 40[26]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Yet he wants more than this extremely socialistic community. In this sense, he gives a 'morphology of self-feelings': according to which the fellow feelings and community feelings are the lower, preparatory stage, at a time when the personal self-feeling, the initiative of value-setting in its purity would not yet be possible at all. The second stage would be the height of collective self-feeling, the pride in distance, the feeling-oneself-unequal, the aversion to mediation, equal rights. The 'collective self-feeling' would force the individual to represent the pride of the whole: *'... he must speak and act with extreme respect for himself, insofar as he represents the community in person...'*

The responsibility for the whole would give the individual a wide view, a strict and terrible hand, a deliberation and coldness, a grandeur of bearing and gesture, which he would not allow himself for his own sake.

'... the 'collective self-feelings' are the great preparatory school of personal sovereignty. The noble class is the one that inherits this practice' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[286]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Thus, the highest community feeling is only a preliminary stage of the self-feeling of the 'great individual'. The herd is only a means of this great individual.

'Fundamental error: to place the goals in the herd and not in individual individuals! The herd is a means, nothing more! But now one tries to understand the herd as an individual and to ascribe to it a higher rank than to the individual... deepest misunderstanding...' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [5=N VII 3. Sommer 1886-Herbst 1887], 5[108]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The great individual is indeed not contrasted with the community, but with the 'herd'. Nietzsche goes so far as to ascribe state sovereignty to the great individual: *'The high individual gives himself all the rights which the state allows itself, to kill, to destroy, to spy, etc.'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[261]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

With this, he places the great human in the unlimited. This exaggeration, however, is necessary.

Nietzsche cannot find the boundary and binding of the 'high individual' because he lacks the people. Therefore, he also cannot resolve the problem of 'egoism' and 'altruism'. Granted that '*altruistic actions are only a species of egoistic ones*' ([Fragments 1885–1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[57]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), yet equally the 'egoistic' are a species of the 'altruistic'. One can only escape this turntable of abstraction through the concrete relation to the people. In place of an abstract 'egoism' and an equally abstract 'altruism' comes the organic polarity of personality interest and people's interest, the emphasis of self-interest within the framework of we-interest, of self-feeling within the boundaries of people-feeling, or programmatically: common good before self-interest. Even the greatest compatriot is bound to this.

If Nietzsche does not find this binding, he is still not an absolute 'autocrat'. For only the highest humans have autocratic rights. And even this 'high individual' does not serve itself, but is placed in the service of culture, of breeding and cultivation of the highest human, of the enhancement of life.

Nietzsche combats individualism. But his 'autocratism' is not the decisive tendency either. With greater right, one can describe his political system as an extreme aristocratism. For all the exaggeration of great individuals, Nietzsche still thinks in communities. *The Genealogy of Morals*, for example, is the grandiose attempt to trace moral values back to existence conditions of estates, peoples and races.'

With that, he creates a racial-communal philosophy of history. Why the organic community of the people is missing in his political system, I have already shown repeatedly: Nietzsche despaired of the bastardization of Europe. And so, he inevitably comes to the conception of a ruling caste or ruling 'race' above the future European, that 'cosmopolitan affect and intelligence chaos'.

2. Aristocratism

Nietzsche separates leadership and followership so far that they stand in a relationship to each other like purpose and means. Even the young Nietzsche shows this tendency extremely in a romantic cult of genius (which is at the same time the preliminary form for the 'great individual' of the later period): '*The goal of humanity*', he writes at that time, '*can only lie in its highest specimens*' (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, 9) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Every human being, with all their benevolence, has only as much dignity as they are, consciously or unconsciously, an instrument of genius... only as a fully determined being serving unconscious purposes can humans justify their existence' (Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern, 3. Der griechische Staat) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'From all this, it becomes clear that genius does not exist for the sake of humanity, while it is indeed humanity's pinnacle and ultimate goal' ([Fragments 1869–1874], [11=Mp XII 1b. Februar 71], 11[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'And who would doubt that the Greek heroic world existed only for the sake of one Homer?' ([Fragments 1869–1874], [11=Mp XII 1b. Februar 71], 11[1]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Genius appears in that time still as the saturated play of colors of all the peculiar forces of the people', yet it has 'as it were only a metaphysical origin, a metaphysical home...' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten Vortrag III) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Even the soldier is only a means for military genius: '*I should think that the warrior would be a means of military genius; and not to him, as an absolute human and non-genius, but to him as a means of genius, which can also will his destruction as a means of the martial work of art, would a degree of dignity accrue, namely that dignity of being deemed worthy to be a means of genius'* (Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern, 3. Der griechische Staat) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche later abandoned this romantic concept of genius influenced by Schopenhauer. He himself once wrote: '*Such gifted beings as I imagined as genius have never existed*' ([Fragments 1875–1879], [29=N II 4. Sommer 1878], 29[16]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Yet the 'great individual' has an affinity with that genius. Nietzsche also retained the means-end relationship for his political construction.

But despite the emphasis on the great individual, autocratism is not the decisive tendency. However, typical for Nietzsche is the means-end relationship. A similar conception dominates him when he radically typifies morality into master morality and slave morality. The bearers are master or herd strata, conquerors or oppressed. Nietzsche, under the influence of Gobineau, comes very close to the realization that this involves racial causes, above all the contrast between Nordic and non-Nordic, especially Jewish values. Nevertheless, for the emergence of moralities, the influence of the tension between conquerors and oppressed, the 'pathos of distance', is overestimated compared to racial causes. For master morality, the 'noble morality', is not always bound to a ruling stratum. The Jewish-Asiatic sub humans have not become 'nobler' since they rule the USSR. Of course, I do not want to give a critique of his moral philosophy here, but only to indicate that the *Genealogy of Morals* also proves Nietzsche's peculiarity of seeing only rulers and ruled instead of the community of leadership and followership, and these separated by an unbridgeable chasm. So much

so that the rulers become the purpose of the ruled, the ruled the means of the rulers.

I therefore consider it justified to describe Nietzsche's political system essentially as extreme aristocratism: *'Aristocratism: The herd animal ideals, now culminating as the highest value setting of 'society': Attempt to give it a cosmic, even metaphysical value. Against it I defend aristocratism'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[140]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Here he himself indicates that he arrives at aristocratism in antithesis to the delusion of equality.

'The more I concede rights and equalize myself, the more I come under the dominion of the average, finally of the most numerous. The presupposition which an aristocratic society has in itself, in order to maintain the high degree of freedom among its members, is the extreme tension which arises from the presence of the opposite drive in all members: the will to dominate' ([Fragmente 1887-1889], [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[140]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In the next aphorism, Nietzsche says what is meant by society here: 'Equality society'. Against this, his aristocratism is founded.

What separates us is the direction and degree of tensions.

While in Nietzsche there exists an abstract oppositional relationship between rulers and ruled, we affirm the natural differences and degrees of value between the members of the people and state, yet these tensions are bound by the community of the people.

Nietzsche, on the contrary, enlarges the natural tensions between the members of the community into oppositions, into a means-end relationship: *'The aristocracy represents the belief in an elite humanity and higher caste'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [26=W I 2. Sommer-Herbst 1884], 26[282]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'Main point of view: that one does not see the task of the higher species in the guidance of the lower (as e.g. Comte does), but the lower as a basis on which a higher species lives its own task, on which it can first stand...' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[44]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The 'shepherd' in contrast to the 'lord' (the former a means for the preservation of the herd; the latter the purpose for which the herd exists...)' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [6=Mp XIV 1, S. 416-420. Mp XVII 3a. Mp XV 2d. P II 12b, S. 37. Sommer 1886-Frühjahr 1887], 6[26]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The herd humans are bearers, transmission tools' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [6=Mp XIV 1, S. 416-420. Mp XVII 3a. Mp XV 2d. P II 12b, S. 37. Sommer 1886-Frühjahr 1887], 6[26]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In contrast to this diminution and adaptation of humans to a specialized utility, there would be need for the opposite movement, the production of the synthetic, the summarizing, the justifying human, for whom that mechanization of humanity would be a precondition of existence as a substructure on which he could invent his higher form of being.

This elite caste would need the opposition of the masses, the 'leveled', the feeling of distance in comparison to them; it would stand on them, it would live from them. 'This higher form of aristocratism is that of the future.' Morally speaking, that total machinery, the solidarity of all wheels, would represent a maximum in the exploitation of man: but it would presuppose those for whom this exploitation has a meaning. Otherwise, it would actually be just the total reduction, value-reduction of the type of man, a phenomenon of regression on the grandest scale ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [10=W II 2. Herbst 1887], 10[17]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

(The symbols of the wheelwork and the machine clearly show how far Nietzsche has departed here from organic thinking.)

The essential thing about a good and healthy aristocracy would be that it feels itself not as a function (be it of the kingship, be it of the commonwealth), *'but as its meaning and highest justification'*.

Therefore, it accepts with a clear conscience the sacrifice of a multitude of humans who, for its sake, would have to be degraded and reduced to incomplete humans, to slaves, to tools (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 9, what is Noble? Section 257, Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Through denationalization, Nietzsche sees this form of domination emerging in Europe: *'The same conditions that drive forward the development of the herd animal also drive the development of the leader-type'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [35=W I 3a. Mai-Juli 1885], 35[10]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'The equalization of the European human is the great process that cannot be hindered: one should even accelerate it. The necessity for a chasm-opening, distance, hierarchy is thereby given not the necessity to slow down that process... This equalized species, as soon as it is achieved, needs a justification: it lies in the service of a higher sovereign kind, which stands on it and can only rise to its task on it. Not just a master race whose task would be exhausted in governing: but a race with its own sphere of life' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [9=W II 1. Herbst 1887], 9[153]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The extreme aristocratism thus also has a clear justification: through Nietzsche's Europe conception, of

a master caste above a herd stratum. The cause is the 'equalization of the European human', the inevitable racial mixing. Only a new ruling stratum can rule over this mixture. Nietzsche is only consistent when he sees therein the 'necessity for a chasm-opening'. And this Europe conception and the means-end relationship have yet another cause: Political thinking in Nietzsche, the former classical philologist, is strongly influenced by antiquity. And so, he sees above all only ancient aristocracies, ancient types of society. Likewise, in the *Genealogy of Morals* he knows only dominion structures arising through conquest, no grown communities.

The young Nietzsche himself once wrote: 'Greek culture rests on the dominion relationship of a numerically small class against four to nine times as many unfree' ([Fragmente 1875-1879], [5=U II 8b. Frühling-Sommer 1875], 5[72]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The later Greeks and Romans were a Nordic racial minority against a racially very foreign majority. Such a racial stratification naturally requires extreme structures of domination: from the same necessity, European peoples organize their colonies differently than their own national community.

As natural as aristocracy is with great racial contrasts, so unnatural it becomes in racially homogeneous peoples. Therefore, the Germanic peoples could only have a people's kingship and the ducal principle. Therefore, Nietzsche's aristocracy is misplaced wherever leadership and followership are as racially related as in most European peoples. The greater the racial difference between social strata, the more severe the hierarchical structure; the more related the parts of the people, the closer leadership and followership stand to each other.

Nietzsche's aristocracy thus has a factual support in relation to past and future, but three false assumptions can be identified: The racially conditioned chasm is expanded into a means-end relationship, It is overlooked that there were and are also organically grown, racially related communities.

The expectation of such a high degree of bastardization of Europe has not been historically fulfilled. We must therefore today stand in fundamental and factual opposition to Nietzsche's aristocracy.

3. Socialism

Nietzsche might have become a socialist state thinker had he continued on the path he so promisingly began with the fragment on the Greek state. An inexplicable fate diverted him from it. Once again, in the last year of his creative work, a related tone resonates where he admires Manu's ordinance.

'The order of castes, the supreme, the dominating law, is only the sanction of a natural order,

natural lawfulness of the first rank, over which no arbitrariness, no 'modern' idea has power' (see State). (We know today that the Manu castes are also the petrified form of former racial stratification).

'To establish a law book after the manner of Manu means to grant a people henceforth to become master, to become perfect, to aspire to the highest art of life...' (Der Antichrist, 57) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'A high culture is a pyramid' (Der Antichrist, 57) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And for this, the 'Chandala' is just as important as the 'mediocrity'.

How is it possible that Nietzsche denies for his own political system what he admires in the Greek state in the early period and later in Manu's law book?

Here he tears apart the great individual and the community; instead of the pyramidal structure, there is the separation of masters and herds, purpose and means. Even statements seemingly contradicting this fact do not prove the opposite; for example: *'As a complement and remedy to the cult of genius and power, one must always place the cult of culture at its side: which also knows how to bestow an understanding appreciation and the concession that all this is necessary, on the material, lowly, base, unrecognized, weak, imperfect, one-sided, half, untrue, apparent, even the evil and terrible; for the coherence and continuance of all human things, achieved through astonishing labors and strokes of luck, and equally the work of Cyclopes and ants as of geniuses should not be lost again: how could we then do without the common deep ground bass, without which melody cannot be melody?'* (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part II, Miscellaneous maxims and opinions, Fragment 186. Vol. 7, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The choice of symbolic words 'Cyclopes, ants, geniuses' already shows his tendency to fatally exaggerate the natural differences between humans.

The accent of Nietzsche's community philosophy lies on extreme aristocracy, which can be demonstrated from all values. This tendency becomes all the more severe the more his Europe conception comes to the fore.

Instead of the equalization and bastardization of Europe expected by Nietzsche and the breeding of a master caste, there came a general strengthening of nationalism, and this is followed in the present by the great awakening of racial and ethnic self-consciousness. Europe is not divided into masters and herds, but into peoples.

The organic concept of the people excludes Nietzsche's political system for us.

In the people, there are no 'herds'! A people are a naturally structured unity: just as an army is not composed of generals and soldiers but is graded from bottom to top and vice versa. And besides the main structure, the people are the grown community of family, clan, and tribe. Nietzsche, otherwise thinking so originally and organically, has lost himself in a mechanistic abstraction with his concept of 'herds'.

Almost as abstract is the concept of 'masters', the 'self-owners', 'self-rulers', of whom Nietzsche once said: 'Whatever forms of state and society may emerge, they will eternally be only forms of slavery, and under all forms you will be the rulers, because you belong to yourselves and those must always be accessories!' ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [16=M III 6a. Dezember 1881-Januar 1882], 16[23]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

How abstract and distant this sounds compared to that passage where genius still appears as 'the highest determination of a people in the homogeneous nature of an individual' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag III) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

If there is no master-herd division in the people, the 'hierarchy' is not abolished. The 'distance' of the natural differences of the people's comrades should not be blurred or equalized, but fully preserved. Distance and community are not a necessary contradiction, do not exclude each other. But above the 'pathos of distance' stands the pathos of blood and fate community: Just as above all differences of service grades in a National Socialist army must stand the comradeship of life and death. Not rank oppositions, but rank structure, not separation but gradation. The leadership is as important as the followership and vice versa. Instead of 'master caste' and 'accessory slaves', in the people, formed into a true state, reigns the 'pre-established harmony between leader and led' (Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten, Vortrag V) (F. Nietzsche, 2016), natural justice.

National Socialism stands equally far from autocratic Caesarism, extreme aristocratism, and collectivist mass delusion. For us, even the great individual is only great in his significance for the people, as indeed human greatness in general is only valuable within the framework of communities.

The great personality logically cannot be separated from the people, it belongs to the people as its highest embodiment. Not the genius is the purpose of the people, but the purpose is the people as the ultimate organic community of life. While the people serve its geniuses, the genius equally serves the people in polar reciprocity. Men make history, but equally races and peoples make men, and often the genius has come from the 'herd'. To the extent that the individual is more determined by the people (which includes his genetic inheritance), to that degree he belongs more to the people

than to himself. The people are greater than even its greatest son.

Nietzsche's autocratic statements become more understandable when one considers that while he thinks of the great individual without ties to the community, he still obliges it to a task: breeding and cultivation, culture, overman, etc. The *völkisch* obligation is missing, but in its place reigns the heroic commitment to the goal:

'Heroism, that is the disposition of a man who strives for a goal compared to which he himself no longer matters' ([Fragmente 1882-1884], [5=Z I 2a. Mp XV 3a. November 1882-Februar 1883], 5[1], also [Briefe 1882], An Lou von Salomé in Tautenburg, 287) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

'But by my love and hope I beseech you: do not throw away the hero in your soul! Hold sacred your highest hope' (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, VIII, The Tree on the Hill, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'My brothers, I do not counsel you to love of the neighbor: I counsel you to love of the farthest' (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First Part, XVI, Neighbor-Love, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

This must be considered at every point. But for the heroic demand, the bridge to the reality of the people is missing. Nietzsche himself is still 'crossed with infinity' here. Our love of the farthest belongs to the people and its greatness.

This socialist attitude also tolerates no means-end division in the people. Organic life knows nowhere this mechanistic principle. One part of the people is never the purpose of one or the means of another. The soldiers are not the means of the generals, and the generals are not the purpose of the soldiers. Above both stands the task of the people's defense. And so, every member of the people finds their task and fulfillment in the people, and the greatest among them at the highest level. This is truly, as Nietzsche once demands, thought 'along the guiding thread of the body'. Every member of the people receives their value in their significance for the people, and genius thus the highest value.

Through the master-herd division, the overemphasis on genius, and the means-end principle, Nietzsche has made the concrete solution of many political problems impossible for himself, which repeatedly emerges in the individual sections. As magnificent as his struggle against Marxist-liberal equality idols is, and as significant as his merits are here, he still cannot quite transcend the antithesis and is both time-transcending and time-bound. He cannot penetrate

to the völkisch-socialist community attitude, and this becomes the real tragedy of his life.

The young Nietzsche's words that *'individuation is the primal ground of all suffering'* (unclear reference, see Sokrates und die griechische Tragödie, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016) and (Die Geburt der Tragödie, Vorwort an Richard Wagner, 10) (F. Nietzsche, 2016) have inexorably proven his own fate. In vain he struggled for community, and without full fulfillment, his struggle for religion and God also remained incomplete. For the religious is socialist and the socialist is religious. *Nietzsche overemphasized the individual against the community and man against God.*

XV. Politics

1. Small Politics

Where Nietzsche seemingly fights against the state, he is in reality, consciously or unconsciously, negating the atrophied form of the state, the liberal administrative state. Something similar applies to his alleged fight against politics. His attacks are fundamentally always directed against the 'atrophy of the political sphere'.

Above all, he attacks the aimless and contentless politics of his time, the politicizing bourgeoisie.

'I consider it impossible to emerge from the study of politics as an actor. The horrible futility of all parties, including the ecclesiastical ones, is clear to me' ([Fragmente 1869–1874], [32=U II 5a. Anfang 1874-Frühjahr 1874], 32[63]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

In the crisis period of *Human, All Too Human* arose the negative judgment about politics: As with war and war readiness, likewise a people that begins to engage in grand politics and secure a decisive voice among the most powerful states, suffers its greatest losses not where one usually finds them. Every capable, industrious, intellectual, ambitious person of such a people lusting after political wreaths of fame would be dominated by this lust. The daily expenditure from the head and heart capital of every citizen: the sum of all these sacrifices of individual energy and labor would be so enormous that the political flourishing of a people would almost necessarily entail a spiritual impoverishment and exhaustion, a reduced capacity for works that demand great concentration and one-sidedness.

'Finally, one may ask: is all this bloom and splendor of the whole (which indeed only manifests itself as the fear of other states before the new colossus and as the favor wrung from foreign countries for national commercial and traffic welfare) worth it, if this coarse and iridescent flower of the nation must be sacrificed to all the nobler, more delicate, more spiritual plants and growths in which its soil was so rich?' (*Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, Eight Division, Glance at the State, Aphorism 481, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.*) (F.

W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The tendency is clear. It concerns one of the first attacks against the Second Reich, against nationalism, against bourgeois nationalism, against a politics whose ultimate result he characterizes as *'fear of other states before the new colossus'* and *'favoring of national commercial and traffic welfare'*. Nietzsche means nothing else when, a decade later, he describes the culture and politics or the state of the Second Reich as antagonists. Similarly, he writes of *'a politics that makes the German spirit barren and is petty politics besides'* (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Fünftes Buch, Wir Furchtlosen, 377*) (F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

This has sufficed for a certain Nietzsche literature to invoke Nietzsche as a witness against politics in general and for an opposition between culture and politics. What he actually combats is national politics, and what he affirms is the politics of the *'good European'* Napoleon. Not politics and culture are the antithesis, but 'petty politics' and culture. It is immaterial that Nietzsche's thesis also has a factual basis, namely the fact that in times of extreme power-political and military tension, cultural creation temporarily recedes. This, however, does not establish a fundamental opposition between culture and politics. In times of power-political relaxation, culture then blooms all the richer, as Nietzsche admires in the Greek state. Where he fights against 'politics', it is the politics of national liberalism, politics for 'commercial and traffic welfare', politics without 'idea', 'petty politics'. In the Greek state, on the other hand, he praises the unity of 'state and art', 'political greed and artistic procreation', 'battlefield and artwork', the Greeks are 'the political humans per se'.

2. Great Politics

For an overall evaluation of Nietzsche, those seemingly anti-political statements are meaningless. *The thinker of the 'will to power' is inherently a political thinker, a theoretical politician.*

For Nietzsche, 'grand' is initially a supranational, European, and ultimately earth-encompassing politics.

'The time for petty politics is over: the next century brings the struggle for world domination, the compulsion to grand politics' (*Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12 4th Ed.*) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

'... the time comes when one will relearn about politics' (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Sechstes Hauptstück: wir Gelehrten, 208*) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Even more so, 'Grand Politics' is substantively grounded politics, politics in service of his doctrine, as realization of values, politics as applied worldview.

Here that superficial assertion must be refuted: the unity of Nietzsche and Fascism. Fascism indeed shares with Nietzsche the anti-democratic tendency. However, a statist and imperialist Fascism, where the accent remains in the formal, which limits its 'totality' more to the external and shares the internal with Catholicism, a Fascism that does not want culture, the unity of life in Nietzsche's sense, cannot be equated with Nietzsche's concept of politics. The more Fascism succeeds in developing total, worldview-based politics, the more akin it becomes to what Nietzsche demands as 'Grand Politics':

'I contradict as has never been contradicted and am nevertheless the opposite of a nay-saying spirit. I am a joyful messenger, as there has never been one, I know tasks of such height that the concept for it has hitherto been lacking; only from me on are there hopes again. With all this I am necessarily also the man of fatality... For when truth enters into battle with the lie of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics has then entirely dissolved into a war of spirits. all power structures of the old society are blown into the air, they all rest on the lie: there will be wars, as there have never been on Earth. Only from me on is there grand politics on Earth' (Ecce Homo, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin, 1) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Politics as 'war of spirits', as struggle of values and worldviews, which is 'Grand Politics' of a coming age: *'That which bears heroism in knowledge and wages wars for the sake of thoughts and their consequences'* (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Viertes Buch. Sanctus Januarius, 283)(F. Nietzsche, 2016; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

The same will of a gigantic politics breaks through in one of the most peculiar passages of the posthumous works, where Nietzsche suddenly, in contradiction to his political construction, also affirms the nations: *'The time is coming when the struggle for world domination will be fought, it will be fought in the name of philosophical fundamental doctrines'* ([Fragmente 1880-1882], [11=M III 1. Frühjahr-Herbst 1881], 11[273]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Already now, one should practice the great principle of *'blood and race kinship'*. Wars would be the great teachers of such concepts, including social wars. Until finally the most powerful concept must prevail ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [7=Mp XVII 3b. Ende 1886-Frühjahr 1887], 7[47]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Grand politics is worldview-based shaping of the overall destiny: since the belief has ceased that a God directs the fates of the world on a large scale and, despite all apparent twists in the path of humanity, leads it gloriously to its end, humans themselves must set

ecumenical goals spanning the entire earth. But first, a knowledge of the conditions of culture surpassing all previous degrees must be found, as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals.

'Herein lies the immense task of the great spirits of the next century' (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, First Division, First and last things, Aphorism 25, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 2003; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Race knowledge gave us the deepest insights into the conditions of culture. At the same time, however, we know through it that there are no immediate ecumenical goals of politics. Grand politics for us is politics based on *völkisch* worldview and our goal is to conduct the highest *völkisch* politics in such a way that this, indirectly, becomes world politics.

3. Great Politicians

'I write for a type of human that does not yet exist, for the 'Lords of the Earth'' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[137]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

Nietzsche has declared war on the entire bourgeois world and expects nothing from its upper strata.

'The rotten ruling classes have spoiled the image of the ruler' ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[349]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

But: *'There is no harsher misfortune in all human fate than when the mighty of the earth are not also the first humans, then everything becomes false and askew and monstrous'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Fourth Part, LXIII, Talk with the Kings, 5th Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Therefore, Nietzsche's greatest concern is the breeding of new rulers: *'a ruling race could only grow from terrible and violent beginnings. Evidently, they would only become visible and consolidate after enormous social crises, they would have to be capable of the greatest hardness against themselves and guarantee the longest will'* ([Fragmente 1887-1889]. [11=W II 3. November 1887-März 1888], 11[31]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

And for this coming age, Nietzsche calls for humans who would possess cheerfulness, patience, simplicity, and contempt for great vanities just as much as magnanimity in victory and indulgence towards the small vanities of all the vanquished, for humans accustomed and secure in commanding and equally ready to obey, when necessary, proud in both, equally serving their own cause, more endangered humans, more fruitful humans, happier humans! For: *'... the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is, to live dangerously! Build your*

cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and possessors, you seekers of knowledge!

The time would come when knowledge and power ally, when the knowers would simultaneously be the rulers (see *The Gay Science*, Book 4, 283) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2001).

These coming leaders live a new love: *'... there is a slavish love which submits and gives itself away: which idealizes and deceives itself, there is a divine love which despises and loves and reshapes and elevates the beloved'* ([Fragmente 1884-1885], [25=W I 1. Frühjahr 1884], 25[335]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

The coming rulers will realize heroic realism and *'not first seek a reason behind the stars to go under and to be a sacrifice'* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, First part, Zarathustra's Prologue, 4) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 2006).

The Lords of the Earth: *'... a new, tremendous aristocracy, built on the harshest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be made to endure for millennia'*.

'... a higher type of humans who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, wealth and influence, use democratic Europe as their most pliable and mobile tool, to take the destinies of the Earth into their hands, to shape the 'human' itself as artists' ([Fragmente 1885-1887], [2=W I 8. Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886], 2[57]) (F. Nietzsche, 2016).

He names three types of artists:

1. The self-shaping one,
2. The previous artists, as *'the small perfectors of a material'*...
3. The highest artist, the human-shaping artist (The Will to Power, Fourth Book. Discipline and breeding, IV. The

Will to power in Art, 795, Vol. 15, 1st Ed.) (F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

The future rulers are the *'humans of the future, who in the present tie the constraint and knot that forces the will of millennia onto new paths'*.

Thus, they become the shapers of history:

'To teach man the future of man as his will, as dependent on a human will, and to prepare great risks and collective experiments in discipline and breeding to put an end to that gruesome domination of nonsense and chance that has so far been called 'history', the nonsense of the 'greatest number' is only its last form, for that a new type of philosophers and commanders will be necessary someday, compared to whose image all that

has existed on earth of hidden, fearful and benevolent spirits might look pale and dwarfed. The image of such leaders is what hovers before our eyes' (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 6, We Scholars, Section 208. Vol. 12, 4th Ed.) (F. Nietzsche & Johnston, 2009a; F. W. Nietzsche *et al.*, 1909).

Nietzsche himself evolves from the 'Untimely One' of the first phase through the 'Free Spirit' of the crisis period to the 'lordly spirit', to the titanic political thinker. Likewise, his image of the highest human grows from 'genius' to 'overman', finally to 'Lord of the Earth', to the Great Politician, the heroic unity of knowledge and deed.

Nietzsche is the philosopher of life. Politics is the conscious shaping of life. He has affirmed this possibility through the liberation from 'revelation', 'world beyond', 'providence' etc. Politics is the shaping of reality. Nietzsche is the most glorious singer and glorifier of reality, the heroic realist.

When he admires the Greeks as political humans and their state instinct, then the related Nordic-Germanic blood speaks.

Because he affirms life, he demands the greatest politics; because he loves reality, he calls for the great rulers of reality. His realm is of 'this' world!

Nietzsche wants the political world-feeling, the leadership of the Great Politician; he ignites: the primacy of the political.

XVI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Nietzsche has shattered the idols of the past. What can no longer justify itself before him is endangered. What withstands his criticism lives on, doubly justified. His judgments are of brilliant clarity and foresight. But a distressing tension, dangerous sensibility, and icy isolation sometimes force him away from political reality, into unhealthy exaggerations.

As the greatest opponent of the 19th century, he fights against the Second Reich. Ruthlessly, unblinded by external successes, he points to the bourgeois cultural corruption, to the Christian-patriotic and liberal-Marxist compromise. Yet his overly bold European conception prevents a fair appreciation of Bismarck's deed.

From the beginning, he stands in sharpest attack against liberalism, Marxism, and egalitarian democracy. Against open and disguised pacifism, he opposes the ethics of struggle, the affirmation of war, the will to power.

It belongs to the greatest in Nietzsche's world of thought how he brilliantly anticipates the recognition of the racial conditionality of all values. Yet he no longer comes to positive consequences. He considers the

bastardization of Europe unstoppable and hopes for a new ruling 'race'. This has a fatal effect on his entire political thinking. Only in the depth of valuation is his racial instinct unerring.

The assumption of inevitable racial mixing leads him to advocate Jewish assimilation. He also does not do justice to contemporary anti-Semitism. But where he recognizes the Jewish in terms of values, he raises the uncanniest accusation against the Jews, the tremendous protest against two thousand years of race destruction and value falsification.

Since Plato, no philosopher has been a racial hygienist with higher seriousness than Nietzsche. While his philosophy destroys all illusions about the meaning and purpose of existence, he posits the breeding and cultivation of higher humans as the real task of human life. However, he is unable to define this task more concretely as the enhancement of the people within their natural dispositions; his elevation remains generally human, as he lacks the organic concept of the people.

Despite all attempts, he finds no positive relationship to the people. The assumption of unstoppable racial mixing forces him to reckon with the overcoming of peoples and nations. Thus, he becomes an opponent not only of formal, but also of *völkisch* nationalism.

In all epochs of his life, he wrestles with the essence of the German. He criticizes, even opposes, German national weaknesses and the contemporary 'German' with a ruthlessness like hardly any great German before him. Nevertheless, until the end, he believes with the highest hopes in the Germanic fundamental values of the Germans.

Amidst the patriotic dynasticism of his time, he demands Europe as a unity. History has refuted his concrete expectations. His claim to Nordic-Germanic leadership in world politics remains future-pointing.

Nietzsche sharply negates the atrophied type of state, the state as an institution, the institution as an end in itself. Opposite to this stand glorious affirmations of the Greek state. He only reaches beginnings for the state of the future because he lacks the content, because he lacks the people. But he presupposes the genuine state as a 'rank order' and 'dominion structure'.

Nietzsche is not an individualist. But also, not a *völkisch* socialist. The exaggeration of the 'great individual' and the lack of an organic concept of the people lead him to a means-end relationship between rulers and ruled, to an extreme aristocracy.

Against illusory world and life-flight, he teaches heroic life-affirmation, mastery of reality, and

thus arrives at the demand for Grand Politics and the leadership of the Great Politician.

Thus, Nietzsche's political thoughts are essentially reducible to:

1. The exaggeration of the 'great individuals', underestimation of the other strata of the people.
2. False assumption of inevitable racial mixings.
3. Sharpest emphasis on the natural difference in value of humans.
4. Affirmation of reality, ethics of struggle.
5. Enhancement of life as life's task.
6. Affirmation of Germanic values, negation of Jewish values.

It should be noted that the inner affinity of Nietzsche with National Socialism is greater than his previous political-historical impact on National Socialism. The ideological kinship does not yet prove the contemporary effect. There always remains the gap between idea and realization, knowledge and deed. All intellectual commonality recedes in the face of the merit of realization, the National Socialist deed.

Nietzsche's political insights are powerful. However, his true significance lies less in the political-concrete, but in the world-view-value realm; he is the greatest poet and revaluator of our time (In concrete politics, Lagarde, Langbehn, and Chamberlain are partly closer to us).

But just as part of his political judgments are fragments of National Socialism, so are his philosophical creations building blocks of a coming National Socialist philosophy. Therefore, I believe that in future impact Nietzsche will surpass all intellectual forerunners of National Socialism.

Yet let us never forget that all these intellectual roots would have been cut off and that only the National Socialist Revolution created the prerequisites for the continued life of this tradition. Perhaps Nietzsche too would have struggled in vain, had not the man come from the World War, the philosopher from the trenches, the thinker and doer: Adolf Hitler.

Nietzsche stands in the dawn of the 20th century. In uncertain lines, yet in the color glow of the visionary, he sees the emerging age. We stand in the strength of the morning. Around us it has become cooler but also brighter, and with clear goals we march into the National Socialist future.

And this future will also be the future of Nietzsche!

XVII. Original Bibliography: Eliminated. If interested, use the original edition.

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